Compatibilism: What's that About?

[steve_bank]

Random does not equate to free will. Determined does not equate to free will. The term "free will" simply does not apply....therefore a semantic construct.

Then again, random and determined are also semantic constructs. Every word and concept is.

Philosophizing without a knowledge of math and science. Math and scince exist in te brain as thoughts and concepts. That does not men tere is no semnatc difference between terms.

Random has a specific definition in proximity. The occurrence of one event does not affect the occurrence of the next evet, there is no correlation between random variables.

I did this stuff waaaayyy back when going through statistics. Just flip a coin or toss a die 100 times and write down the results.

 

[DBT]

Random does not equate to free will. Determined does not equate to free will. The term "free will" simply does not apply....therefore a semantic construct.

Then again, random and determined are also semantic constructs. Every word and concept is.

The words random and determined refer to conditions in the world: how the world works, how it's objects and events interact.

Compatibilism selects a slice of how the world works deterministically and declares this slice of determined behaviour to be an example of free will.

 

[Jarhyn]

It kills the possibility of "having done differently". But compatibilism does not place "having done differently" as the meter of "free will".

Rather, it places free will as a function of executive contribution in a different consideration of the model of ethics: free will is not the ability to do differently in this framework, but rather the ability to, of various probabilistic outcomes arising from imperfection of physical mode, having available a means to compare and contrast what would happen, probably, "if A" versus "if !A"

Choosing then is a function of whether (then, of 'if->then") from the relationship is (down/towards goal) or (not down/towards goal). It is a function of simulation and assumption based on model.

There was, given the consideration, a single choice made on the basis of factors. Could the graph have chosen differently? No. No more than f(x)=1+X has any choice of grinding out 2 given x=1.

Really, free will becomes an element of the discussion of executive function, which is to say "in the reference frame of an event, what is the executive agency?"

Choosing is a deterministic operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and, based on that evaluation, outputs a single choice. The operation is deterministic because the output is a reliable result of our own purposes and reasons, our own thoughts and feelings, our own beliefs and values, our own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences, and any other things that make us uniquely us. So, the choice is not only reliably caused, but it is reliably caused by us.

The "ability to do otherwise" is built into the choosing operation. For example, suppose we need to decide between A and B. In order for the choosing operation to proceed, "I can choose A" must be true and "I can choose B" must also be true. If either of those are false, then choosing cannot proceed. For example, if "I can choose A" is false then we would simply do B, without any choosing. And, if "I can choose B" is false, then we would simply do A. So, before we can get to the comparative evaluation phase of the operation, both "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" must be true, by logical necessity (they are required by the operation).

Whenever "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" are both true, then I have the "ability to do otherwise".

Suppose the result of the comparison is that I choose A. Then A becomes the thing I will do and B becomes the thing that I could have done, but didn't do. Why is "I could have done B" true? Because "I can choose B" was true earlier, and "could have" is just the past tense of "can".

So, as it turns out, in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, whenever a choosing operation shows up in the causal chain, "I could have done otherwise" is ALWAYS true. It is "I would have done otherwise" that is ALWAYS false.

It is an error to confuse "can" and "will". If something will happen, then it certainly will happen. But if something can happen, then it may happen, or, it may never happen. What "can" happen constrains what "will" happen, because if it cannot happen then it will not happen. But what will happen never constrains what can happen. What can happen is only constrained by the imagination.

Possibilities exist solely within the imagination. We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. We can only drive across an actual bridge. However, in order to build an actual bridge, we must first imagine one or more possible bridges.

The fact that a possibility will not happen does not make it an impossibility. It only makes it a possibility that never happened.

Except it doesn't actually have to be true that you can choose B to have chosen A.

Choice exists on a different level of abstraction from determinism.

You think about two things, there's a process which likes one or the other, and we call that force of descent against a surface of action "choice". It is when one agency deflects another as it draws down the surface of it's own behavior which modifies it's path, the path along this surface of which can be called "executive flow". Sometimes the forces that act on it deform the graph and so the shape of the surface that it moves "down" along. But this deformation still only provides one best path of least resistance in it's metaphorical fall.

The discussion of free will is on the extent of the graph's potential to self modify against deflections towards consistent "goals", and the "freedom" from inefficiencies associated with the need to do so.

That is how "free will", the freedom of the agent toward the goal from opposition, to achieve it, becomes "compatible".

But that only gets into the very first level of the meta.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It kills the possibility of "having done differently". But compatibilism does not place "having done differently" as the meter of "free will".

Rather, it places free will as a function of executive contribution in a different consideration of the model of ethics: free will is not the ability to do differently in this framework, but rather the ability to, of various probabilistic outcomes arising from imperfection of physical mode, having available a means to compare and contrast what would happen, probably, "if A" versus "if !A"

Choosing then is a function of whether (then, of 'if->then") from the relationship is (down/towards goal) or (not down/towards goal). It is a function of simulation and assumption based on model.

There was, given the consideration, a single choice made on the basis of factors. Could the graph have chosen differently? No. No more than f(x)=1+X has any choice of grinding out 2 given x=1.

Really, free will becomes an element of the discussion of executive function, which is to say "in the reference frame of an event, what is the executive agency?"

Choosing is a deterministic operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and, based on that evaluation, outputs a single choice. The operation is deterministic because the output is a reliable result of our own purposes and reasons, our own thoughts and feelings, our own beliefs and values, our own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences, and any other things that make us uniquely us. So, the choice is not only reliably caused, but it is reliably caused by us.

