Anti-LGBTQ hate group asks the Supreme Court to formally foreclose protections for LGBTQ workers

[Angra Mainyu]

A reasonable dress code for both sexes isn’t disparate treatment on the basis of sex, a notion long recognized by the federal circuits. Indeed, those cases I cited stated Title VII didn’t prohibit reasonable dress codes for both sexes, that Congress never intended for that to occur, and it’s not disparate treatment Title VII seeks to prohibit.

The courts may have claimed that it is not disparate treatment, though they did not address cases in which they had to distinguish between dress codes based on sex and based on sex appearance. I'm arguing that even by the standard "In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman.", in fact it is disparate treatment, at least if the dress code is based on sex rather than sex appearance. You disagree, but I don't understand why. After all, the firing happens because the person is a female.

So, she’s fired for violating the dress code.
She wasn’t fired because of discriminatory and disparate treatment on the basis of her sex.

She's fired for violating a dress code whose imposition entails disparate treatment on the basis of sex. The very fact that she was told she had to wear uniform F (implicitly: or be fired), but a male would have been told to wear uniform M (implicitly: or be fired) but not F, is discrimination on the basis of sex. Why? Because people are treated differently on the basis of their sex (not even on the basis of the consequences for the business of letting them wear F or M, but merely on the basis of their sex).

 

[James Madison]

A reasonable dress code for both sexes isn’t disparate treatment on the basis of sex, a notion long recognized by the federal circuits. Indeed, those cases I cited stated Title VII didn’t prohibit reasonable dress codes for both sexes, that Congress never intended for that to occur, and it’s not disparate treatment Title VII seeks to prohibit.

The courts may have claimed that it is not disparate treatment, though they did not address cases in which they had to distinguish between dress codes based on sex and based on sex appearance. I'm arguing that even by the standard "In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman.", in fact it is disparate treatment, at least if the dress code is based on sex rather than sex appearance. You disagree, but I don't understand why. After all, the firing happens because the person is a female.

So, she’s fired for violating the dress code.
She wasn’t fired because of discriminatory and disparate treatment on the basis of her sex.

She's fired for violating a dress code whose imposition entails disparate treatment on the basis of sex. The very fact that she was told she had to wear uniform F (implicitly: or be fired), but a male would have been told to wear uniform M (implicitly: or be fired) but not F, is discrimination on the basis of sex. Why? Because people are treated differently on the basis of their sex (not even on the basis of the consequences for the business of letting them wear F or M, but merely on the basis of their sex).

In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman.", in fact it is disparate treatment, at least if the dress code is based on sex rather than sex appearance.

You disagree, but I don't understand why. After all, the firing happens because the person is a female.

You’ve been told why, numerous times now. SCOTUS has construed the statute to prohibit disparate treatment between the sexes in which the disparate treatment is based on sex. The language you are quoting from Price isn’t rewriting the prior precedent, but instead the statement you are quoting is within the context of disparate treatment between the sexes and because of sex. Indeed, the Court in Price refers to “disparate” treatment. The quote from Price is the “applicant or employee was a woman” but men, in her situation, were treated differently. And in Price that is exactly what happened, she was treated differently than men.

Second, a dress code based on “sex” is not disparate treatment when it’s a code for both sexes! Disparate treatment refers to different treatment, discriminatory treatment. Under Title VII, the disparate treatment is because of sex in which one sex is treated differently from the other sex, and the discriminatory treatment is because of sex. Sensible, since the plain text of Title VII prohibits “discrimination...because of...individual’s sex.”

So, a dress code for both sexes isn’t, without more, discriminatory conduct against one sex in which the discriminatory conduct is “because of...sex.” Both sexes are treated the SAME, “burdened,” as the courts say, the SAME, and being treated and burdened the the SAME, is inapposite to discrimination. Hence, a reasonable dress code for BOTH sexes is to treat both the SAME. “BURDEN” both sexes the same in relation to the sexes, as both sexes are required to adhere to the dress code, doesn’t violate Title VII. Just as the many federal appellate courts have ruled, and their reasoning is compelling and persuasive.

Second, as I said previously and federal appellate courts affirm, a dress code for both sexes to follow to create a formal, professional environment, doesn’t, by itself, violate Title VII.

She's fired for violating a dress code whose imposition entails disparate treatment on the basis of sex

Not under your example. As I recall your hypo, both sexes had a dress code. Hence, this is not an instance of one sex with a dress code requirement but not the other, which would be disparate treatment between the sexes and discriminatory conduct between the sexes because of sex.

She's fired for violating a dress code whose imposition entails disparate treatment on the basis of sex. The very fact that she was told she had to wear uniform F (implicitly: or be fired), but a male would have been told to wear uniform M (implicitly: or be fired) but not F, is discrimination on the basis of sex.

No, for reasons previously noted. Both are treated the same as both are required to wear something specific. It’s not an instance of men allowed to wear whatever and women must wear X.





