According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[Jarhyn]

In writing the post above, I realize that the formulation of Compatibilism in my prior post was mistaken -- just as you stated. Accordingly, I appreciate the correction, and apologize for any confusion I caused

That's ok, we all make mistakes. Unfortunately, though, you repeat the very same error in your follow-up.

That being said, Compatibilism does rest on the definitions of Determinism and Free Will I have set forth in multiple posts (and with which multiple posters on the board disagree) -- namely (i) Determinism is a paradigm in which the future is inexorably fixed in advance of its occurrence by the past (without regard to whether some posters on this board believe that to be impossible, illogical, or absurd), and (ii) Free Will is the Libertarian version of the notion.

Here you quite clearly state, again, that compatibilism, amongst other things, rests on Libertarian Free Will.

Libertarian free will is an incompatibilist position. It is is the view that human choices are not causally determined by prior events and that agents are the ultimate source of their actions. On this view free will and determinism cannot co-exist.

Compatibilist free will is defined simply as the ability to act on one's own desires, motives, or will without external coercion or impediment and that on this view free will and determinism can co-exist.

To claim that compatibilism rests on incompatibilist free will is confused and suggests you are labouring under a mistaken understanding of the terms you're using.

I will also add that "determinism" discussed here, of compatibilists, is not fatalism; there is no necessitation imputed upon it.

This "necessitation" part is hidden belief in God.

 

[BSilvEsq]

In writing the post above, I realize that the formulation of Compatibilism in my prior post was mistaken -- just as you stated. Accordingly, I appreciate the correction, and apologize for any confusion I caused

That's ok, we all make mistakes. Unfortunately, though, you repeat the very same error in your follow-up.

That being said, Compatibilism does rest on the definitions of Determinism and Free Will I have set forth in multiple posts (and with which multiple posters on the board disagree) -- namely (i) Determinism is a paradigm in which the future is inexorably fixed in advance of its occurrence by the past (without regard to whether some posters on this board believe that to be impossible, illogical, or absurd), and (ii) Free Will is the Libertarian version of the notion.

Here you quite clearly state, again, that compatibilism, amongst other things, rests on Libertarian Free Will.

Libertarian free will is an incompatibilist position. It is is the view that human choices are not causally determined by prior events and that agents are the ultimate source of their actions. On this view free will and determinism cannot co-exist.

Compatibilist free will is defined simply as the ability to act on one's own desires, motives, or will without external coercion or impediment and that on this view free will and determinism can co-exist.

To claim that compatibilism rests on incompatibilist free will is confused and suggests you are labouring under a mistaken understanding of the terms you're using.

Appreciate the follow up and feedback.

I am just stating what I learned in college 40 years ago and have continued to read in various philosophy texts and source materials for the past 40 years. Based on what I have been taught and learned from multiple sources (other than folks on this board), (i) Libertarians believe in the existence of a form of Free Will that is unconstrained by extrinsic forces that may restrain acting on the will, but do not preclude the exercise of a free decision (excluding, of course, brain damage, intoxication, hypnosis, and other mind-altering circumstances that impair the exercise of free will), (ii) Hard Determinists believe in a form of Determinism that others on this board prefer to call Fatalism, and (iii) Incompatibilists believe that Libertarian Free Will and Hard Determinism cannot coexist, (iv) Compatibilists believe that Libertarian Free Will and Hard Determinism can coexist, and (v) Soft Determinists seek to harmonize Determinism and Free Will by refining one or the other of the two concepts to fit the other.

I agree with you that Libertarian Free Will employs the Incompatibilist's position on Free Will, but that does not mean that Libertarian Free Will is not also the Compatibilist's position on Free Will -- which it is (at least as I have learned it). As I have been taught this subject and continued to learn it through my academic reading, Incompatibilists, Compatibilists, Hard Determinists, and Libertarians all utilize a common definition of Free Will and Determinism, and only Soft Determinists reject that shared understanding in order to achieve harmony. It seems that you and some others on this Board call Compatibilism what I have been taught to be Soft Determinism. If so, I still view that as contrary to what I have ben taught and continue to learn -- but c'est la vie.