The "ability to do otherwise" is built into the choosing operation. For example, suppose we need to decide between A and B. In order for the choosing operation to proceed, "I can choose A" must be true and "I can choose B" must also be true. If either of those are false, then choosing cannot proceed. For example, if "I can choose A" is false then we would simply do B, without any choosing. And, if "I can choose B" is false, then we would simply do A. So, before we can get to the comparative evaluation phase of the operation, both "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" must be true, by logical necessity (they are required by the operation).

Whenever "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" are both true, then I have the "ability to do otherwise".

Suppose the result of the comparison is that I choose A. Then A becomes the thing I will do and B becomes the thing that I could have done, but didn't do. Why is "I could have done B" true? Because "I can choose B" was true earlier, and "could have" is just the past tense of "can".

So, as it turns out, in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, whenever a choosing operation shows up in the causal chain, "I could have done otherwise" is ALWAYS true. It is "I would have done otherwise" that is ALWAYS false.

It is an error to confuse "can" and "will". If something will happen, then it certainly will happen. But if something can happen, then it may happen, or, it may never happen. What "can" happen constrains what "will" happen, because if it cannot happen then it will not happen. But what will happen never constrains what can happen. What can happen is only constrained by the imagination.

Possibilities exist solely within the imagination. We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. We can only drive across an actual bridge. However, in order to build an actual bridge, we must first imagine one or more possible bridges.

The fact that a possibility will not happen does not make it an impossibility. It only makes it a possibility that never happened.

Except it doesn't actually have to be true that you can choose B to have chosen A.

Choice exists on a different level of abstraction from determinism.

You think about two things, there's a process which likes one or the other, and we call that force of descent against a surface of action "choice". It is when one agency deflects another as it draws down the surface of it's own behavior which modifies it's path, the path along this surface of which can be called "executive flow". Sometimes the forces that act on it deform the graph and so the shape of the surface that it moves "down" along. But this deformation still only provides one best path of least resistance in it's metaphorical fall.

The discussion of free will is on the extent of the graph's potential to self modify against deflections towards consistent "goals", and the "freedom" from inefficiencies associated with the need to do so.

That is how "free will", the freedom of the agent toward the goal from opposition, to achieve it, becomes "compatible".

But that only gets into the very first level of the meta.

That's an interesting metaphor. You've got gravity motivating the descent, obstacles causing resistance shaping the path, and the distortion of the graph like the bowling ball on the bed distorting space-time. Perhaps we could make this a little simpler?

Why not go with a standard description of choosing that everyone can understand:
(1) We encounter a problem or issue that requires us to make a decision before we can continue. Perhaps we've just been seated in a restaurant and we've picked up the menu. Unless we make a choice, we will go hungry tonight. The waiter assures us that we can choose any item on the menu. The chef has the ingredients to prepare any meal we order. We see several options that we like. Each of these options is a real possibility. And we can choose any one of them.
(2) We consider (a) the Steak dinner. Is it likely to satisfy our hunger and our tastes? Is it consistent with our dietary goals? Now we apply the same criteria to (b) the Lobster dinner, and finally to (c) the Chef's Salad.
(3) After these considerations, the Chef's salad seems better to us than the others. Our thoughts and feelings confirm that it is one we want the most.
(4) Our will, our specific intent for the immediate future, is now set.
(5) This intention then motivates and directs our subsequent actions: "I will have the Chef's Salad, please", we say to the waiter.
(6) After the meal, the waiter brings us the bill for the Chef's Salad, holding us responsible for ordering the Chef's Salad.

Now, just to avoid confusion, each of these events, (1) through (6), was causally necessary/inevitable from any prior point in eternity. We could easily put "It was causally necessary that ... " as a lead-in to every one of those events. In fact, assuming a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, we could always put that phrase in front of every event we describe. But why bother?

Universal causal necessity/inevitability never changes anything, not even free will. It is a background constant, as if it were on both sides of every equation and can be subtracted from both sides without affecting the result.

Except it doesn't actually have to be true that you can choose B to have chosen A.

I could not have "chosen" A without there being another real option. So, logically, it has to be true that I can choose B, in order to get to the next step, evaluation. I can choose A must be true. I can choose B must be true. This is the way "can" functions within the choosing operation. It is logically impossible to choose between a single possibility. For example:

Waiter (a hard determinist): "What will you have for dinner tonight, sir?"
Customer (hungry): "I don't know, what are my possibilities tonight?"
Waiter: "Sir, because we live in a deterministic universe, there can only be one possibility".
Customer (disappointed): "Oh. Okay. Then what is that possibility?"
Waiter (angry): "How would I know? I can't read your mind!"

We have evolved certain concepts to deal with uncertainty. When we do not know what will happen, we imagine what can happen, to prepare for what does happen.

The meaning of words is derived from their practical function. What we "can" do, we may do, or we may never do, we don't know yet. And that's the uncertainty that we must resolve with the choosing operation. At the end of choosing we have certainty. We know what we will do. And we also know for certain what we could have done, but didn't do. The "could have done" is just as certain as the "will do".

You suggest that the graph needs to "self-modify". Well, empirically speaking, the brain is in a continuous process of self-modification. And each of these modifications will be causally necessary/inevitable from any prior point in time.

Free will is a deterministic event. There is perfectly reliable causation leading up to the point where we are faced with an issue that requires us to make a decision. Within the choosing operation each step is also reliably caused by prior mental events. The choosing operation is where we exercise executive control, because the choice determines our actions. Our actions reliably cause what comes next (our agency). And perfectly reliable causation continues as events caused by our actions reliably follow. As the song says, "May the chain be unbroken", and it is.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The only true freedom within a determined system would be the possibility to have done otherwise within any moment in time. But of course determinism does no allow multiple selections at any moment in time, and this essentially kills the possibility of free will.