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[Angra Mainyu]

You’ve been told why, numerous times now. SCOTUS has construed the statute to prohibit disparate treatment between the sexes in which the disparate treatment is based on sex. The language you are quoting from Price isn’t rewriting the prior precedent, but instead the statement you are quoting is within the context of disparate treatment between the sexes and because of sex. Indeed, the Court in Price refers to “disparate” treatment. The quote from Price is the “applicant or employee was a woman” but men, in her situation, were treated differently. And in Price that is exactly what happened, she was treated differently than men.

But in Price, the court would not have to re-write any previous precedent. It's disparate treatment for the reasons I've carefully explained (and Bomb#20 also explained it, in the actual case). I constructed the example to make it absolutely clear that it is disparate treatment.

Second, a dress code based on “sex” is not disparate treatment when it’s a code for both sexes!

Of course, it would not be disparate treatment if it is a code for both sexes, in which case it is not based on sex at all, because people of both sexes are told to dress in the same way!
But if it is a code that establishes different clothes for different sexes, obviously it is disparate treatment.

Disparate treatment refers to different treatment, discriminatory treatment. Under Title VII, the disparate treatment is because of sex in which one sex is treated differently from the other sex, and the discriminatory treatment is because of sex. Sensible, since the plain text of Title VII prohibits “discrimination...because of...individual’s sex.”

But of course, if a person is told to wear uniform F or else be fired, and she's told so because she's female, but a male would not be told to wear uniform F or else be fired, then surely one sex is treated differently from the other sex.

So, a dress code for both sexes isn’t, without more, discriminatory conduct against one sex in which the discriminatory conduct is “because of...sex.” Both sexes are treated the SAME, “burdened,” as the courts say, the SAME, and being treated and burdened the the SAME, is inapposite to discrimination. Hence, a reasonable dress code for BOTH sexes is to treat both the SAME. “BURDEN” both sexes the same in relation to the sexes, as both sexes are required to adhere to the dress code, doesn’t violate Title VII. Just as the many federal appellate courts have ruled, and their reasoning is compelling and persuasive.

Actually, it is not the case that people of both sexes are required to adhere to "the" dress code. Rather, females are required to adhere to the dress code for females (something males are not burdened with), and males are required to adhere to the dress code for males (something females are not burdened with). So, the burden is not the same, if one is talking about the content of the burden (i.e., what they are actually required to do).
Now, if one is talking about the extent or weight of the burden, that depends on the individual, but that is always the case. A female who wants to present as male will be heavily burdened; to a lesser extent, a female who just does not like that sort of dress code will be burdened. On the other hand, a female who really likes the dress code for females will not be burdened at all, except in knowing that she has an obligation - which she might not care, in which case not even that.

Second, as I said previously and federal appellate courts affirm, a dress code for both sexes to follow to create a formal, professional environment, doesn’t, by itself, violate Title VII.

I already explained why it does.

Not under your example. As I recall your hypo, both sexes had a dress code. Hence, this is not an instance of one sex with a dress code requirement but not the other, which would be disparate treatment between the sexes and discriminatory conduct between the sexes because of sex.

Of course it is, because the dress code is different for each sex.

No, for reasons previously noted. Both are treated the same as both are required to wear something specific. It’s not an instance of men allowed to wear whatever and women must wear X.

Again, that does not change the fact that they're required to wear different things. Again, here is an analogy. Suppose a bar bans interracial couples. Is that disparate treatment on the basis of race? (let's say it happens in 1920, before any laws against that, or for that matter, in 1820).

Well, sure, it is disparate treatment on the basis of race because a Black person is not allowed to go there with a White person, but a White person is allowed to go with a White person, and it's also disparate treatment on the basis of race because a White person is not allowed to go there with a Black person, but a Black person is allowed to go with a White person (well, actually "Black" and "White" are not races, but I know of no word that I can use to name the races without high risk of derail, depending on who's reading).

 

[Jarhyn]

But in Price, the court would not have to re-write any previous precedent. It's disparate treatment for the reasons I've carefully explained (and Bomb#20 also explained it, in the actual case). I constructed the example to make it absolutely clear that it is disparate treatment.


Of course, it would not be disparate treatment if it is a code for both sexes, in which case it is not based on sex at all, because people of both sexes are told to dress in the same way!
But if it is a code that establishes different clothes for different sexes, obviously it is disparate treatment.

Disparate treatment refers to different treatment, discriminatory treatment. Under Title VII, the disparate treatment is because of sex in which one sex is treated differently from the other sex, and the discriminatory treatment is because of sex. Sensible, since the plain text of Title VII prohibits “discrimination...because of...individual’s sex.”

But of course, if a person is told to wear uniform F or else be fired, and she's told so because she's female, but a male would not be told to wear uniform F or else be fired, then surely one sex is treated differently from the other sex.

