A Little Thought About Truth

[Speakpigeon]

Whoa! Is that all you can do! You sometimes complain I'm "evading" and now you're just wasting my time, once again. Pathetic. You prefer to merely assert deviously that there are no truths rather than argue your case. Of course, the assertion that there are no truths is in itself a contradiction. So you have no argument but it didn't stop you pretending you were prepared to argue your viewpoint. Nah. Not even that. Waster.
EB

Calm down.

Get up your ass.

Truth is in itself a contradiction.

idiotic.

As the information systems we are all we can do is to gather information.

Some information fits better with how the world out there behaves.

We project that back out on the "world out there" and call it "truth". But there is nothing out there that is true per se.

Truth has to do with information we have not with the real world.

If that was meant to show that the idea of truth was a contradiction you failed.

In fact, I broadly agree with your point about "information" although I would never use the same vocabulary.

Further, I didn't say or suggest that truth was somehow "out there". I was talking about propositional truth, propositions that would be true. Please don't confuse a propositonal truth and "truth" as "fact".

It's true that some philosophers would say that as an abstract thing a proposition is somehow out there, i.e. not inside our mind and in fact not even out there in the world but somehow existing nonetheless. But that's a sophisticated view impossible to support and I don't subscribe to it because subscription is costly.

So I take a proposition, and therefore a truth, to be somehow inside my mind. There's no contradiction in that or at least you haven't shown that there is.

And if you had read my post and understood it you would have seen that I explicitly said I didn't know any truth about the material world, i.e. le world "out there".
EB

 

[Juma]

Calm down.

Get up your ass.

Truth is in itself a contradiction.

idiotic.

As the information systems we are all we can do is to gather information.

Some information fits better with how the world out there behaves.

We project that back out on the "world out there" and call it "truth". But there is nothing out there that is true per se.

Truth has to do with information we have not with the real world.

If that was meant to show that the idea of truth was a contradiction you failed.

In fact, I broadly agree with your point about "information" although I would never use the same vocabulary.

Further, I didn't say or suggest that truth was somehow "out there". I was talking about propositional truth, propositions that would be true. Please don't confuse a propositonal truth and "truth" as "fact".

"Propositional truth" isnt about truth at all.
It is about valid or invalid deduction: wether a proposition is in or out of the system.

 

[Speakpigeon]

the idea of truth implies something beyond the mind that has fixed properties for some reason.

No. Not necessarily.

Suggests, yes, sometimes, possibly.

So the ultimate truth is: Why do these properties exist? Not: What are the properties?

This is not about "truth" this is about whatever exists out there if anything. It may or may not exist, may or may not have properties, there may or may not be a truth about why these properties would exist if they did. But, yes, it's "ultimate" all right.

However, you may be confused (like fast would say). Properties need not be that of the things that would exist out there in the world. In fact, science tells us they're not. Rather, what you call properties may be better called attributes that are part of our model of this world that would be out there. When a physicist says a proton has a positive charge, "positive charge" is an attribute in his model of elementary particles. He doesn't mean, if he is a little bit consistent, literaly that there is an actual property out there called "positive charge". What matter is that there is this attribute part of his model and that he is capable of carrying out operations on any proton in a way consistent with his model. Some sciency types here don't seem to have understood that but that's really basic to physics as it's understood now.

Of course, one could then explain why we use these attributes. Because they are very convenient and effective and evolution sort of led us there.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

"Propositional truth" isnt about truth at all.

Please don't waste my time with vacuous pronouncements.

Pythie.
EB

 

[Juma]

"Propositional truth" isnt about truth at all.

Please don't waste my time with vacuous pronouncements.

Pythie.
EB

It isnt vacous.

 

[untermensche]

the idea of truth implies something beyond the mind that has fixed properties for some reason.

No. Not necessarily.

Suggests, yes, sometimes, possibly.

There has to be objectivity for there to be "truth".

So it has to be something beyond the human mind and you cannot have objectivity without a fixed property. Without some "object".

So the ultimate truth is: Why do these properties exist? Not: What are the properties?

This is not about "truth" this is about whatever exists out there if anything. It may or may not exist, may or may not have properties, there may or may not be a truth about why these properties would exist if they did. But, yes, it's "ultimate" all right.

It is not only about what exists out there, since there is no divide between what is out there and what we are. We are a product of what is out there. What is out there is all there is.

But what is out there?