Feelings can be deceptive. We simply have ''will.''

Will is not free.

The bolded has been my largest objection to determinism, and also why I end up pretty waffly on compatibilism. Determinism and agency are at odds with one another unless determinism gets redefined to allow for stochasticism.

I think a stochastic existence can be compatible with agency, but I don't think that a deterministic existence can be. That's why a lot of my arguments end up based not on the endless argument over what 'will' is and whether it's 'free' or what extent of 'freedom' it has... but on whether or not the assumption of determinism makes sense in the first place.

As a compatibilist, I would suggest that determinism and agency are compatible. For example, if my choice was causally necessary/inevitable, then it was also causally necessary/inevitable that I would be the single object in the universe that would perform the choosing, and it was also causally necessary/inevitable that my choice would be controlled by my own purposes and reasons, my own beliefs and values, my own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences, in short, everything that makes me "me". And if that-which-is-me is the same as that-which-chooses what happens next, then clearly I have agency.

Stochasticism is also deterministic (I expect you to dismiss this out of hand). "There are many possible futures" is consistent with "there will only be one actual future". Possibilities exist solely within the imagination, and we can have as many possible futures as we can imagine. But, there will be only one actual future, because, after all, we only have one past to put it in. Stochasticism results from our inability to predict what will happen, without using sampling and statistical methods. We cannot predict what will happen, but we can predict and graph the range and probabilities.

Within the domain of human influence (things we can make happen if we choose to), the single inevitable future will be chosen by us from among the many possible futures that we imagine.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It kills the possibility of "having done differently". But compatibilism does not place "having done differently" as the meter of "free will".

Rather, it places free will as a function of executive contribution in a different consideration of the model of ethics: free will is not the ability to do differently in this framework, but rather the ability to, of various probabilistic outcomes arising from imperfection of physical mode, having available a means to compare and contrast what would happen, probably, "if A" versus "if !A"

Choosing then is a function of whether (then, of 'if->then") from the relationship is (down/towards goal) or (not down/towards goal). It is a function of simulation and assumption based on model.

There was, given the consideration, a single choice made on the basis of factors. Could the graph have chosen differently? No. No more than f(x)=1+X has any choice of grinding out 2 given x=1.

Really, free will becomes an element of the discussion of executive function, which is to say "in the reference frame of an event, what is the executive agency?"

Choosing is a deterministic operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and, based on that evaluation, outputs a single choice. The operation is deterministic because the output is a reliable result of our own purposes and reasons, our own thoughts and feelings, our own beliefs and values, our own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences, and any other things that make us uniquely us. So, the choice is not only reliably caused, but it is reliably caused by us.

The "ability to do otherwise" is built into the choosing operation. For example, suppose we need to decide between A and B. In order for the choosing operation to proceed, "I can choose A" must be true and "I can choose B" must also be true. If either of those are false, then choosing cannot proceed. For example, if "I can choose A" is false then we would simply do B, without any choosing. And, if "I can choose B" is false, then we would simply do A. So, before we can get to the comparative evaluation phase of the operation, both "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" must be true, by logical necessity (they are required by the operation).

Whenever "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" are both true, then I have the "ability to do otherwise".

Suppose the result of the comparison is that I choose A. Then A becomes the thing I will do and B becomes the thing that I could have done, but didn't do. Why is "I could have done B" true? Because "I can choose B" was true earlier, and "could have" is just the past tense of "can".

So, as it turns out, in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, whenever a choosing operation shows up in the causal chain, "I could have done otherwise" is ALWAYS true. It is "I would have done otherwise" that is ALWAYS false.

It is an error to confuse "can" and "will". If something will happen, then it certainly will happen. But if something can happen, then it may happen, or, it may never happen. What "can" happen constrains what "will" happen, because if it cannot happen then it will not happen. But what will happen never constrains what can happen. What can happen is only constrained by the imagination.

Possibilities exist solely within the imagination. We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. We can only drive across an actual bridge. However, in order to build an actual bridge, we must first imagine one or more possible bridges.

The fact that a possibility will not happen does not make it an impossibility. It only makes it a possibility that never happened.

OK, preform the basic function of your assessment.
Use your imagination..
Put it out there, perform a physics motion test.
Produce a possibility that will not happen.

Okay. It is possible that I could answer that question. Let me know when it happens.

 

[Jarhyn]

Except it doesn't actually have to be true that you can choose B to have chosen A.

Choice exists on a different level of abstraction from determinism.

You think about two things, there's a process which likes one or the other, and we call that force of descent against a surface of action "choice". It is when one agency deflects another as it draws down the surface of it's own behavior which modifies it's path, the path along this surface of which can be called "executive flow". Sometimes the forces that act on it deform the graph and so the shape of the surface that it moves "down" along. But this deformation still only provides one best path of least resistance in it's metaphorical fall.

The discussion of free will is on the extent of the graph's potential to self modify against deflections towards consistent "goals", and the "freedom" from inefficiencies associated with the need to do so.

That is how "free will", the freedom of the agent toward the goal from opposition, to achieve it, becomes "compatible".

But that only gets into the very first level of the meta.

That's an interesting metaphor.

the craziest thing is that it is not entirely metaphor. This is why I keep wanting you lot to look more at the perceptron, because one of the important things to understand in research of neural systems is the concept of the "error surface". It's a mathematical structure in a non-cartesian space.

You've got gravity motivating the descent, obstacles causing resistance shaping the path, and the distortion of the graph like the bowling ball on the bed distorting space-time. Perhaps we could make this a little simpler?

