Analytic vs Continental Philosophy

[steve_bank]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continental_philosophy

'First, continental philosophers generally reject the view that the natural sciences are the only or most accurate way of understanding natural phenomena. This contrasts with many analytic philosophers who consider their inquiries as continuous with, or subordinate to, those of the natural sciences. Continental philosophers often argue that science depends upon a "pre-theoretical substrate of experience" (a version of Kantian conditions of possible experience or the phenomenological "lifeworld") and that scientific methods are inadequate to fully understand such conditions of intelligibility.[6]
Second, continental philosophy usually considers these conditions of possible experience as variable: determined at least partly by factors such as context, space and time, language, culture, or history. Thus continental philosophy tends toward historicism (or historicity). Where analytic philosophy tends to treat philosophy in terms of discrete problems, capable of being analyzed apart from their historical origins (much as scientists consider the history of science inessential to scientific inquiry), continental philosophy typically suggests that "philosophical argument cannot be divorced from the textual and contextual conditions of its historical emergence".[7]
Third, continental philosophy typically holds that human agency can change these conditions of possible experience: "if human experience is a contingent creation, then it can be recreated in other ways".[8] Thus continental philosophers tend to take a strong interest in the unity of theory and practice, and often see their philosophical inquiries as closely related to personal, moral, or political transformation. This tendency is very clear in the Marxist tradition ("philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it"), but is also central in existentialism and post-structuralism.
A final characteristic trait of continental philosophy is an emphasis on metaphilosophy. In the wake of the development and success of the natural sciences, continental philosophers have often sought to redefine the method and nature of philosophy.[9] In some cases (such as German idealism or phenomenology), this manifests as a renovation of the traditional view that philosophy is the first, foundational, a priori science. In other cases (such as hermeneutics, critical theory, or structuralism), it is held that philosophy investigates a domain that is irreducibly cultural or practical. And some continental philosophers (such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, the later Heidegger, or Derrida) doubt whether any conception of philosophy can coherently achieve its stated goals.'

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_philosophy

'As a philosophical practice,[2][3] it is characterized by an emphasis on argumentative clari'ty and precision, often making use of formal logic, conceptual analysis, and, to a lesser degree, mathematics and the natural sciences.[4][5][6]

Which are you and why?

I would call myself analytical. The best way to understand reality is through quantifiable science. Conceptual views of reality only have meaning when connected to objective scienc

 

[fast]

Analytic.

 

[steve_bank]

Analytic.

To ne your posts say otherwise. You always try to work around obvious scientific explanations.

 

[Speakpigeon]

'First, continental philosophers generally reject the view that the natural sciences are the only or most accurate way of understanding natural phenomena.

Me, I'm entirely comfortable with the idea that science is doing a good job with understanding nature. I fail to see how any of the philosophers I have some notions about could have done a better job.

Still, this is an empirical issue in itself. So, I'm also open to the idea that my view on this could change. I might for example suddenly realise that scientists are hopelessly stupid and that you can't trust them with anything.

This contrasts with many analytic philosophers who consider their inquiries as continuous with, or subordinate to, those of the natural sciences.

My own enquiries are clearly beyond the scope of science but I can see how the enquiries of most philosophers could seem to them continuous with science, and I would in fact agree with this view.

Continental philosophers often argue that science depends upon a "pre-theoretical substrate of experience" (a version of Kantian conditions of possible experience or the phenomenological "lifeworld") and that scientific methods are inadequate to fully understand such conditions of intelligibility.[6]

Yes, I agree with that but I fail to see why that would necessarily break continuity with science. Again, it's a pragmatic matter. Things could evolve such that what science couldn't do today it will do it tomorrow.

Or not. Who knows?

Second, continental philosophy usually considers these conditions of possible experience as variable: determined at least partly by factors such as context, space and time, language, culture, or history.

Sure but that doesn't necessarily mean different people can't possibly agree on what is the case.

Thus continental philosophy tends toward historicism (or historicity).

Yes, and I see that as a good assumption to start with when you don't have anything better. It certainly makes sense although I would hope any idiot could see the necessary limitations in that approach.

Where analytic philosophy tends to treat philosophy in terms of discrete problems, capable of being analyzed apart from their historical origins (much as scientists consider the history of science inessential to scientific inquiry),

I would say any approach is legitimate until somebody can show how it's hopelessly flawed. I think egos also explain a lot here.

continental philosophy typically suggests that "philosophical argument cannot be divorced from the textual and contextual conditions of its historical emergence".[7]

Well, put like this it's just plain idiotic. Anyone for it?

