According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[pood]

Yes but the disagreement is about the nature of free will, not about determinism.

Not for me. For me, the problem is that hard determinism mistakes determinism for pre-determinism.

I don't think this is right. You're assuming that incomptatibilism necessarily entails a belief in pre-determinism. Whilst there will be some incomptatibilists who do subscribe to pre-determinism (a bizarre worldview) I'm pretty sure most don't. Most incomptatibilists believe that reliable cause and effect means that, under the same conditions, we couldn't act differently and that this robs us of freedom of will - this is standard hard determinism. The disagreement is about the nature of freedom under determinism.

Yes, I basically agree, except that I am arguing that we WOULDN’T act differently under the same circumstances, not that we COULDN’T. The latter is the modal fallacy — modal collapse, confusing contingency with necessity.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

The one thing that is rejected from "possibility" is, in fact, contradiction.

A contradiction is NECESSARILY derived from multiples. In the current context, the focus of multiples is set on multiple possibilities. Not all multiple possibilities effect contradiction even if the actualization of one of the possibilities excludes or precludes actualization of the other alternatives. Your reply was unresponsive.

 

[Jarhyn]

A contradiction is NECESSARILY derived from multiples

And necessarily and sufficiently when those multiples are forced under the same "complete" context, though this is not in the mathematical interpretation of "completeness" in my understanding.

Any viewing of a * in the same "position" "in all respects" as any other * is a fucking contradiction.

In fact this is one of the principal reasons to reject Libertarianism, because that is the claim of the libertarian.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Any viewing of a * in the same "position" "in all respects" as any other * is a fucking contradiction.

Your dimensionless "position" is NOT necessary. It is neither modally nor contingently necessary.

The issue of the same place-time has already been shown to be NOT a contradiction.

You insist on being modally erroneous. That insistence of yours along with your foulness wastes my time. But you go on being the trash-spewing intransigent you.

 

[Jarhyn]

Your dimensionless "position" is NOT necessary

The fuck is this even supposed to mean. I didn't propose a "dimensionless position". Positions are sometimes dimensional, sometimes they're more weird than "dimensions". Sometimes they're along some symmetry group.

The issue of the same place-time has already been shown to be NOT a contradiction

No, it has not been. You have claimed it, kicked a tantrum wanting it to not be so that it is a contradiction, but it is a fucking contradiction.

You insist on being modally erroneous

And again, this does not mean what you think it means.

I reject contradiction.

I insist you reject contradiction or I will keep pointing out that you believe in contradictions.

Seriously, you are fucking ridiculous...

And moreover on a Newtonian level/scale, "same place-time" is entirely disproven by conservation and general relativity.

And most importantly, to declare two different things can be in the exact same place/time in space on a fundamental level is to admit to libertarianism, which we all reject here, and I goddamn fucking wonder why.

I wonder if it has anything to do with the fact that it's contradictory.

This is so goddamn stupid.

And the worst part is that the post trying to refute physical non-contradiction is half screed against any claims of knowledge.

I very much want these folks to take a math class and a software engineering class, instead of wasting that same hour or two out of every day or every other day proving to sun and sundry that they need to.

 

[BSilvEsq]

In order for the discussion of compatibilism to have any coherence, it is important that the participants in the discussion employ shared terms, or, at least, define their terms.

In that regard, I find the following chart from the introductory chapter of the 2003 book "Freedom and Determinism" by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and David Shier," published by M.I.T., nicely lays out the meaning of the various "isms" being discussed.

As summarized by the chart, and as I understand the term:

1. Compatibilism and Incompatibilism are overarching approaches to the relationship between Determinism and Free Will (called "Freedom" in the chart), which do not include any position on whether the universe is, in fact, deterministic and/or whether Free Will (or "Freedom") does, in fact, exist. Compatibilism and Incompatibilism are simply relational beliefs, which are agnostic to whether the concepts being compared (i.e., Determinism and Free Will) do or do not have a factual foundation.

2. Soft Determinism combines Compatibilism with a belief that the universe is, in fact, deterministic and Free Will does, in fact, exist.

3. Hard Determinism combines Incompatibilism with a belief that the universe is, in fact, deterministic and Free Will does not, in fact, exist.

4. Libertarianism combines Incompatibilism with a belief that the universe is not, in fact, deterministic and Free Will does, in fact, exist.

It is necessary to read the book (and other classical philosophical works on this subject) to understand what how the five "isms" define Determinism and Freedom. Moreover, it is unclear from the classical debate that all engaged in the debate bother to articulate their definition of Determinism and Freedom, much less have a shared definition.

For my purposes, which I understand to be born out by the classical philosophical literature, all of the foregoing "isms" (i.e., Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Soft Determinism, Hard Determinism, and Libertarianism) define Determinism and Free Will (or "Freedom" as used in the chart above) as follows:

"Determinism"

Determinism is a paradigm that posits that all activity in the universe is both (i) the effect of all antecedent activity, and (ii) the only activity that can occur given the antecedent activity. That is what is meant by saying that everything is “determined” — it is the inexorable consequence of activity that preceded it. This determined activity of the universe necessarily includes all human action, including all human cognition.