Why not go with a standard description of choosing that everyone can understand:
(1) We encounter a problem or issue that requires us to make a decision before we can continue. Perhaps we've just been seated in a restaurant and we've picked up the menu. Unless we make a choice, we will go hungry tonight. The waiter assures us that we can choose any item on the menu. The chef has the ingredients to prepare any meal we order. We see several options that we like. Each of these options is a real possibility. And we can choose any one of them.
(2) We consider (a) the Steak dinner. Is it likely to satisfy our hunger and our tastes? Is it consistent with our dietary goals? Now we apply the same criteria to (b) the Lobster dinner, and finally to (c) the Chef's Salad.
(3) After these considerations, the Chef's salad seems better to us than the others. Our thoughts and feelings confirm that it is one we want the most.
(4) Our will, our specific intent for the immediate future, is now set.
(5) This intention then motivates and directs our subsequent actions: "I will have the Chef's Salad, please", we say to the waiter.
(6) After the meal, the waiter brings us the bill for the Chef's Salad, holding us responsible for ordering the Chef's Salad.

Now, just to avoid confusion, each of these events, (1) through (6), was causally necessary/inevitable from any prior point in eternity. We could easily put "It was causally necessary that ... " as a lead-in to every one of those events. In fact, assuming a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, we could always put that phrase in front of every event we describe. But why bother?

Universal causal necessity/inevitability never changes anything, not even free will. It is a background constant, as if it were on both sides of every equation and can be subtracted from both sides without affecting the result.

Except it doesn't actually have to be true that you can choose B to have chosen A.

I could not have "chosen" A without there being another real option. So, logically, it has to be true that I can choose B, in order to get to the next step, evaluation. I can choose A must be true. I can choose B must be true. This is the way "can" functions within the choosing operation. It is logically impossible to choose between a single possibility. For example:

Waiter (a hard determinist): "What will you have for dinner tonight, sir?"
Customer (hungry): "I don't know, what are my possibilities tonight?"
Waiter: "Sir, because we live in a deterministic universe, there can only be one possibility".
Customer (disappointed): "Oh. Okay. Then what is that possibility?"
Waiter (angry): "How would I know? I can't read your mind!"

We have evolved certain concepts to deal with uncertainty. When we do not know what will happen, we imagine what can happen, to prepare for what does happen.

The meaning of words is derived from their practical function. What we "can" do, we may do, or we may never do, we don't know yet. And that's the uncertainty that we must resolve with the choosing operation. At the end of choosing we have certainty. We know what we will do. And we also know for certain what we could have done, but didn't do. The "could have done" is just as certain as the "will do".

You suggest that the graph needs to "self-modify". Well, empirically speaking, the brain is in a continuous process of self-modification. And each of these modifications will be causally necessary/inevitable from any prior point in time.

Free will is a deterministic event. There is perfectly reliable causation leading up to the point where we are faced with an issue that requires us to make a decision. Within the choosing operation each step is also reliably caused by prior mental events. The choosing operation is where we exercise executive control, because the choice determines our actions. Our actions reliably cause what comes next (our agency). And perfectly reliable causation continues as events caused by our actions reliably follow. As the song says, "May the chain be unbroken", and it is.

I'm thinking we are saying similar things. I'm just trying to be a bit formal about why free will is so far from determinism in the framework, determinism being discussions of molecules and atom's and quarks, and free will being discussion of the strategies of self-modifying agents.

 

[none]

OK, preform the basic function of your assessment.
Use your imagination..
Put it out there, perform a physics motion test.
Produce a possibility that will not happen.

Okay. It is possible that I could answer that question. Let me know when it happens.

Is not a question.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

the craziest thing is that it is not entirely metaphor. This is why I keep wanting you lot to look more at the perceptron, because one of the important things to understand in research of neural systems is the concept of the "error surface". It's a mathematical structure in a non-cartesian space.

You've got gravity motivating the descent, obstacles causing resistance shaping the path, and the distortion of the graph like the bowling ball on the bed distorting space-time. Perhaps we could make this a little simpler?

Why not go with a standard description of choosing that everyone can understand:
(1) We encounter a problem or issue that requires us to make a decision before we can continue. Perhaps we've just been seated in a restaurant and we've picked up the menu. Unless we make a choice, we will go hungry tonight. The waiter assures us that we can choose any item on the menu. The chef has the ingredients to prepare any meal we order. We see several options that we like. Each of these options is a real possibility. And we can choose any one of them.
(2) We consider (a) the Steak dinner. Is it likely to satisfy our hunger and our tastes? Is it consistent with our dietary goals? Now we apply the same criteria to (b) the Lobster dinner, and finally to (c) the Chef's Salad.
(3) After these considerations, the Chef's salad seems better to us than the others. Our thoughts and feelings confirm that it is one we want the most.
(4) Our will, our specific intent for the immediate future, is now set.
(5) This intention then motivates and directs our subsequent actions: "I will have the Chef's Salad, please", we say to the waiter.
(6) After the meal, the waiter brings us the bill for the Chef's Salad, holding us responsible for ordering the Chef's Salad.

Now, just to avoid confusion, each of these events, (1) through (6), was causally necessary/inevitable from any prior point in eternity. We could easily put "It was causally necessary that ... " as a lead-in to every one of those events. In fact, assuming a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, we could always put that phrase in front of every event we describe. But why bother?

Universal causal necessity/inevitability never changes anything, not even free will. It is a background constant, as if it were on both sides of every equation and can be subtracted from both sides without affecting the result.

Except it doesn't actually have to be true that you can choose B to have chosen A.