Unless perhaps "continental philosophy" isn't just philosophy. Beats me.

Third, continental philosophy typically holds that human agency can change these conditions of possible experience: "if human experience is a contingent creation, then it can be recreated in other ways".[8] Thus continental philosophers tend to take a strong interest in the unity of theory and practice, and often see their philosophical inquiries as closely related to personal, moral, or political transformation. This tendency is very clear in the Marxist tradition ("philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it"), but is also central in existentialism and post-structuralism.

Well, it's a historical fact that people were able to do things that were previously thought impossible to do for human beings. It's a historical fact that our perspective on reality has evolved in a way that would have been seen as nonsensical before it did. Nobody could possibly prove any limitation in our future. All we can do is assume some limitations. But we did that before and were proved wrong.

And obviously, science is done by scientists, for now at least, and scientists are people, and as such they're subject their own human nature, and to a large extent therefore to the psychology of human beings.

Except that some individuals can be very different from most other people, and therefore do things most other people couldn't do by themselves.

A final characteristic trait of continental philosophy is an emphasis on metaphilosophy. In the wake of the development and success of the natural sciences, continental philosophers have often sought to redefine the method and nature of philosophy.[9] In some cases (such as German idealism or phenomenology), this manifests as a renovation of the traditional view that philosophy is the first, foundational, a priori science.

Yes, and I say it's a smart move. Solutions usually appears just because you broaden the conceptual framework within which you look at the problem. You know, if you can't beat them, just change the rules. And ego is definitely a very effective motivation here.

In other cases (such as hermeneutics, critical theory, or structuralism), it is held that philosophy investigates a domain that is irreducibly cultural or practical. And some continental philosophers (such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, the later Heidegger, or Derrida) doubt whether any conception of philosophy can coherently achieve its stated goals.'

Human beings are social animals. They work like ants, by being all over the place. Each ant doesn't know what it's doing beyond running around like mad but, boy, look at the overall result! It works! I've always been fascinated by ants. They're stupid. I love them.

'As a philosophical practice,[2][3] it is characterized by an emphasis on argumentative clari'ty and precision, often making use of formal logic, conceptual analysis, and, to a lesser degree, mathematics and the natural sciences.[4][5][6]

Each school it's regulations. Let one hundred flowers bloom.

Which are you and why?

I think I just explained.

I failed to see where ego is taken into account in there. My view is that you can't understand things without taking ego into account.
EB

 

[skepticalbip]

I found the Wiki article a bit confusing. It seems that the author does not really understand how science does what it does so gives the impression that science and "continental?" philosophy are complete antithetical endeavors. As I see it, scientific research begins with "continental philosophy" - the researcher starts by considering how some phenomena may work so develops a philosophical model. Where science methodology separates from "continental philosophy" is that the model is then tested to see if it does actually work in the real world. If it doesn't work as predicted, then the researcher modifies the model (or scraps that model and develops a new model) and then retests it while the philosopher does not test their model but just defends their model with argumentation against any criticism.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Where science methodology separates from "continental philosophy" is that the model is then tested to see if it does actually work in the real world. If it doesn't work as predicted, then the researcher modifies the model (or scraps that model and develops a new model) and then retests it while the philosopher does not test their model but just defends their model with argumentation against any criticism.

I would assume most philosophers do a bit more than that. What they don't do is to develop specific instruments, facilities, methods, organisations and institutions to test. But I would hope your average philosopher would still be a keen observer of the real world and test his views against his observations as much as possible. For what it's worth.

And there are areas of investigation where nobody at all, scientists included, can do better than that, at least for now.
EB

 

[skepticalbip]

Where science methodology separates from "continental philosophy" is that the model is then tested to see if it does actually work in the real world. If it doesn't work as predicted, then the researcher modifies the model (or scraps that model and develops a new model) and then retests it while the philosopher does not test their model but just defends their model with argumentation against any criticism.

I would assume most philosophers do a bit more than that. What they don't do is to develop specific instruments, facilities, methods, organisations and institutions to test. But I would hope your average philosopher would still be a keen observer of the real world and test his views against his observations as much as possible. For what it's worth.

And there are areas of investigation where nobody at all, scientists included, can do better than that, at least for now.
EB

Even if the philosopher does re-observe the same phenomena under the same conditions to see if they are happy with their model, that is not a test. A test (in the science sense) is an honest attempt to falsify the model (hypothesis) by changing conditions as much a possible to see if the model fails. Only after seeing that the model (and all the model implies) holds up under various parameters being changed will the model be conditionally accepted.

 

[fast]

Analytic.