I have no issue with Soft Determinists, as they openly acknowledge that they are redefining the core terms of the debate -- which actually means that they are accepting Indeterminism and rejecting Compatibilism, and seeking to find a different way to look at the subject that allows for the existence of some form of Free Will within a universe that is in some way Deterministic.

If I were to reformulate the understanding of these terms I have had for the past 40 years, and switch the name Compatibilism for what I have learned to be Soft Determinism, I would have no problem with the internal logical consistency of Compatibilism (as redefined). By the same token, I would hope that you similarly would agree that it would be illogical for a person to believe that Hard Determinism and Libertarianism can be harmonized -- without regard to whether that stance is called Soft Determinism, Compatibilism, Libertarian Determinism, of Philosophy X. If so, we would be in harmony, as that is all I have been saying -- albeit using the term Compatibilism as it was taught to me in college and as I have seen in multiple texts and source materials. If, however, you were to contend that Libertarianism and Hard Determinism can be harmonized, I would need to understand that better.

 

[Jarhyn]

I would hope that you similarly would agree that it would be illogical for a person to believe that Hard Determinism and Libertarianism can be harmonized

Obviously, which is why your literature, mostly written by Libertarians and hard determinists, might not actually successfully represent compatibilism? I mean if most of them understood that determinism doesn't entail to fatalism, and that the must of the sea battle is a syntax error, and that compatibilism argues it is an invalidly worded statement, then I hazard to think that more people would end up compatibilists.

Rather, the compatibilist contends that neither can Fatalism or Libertarianism be harmonized even within themselves.

As has been pointed out, every time you try, you end up making a syntax error.

I have pointed out numerous times that the source of all of these errors stem from the injection of the "must", the titular modal fallacy, and the injection of some demand of God names "necessitation".

This is not an overly hard thing to point out, or to notice. Marvin Edwards noticed it, Pood noticed it, I noticed it, on Reddit I've seen Simon Hibbs notice it, and a number of others, and then oftentimes they find out from the rest of the group shortly after that this particular application of contradiction so as to justify a syntax error is called 'The Modal Fallacy' and it has it's basis in formal logic!

If I were to use a problematically spiritualistic word, I would say "Can can only ever speak to the soul". The "soul" of you can do many things that you will not, in addition to everything that "you" have ever done, because "the soul of you" is a metaphysical thing like "water", a word that describes a local macro-state that is implemented by any of a Large Number of micro-states as is necessary to fit it into any of a Much Larger Number of contexts.

which actually means that they are accepting Indeterminism

No, they aren't, they are rejecting fatalism. Specifically and only that. That doesn't mean we accept that our experience of the universe is probabilistic (not deterministic)

In fact I went to great lengths to demonstrate a block forming deterministic infinite "closed" system (a 'possible universe'), and to even introduce the idea of "pseudo-probabilistic" systems, and demonstrated that there is no "ultimate necessitation" over it.

No, we do not accept indeterminism, and I wager that compatibilists NEVER have.

How many such dialogues have you ever had with compatibilists before now? Or with self-avowed historic compatibilists in your literature? How many hundreds or thousands of years ago did it happen? Who recorded the interaction: a determinist, a libertarian, or a compatibilist?

Because I guarantee you, we have been arguing this for 10 years and DBT still doesn't understand determinism does not entail necessitation, and if he were to write down some history of our conversations, the result would be yet another proclamation that compatibilists think as you said, when we very much do not.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

making a syntax error. ... the source of all of these errors stem from the injection of the "must", the titular modal fallacy

That is not how I see it.

I agree that, logically and expressively, it is better to eschew that must - not just because of the modal fallacy or for the sake of avoiding the modal fallacy charge, but, rather - because that must ignores the fact that the physics laws are, and can only be, descriptive rather than in any way effectual, since those laws are not themselves physical components of a supposedly entirely physical reality. And a must does not (physically or necessarily) follow from such a description.

That being said, it seems that the issue boils down to or starts with the question of whether determinism is such that determinists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness. That sort of indeterminateness is what persons think they experience when they decide/select/choose, and that sort of indeterminateness is actual as logical possibility even if that indeterminateness is not actual as physical possibility.

At the macrophysical level, if the descriptive laws of physicalism physics are as sufficient as physicalists presume them to be, then that is just a way of saying that there never are the assortment of physical possibilities which humans think they experience as being non-subjectively (or not strictly subjectively) actual.