I could not have "chosen" A without there being another real option. So, logically, it has to be true that I can choose B, in order to get to the next step, evaluation. I can choose A must be true. I can choose B must be true. This is the way "can" functions within the choosing operation. It is logically impossible to choose between a single possibility. For example:

Waiter (a hard determinist): "What will you have for dinner tonight, sir?"
Customer (hungry): "I don't know, what are my possibilities tonight?"
Waiter: "Sir, because we live in a deterministic universe, there can only be one possibility".
Customer (disappointed): "Oh. Okay. Then what is that possibility?"
Waiter (angry): "How would I know? I can't read your mind!"

We have evolved certain concepts to deal with uncertainty. When we do not know what will happen, we imagine what can happen, to prepare for what does happen.

The meaning of words is derived from their practical function. What we "can" do, we may do, or we may never do, we don't know yet. And that's the uncertainty that we must resolve with the choosing operation. At the end of choosing we have certainty. We know what we will do. And we also know for certain what we could have done, but didn't do. The "could have done" is just as certain as the "will do".

You suggest that the graph needs to "self-modify". Well, empirically speaking, the brain is in a continuous process of self-modification. And each of these modifications will be causally necessary/inevitable from any prior point in time.

Free will is a deterministic event. There is perfectly reliable causation leading up to the point where we are faced with an issue that requires us to make a decision. Within the choosing operation each step is also reliably caused by prior mental events. The choosing operation is where we exercise executive control, because the choice determines our actions. Our actions reliably cause what comes next (our agency). And perfectly reliable causation continues as events caused by our actions reliably follow. As the song says, "May the chain be unbroken", and it is.

I'm thinking we are saying similar things. I'm just trying to be a bit formal about why free will is so far from determinism in the framework, determinism being discussions of molecules and atom's and quarks, and free will being discussion of the strategies of self-modifying agents.

Determinism is not limited to atoms and molecules.

There are at least three distinct causal mechanisms: physical (inanimate objects), biological (living organisms), and rational (intelligent species). All three are causally deterministic, offering theoretically perfect predictability, but often impossible to predict in practice. But, we may assume that each operates with perfect cause and effect within its own realm. And that allows us to assert that every event is reliably caused by some specific combination of these reliable mechanisms, such that determinism holds.

The rational causal mechanism uses the brains model of reality to imagine new possibilities, estimate the likely outcomes of our actions, and choose what we will do. The rational mechanism is distinctly different from physical forces and biological drives. But since it utilizes logic and calculation, we may say that the choices will be reliably caused, even when they are reliably wrong choices, calculated from bad information, and with bad logic. The errors will also be reliably caused and theoretically predictable.

Free will shows up in the rational causal mechanism of the choosing operation. Now, we presume that this rational processing is running upon the physical and biological infrastructure. And injuries to the infrastructure can also impair our ability to choose rationally.

Free will is deterministic because the choosing operation is deterministic. But, then again, everything is deterministic, so it's not really a significant fact. I think I mentioned to DBT that universal causal necessity/inevitability is the grandest of all trivialities. It is a logical fact, but not a meaningful or relevant fact. It was summed up by Doris Day when she sang "Que sera, sera. Whatever will be, will be". Not very helpful or useful information.

Universal causal necessity/inevitability does not change anything. It has no significant implications to any human scenario.

I've explained how free will retains its operational definition (a choice free of coercion and undue influence) even within a perfectly deterministic universe. Universal causal necessity/inevitability is not something that anyone can, or needs to be "free from". It is nothing more than a derivation from the simple notion of reliable cause and effect, something that we all take for granted every day. We know that our choices are caused. And we know that the most meaningful and relevant causes are within us. And we know that it is actually we, ourselves, that are performing the choosing, to suit our own purposes and interests.

 

[DBT]

The only true freedom within a determined system would be the possibility to have done otherwise within any moment in time. But of course determinism does no allow multiple selections at any moment in time, and this essentially kills the possibility of free will.

Feelings can be deceptive. We simply have ''will.''

Will is not free.

The bolded has been my largest objection to determinism, and also why I end up pretty waffly on compatibilism. Determinism and agency are at odds with one another unless determinism gets redefined to allow for stochasticism.

I think a stochastic existence can be compatible with agency, but I don't think that a deterministic existence can be. That's why a lot of my arguments end up based not on the endless argument over what 'will' is and whether it's 'free' or what extent of 'freedom' it has... but on whether or not the assumption of determinism makes sense in the first place.

That's right. But then non determinism doesn't help support a case for free will either. Random or probabilistic events are no more subject to will than those that are determined, random events simply act upon the system, brain or whatever, in random ways....you start to do this, suddenly you find that you don't know what you are doing.

 

[DBT]

It makes no difference if "'freedom' is exercised before awareness" as noted in your excerpt from the abstract. If the choice is made unconsciously, and then presented to awareness as a dinner already cooked, then the choosing is still being performed by that same brain. And the only explanation we have for the choice is how it is described by the conscious experience of events, the part of the brain that Michael Gazzaniga calls the "interpreter", the part that explains our behavior to ourselves and others.

So, if deciding what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, is happening consciously or unconsciously, it makes no difference. Free will is not freedom from one's own brain. That's an impossible freedom. Free will is a question of whether the decision making performed by that brain is free of coercion and undue influence.

As the abstract notes, neuroscience is studying how volition works. Volition is will. Will is chosen. Hopefully, neuroscience will continue to increase our understanding of how the brain performs this function. But explaining how something works does not "explain it away", it simply explains how it works.