A great number of discussions of Determinism explicitly or implicitly assume that the future would be perfectly predictable with a combination of (i) perfect information about the past and the present instant, and (ii) perfect information about the so-called laws of nature as (assuming that nature continues to operate in the same manner going forward). Personally, I reject that predictability is an aspect of Determinism. As I understand it, Determinism posits only that everything has a cause and cannot occur in any manner other than how it does occur — without regard to the ability to predict or replicate that activity. Moreover, Determinism does not posit that the factors that have caused, are causing, or will cause any particular activity can be known or understood, or that any specific future activity can be predicted with any degree of certainty. As Karl Popper explained:

“The metaphysical doctrine of determinism simply asserts that all events in this world are fixed, or unalterable, or predetermined. It does not assert that they are known to anybody, or predictable by scientific means. But it asserts that the future is as little changeable as is the past. Everybody knows what we mean when we say that the past cannot be changed. It is in precisely the same sense that the future cannot be changed, according to metaphysical determinism.”

"Free Will" or "Freedom"

Free Will posits that a human being, when presented with more than one course of action, has the freedom or agency to choose between or among the alternatives, and that the state of affairs that exists in the universe immediately prior to the putative exercise of that freedom of choice does not eliminate all but one option and compel the selection of only one of the available options.

The Logical Incoherence of Classical Compatibilism

As previously noted, the classical version of Compatibilism is that Free Will or Freedom (as defined above) can and does exist within a universe that is, in fact, perfectly and entirely deterministic (as defined above). I view that as a contradiction that does not hold up to logical scrutiny. As I previously have posted:

1. If Determinism is true (i.e., the universe is truly and entirely deterministic), then humans lack Free Will because the truth of Determinism means that (a) humans lack the ability to think in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, as human cognition is simply a form of activity that is governed by Determinism, and (b) there are no such thing as true “options” or “alternatives” because there is one, and only one, activity that can ever occur at any given instant;

and

2. If Free-Will exists in its pure form, then Determinism is not true because the existence of Free Will in its pure form depends upon (a) the existence of true “options” or “alternatives,” and (b) humans being capable of thinking (and acting) in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside their control.

As I understand Determinism and Free Will, they are irreconcilably incompatible unless (i) Determinism is defined to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence, and/or (ii) Free Will is defined to be include the illusion of human cognition that is a part of the path of Determinism.
As William James aptly observed:

“The issue . . . is a perfectly sharp one, which no eulogistic terminology can smear over or wipe out. The truth must lie with one side or the other, and its lying with one side makes the other false.”

I could write many pages describing the varied attempts of by Compatibilists to harmonize the irreconcilable concepts of Determinism and Free Will, but it is unnecessary for me to do so, as there is an excellent discussion of this subject on-line at Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). It should suffice to say that none of the various arguments for Compatibilism courageously presented on the Stanford website is satisfying, and all suffer from the same flaw identified above — namely, a stubborn refusal to come to grips with the true and complete nature of Determinism and Free Will. Or, as William James less generously observed, all efforts to harmonize Determinism and Free Will are a “quagmire of evasion.”

Notwithstanding the foregoing, if people do, in fact, lack Free Will, then the true and only reason that anyone believes in Compatibilism is because that is what such people are compelled to believe by forces outside of their non-existent control. By the same token, if Free Will does exist, then the people who freely choose to believe in Compatibilism do so based on the mistaken belief that Determinism is true, combined with an emotion-driven irrational effort to harmonize their mistaken belief in Determinism with their psychological desire to believe (correctly) in their own Free Will.

 

[BSilvEsq]

Yes but the disagreement is about the nature of free will, not about determinism.

Not for me. For me, the problem is that hard determinism mistakes determinism for pre-determinism.

I don't think this is right. You're assuming that incomptatibilism necessarily entails a belief in pre-determinism. Whilst there will be some incomptatibilists who do subscribe to pre-determinism (a bizarre worldview) I'm pretty sure most don't. Most incomptatibilists believe that reliable cause and effect means that, under the same conditions, we couldn't act differently and that this robs us of freedom of will - this is standard hard determinism. The disagreement is about the nature of freedom under determinism.

I like the way you have framed the issue as being that the central difference between Compatibilists and Incompatibilists lies in their respective definitions of Free Will or Freedom -- although I will add that classical Compatibilists (as contrasted with the pseudo-Compatibilists in this thread) claim to accept the same definition of Free Will or Freedom as is used by Incompatibilists, but draw a different conclusion respecting the compatibility of that concept with determinism.

As a logical matter, Determinism and Free Will care incapable of being harmonized using the definition of the two terms within Indeterminism. That is the point that DBT and I have been making. If someone wants to reject the Incompatibilist definitions of Free Will, and define the concept in such a way includes the "feeling" of making a free decision that is not known or knowable in advance of it being made, then the two concepts can be harmonized -- but that does not negate Incompatibilism. Rather, it evades the logical dilemma by redefining the problem -- which also is the point that DBT an I have been making.