If the macrophysical is such that there is no macrophysical indeterminateness, then the macrophysical is always determinate. If the macrophysical is always determinate and devoid of macrophysical indeterminateness, then any and all macrophysical states are eternally states of utter macrophysical determinateness. Eternal utter macrophysical determinateness is incompatible with there being any constituent macrophysical indeterminateness. And that is to say that given any macrophysical determinate state and its incompatibility with macrophysical indeterminateness, there is only one possible physical state to follow sequentially.

Do compatibilists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness?

If compatibilists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness, then there is this obvious sense in which compatibilists are incompatibilists.

If compatibilists do not deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness, then there is a sense in which compatibilists are not determinists.

I think this is essentially what the incompatibilist determinists are trying to convey in discussions with compatibilist determinists.

The matter of the human will and with what it is or is not compatible can be or would be a separate and subsequent topic.

 

[The AntiChris]

Appreciate the follow up and feedback.

My pleasure.

I am just stating what I learned in college 40 years ago and have continued to read in various philosophy texts and source materials for the past 40 years.

Ok. You say:

(iv) Compatibilists believe that Libertarian Free Will and Hard Determinism can coexist

This isn't just wrong, it's utter nonsense and demonstrates that you really don't understand the terms you're using.

To try and clarify:

1) do you accept that compatibilism is the belief that free will is compatible with determinism,

AND

2) you accept that libertarian free will is not compatible with free will

If you think that either of these statements is not in line with current mainstream thinking/debate then please provide supporting evidence.

 

[Jarhyn]

because that must ignores the fact that the physics laws are, and can only be, descriptive rather than in any way effectual,

And this is where the second part about necessitation equalling EinSof belief comes in.

That being said, it seems that the issue boils down to or starts with the question of whether determinism is such that determinists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness

It really doesn't.

As I have pointed out MANY times, pseudo-probabilistic systems are still deterministic, not merely on the macro level but on the micro level, and yet still there is free will operating in such a system because compatibilists eschew fatalism.

are eternally states of utter macrophysical determinateness

Here you tuck in a necessitation, in the invocation of "eternal states". There is a "must" here.

The rest of your logic twists and corrupts around that error.

 

[BSilvEsq]

making a syntax error. ... the source of all of these errors stem from the injection of the "must", the titular modal fallacy

That is not how I see it.

I agree that, logically and expressively, it is better to eschew that must - not just because of the modal fallacy or for the sake of avoiding the modal fallacy charge, but, rather - because that must ignores the fact that the physics laws are, and can only be, descriptive rather than in any way effectual, since those laws are not themselves physical components of a supposedly entirely physical reality. And a must does not (physically or necessarily) follow from such a description.

That being said, it seems that the issue boils down to or starts with the question of whether determinism is such that determinists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness. That sort of indeterminateness is what persons think they experience when they decide/select/choose, and that sort of indeterminateness is actual as logical possibility even if that indeterminateness is not actual as physical possibility.

At the macrophysical level, if the descriptive laws of physicalism physics are as sufficient as physicalists presume them to be, then that is just a way of saying that there never are the assortment of physical possibilities which humans think they experience as being non-subjectively (or not strictly subjectively) actual.

If the macrophysical is such that there is no macrophysical indeterminateness, then the macrophysical is always determinate. If the macrophysical is always determinate and devoid of macrophysical indeterminateness, then any and all macrophysical states are eternally states of utter macrophysical determinateness. Eternal utter macrophysical determinateness is incompatible with there being any constituent macrophysical indeterminateness. And that is to say that given any macrophysical determinate state and its incompatibility with macrophysical indeterminateness, there is only one possible physical state to follow sequentially.

Do compatibilists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness?

If compatibilists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness, then there is this obvious sense in which compatibilists are incompatibilists.

If compatibilists do not deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness, then there is a sense in which compatibilists are not determinists.

I think this is essentially what the incompatibilist determinists are trying to convey in discussions with compatibilist determinists.

The matter of the human will and with what it is or is not compatible can be or would be a separate and subsequent topic.

Excellent summary!

I sometimes have difficulty following what you write, because you use terms with which I am not familiar. Once I get the hang of the terminology, however, I am quite impressed with precision of your writing.

