A scientific definition of the term 'free will'

[The AntiChris]

I'm pretty sure we view compatibilist free will quite differently. Do you know of any philosophers who defend compatibilist free will in the same way you do? It might help me to understand your approach.

Not a clue. I'm an autistic wonk. Of course we "view" it differently, but I have some faith we are "viewing" the same thing from different perspectives.

I'm not convinced.

I see very little in your posted argumentation that relates in any direct way to the compatibilist/incompatibilist debate from my perspective.

Having said that, I have to admit that I find much of what you post quite impenetrable. This isn't intended as a criticism - it's simply an admission of my own shortcomings.

 

[Jarhyn]

I'm pretty sure we view compatibilist free will quite differently. Do you know of any philosophers who defend compatibilist free will in the same way you do? It might help me to understand your approach.

Not a clue. I'm an autistic wonk. Of course we "view" it differently, but I have some faith we are "viewing" the same thing from different perspectives.

I'm not convinced.

I see very little in your posted argumentation that relates in any direct way to the compatibilist/incompatibilist debate from my perspective.

Having said that, I have to admit that I find much of what you post quite impenetrable. This isn't intended as a criticism - it's simply an admission of my own shortcomings.

So, after reviewing some of the posts I made in response to Copernicus yesterday, maybe this might help:

It is argued by many that there is no "Realis" mode in which "freedom" makes sense.

Incompatibilist argue, and too often compatibilists argue, that freedom requires irrealis modality; the compatibilist often says "imaginary is OK", and then the incompatibilist often says "but then freedom is imaginary, not real".

I am trying to lay the foundation for the idea that there is a "Realis" mode of freedom, and while Irrealis mode is how we discover and even create that Realis mode, that the Realis mode does exist, and that the Realis mode vindicates the compatibilist from the incompatibilist.

 

[rousseau]

Really, I'm not sure what Rousseau even wants at this point.

Abandonment of the term "free will" as an address relating to responsibility?

I don't see what's so wrong with saying "I had free will in my decision to do the thing" instead of "I was responsible for doing the thing".

Maybe my point still isn't getting across, I thought I'd stated it relatively clearly, but it seems like it's not getting there.

There's nothing wrong with saying 'I had free will', this is just common lingo that indicates a person hasn't been coerced, and is free to be what they are (what a human being is / how they operate). But when you try to take the term 'free will' any deeper than that, and build a philosophy of freedom out of it, you're using a term which doesn't refer to any actual thing. It's a referent without a concrete definition, all that it indicates when used in everyday language is that a person felt free to carry out an action.

So you can't prove or disprove the existence of free will - unless you just want to call it 'people being free to be what they are' - you shouldn't even try, because it's not a real, objective thing. The conversation on the subject has already been started assuming that we can prove or disprove free will, but IMO that's entirely wrong-headed. We're starting with a conclusion that it can or cannot exist, when in practice we're arguing over whether a unicorn can exist. What you can do is explicate on how humans actually operate, which doesn't require any kind of subjective qualifier. You could call how humans operate 'freedom' if you wanted to, or 'lack of freedom', but that's ultimately a subjective judgement.

It's like the argument on capitalism/socialism - the foundation of the argument is based on the wrong premises, but nobody can see it and just keeps talking about the wrong thing.

Fundamentally, I don't think you and I are saying totally different things. You're just calling your description of 'how people operate' ipso facto free will, while I don't think you need to call it anything, and I don't think describing how people operate as 'free will' really adds to our understanding. To be clear I'm not saying that free will doesn't exist, or that it does exist, I'm saying that the term isn't really required to add to our understanding on human behavior and function. The world keeps spinning in circles trying to prove or disprove a unicorn, when we could just be talking about what's actually there, and how it works.

If that doesn't get you there, I'm not sure I can do much better.

 

[Jarhyn]

you're using a term which doesn't refer to any actual thing

Which my point is, this is untrue: it clearly refers to the momentary immediate state which drives the output "true" or "false" to a process that renders a conclusion against the question "did the wills pass internal review such that they came from me, or did they come from outside such that they align against my goals and create so much Resistance theu cannot be overcome".

