Koyaanisqatsi
Veteran Member
We’re standing outside on a bright sunny day with no clouds in sight. The automatic lawn sprinkler cuts on, and we all know the reason for the water falling on our heads is because of the water sprinkler. Joe makes the assertion, the absurd assertion, that it’s raining. Someone speaks up and says, what can you present to support that assertion? He says, “I have crayons in my car.” That is presented for the purpose of supporting his assertion. Another exclaims, “there is no relevance between having crayons in your car and rain.” So, despite that it was brought forward for the purpose of supporting his assertion, no one wants to accept the irrelevant facts as evidence for the assertion.
Wrong. They are all rejecting the notion that "crayons in my car" constitute evidence. It's not necessarily specific to his "assertion" in any formal sense; the crayons--in and of themselves--have no correlation with rain, let alone the further observation that they are in his car.
They are, simply, NOT evidence, no matter how strenuously Joe might insist that they are. Thus, Joe has made a mistake.
Fine, but Bob speaks up and says, “the ground is wet.” That’s actually consistent with rain. Had it been raining, it would be expected and consistent for the ground to be wet. That actually supports the assertion.
What assertion? That it is raining because Joe has crayons in his car? As that would be the full assertion Joe is actually making.
Quite obviously, it doesn’t prove the assertion, and besides, we all know it’s not raining and that the cause of the ground being wet is the sprinkler and not rain.
There is clear and indisputable evidence for why the ground is wet, but the issue isn’t how easily defeated the extremely week evidence is but rather it’s actual status as evidence. Both the facts “crayons in the car” and “the wet ground” are presented for the purpose of supporting the assertion, but while one fails to support the assertion, the other succeeds.
Exactly. Hence, it is a perceptual mistake, not anything objective/inherent to the evidence.
Successfully supporting an assertion is not remotely the same as successfully proving the assertion true.
Yes it is, since, once again, you are making absolute conditionals. "Successfully" being the operative term in this case. Successfully supporting an assertion is the same thing as successfully proving the assertion true. You're just equivocating in regard to what it CAN mean to "support an assertion" (i.e., that the standard of evidence to "support" may not be as high as it would in regard to a more formal "proving" situation). But the word "successful" counters that ambiguity, since the "success" of "supporting an assertion" would necessarily mean the assertion was proved.
Nobody goes around saying, "I successfully kind of semantically sort of have pretty good evidence that I think generally backs up my assertion." To "successfully support" one's assertion is to prove it.
We know, and quite well, that the assertion is false, but knowledge of that fact has no bearing on whether the assertion is supported
Equivocation. And directly contradictory. If we do, in fact, know "quite well" that the assertion is false, then knowledge of that fact absolutely would bear on whether or not the assertion that is is true has any evidence to support it.
You're playing meaningless--and outright false--semantics games, but for what reason? None of this gets you anywhere as you can clearly see.
There is often supporting evidence that fails to guarantee the truth of an assertion.
Iow, the evidence does not support the assertion. Again, you're playing meaningless semantics games in trying to split irrelevant hairs. Why? Where does it get you?
Small tracks the size of mice may be brought forward and presented as evidence for a gigantic Sasquatch, but while it might be okay to dismiss such a presentation as evidence because of inconsistency, it would be inaccurate to deny the presentation of very large tracks as being evidence because it’s consistency stands good for support
What? Are you trying to say "large tracks are evidence of a Bigfoot"?
knowing full well there is no Bigfoot doesn’t alter the status of the tracks as evidence
Once again, it is the absolute conditions that do that. You just said--again--"knowing full well there is no Bigfoot." If we know "full well" that there is no Bigfoot, then we know that if we find large tracks in the woods, they cannot be from a Bigfoot.
What you MEAN to say is, "Since we do not know to an absolute degree of certainty that there could not exist something like a Bigfoot, then if we find large tracks in the woods, we should entertain the possibility that they are Bigfoot tracks and investigate further." Or words to that effect.
But if you are stipulating that we already have absolute knowledge, then that dictates all else.
but not it’s status as evidence.
By "status as evidence" do you mean strength of evidence, or are you simply using the term "evidence" to mean "anything we damn well want it to be just for the fuck of it"?
The crayons nor the mice tracks support the assertions, but the wet ground and the large tracks do.
Not if we already know the conditions for either the rain or the tracks.
Again, what is it you're trying to get at? That there are degrees of strength for what we consider to be "evidence" of something or event? No one would dispute that. That we are prone to making mistakes? Again, no one would dispute that. Perceptual mistakes vs. objective evidence.
And....?