Thanks for wading in.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Here you tuck in a necessitation, in the invocation of "eternal states". There is a "must" here.

False. Nothing got tucked in.

If the determinist holds that there is no macrophysical indeterminateness in a spacetime which is utterly determinate, then that is identical to holding that all states within spacetime are states of utter macrophysical determinateness, and the "time" part of "spacetime" renders that utter macrophysical determinateness as eternal - even if any of those states are not actual from some particular perspective.

There is no "must" anywhere in that.

It is the supposed macrophysical determinateness of spacetime which provides for the eternalism of determinism. Macrophysical indeterminateness is incompatible with that determinism, and actual macrophysical indeterminateness would preclude eternal macrophysical determinateness as a physical possibility in a context which contains entities capable of recognizing and settling that indeterminateness.

 

[Jarhyn]

False. Nothing got tucked in.

No, it's right there in the word "eternal". It's a synonym here for "necessary".

 

[Jarhyn]

If the determinist holds that there is no macrophysical indeterminateness in a spacetime which is utterly determinate, then that is identical to holding that all states within spacetime are states of utter macrophysical determinateness

Nope. You keep inserting these "utter" and "eternal" qualifiers that really just mean "necessary" and speak to "necessitation" and I won't be having it, thanks.

It is the supposed macrophysical determinateness of spacetime which provides for the eternalism of determinism

Nope. It doesn't accomplish the lift. You never get from "it was determined" to "it was determined eternally" or "necessarily" or any other such thing.

Your attempt to play a shell game has been noted. Please stop it.

Eternal here is nothing but a synonym of necessary or divinely mandated.

But these do not follow from determinateness.

Time doesn't get determined except exactly where and when it is. That determination is contingent, not "eternal", specifically based on the context.

 

[BSilvEsq]

Appreciate the follow up and feedback.

My pleasure.

I am just stating what I learned in college 40 years ago and have continued to read in various philosophy texts and source materials for the past 40 years.

Ok. You say:

(iv) Compatibilists believe that Libertarian Free Will and Hard Determinism can coexist

This isn't just wrong, it's utter nonsense and demonstrates that you really don't understand the terms you're using.

To try and clarify:

1) do you accept that compatibilism is the belief that free will is compatible with determinism,

AND

2) you accept that libertarian free will is not compatible with free will

If you think that either of these statements is not in line with current mainstream thinking/debate then please provide supporting evidence.

Without commenting upon, much less agreeing with the unwarranted and disrespectful preamble to the two questions posed above, my answer to the two questions is the following:

1. Yes

2. No

Notwithstanding the fact that multiple posters on this board claim that "Determinism" within the Determinism / Free Will debate does not involve an inexorably determined and immutable future (or an unwaveringly fixed state if there is no time) and that "Free Will" within the Determinism / Free Will debate does not equate to Libertarian Free Will, that is not how I have learned the philosophical issues and not how they are presented in the text I identified in a prior post or in many other texts and original source material I have read, including the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy in multiple areas (including in the discussions of Causal Determinism, Free Will, and Compatibilism).

If by current "mainstream" thinking/debate, you mean the manner in which some posters on this board present and debate the issue and/or how the debate has been bastardized in popular media, then I agree that what I have written is not in line with that thinking. I disagree, however, that the way the issue is presented by many posters on this board accurately reflects the debate within rigorous philosophical circles. Rather, it is a popular discourse that carelessly injects pseudo-scientific (and, in the case of one particularly belligerent poster, computer science) concepts that are outside the rigorous philosophical debate.

In your own posts, you appear to assert that Libertarianism is incompatible with Compatibilism, because you state that Libertarianism incorporates Incompatibism, which rejects Compatibilism. As I understand it, Libertarianism takes no position on the Compatibilism / Incompatibilism debate, but merely asserts that people do, in fact, have Free Will and their actions are not inexorably determined by antecedent activity -- without regard to whether the two notions can or cannot be harmonized. By contrast, the Incompatibilist has no view on the factual question of whether Free Will does or does not exist or whether human actions (including thought) are inexorably determined by antecedent activity, but does assert the logical proposition that the two notions are incompatible and cannot be harmonized.