However, you may be confused (like fast would say). Properties need not be that of the things that would exist out there in the world. In fact, science tells us they're not. Rather, what you call properties may be better called attributes that are part of our model of this world that would be out there.

The speed of light is not a result of our models.

When a physicist says a proton has a positive charge, "positive charge" is an attribute in his model of elementary particles.

It is only part of his model because it is a property in the world.

His model does not create positive charge. It tries to define and explain it.

 

[fromderinside]

Please don't waste my time with vacuous pronouncements.

Pythie.
EB

It isnt vacous.

The question is, boys, which one is model A and which one is model T. Oh yes, and which one is first. But that's another model isn't it.

 

[fast]

[...] your comment is misplaced.

I don't think so. You were a little careless. That's okay. It happens.

 

[Speakpigeon]

[...] your comment is misplaced.

I don't think so. You were a little careless. That's okay. It happens.

Clearly Big Brother could take lessons from you if he existed.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

No. Not necessarily.

Suggests, yes, sometimes, possibly.

There has to be objectivity for there to be "truth".

So it has to be something beyond the human mind and you cannot have objectivity without a fixed property. Without some "object".

First, you don't actually know that there is something beyond your mind so your notion of truth certainly does not imply that there is something. It only suggests that there is something. And maybe there is something but it doen't imply it in the logical sense of imply.

Second, there is no need to objectivity. Either a statement is true and it is not. Requiring objectivity is merely pre-judging what there is an objective world. Maybe there is an objective world but that's precisely what we don't know.
EB

 

[fast]

There has to be objectivity for there to be "truth".

So it has to be something beyond the human mind and you cannot have objectivity without a fixed property. Without some "object".

First, you don't actually know that there is something beyond your mind so your notion of truth certainly does not imply that there is something. It only suggests that there is something. And maybe there is something but it doen't imply it in the logical sense of imply.

Second, there is no need to objectivity. Either a statement is true and it is not. Requiring objectivity is merely pre-judging what there is an objective world. Maybe there is an objective world but that's precisely what we don't know.
EB

What does "actually" add to your statement? Emphasis. But why add it? Do we know but not actually know? Of course not. We know and we actually know. You are meaning one thing (and it has to do with certainty) but you hijack the word "know." The tell-tale sign is the emphasis.

 

[untermensche]

There has to be objectivity for there to be "truth".

So it has to be something beyond the human mind and you cannot have objectivity without a fixed property. Without some "object".

First, you don't actually know that there is something beyond your mind so your notion of truth certainly does not imply that there is something. It only suggests that there is something. And maybe there is something but it doen't imply it in the logical sense of imply.

Second, there is no need to objectivity. Either a statement is true and it is not. Requiring objectivity is merely pre-judging what there is an objective world. Maybe there is an objective world but that's precisely what we don't know.
EB

The evidence that our brains represent to our minds tells a story.

It tells a story of evolving animals. Animals that need to survive and strive to reproduce.

So the mind could either be some evolved artifact that helps animals survive.

Or it could be a trick.

Parsimony points strongly to the former.

The evolved mind allows a mind to exist without some other mind behind it.

While imagining all is a trick requires some other mind creating the trick for some reason. It requires all kinds of invisible plans and planners.

 

[Speakpigeon]

First, you don't actually know that there is something beyond your mind so your notion of truth certainly does not imply that there is something. It only suggests that there is something. And maybe there is something but it doen't imply it in the logical sense of imply.

Second, there is no need to objectivity. Either a statement is true and it is not. Requiring objectivity is merely pre-judging what there is an objective world. Maybe there is an objective world but that's precisely what we don't know.
EB

What does "actually" add to your statement? Emphasis. But why add it?

Hi, Big Brother 2.
We all make vacuous claims to knowledge all the time so the default emphasis is on vacuous claim to knowledge as opposed to actual knowledge. I guess I just instinctively put "actually" in and I think was damn right to do it.

Do we know but not actually know? Of course not. We know and we actually know.

This is correct but semantic analysis isn't enough to explain rethorical uses like emphasis.

You are meaning one thing (and it has to do with certainty) but you hijack the word "know." The tell-tale sign is the emphasis.

Sorry, this literally doesn't make sense. Please rephrase.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

First, you don't actually know that there is something beyond your mind so your notion of truth certainly does not imply that there is something. It only suggests that there is something. And maybe there is something but it doen't imply it in the logical sense of imply.