To ne your posts say otherwise. You always try to work around obvious scientific explanations.

Perhaps my lack of clarity leaves me misunderstood.

Although it's true I have my doubts about some scientific claims, I'm understanding and flexible enough to go with the flow for the most part in many cases. My issue comes not with the appreciated efforts of the scientists and the verified results produced; rather, it's the abomination of language in their interpretation that leaves me reeling. For instance, telling me that I cannot really see things in front of me, as evidenced by a more thourough scientific understanding of the mechanisms of vision leaves me not doubting the results of their experiments but rather the words they use when speaking of it.

 

[fromderinside]

The physical underpinning ere there way before even a hint of language appeared. Perhaps better strategy is to improve language to coincide with scientific findings in the operations scientists use to arrive at physical findings of physical condition.

I'm satisfied that six sigma criteria provide sufficient confidence in validity of specific result for most physical observation, just as I'm satisfied the underpinnings of statistics are lawful enough to guide publication of most empirical results.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Where science methodology separates from "continental philosophy" is that the model is then tested to see if it does actually work in the real world. If it doesn't work as predicted, then the researcher modifies the model (or scraps that model and develops a new model) and then retests it while the philosopher does not test their model but just defends their model with argumentation against any criticism.

I would assume most philosophers do a bit more than that. What they don't do is to develop specific instruments, facilities, methods, organisations and institutions to test. But I would hope your average philosopher would still be a keen observer of the real world and test his views against his observations as much as possible. For what it's worth.

And there are areas of investigation where nobody at all, scientists included, can do better than that, at least for now.
EB

Even if the philosopher does re-observe the same phenomena under the same conditions to see if they are happy with their model, that is not a test.

Sure, but I would assume that life usually provides to the keen observer conditions that are sufficiently different to make progress possible over the span of a lifetime.

Some philosophers are noted for having switched to very different perspectives, like Karl Marx and Wittgenstein for example. Oh, and I don't know who else.

A test (in the science sense) is an honest attempt to falsify the model (hypothesis) by changing conditions as much a possible to see if the model fails.

Sure, I think I knew that. However, how do you achieve that when the object of your attention is human society for example, human nature, or the metaphysics of time? So, some people at least will do their best but there are intrinsic limitations.

Only after seeing that the model (and all the model implies) holds up under various parameters being changed will the model be conditionally accepted.

Astronomers, I suppose, accepted Newton's theory because it could predict accurately enough the movement of the planets initially observed. Once Uranus had been discovered, that was no longer the case. Yet, astronomers didn't put out a declaration saying that Newton's theory was no longer accepted as true. Instead, they split into two camps. That of most astronomers who preferred to assume that Newton's theory was correct and that Uranus' orbit was subjected to perturbations by some unknown planet, and that of George Biddell Airy, who thought Newton's theory was disqualified. Human beings, I would assume, usually have broadly all the same kind of attitudes. Scientists are obviously more professional so they will be more demanding but they still abide by the conservative principle of the best best and god for them.

Still, I would agree with you that scientists are better scientists than philosophers.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Analytic.

To ne your posts say otherwise. You always try to work around obvious scientific explanations.

Perhaps my lack of clarity leaves me misunderstood.

Although it's true I have my doubts about some scientific claims, I'm understanding and flexible enough to go with the flow for the most part in many cases. My issue comes not with the appreciated efforts of the scientists and the verified results produced; rather, it's the abomination of language in their interpretation that leaves me reeling. For instance, telling me that I cannot really see things in front of me, as evidenced by a more thourough scientific understanding of the mechanisms of vision leaves me not doubting the results of their experiments but rather the words they use when speaking of it.

Well, some scientists would say that in any case you cannot really understand things, as evidenced by a more thorough scientific understanding of the mechanisms of our neurological brain.

I'm with you here but we must admit it's a difficult job to explain that we don't really see things as they are.

You seem to understand the science of it, so, how would you express this veridical idea yourself?
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

The physical underpinning ere there way before even a hint of language appeared. Perhaps better strategy is to improve language to coincide with scientific findings in the operations scientists use to arrive at physical findings of physical condition.

I'm satisfied that six sigma criteria provide sufficient confidence in validity of specific result for most physical observation, just as I'm satisfied the underpinnings of statistics are lawful enough to guide publication of most empirical results.

I must absolutely strive to improve my English skills beyond what is humanely possible to achieve understanding of your prose here.
EB

 

[Juma]

Analytic.

To ne your posts say otherwise. You always try to work around obvious scientific explanations.

Perhaps my lack of clarity leaves me misunderstood.