The notion of "free will" references both internal (mental health) and external (coercion) influences upon our process of choosing what we will do. The neuroscientist provides information to the psychiatrist as to any physical causes behind a mental illness. The psychiatrist addresses mental illness due to both physical and psychological factors.

In any case, free will remains what it has always been, choosing what we will do when free of coercion and undue influence.

But within a deterministic system there is no actual ''freedom is exercised before awareness'' either. Some use that figure of speech to convey the meaning that the results are determined before awareness, that it is not consciousness itself that processes information and produces response.

Freedom simply means the attributes and abilities of a brain to perform its function according to architecture, inputs and memory.

The same freedom that a planet orbits a star, water cascades down a gorge, the same freedom that trees grow and birds fly.... abilities that have nothing to do with 'will' or 'free will.'


For compatibilism to select behaviour that is uncoerced, unforced, and call this an example of 'free will' fails for that reason.

The only true freedom within a determined system would be the possibility to have done otherwise within any moment in time. But of course determinism does no allow multiple selections at any moment in time, and this essentially kills the possibility of free will.

Feelings can be deceptive. We simply have ''will.''

Will is not free.

It kills the possibility of "having done differently". But compatibilism does not place "having done differently" as the meter of "free will".

I know it doesn't. That is the incompatibilist objection to compatibilism, that without the ability to choose otherwise. Basically, that the term 'free will' is a misnomer. That compatibilists have it wrong.

 

[DBT]

If the whole picture of cognition is considered, it must include inputs.

Nobody denies the role of input. That is what I have been pointing out, that there is no single factor like 'free will' at work, that brain output/behaviour is based on a number of factors, brain architecture and state (someone may be drunk, a chemical imbalance, lesion etc) inputs interacting with memory and so on....memory function (if severe) disintegrates consciousness, loss of recognition, loss of self awareness.




It's not a matter of ''finally'' - not everything can be said in a limited time frame. The role of each function can be explored in detail if need be;

As an outline of the systems of the brain and their functions:

perceptual processing
• Superior colliculus

Modulation of cognition
(memory, attention)
• Cingulate cortex
• Hippocampus
• Basal forebrain

Representation of emotional response
• Somatosensory-related
cortices

Representation of perceived action
• Left frontal operculum
• Superior temporal gyrus

Motivational evaluation
• Amygdala
• Orbitofrontal cortex

Social reasoning
• Prefrontal cortex




As can any sufficiently complex information processor. Not as a matter of free will, just function enabled by architecture; the ability to acquire information, process it and proceed with an action based on a given set of criteria/algorithms.

No free will needed.

''I don't think "free will" is a very sensible concept, and you don't need neuroscience to reject it -- any mechanistic view of the world is good enough, and indeed you could even argue on purely conceptual grounds that the opposite of determinism is randomness, not free will! Most thoughtful neuroscientists I know have replaced the concept of free will with the concept of rationality -- that we select our actions based on a kind of practical reasoning. And there is no conflict between rationality and the mind as a physical system -- After all, computers are rational physical systems! - Martha Farah, director of the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Cognitive Neuroscience and a prominent neuroethicist.

Okay, so now we have all the primary functions of the brain. We've got the sensory processing that organizes external input into a model of reality. We've got decision-making and planning parts that evaluate that model, imagines what we might do next, and then chooses the specific plan for what we will do. And finally we've got the motor management parts that enable our bodies to carry out our deliberately chosen will.

And, assuming all of these parts are reliable, in good working order, we now have all we need to deal with practical real world issues. We can consider our options and then carry out what we, ourselves, have deliberately decided we will do.

Then Martha Farah asks us us to replace the notion of "free will" with the notion of "rationality", pointing out "that we select our actions based on a kind of practical reasoning", and assuring us that "there is no conflict between rationality and the mind as a physical system".

Well, Ms. Farah, we're not quite done with the notion of "free will" yet. We still have the practical problems that arise when that rational system is subjected to coercion and other forms of undue influence. We must still distinguish the deliberate choice of a rational mind, from a choice being forced upon us by a guy with a gun. And we must take into account any significant mental illness or injury that renders the normally rational mind irrational.

Free will is when someone decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. This is the definition we use when assigning moral or legal responsibility for a person's actions. It informs us of the meaningful and relevant cause of the action, so that we know what we need to do to correct actions that break the law. Do we correct the behavior by psychiatric treatment or by rehabilitation? Or, is the behavior corrected by simply removing the guy with the gun who coerced the behavior?

Free will, when properly defined, remains a key concept that makes significant distinctions about events in the real world. And it has no issues with the mind as a physical system.

Taking the characters, actions and events we see in a video as an example, let's say Romeo and Juliet - a compatibilist apparently, upon seeing Romeo and Juliet come together in a passionate embrace and kiss - to all appearances of their own choosing, their actions unimpeded and uncoerced - declares this to be an example of free will....never mind that we can rewind and play the same scenes over and over without variation, the characters doing precisely what the material/information they are composed of determines.

If determinism is true, it allows us no more freedom of will than what we see in the characters of a video or film.....rewind and play, it comes out the same; each moment in time fixed as a matter of natural law. The World unfolding as it must.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The only true freedom within a determined system would be the possibility to have done otherwise within any moment in time. But of course determinism does no allow multiple selections at any moment in time, and this essentially kills the possibility of free will.

Feelings can be deceptive. We simply have ''will.''

Will is not free.

The bolded has been my largest objection to determinism, and also why I end up pretty waffly on compatibilism. Determinism and agency are at odds with one another unless determinism gets redefined to allow for stochasticism.