Or, in a more simple context, "do I have the voltage to overcome resistance in the circuit so to activate the switch?" This is as real as the activation/deactivation moment of said switch, and as real as the circuit referenced by "I".

It's just referencing a specific circuit which fundamentally instantiates a belief in "self-ness".

 

[rousseau]

you're using a term which doesn't refer to any actual thing

Which my point is, this is untrue: it clearly refers to the momentary immediate state which drives the output "true" or "false" to a process that renders a conclusion against the question "did the wills pass internal review such that they came from me, or did they come from outside such that they align against my goals and create so much Resistance theu cannot be overcome".

Or, in a more simple context, "do I have the voltage to overcome resistance in the circuit so to activate the switch"? This is as real as the activation/deactivation moment of said switch.

That's fair enough. Then I think we're basically in agreement, you're just choosing to call it literal free will, while I'd call that a subjective qualifier that isn't that important.

 

[Jarhyn]

you're using a term which doesn't refer to any actual thing

Which my point is, this is untrue: it clearly refers to the momentary immediate state which drives the output "true" or "false" to a process that renders a conclusion against the question "did the wills pass internal review such that they came from me, or did they come from outside such that they align against my goals and create so much Resistance theu cannot be overcome".

Or, in a more simple context, "do I have the voltage to overcome resistance in the circuit so to activate the switch"? This is as real as the activation/deactivation moment of said switch.

That's fair enough. Then I think we're basically in agreement, you're just choosing to call it literal free will, while I'd call that a subjective qualifier that isn't that important.

Well, it's not subjective. It's an object, that answers a question about another object, relative to other objects. This is a flaw of the very concept of considering "subjectivity" rather than "relativity".

It's pretty important when the question is over whether some exercise of force aligns the agent to some goal state or against it.

 

[rousseau]

you're using a term which doesn't refer to any actual thing

Which my point is, this is untrue: it clearly refers to the momentary immediate state which drives the output "true" or "false" to a process that renders a conclusion against the question "did the wills pass internal review such that they came from me, or did they come from outside such that they align against my goals and create so much Resistance theu cannot be overcome".

Or, in a more simple context, "do I have the voltage to overcome resistance in the circuit so to activate the switch"? This is as real as the activation/deactivation moment of said switch.

That's fair enough. Then I think we're basically in agreement, you're just choosing to call it literal free will, while I'd call that a subjective qualifier that isn't that important.

Well, it's not subjective. It's an object, that answers a question about another object, relative to other objects. This is a flaw of the very concept of considering "subjectivity" rather than "relativity".

It's pretty important when the question is over whether some exercise of force aligns the agent to some goal state or against it.

To me it's not fundamentally different from one person calling someone good looking, and another person calling them ugly. In the way you're using it 'free will' is descriptive, not explicative. We can definitely call human operation free will, and if everyone in the world also wants to call it free will, then that's the way it goes. But the term itself doesn't actually explain anything about human functioning.

To me the conversation on free will has traditionally been about the first point - are we free - rather than the more important point - how do people actually operate. The question on freedom isn't that important, and maybe just a past time for retirees .

 

[Jarhyn]

To me it's not fundamentally different from one person calling someone good looking, and another person calling them ugly

And this is where we are different.

To me it's more like saying "it came from over there" rather than "it came from over here". The direction and magnitude of forces directly impact the effect that force has when imparted by an object onto another. This is relational, but not "unreal" or "unimportant" from the perspective of the thing that contains the will that established and defines that limit.

Whether a force of 33 newtons comes from one side or the other of an object determines it's impact on the object.

Whatever the case, goals are real parts of real objects, and that particular goal maintains the feasibility of a number of other goals that are very important to the continuation of said process free of such impositions as "parasitic forces" in the journey to such goals.

 

[Jarhyn]

@rousseau

Apologies for my above post. I know you liked it, so I ascertain you got my point, but OMG it was so badly stated that I'm surprised you did!

 

[rousseau]

To me it's not fundamentally different from one person calling someone good looking, and another person calling them ugly

And this is where we are different.

To me it's more like saying "it came from over there" rather than "it came from over here". The direction and magnitude of forces directly impact the effect that force has when imparted by an object onto another. This is relational, but not "unreal" or "unimportant" from the perspective of the thing that contains the will that established and defines that limit.