Although it's true I have my doubts about some scientific claims, I'm understanding and flexible enough to go with the flow for the most part in many cases. My issue comes not with the appreciated efforts of the scientists and the verified results produced; rather, it's the abomination of language in their interpretation that leaves me reeling. For instance, telling me that I cannot really see things in front of me, as evidenced by a more thourough scientific understanding of the mechanisms of vision leaves me not doubting the results of their experiments but rather the words they use when speaking of it.

Maybe you rather should doubt your understanding of what they ment.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Perhaps my lack of clarity leaves me misunderstood.

Although it's true I have my doubts about some scientific claims, I'm understanding and flexible enough to go with the flow for the most part in many cases. My issue comes not with the appreciated efforts of the scientists and the verified results produced; rather, it's the abomination of language in their interpretation that leaves me reeling. For instance, telling me that I cannot really see things in front of me, as evidenced by a more thourough scientific understanding of the mechanisms of vision leaves me not doubting the results of their experiments but rather the words they use when speaking of it.

Maybe you rather should doubt your understanding of what they ment.

Maybe you should try and understand what fast said.

Or is it that you cannot understand good English?

Nah, just try it!
EB

 

[skepticalbip]

Even if the philosopher does re-observe the same phenomena under the same conditions to see if they are happy with their model, that is not a test.

Sure, but I would assume that life usually provides to the keen observer conditions that are sufficiently different to make progress possible over the span of a lifetime.

As I said originally, the scientific methodology begins with philosophy then takes an additional step of testing the models they develop from their observations. The many, many observations in life that philosophers make is called "the data collection stage" in science. The next step taken in philosophy is to then draw a conclusion (develop a model). Here science begins to expand on general philosophy by also developing a mathematical model in addition to the mental model. The next step in science methodology (not general philosophy) is to rigorously test (test as described above) the model in an honest attempt to falsify the model.

Science is not an endeavor separate from philosophy. Science is general philosophy adding a more rigorous attempt to find "truth".

 

[Speakpigeon]

Even if the philosopher does re-observe the same phenomena under the same conditions to see if they are happy with their model, that is not a test.

Sure, but I would assume that life usually provides to the keen observer conditions that are sufficiently different to make progress possible over the span of a lifetime.

As I said originally, the scientific methodology begins with philosophy then takes an additional step of testing the models they develop from their observations. The many, many observations in life that philosophers make is called "the data collection stage" in science. The next step taken in philosophy is to then draw a conclusion (develop a model). Here science begins to expand on general philosophy by also developing a mathematical model in addition to the mental model. The next step in science methodology (not general philosophy) is to rigorously test (test as described above) the model in an honest attempt to falsify the model.

Science is not an endeavor separate from philosophy. Science is general philosophy adding a more rigorous attempt to find "truth".

Sure, we agree on that.

I was responding to your initial statement here:

IWhere science methodology separates from "continental philosophy" is that the model is then tested to see if it does actually work in the real world. If it doesn't work as predicted, then the researcher modifies the model (or scraps that model and develops a new model) and then retests it while the philosopher does not test their model but just defends their model with argumentation against any criticism.

I fail to see what would be preventing the philosopher from testing his ideas against new observations of the real world. It's really the scale of this effort which is different. And the reason that the scale is different seems to me to be essentially that scientists are people who are working in those areas where they can use technological means to make observations while philosophers are those people who are working on issues where they only have their own eyes and ears as means of observation.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

I fail to see what would be preventing the philosopher from testing his ideas against new observations of the real world. It's really the scale of this effort which is different. And the reason that the scale is different seems to me to be essentially that scientists are people who are working in those areas where they can use technological means to make observations while philosophers are those people who are working on issues where they only have their own eyes and ears as means of observation.
EB

You answered your own question. Philosophers use, depend on, an easy chair and peep (Clouseau) to do their work.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I fail to see what would be preventing the philosopher from testing his ideas against new observations of the real world. It's really the scale of this effort which is different. And the reason that the scale is different seems to me to be essentially that scientists are people who are working in those areas where they can use technological means to make observations while philosophers are those people who are working on issues where they only have their own eyes and ears as means of observation.
EB

You answered your own question.

What question?!

Philosophers use, depend on, an easy chair and peep (Clouseau) to do their work.

That must be very profound and so true. You're obviously talking from your own experience. I am sooo impressed.