I think a stochastic existence can be compatible with agency, but I don't think that a deterministic existence can be. That's why a lot of my arguments end up based not on the endless argument over what 'will' is and whether it's 'free' or what extent of 'freedom' it has... but on whether or not the assumption of determinism makes sense in the first place.

That's right. But then non determinism doesn't help support a case for free will either. Random or probabilistic events are no more subject to will than those that are determined, random events simply act upon the system, brain or whatever, in random ways....you start to do this, suddenly you find that you don't know what you are doing.

I'm afraid I have to agree with DBT on this one. If we ask someone "Why did you chose A instead of B?", they will happily list the reasons why A was the better choice. If we follow up with "So, those reasons caused you to choose A?", they will say "Yes, that's right". So, the choice was indeed reliably caused, and reliably caused by the chooser. (The chooser was in turn reliably caused by their parents. Their parents were reliably caused by the evolution of the human species, etc. etc. all the way back to the Big Bang, but that's an interesting but totally pointless fact that an intelligent mind simply acknowledges and then never brings it up again).

The fact that the chooser's own reasoning was the most meaningful and relevant cause of the choice, and that the choice was neither coerced nor unduly influenced, is what most people outside of philosophy would call a "choice of their own free will", which is literally nothing more than a "freely chosen 'I will'".

So, we know that the choice was reliably caused by human reasoning and we know who performed the reasoning. So, if the chosen action unnecessarily harms someone else, we know whose future choices need to be corrected by our intervention. And that is what "holding responsible" is about, identifying the meaningful and relevant cause(s) so that we know what needs to be corrected by intervention.

The key point is that, if our thoughts were truly random, then our choices would be irrational. We would have no ability to perform choosing, or anything else that requires rational thought. Thus our freedom is diminished rather than improved.

 

[Bomb#20]

The only way for the game to be consistent with t = 0 natural law statement is for the game to permit both forward and backward reference for all time. Stacking deck is not an example of determinism statement. Provide a game that works both ways and I'll bet my assertion works.

Conway's life game isn't an example of anything relevant to determinism discussion.

Possibly; but we don't actually know that the natural laws of the universe work both ways. We tend to assume they do because the equations of Newtonian mechanics and the "Standard Model" of quantum mechanics are time-symmetric. But there are anomalies in kaon decay experiments that suggest the Standard Model may be in need of some modification; and let's not forget gravity. General Relativity isn't time-symmetric. If you drop one black hole into another, according to Einstein's equations they merge to form a bigger black hole; and this is irreversible. There's no process by which a black hole can spontaneously split in two. So any philosophizing about time symmetry is premature -- as with many other questions about the universe, we really need to suspend judgment until somebody comes up with a working theory of quantum gravity.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

...

Taking the characters, actions and events we see in a video as an example, let's say Romeo and Juliet - a compatibilist apparently, upon seeing Romeo and Juliet come together in a passionate embrace and kiss - to all appearances of their own choosing, their actions unimpeded and uncoerced - declares this to be an example of free will....never mind that we can rewind and play the same scenes over and over without variation, the characters doing precisely what the material/information they are composed of determines.

If determinism is true, it allows us no more freedom of will than what we see in the characters of a video or film.....rewind and play, it comes out the same; each moment in time fixed as a matter of natural law. The World unfolding as it must.

Romeo: "I can climb up to the balcony and give Juliet a kiss. Or, I can stay here on the ground and throw her a kiss. If I climb up then others might hear us and I would have to fight my way out."

Romeo has two real possibilities, two different things that he can choose to do. But he doesn't know yet what he will do.

Romeo: "I will take the risk and climb to the balcony, because her kiss is worth the risk". (Hey, it's on his list of the best things in life, according to Hall and Oates).

Romeo has made his choice He will climb to the balcony. Could he have chosen otherwise? Well, yes. He could have stayed on the ground and thrown her a kiss. But he didn't.

So, at the end of his choosing, he knew for certain what he would do, and he also knew for certain what he could have done instead.

Scene!

Okay, rewind the film and let's give it another look. Sure enough, everything is exactly the same. He starts with two things that he "can" do and ends up with one thing that he "will" do and one thing that he "could have done" but didn't.

No matter how many times we replay the film, what he would do and what he could have done remain the same.

And that's the way all choosing operations work. There is uncertainty at the outset about what we will do. "Will I climb the balcony or will I throw her a kiss?" We do not know which will be true. So, in order to proceed, we use a special token, the word "can", to replace the word "will". This marks each option as a possibility, something that may happen, but then again it may never happen. These concepts of "can" and "possibility" evolved specifically to operate in the context of uncertainty, when we do not know yet what "will" happen or what we "will" do.

As a result, every choosing operation always begins with at least two "I can's". And every choosing operation ends with exactly one "I will" and at least one "I could have, but didn't".

So, as it turns out, whenever a choosing operation appears in a causal chain, "I could have done otherwise" will always be true, but "I would have done otherwise" will always be false.

 

[Keith&Co.]

I'm afraid I have to agree with DBT on this one. If we ask someone "Why did you chose A instead of B?", they will happily list the reasons why A was the better choice. If we follow up with "So, those reasons caused you to choose A?", they will say "Yes, that's right". So, the choice was indeed reliably caused, and reliably caused by the chooser.

Maybe.
Thing is, you can hypnotize someone and suggest to them that every time they hear a bell they shout "Excelsior!" Then ring a bell. They will shout "Excelsior!"
You ask them why they shouted that.
THE ACTUAL REASON is because they were programmed to do this at a deep level of their subconscious. But they will happily explain, inventing a logic chain going from bell to yell, happily satisfied that it was a choice they made and decided to do. To the subject, there's no difference between the choice to shout or the choice to go see a hypnotist tonight.