Second, there is no need to objectivity. Either a statement is true and it is not. Requiring objectivity is merely pre-judging what there is an objective world. Maybe there is an objective world but that's precisely what we don't know.
EB

The evidence that our brains represent to our minds tells a story.

It tells a story of evolving animals. Animals that need to survive and strive to reproduce.

So the mind could either be some evolved artifact that helps animals survive.

Or it could be a trick.

Parsimony points strongly to the former.

The evolved mind allows a mind to exist without some other mind behind it.

While imagining all is a trick requires some other mind creating the trick for some reason. It requires all kinds of invisible plans and planners.

I didn't (actually) argue that you didn't believe anything about the material world. I'm quite sure you do. You believe the stories you want to believe and it's Ok with me. No need to justify you beliefs to me. You are a consenting adult (actually, I am guessing here).

On parsimony, you argument,if it is one, is fallacious. You certainly believe that the notion of parsimony makes sense but you don't (actually) know that it is somehow effective or operational in the material world precisely because you don't know it. Again, you believe things about it, like parsimony. Good for you but I do the same thing. I believe parsimony makes sense and I look out when I want to cross a road. I even believe I would be dead if I didn't do it all the time.
EB

 

[untermensche]

The evidence that our brains represent to our minds tells a story.

It tells a story of evolving animals. Animals that need to survive and strive to reproduce.

So the mind could either be some evolved artifact that helps animals survive.

Or it could be a trick.

Parsimony points strongly to the former.

The evolved mind allows a mind to exist without some other mind behind it.

While imagining all is a trick requires some other mind creating the trick for some reason. It requires all kinds of invisible plans and planners.

I didn't (actually) argue that you didn't believe anything about the material world. I'm quite sure you do. You believe the stories you want to believe and it's Ok with me. No need to justify you beliefs to me. You are a consenting adult (actually, I am guessing here).

On parsimony, you argument,if it is one, is fallacious. You certainly believe that the notion of parsimony makes sense but you don't (actually) know that it is somehow effective or operational in the material world precisely because you don't know it. Again, you believe things about it, like parsimony. Good for you but I do the same thing. I believe parsimony makes sense and I look out when I want to cross a road. I even believe I would be dead if I didn't do it all the time.
EB

You haven't addressed the argument.

Either we are here because of evolution, the clear evidence, which does not require any external agency.

Or all is some elaborate trick. Which requires all kinds of external agency.

Parsimony clearly favors the former.

 

[fast]

You are meaning one thing (and it has to do with certainty) but you hijack the word "know." The tell-tale sign is the emphasis.

Sorry, this literally doesn't make sense. Please rephrase.

You are broadening the scope of what it means to say we know something. If we do in fact know something, that merely means we have a justified true belief. For instance, I believe I'm currently sitting in a chair. Of course, it's not merely the case that I hold the belief. In addition, it's in fact true that I'm currently sitting in a chair. Importantly, I have good reason to hold the belief I do, and there's no good contrary reason to think otherwise. Given all that, and that alone, I'm justified in claiming that I know that I'm currently sitting in a chair.

As you might readily agree, it's still possible to be mistaken and not know what I claim to know despite having good reason for believing what I do. Does this therefore imply that I don't REALLY know what I claim to know? No! That I might be mistaken; hence, that there is a possibility for mistake does not therefore imply we don't know what we think we know.

Never must we be unmistakably certain that we know what we claim to know in order to know what we claim we do. And it's that in which we must come to grips with before recognizing the mistake so many people make. We do not know with Cartesian certainty, but that doesn't mean we don't in normal speak know.

Possibly mistaken and actually mistaken are not one and the same. Just because I might possibly be under the influence of hallucenagenic drugs and not actually sitting when I think I am, that doesn't therefore mean I'm not actually sitting. If the truth condition of a justified belief is ACTUALLY met, then I know just what it is I think I do. Just because I'm POSSIBLY mistaken shows that I have no Cartesian certainty of knowing without possibility of mistake, but the truth condition is an issue of actuality, not possibility.

Hijacking the term knowledge and treating it with the same rigor as Cartesian certainty unfortunately plagues the issue and regrettably increases the scope of how the term knowledge is ordinarily used in our lexicon. Saying, "but do we really know" in face of good reasoning for thinking what we do signals us to keep our eyes peeled for those who overthethink the issue and begin to misuse the term.

 

[Speakpigeon]

You haven't addressed the argument.

Either we are here because of evolution, the clear evidence, which does not require any external agency.