What other jewel you haven't revealed to the world? Come on! You have to tell us mortals!
EB

 

[Subsymbolic]

I found the Wiki article a bit confusing. It seems that the author does not really understand how science does what it does so gives the impression that science and "continental?" philosophy are complete antithetical endeavors. As I see it, scientific research begins with "continental philosophy" - the researcher starts by considering how some phenomena may work so develops a philosophical model. Where science methodology separates from "continental philosophy" is that the model is then tested to see if it does actually work in the real world. If it doesn't work as predicted, then the researcher modifies the model (or scraps that model and develops a new model) and then retests it while the philosopher does not test their model but just defends their model with argumentation against any criticism.

I think the point is that philosophy simply uses different criteria to arrive at and preserve truth. The point about philosophy is that it is alway metacognition, it’s interested in examining, for example, the methodology of science, or philosophy or whatever to try to make sure it’s doing the job it needs to to maximise whatever should be maximised. To do this, philosophy needs a toolkit, scaffolding that stops philosophy from falling. This is logic and maths, the stuff Russel and, to a lesser degree, Frege set in the sound footing of set theory after millennia of restricting ourselves to syllogisms, fragments of argument we knew worked. Logic gives us a reliable, repeatable and verifiable way of moving from true premises to true conclusions. These form lemma for further exploration.

There is one key dupifference between continentals and analytics, analytics wholeheartedly endorse Russell’s approach while Continentals are more Catholic, frolicking with Frege, dialectic and other approaches, this makes Continental philosophy more fun at parties but...

Ironically, the method of establishing truth that is slowly nibbling away at falsificationist approaches in science, is all about consistency with prior theory, it dodges the problems with scepticism and even, partly, induction if you don’t look too hard, but it means science is finally accepting defeat and allowing philosophy to offer criteria for judging truth. If you want to argue this point, I’d love to hear precisely what ‘Sigma Six’ means beyond ‘house’ in Bullshit Bingo. Science and Continental philosophy, two things that are not as rigorous as analytic philosophy.

Duck and cover...

 

[skepticalbip]

As I said originally, the scientific methodology begins with philosophy then takes an additional step of testing the models they develop from their observations. The many, many observations in life that philosophers make is called "the data collection stage" in science. The next step taken in philosophy is to then draw a conclusion (develop a model). Here science begins to expand on general philosophy by also developing a mathematical model in addition to the mental model. The next step in science methodology (not general philosophy) is to rigorously test (test as described above) the model in an honest attempt to falsify the model.

Science is not an endeavor separate from philosophy. Science is general philosophy adding a more rigorous attempt to find "truth".

Sure, we agree on that.

I was responding to your initial statement here:

IWhere science methodology separates from "continental philosophy" is that the model is then tested to see if it does actually work in the real world. If it doesn't work as predicted, then the researcher modifies the model (or scraps that model and develops a new model) and then retests it while the philosopher does not test their model but just defends their model with argumentation against any criticism.

I fail to see what would be preventing the philosopher from testing his ideas against new observations of the real world.

There is nothing preventing a philosopher from testing their ideas but it would be a small step toward the scientific method and away from the typical philosophical methodology of staunch argumentative defense.

It's really the scale of this effort which is different. And the reason that the scale is different seems to me to be essentially that scientists are people who are working in those areas where they can use technological means to make observations while philosophers are those people who are working on issues where they only have their own eyes and ears as means of observation.
EB

It isn't so much a difference in available resources as it is a difference in methodology and mindset.

To illustrate the methodologies and mindsets, lets look at a very simple and ancient example. Ancient Greek philosophers concluded that there were four elements; fire, air, water, and earth. This is actually fairly insightful for the time - it categorizes the four states of matter commonly recognized today; plasma, gas, liquid, and solid. However through the many, many observations of nature of always seeing that rocks sink to the bottom in water, air always bubbles up through water, and fire always rises through air, philosophers of the time concluded that "each element always seeks its level of tranquility" - earth at the bottom, then water above the earth but below air, then air above water but below fire, then fire at the top. This philosophical view of elements always trying to get to where they are happy or content was accepted as the explanation for quite a few observed phenomena for many centuries.

If there had been someone with a scientific mindset of questioning and testing explanatory models at the time then I can imagine some of the tests they could have done. Do all stones sink in water? Try several types of stone. Do all shape stones sink in water? Try different shapes. If one of these shapes happened to be a bowl carved from marble then the model would have been falsified since the bowl would have floated and certainly marble would be earth under the model but it acted like air. In science, such tests that end up falsifying models are the springboard to expanded understanding of nature as they lead to more new questions and suggested answers to be further tested. In this example, those new questions and suggested answers could have led to an understanding of gravity, density, bouncy, displacement, etc. much, much earlier than they were eventually explored and understood.