Where we seem to come apart is in your insistence that Compatibilism does not contend that Libertarian Free Will and (Fatalistic) Determinism are compatible and can be harmonized. That is, in fact, the classical definition of Compatibilism, whether you are willing to accept it or not. That also is why I contend that Compatibilism (when defined as I have explained) is logically incoherent and depends upon the person who lays claim to such a view to actually subscribe to Soft Determinism, which alters the playing field of the classical debate by changing the meaning of Free Will, Determinism, or both.

The proposition that Free Will is something less than or other than Libertarian Free Will and/or that Determinism does not imply a fixed, inexorable and immutable future (to the extent that there is such a thing as the passage of time) is called Soft Determinism in classical philosophical debate -- again, whether you agree to that terminology or not.

As best I can tell, the most rigorous and pure analysis is presented by Michael Pearl, who has, thus far, been spared the pejorative attacks that appear to be reserved for DBT and me. [Wait, after I initially wrote this, I saw that Jarhyn has now begun to accuse Michael of playing a shell game -- so I suppose it now begins for Michael, as well].

 

[BSilvEsq]

Here you tuck in a necessitation, in the invocation of "eternal states". There is a "must" here.

False. Nothing got tucked in.

If the determinist holds that there is no macrophysical indeterminateness in a spacetime which is utterly determinate, then that is identical to holding that all states within spacetime are states of utter macrophysical determinateness, and the "time" part of "spacetime" renders that utter macrophysical determinateness as eternal - even if any of those states are not actual from some particular perspective.

There is no "must" anywhere in that.

It is the supposed macrophysical determinateness of spacetime which provides for the eternalism of determinism. Macrophysical indeterminateness is incompatible with that determinism, and actual macrophysical indeterminateness would preclude eternal macrophysical determinateness as a physical possibility in a context which contains entities capable of recognizing and settling that indeterminateness.

There is no sense wasting your time engaging further with Jarhyn, as he is not capable of understanding what you are saying because it does not line up with his view of reality -- and even if it does line up if properly understood, it is not expressed in words he is capable of understanding and/or is willing to understand for one reason or another. He also is prone to being belligerent and claims to not care how he treats others. I do not know this person, and do not care to get to know him, but I do know that others who act and speak in a similar manner tend to have the sort of problems for which therapy and other help is beneficial -- but the first step to obtaining such help is to want it, and Jarhyn exhibits no signs of being anywhere close to that.

 

[Jarhyn]

The proposition that Free Will is something less than or other than Libertarian Free Will and/or that Determinism does not imply a fixed, inexorable and immutable future (to the extent that there is such a thing as the passage of time) is called Soft Determinism in classical philosophical debate -- again, whether you agree to that terminology or not

You complain about me but continually fail to understand the position you're trying to speak to, at least here.

I have yet to see any real rigor applied to this philosophical debate. I see sophistry from you. Piles and piles of sophistry, a million little words all intended to inject necessity and must and other such language that things somehow had to be that way for any other reason than "that's just what happened".

This will remain descriptive. There is no prescriptive power there. Elsewhere it is otherwise and it is otherwise elsewhere. It is never otherwise here because to be otherwise here would mean here would not be here and then there's a contradiction there!

But it is otherwise, and it is specifically so elsewhere. It does not need to be otherwise here for it to be "otherwise". In fact In saying "it can be otherwise elsewhere" we directly and tautologically observed the "otherwise".

To say otherwise than this is to invoke contradiction.

 

[Jarhyn]

I'll note, I don't care whether I'm an asshole.

I prefer especially here to be a bit of an asshole. It serves my purposes.

What I care to be is "correct about what I'm talking about".

Frankly, I don't care how people would classify my views, other than "correct, even if spoken by an asshole".

Compatibilism, within the scope of these forums, for a decade now I think, has been used to refer to the idea that "free will" has and will always be "the ability to act according to one's own desires".

If I was kind and coddling and had any sort of time for the sort of folks who invoked rather than eliminated contradictions, I would still be the sort of person who invokes contradictions myself.

The answer is that Aristotle was wrong; propositions about momentary events are never "necessarily" or "eternally" true. In fact Only propositions about metaphysical things can be said to be true, and only given some provided context.

The qualifier, rather than eternal, is "momentarily" or "contextually" true.