Or all is some elaborate trick. Which requires all kinds of external agency.

Parsimony clearly favors the former.

I'm not sure there is much of an argument here. You just believe parsimony is a concept that is somehow operational. But to be operational parsimony would require that there is some kind of external world with particular crucial properties, for example that the impressions you have are somewhat indicative of this world. This is what "clear evidence" means. We call evidence some impression we deem indicative of something else. This is your choice but this is not an argument, or not a very compelling one, not to me.

Further you set up the alternative as some sort of elaborate trick but there's no good reason to accept this move. You are just displaying a confounding lack of imagination. It needs not be a trick. I could be just the way things are, whether or not there is some kind of external world.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Sorry, this literally doesn't make sense. Please rephrase.

You are broadening the scope of what it means to say we know something. If we do in fact know something, that merely means we have a justified true belief. For instance, I believe I'm currently sitting in a chair. Of course, it's not merely the case that I hold the belief. In addition, it's in fact true that I'm currently sitting in a chair. Importantly, I have good reason to hold the belief I do, and there's no good contrary reason to think otherwise. Given all that, and that alone, I'm justified in claiming that I know that I'm currently sitting in a chair.

As you might readily agree, it's still possible to be mistaken and not know what I claim to know despite having good reason for believing what I do. Does this therefore imply that I don't REALLY know what I claim to know? No! That I might be mistaken; hence, that there is a possibility for mistake does not therefore imply we don't know what we think we know.

Never must we be unmistakably certain that we know what we claim to know in order to know what we claim we do. And it's that in which we must come to grips with before recognizing the mistake so many people make. We do not know with Cartesian certainty, but that doesn't mean we don't in normal speak know.

Possibly mistaken and actually mistaken are not one and the same. Just because I might possibly be under the influence of hallucenagenic drugs and not actually sitting when I think I am, that doesn't therefore mean I'm not actually sitting. If the truth condition of a justified belief is ACTUALLY met, then I know just what it is I think I do. Just because I'm POSSIBLY mistaken shows that I have no Cartesian certainty of knowing without possibility of mistake, but the truth condition is an issue of actuality, not possibility.

Hijacking the term knowledge and treating it with the same rigor as Cartesian certainty unfortunately plagues the issue and regrettably increases the scope of how the term knowledge is ordinarily used in our lexicon. Saying, "but do we really know" in face of good reasoning for thinking what we do signals us to keep our eyes peeled for those who overthethink the issue and begin to misuse the term.

You could have said it with far fewer words. Or maybe you don't remember we have discussed JTB in the past.

JTB might be correct regarding our putative knowledge of the world. However, your argument here only assumes JTB is correct and proceed on this basis to explain why I'm wrong. I already know the gig. But this is your classical case of begging the question. So why should I believe that JTB is the correct theory of knowledge? You haven't said and I don't remember anybody ever explaining.

As to the sense of knowledge I use, it seems to me I use the same as everybody else based on how people express themselves. And this includes the idea that of certainty. Not that you would need to be certain in order to know anything but simply that knowledge gives you an impression of certainty.
EB

 

[untermensche]

You haven't addressed the argument.

Either we are here because of evolution, the clear evidence, which does not require any external agency.

Or all is some elaborate trick. Which requires all kinds of external agency.

Parsimony clearly favors the former.

I'm not sure there is much of an argument here. You just believe parsimony is a concept that is somehow operational. But to be operational parsimony would require that there is some kind of external world with particular crucial properties, for example that the impressions you have are somewhat indicative of this world. This is what "clear evidence" means. We call evidence some impression we deem indicative of something else. This is your choice but this is not an argument, or not a very compelling one, not to me.

Further you set up the alternative as some sort of elaborate trick but there's no good reason to accept this move. You are just displaying a confounding lack of imagination. It needs not be a trick. I could be just the way things are, whether or not there is some kind of external world.
EB

If there are two choices and one has all known evidence to support it (evolution) and requires no outside agency and the other choice has no evidence to support it (mind with no external world) and requires massive external agency then one choice is parsimonious.

And parsimony is a well established philosophical method for evaluating possibilities.

The idea of a mind with no external world defies parsimony and is illogical to even contemplate.

That this silly idea gets any attention is amazing.

 

[fast]

So why should I believe that JTB is the correct theory of knowledge?

It's the most scholarly accepted theory of knowledge we have, so it makes since to lean towards that theory being the most accurate without substantial evidence to think otherwise.