Whether a force of 33 newtons comes from one side or the other of an object determines it's impact on the object.

Whatever the case, goals are real parts of real objects, and that particular goal maintains the feasibility of a number of other goals that are very important to the continuation of said process free of such impositions as "parasitic forces" in the journey to such goals.

I think I'm getting your meaning now, so thanks for that. Although I'd argue that the term 'free will' still isn't really that important as anything more than an indicator of it's everyday definition, freedom to act, freedom to be what we are. But on this point we disagree, so I guess that's where we're at.

 

[Jarhyn]

To me it's not fundamentally different from one person calling someone good looking, and another person calling them ugly

And this is where we are different.

To me it's more like saying "it came from over there" rather than "it came from over here". The direction and magnitude of forces directly impact the effect that force has when imparted by an object onto another. This is relational, but not "unreal" or "unimportant" from the perspective of the thing that contains the will that established and defines that limit.

Whether a force of 33 newtons comes from one side or the other of an object determines it's impact on the object.

Whatever the case, goals are real parts of real objects, and that particular goal maintains the feasibility of a number of other goals that are very important to the continuation of said process free of such impositions as "parasitic forces" in the journey to such goals.

I think I'm getting your meaning now, so thanks for that. Although I'd argue that the term 'free will' still isn't really that important as anything more than an indicator of it's everyday definition, freedom to act, freedom to be what we are. But on this point we disagree, so I guess that's where we're at.

Well, I wasn't ever really intending on saying it wasn't more than it's everyday definition, rather I was going on the long and very painful journey of defending its "realness" and its importance to the dialogues around that everyday definition.

It's the fundamental approach to validating that the everyday definition is compatible with the formal definition of determinism, and in fact reliant upon it so that we can throw away the "nonsensical" definition of "libertarian free will".

I agree that throwing away "libertarian free will" is a pretty important goal, just not "everyday free will".

Libertarian free will is just a shitty argument for throwing away responsibilities, a forgiveness doctrine hiding in sciency language

 

[Politesse]

In a previous thread @Elixir and I mentioned the concept of 'free will' being a semantic construct, and I think I've figured out a good way to express this idea.

If the term 'free will' doesn't actually correspond to any real, objective thing or phenomena in the known universe then we can't not have it, and we can't have it either, because it's not a real thing. It's a human, imaginary semantic construct. A person can have brown hair, a heart, a car, because these things correspond to real aspects of the known universe. Where 'free will' is a completely imagined construct. You can't not have something that doesn't exist.

Basically, free will is an irrelevant way of describing or not describing human behavior. We need to rely on other constructs that actually exist.

So in this thread I challenge others to provide a scientific definition of what free will is and it's referent in the known universe. If we can't, then the entire conversation on free will makes no sense, because you can't not have something that doesn't exist.

"Creation Science".

 

[steve_bank]

I go with Popper's definition of what constitutes objective science. It has to be testable and I'll add repeatable by anyone and getting the same results.

Anything else is philosophical speculation and metaphysics, which can be based in science.

It all comes down to how our brains are wired.

 

[Jarhyn]

I go with Popper's definition of what constitutes objective science. It has to be testable and I'll add repeatable by anyone and getting the same results.

Anything else is philosophical speculation and metaphysics, which can be based in science.

It all comes down to how our brains are wired.

As I have said a couple times now, this is objectively computer science. Math in fact.

I will argue that it is the other way around. Science can be based on metaphysics (math), but math is not based on science but general theory about logic, which is more general and powerful than science.

If we're going to talk about determinism, that's a subject of math, not strictly science.

Where this makes contact with reality is in the discussion of systems of math that have correspondence to physical structures.

This starts at switches and neurons, which h are both handled well by systems theory. You could prove simple statements about what is possible in deterministic systems by constructing a computer that demonstrates a "simple" example of such constructs as algorithm design within a deterministic system (arguably all things done in a computer environment are can be modeled deterministically).

As such, the free will debate IS a matter of objective science, assuming it is a question that may be handled by general systems theory.