Yet again this reflects in the attempt to affix the pre- to determined, and it is always inappropriate, because it assumes a necessity, a reason things MUST be this way, a contradiction, and this is a God hiding in the shadows.

 

[Jarhyn]

Only propositions about metaphysical things can be said to be true

*At any and all times

 

[Jarhyn]

As I was walking to Chipotle tonight, I came to the realization that assigning eternalness to statements about momentary phenomena IS exactly a modal fallacy.

It is assigning metaphysical significance to an event; it is treating an instance as a type.

All an event can serve in terms of metaphysics is to act as a counterexample to a metaphysical proclamation.

 

[The AntiChris]

Appreciate the follow up and feedback.

My pleasure.

I am just stating what I learned in college 40 years ago and have continued to read in various philosophy texts and source materials for the past 40 years.

Ok. You say:

(iv) Compatibilists believe that Libertarian Free Will and Hard Determinism can coexist

This isn't just wrong, it's utter nonsense and demonstrates that you really don't understand the terms you're using.

To try and clarify:

1) do you accept that compatibilism is the belief that free will is compatible with determinism,

AND

2) you accept that libertarian free will is not compatible with free will

If you think that either of these statements is not in line with current mainstream thinking/debate then please provide supporting evidence.

Without commenting upon, much less agreeing with the unwarranted and disrespectful preamble to the two questions posed above, my answer to the two questions is the following:

1. Yes

2. No

My turn to apologise. I mis-typed my question #2. It should have said:

2) do you accept that libertarian free will is not compatible with determinism

On the assumption that you do accept that libertarian free will is incompatible with determinism, it follows that compatibilist free will and libertarian free will are mutually exclusive. That being the case, how are we to make sense of your previous claim that:

Compatibilists believe that Libertarian Free Will and Hard Determinism can coexist

Bearing in mind that  Hard Determinism is the view that determinism is true and that it is incompatible with free will (in other words, the hard determinist doesn't believe any form of free will can exist), your statement above makes contradictory claims and I can't make any sense of it.

 

[The AntiChris]

If compatibilists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness, then there is this obvious sense in which compatibilists are incompatibilists.

I'm struggling to follow your train of thought here. You seem to be saying that a compatibilist that holds that determinism is true is in some (obvious?) sense an incompatibilist? Is this what you're saying? If so, can you explain further?

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Eternal here is nothing but a synonym of necessary or divinely mandated.

But these do not follow from determinateness.

Time doesn't get determined except exactly where and when it is. That determination is contingent, not "eternal", specifically based on the context.

Eternal is not a synonym of necessary, and this is the case with or without God - as I will now explain.

Given a static spacetime which, as per determinism, is assumed to be fully determinate not only in terms of the spacetime morphology or topography but also with regards to all events within that spacetime, all of spacetime is eternally determinate. There is no modal necessity; there is no must about it. All simply eternally is.

Given a non-static spacetime which is assumed to be fully determinate not only in terms of the spacetime morphology or topography but also with regards to all events to occur within that spacetime, the determinateness is eternal such that all contained events are eternally determinate/determined even though those events are not eternally actual. The determined events are not determined at their spacetime coordinate locations; rather, it is that those events become actual at their spacetime locations. And there is still no modal necessity; there is no must. All is simply eternally determinate (which is better than saying eternally determined, since determined hints of there being a something which does the determining upon a state that is not determined or is yet to be determined, which would be to say a state with indeterminateness, but that is a state denied by determinism via assumption or definition apparently).

 

[Jarhyn]

Eternal is not a synonym of necessary

Yes, it is. Show me here how it is not.

regards to all events within that spacetime, all of spacetime is eternally determinate

No, it isn't, and this is an abuse.

As I was walking to Chipotle tonight, I came to the realization that assigning eternalness to statements about momentary phenomena IS exactly a modal fallacy.

It is assigning metaphysical significance to an event; it is treating an instance as a type.

At best you can say that there is an eternal truth about the metaphysical aspects that we derive from those events, but the events themselves are all contextually determinate.

They are only determined as such in the context of that structure.

The metaphysical aspects of each of those moments are eternal, but those aren't determinate as such.

It really is a modal fallacy to assign eternalness to momentary phenomena. They only attach to metaphysical statements and again only in the context of whatever metaphysical assumption, of which necessitation is not valid.