This suggests that maybe our process of 'deciding' something is not real, it happens after the fact. The decision is already made (by us? FOR us? No way of knowing.) and our consciousness exerts itself only to rationalize the decision we are merely a vector for, helpless to alter.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I'm afraid I have to agree with DBT on this one. If we ask someone "Why did you chose A instead of B?", they will happily list the reasons why A was the better choice. If we follow up with "So, those reasons caused you to choose A?", they will say "Yes, that's right". So, the choice was indeed reliably caused, and reliably caused by the chooser.

Maybe.
Thing is, you can hypnotize someone and suggest to them that every time they hear a bell they shout "Excelsior!" Then ring a bell. They will shout "Excelsior!"
You ask them why they shouted that.
THE ACTUAL REASON is because they were programmed to do this at a deep level of their subconscious. But they will happily explain, inventing a logic chain going from bell to yell, happily satisfied that it was a choice they made and decided to do. To the subject, there's no difference between the choice to shout or the choice to go see a hypnotist tonight.

This suggests that maybe our process of 'deciding' something is not real, it happens after the fact. The decision is already made (by us? FOR us? No way of knowing.) and our consciousness exerts itself only to rationalize the decision we are merely a vector for, helpless to alter.

It's what Michael Gazzaniga calls the "interpreter", and if it doesn't know the real reason, yet feels it must have one, then it confabulates. But there's no reason to assume that the description is inaccurate under normal conditions.

Hypnosis would be an "undue influence", preventing the person from deciding for themselves what they will do. So, the behavior would not be freely chosen by the subject (a freely chosen "I will", or simply "free will"), but instead the behavior is chosen by the hypnotist.

Some insignificant behaviors, like those in the Libet experiments, can apparently be decided unconsciously and then presented to conscious awareness. But most significant decisions are going to involve a longer interplay between conscious and unconscious brain activity. But, if we asked the subject whether he participated in the experiment of his own free will, everyone would know what we were talking about.

If our unconscious brains decided to rob a bank, and left consciousness unaware, then the we would end up in jail without knowing how we got there. It would be like sleep walking. And that would be very rare if ever.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Deterministic has a mathematical and subjective meaning.


A deterministic mathematical function means you plug numbers into an equation an get an answer.

Speed = Distance x Time is a deterministic function.

Flipping a coin is probabilistic. The probability of heads or tails is 50/50 on each toss, but there is ni dteenistic way to predict which will occur on a toss. Flip a coin 100 times and it will be close to 50/50.

Probabilistic does not Violeta causality.

Quantum indeterminacy plays out in routine measurements. There are no absolutely exact measurements. Therer is alwas a probability that goes with a measurement. DC current in a wire wire is measured as an average of a large quantity of electrons in a wire. At 10 amps the error or uncertainty is low, quantum effects of the electrons can be ignored. As current gets small quantum effects become an issue. At the quantum level there is 'quantum noise'.

Philosophical determinism is whether or not all things are predetermined. Am I destined to write this post?

I have a problem with the notion of "predetermined" in regards to causation. An event is not fully caused until its final prior causes have played themselves out. Usually, the most meaningful and relevant causes are those closest to the event. As we trace backward through the prior causes of those prior causes, our causes become more incidental and more meaningless and less relevant.

So, for all practical human purposes, the most direct causes are usually all we care about. To be meaningful, a cause must efficiently explain why the event happened. To be relevant, a cause must be something we can actually do something about.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Random does not equate to free will. Determined does not equate to free will. The term "free will" simply does not apply....therefore a semantic construct.

Then again, random and determined are also semantic constructs. Every word and concept is.

Philosophizing without a knowledge of math and science. Math and scince exist in te brain as thoughts and concepts. That does not men tere is no semnatc difference between terms.

Random has a specific definition in proximity. The occurrence of one event does not affect the occurrence of the next evet, there is no correlation between random variables.

I did this stuff waaaayyy back when going through statistics. Just flip a coin or toss a die 100 times and write down the results.

It's hard to control the flip of a coin, but a professional knife thrower controls the number of revolutions sufficiently to assure that the point rather than the hilt hits the target.

The result of the coin toss will be reliably caused by the position of the thumb under the coin and the force applied. Then the inertia of the coin versus the air resistance. Then how it bounces on the surface where it lands. If you control all of these factors, perhaps by building a machine that flips the coin under controlled conditions, then the result of the coin toss cannot only be reliably predicted, but it can be reliably controlled. Oh, and the math and physics would be used to describe and calculate the effects at each stage.

Controlling the behavior of a quark is likely to be much more challenging. But, we may as well assume reliable causation even though we do not yet understand the rules that the quark is following.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Random does not equate to free will. Determined does not equate to free will. The term "free will" simply does not apply....therefore a semantic construct.

Then again, random and determined are also semantic constructs. Every word and concept is.

The words random and determined refer to conditions in the world: how the world works, how it's objects and events interact.

Compatibilism selects a slice of how the world works deterministically and declares this slice of determined behaviour to be an example of free will.

Free will is an event, just like any other event. And it is deterministic, just like any other event. The "free" in free will has nothing to do with "freedom from causal necessity". It simply means the choosing event was free from coercion and other forms of undue influence.

Causal necessity is not a meaningful or relevant constraint. It is not meaningful because what I will inevitably do is exactly identical to me just being me, choosing what I choose, and doing what I do. And it is not a relevant constraint, because there's nothing we can do about it.

Basically, causal necessity is just a background constant that always appears on both sides of every equation, and it can be subtracted from both sides without affecting the result. It literally makes no difference.