You either didn't read or didn't understand my post.
The "terms" don't entail anything. Words don't have innate, irrevocable meaning. Meaning is derived from usage.
You state this as though it were fact. It's not. It's just your (and others') dogmatic belief.
Word meaning doesn't work like this. Meanings are not determined according to personal preferences. Meanings are determined by usage.
Where a word or phrase has more than one common usage, no single...
It does.
This is how compatibilist free will is defined.
The reason you find this definition unsatisfactory is because you don't understand compatibilism and appear only to be able to think of free will in terms of libertarian free will
Until you understand that libertarian and...
I'm not convinced.
Quantum indeterminacy has no bearing on compatibilist free will and neither will it change the minds of hard determinists (I don't know of any who would concede free will even if it could be 'proved/demonstrated' that the universe wasn't really deterministic).
I think...
I'm not convinced.
I see very little in your posted argumentation that relates in any direct way to the compatibilist/incompatibilist debate from my perspective.
Having said that, I have to admit that I find much of what you post quite impenetrable. This isn't intended as a criticism - it's...
I'm pretty sure we view compatibilist free will quite differently. Do you know of any philosophers who defend compatibilist free will in the same way you do? It might help me to understand your approach.
He certainly doesn't understand compatibilism. His criticisms of compatibilism indisputably confirm this.
For me, compatibilist freedom is quite simply freedom from specific morally relevant constraints/influences - the kinds of constraints/influences that we all take into account when...
This has always been my bone of contention with DBT (I've 'discussed' free will with DBT over many years ;) ).
Although he never explicitly makes the claim, he does argue (and always has) as though he believes the sense of free will defended by compatibilists is in some way wrongheaded...
Apologies. Having reread your post I can see now that was what you must have intended.
In my defense it was a longish and quite dense post and I made the mistake of skim-reading and that single sentence popped out at me. :oops:
This sounds very much like DBT's attitude to compatibilists. It implies, rather uncharitably, that compatibilists may not be entirely honest when they "claim" to be determinists.
This is straightforwardly wrong.
You, like DBT, start out with the assumption that any conception of 'free will'...
I think it needs pointing out that no compatibilist would argue any such thing.
I'm concerned that your response here will only reinforce DBT's deeply held conviction that compatibilists don't genuinely accept determinism.
The following is taken from Marvin Edwards' thread, Compatibilism: What's that About? It might help a little more
I think it explains quite well the kind of Dennettian compatibilism I subscribe to.
An "Adequate determinism" that isn't fully adequate is not adequate determinism - it's simply indeterminism (random events). I agree with hard determinists that there's no free will (libertarian or otherwise) to be found in random events.
This site uses cookies to help personalise content, tailor your experience and to keep you logged in if you register.
By continuing to use this site, you are consenting to our use of cookies.