By discussing the subject purely in terms of algorithms and execution paths, I'm pretty sure we prove the existence of freedoms and wills every day through our consummation of that through applications of computer science.

 

[steve_bank]

Jaryn

You are conflating philosophy-metaphysics with science.

Metaphysics is abstract thought strictures.

Science is tied to unambiguous physical references not subject to semantics or interpretation, IOW Systems International.

A metaphysical proof does not equate to a scientific proof or demonstration. I go with Popper who wrote that for something to be considered objective science it must be testable experimentally.

I think it was in Durant;s Story Of Philosophy I read that which is quantifiable is science the rest is philosophy and religion.

Your logical argument that science is metaphysics thereforr my meta[physical proof is valid science fails.

Kelvin, one of my favorite quotes.

When you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind.?
That's beautifully expressed by Lord Kelvin; “… when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science, whatever the matter may be.”

 

[Jarhyn]

Metaphysics is abstract thought strictures

My point is that when you have an abstract thought structure such as determinism, and another abstract thought structure such as an algorithm, but can make concrete examples of each in reality, you prove things about reality by messing with those instances of those structures.

You seem to fail at the observation that it ceases being "just" an abstract thought structure when you instantiate it and have it in front of you to play with and make observations about.

Because I do both, it is both science and metaphysics.

Computer science bridges the physical and the metaphysical because it is about physical instantiations AND mathematical constructs at the same time.

Make a computer that does ___? You've proven that you can model ___ in pure math. Prove in pure math that a finite buildable computational framework can ___? Congratulations, you just proved it's physically possible to ___.

 

[steve_bank]

I do not think a scientific definition of free will that is comming anytime soon.

It would require a complete working physical model of how the brain works.

 

[Politesse]

One cannot create a "scientific definition" of a theological principle, except to observe that it exists and that people believe in it.

 

[Jarhyn]

I do not think a scientific definition of free will that is comming anytime soon.

It would require a complete working physical model of how the brain works.

There's one in the thread. "An algorithm such to test heuristically whether another algorithm came from within some specific bound arbitrarily determined by the structure of said heuristic which is momentarily executing a positive identification on said heuristic". I explained this in the thread in far more detail as to why and how that is, along with a bit more context filling out more details.

That's a mathematical definition, a metaphysical one not a physical one.

Science proves this by displaying in reality, via a computer, an algorithm as above executing as above.

 

[Copernicus]

I was unaware of this thread until just now, because I don't have a lot of time to get involved, as I am preparing to go on a trip for a few weeks.

I'll just make a few comments here. Although Jarhyn has described what he thought our discussion was about, I would ask people to reserve judgment on my side of the conversation. One of the reasons I left that discussion was that I did not think anything I said was going to resonate with DBT or Jarhyn. Like Jarhyn, I style myself a compatibilist, and DBT, an ardent hard determinist, kept confusing compatibilism with libertarian free will. He wasn't going to be budged from that position. Jarhyn tries to understand everything in terms of his programming background, and I didn't see any easy way to break through the barrier of that filter. I regretted introducing the distinction between Ordinary Language Philosophy and Ideal Language Philosophy in the discussion, because that just pulled the discussion further off track, as he went for a defense of ILP over OLP, not having sufficient understanding of either. My attempt to explain realis and irrealis tenses--linguistic concepts used to classify tense references--did not clarify matters for him in the way that I had hoped. I thought they revealed something fundamental about human cognition that explained the semantics of free will, but I wasn't getting through. So I stopped beating my head against the wall and withdrew.

I am not sure about how to approach this thread topic, but only because I don't know what Rousseau thinks of as a "scientific definition". I certainly understand what a technical definition is, because I have worked on those for years. Steve Bank thinks a scientific definition has something to do with making sense to people who work in so-called hard science fields apparently, rather than those involved in other disciplines whose researchers also think they can do "science". Jarhyn thinks it has to do with mathematics and algorithms--something a computer scientist might better understand. There are many different ways in which to define terms, depending on how one wants people to use them in a consistent, cooperative way.

Anyway, I fly off tomorrow to Oslo for my vacation, so I can't really get involved in a real discussion until early July. Meanwhile, have fun while I am away. I know that I will.