So, a dress code for both sexes isn’t, without more, discriminatory conduct against one sex in which the discriminatory conduct is “because of...sex.” Both sexes are treated the SAME, “burdened,” as the courts say, the SAME, and being treated and burdened the the SAME, is inapposite to discrimination. Hence, a reasonable dress code for BOTH sexes is to treat both the SAME. “BURDEN” both sexes the same in relation to the sexes, as both sexes are required to adhere to the dress code, doesn’t violate Title VII. Just as the many federal appellate courts have ruled, and their reasoning is compelling and persuasive.

Actually, it is not the case that people of both sexes are required to adhere to "the" dress code. Rather, females are required to adhere to the dress code for females (something males are not burdened with), and males are required to adhere to the dress code for males (something females are not burdened with). So, the burden is not the same, if one is talking about the content of the burden (i.e., what they are actually required to do).
Now, if one is talking about the extent or weight of the burden, that depends on the individual, but that is always the case. A female who wants to present as male will be heavily burdened; to a lesser extent, a female who just does not like that sort of dress code will be burdened. On the other hand, a female who really likes the dress code for females will not be burdened at all, except in knowing that she has an obligation - which she might not care, in which case not even that.

Second, as I said previously and federal appellate courts affirm, a dress code for both sexes to follow to create a formal, professional environment, doesn’t, by itself, violate Title VII.

I already explained why it does.

Not under your example. As I recall your hypo, both sexes had a dress code. Hence, this is not an instance of one sex with a dress code requirement but not the other, which would be disparate treatment between the sexes and discriminatory conduct between the sexes because of sex.

Of course it is, because the dress code is different for each sex.

No, for reasons previously noted. Both are treated the same as both are required to wear something specific. It’s not an instance of men allowed to wear whatever and women must wear X.

Again, that does not change the fact that they're required to wear different things. Again, here is an analogy. Suppose a bar bans interracial couples. Is that disparate treatment on the basis of race? (let's say it happens in 1920, before any laws against that, or for that matter, in 1820).

Well, sure, it is disparate treatment on the basis of race because a Black person is not allowed to go there with a White person, but a White person is allowed to go with a White person, and it's also disparate treatment on the basis of race because a White person is not allowed to go there with a Black person, but a Black person is allowed to go with a White person (well, actually "Black" and "White" are not races, but I know of no word that I can use to name the races without high risk of derail, depending on who's reading).

The TLDR here: "separate but equal" was already ruled to be a discriminatory farce.

 

[James Madison]

But in Price, the court would not have to re-write any previous precedent. It's disparate treatment for the reasons I've carefully explained (and Bomb#20 also explained it, in the actual case). I constructed the example to make it absolutely clear that it is disparate treatment.


Of course, it would not be disparate treatment if it is a code for both sexes, in which case it is not based on sex at all, because people of both sexes are told to dress in the same way!
But if it is a code that establishes different clothes for different sexes, obviously it is disparate treatment.

Disparate treatment refers to different treatment, discriminatory treatment. Under Title VII, the disparate treatment is because of sex in which one sex is treated differently from the other sex, and the discriminatory treatment is because of sex. Sensible, since the plain text of Title VII prohibits “discrimination...because of...individual’s sex.”

But of course, if a person is told to wear uniform F or else be fired, and she's told so because she's female, but a male would not be told to wear uniform F or else be fired, then surely one sex is treated differently from the other sex.

So, a dress code for both sexes isn’t, without more, discriminatory conduct against one sex in which the discriminatory conduct is “because of...sex.” Both sexes are treated the SAME, “burdened,” as the courts say, the SAME, and being treated and burdened the the SAME, is inapposite to discrimination. Hence, a reasonable dress code for BOTH sexes is to treat both the SAME. “BURDEN” both sexes the same in relation to the sexes, as both sexes are required to adhere to the dress code, doesn’t violate Title VII. Just as the many federal appellate courts have ruled, and their reasoning is compelling and persuasive.

Actually, it is not the case that people of both sexes are required to adhere to "the" dress code. Rather, females are required to adhere to the dress code for females (something males are not burdened with), and males are required to adhere to the dress code for males (something females are not burdened with). So, the burden is not the same, if one is talking about the content of the burden (i.e., what they are actually required to do).
Now, if one is talking about the extent or weight of the burden, that depends on the individual, but that is always the case. A female who wants to present as male will be heavily burdened; to a lesser extent, a female who just does not like that sort of dress code will be burdened. On the other hand, a female who really likes the dress code for females will not be burdened at all, except in knowing that she has an obligation - which she might not care, in which case not even that.

Second, as I said previously and federal appellate courts affirm, a dress code for both sexes to follow to create a formal, professional environment, doesn’t, by itself, violate Title VII.

I already explained why it does.

Not under your example. As I recall your hypo, both sexes had a dress code. Hence, this is not an instance of one sex with a dress code requirement but not the other, which would be disparate treatment between the sexes and discriminatory conduct between the sexes because of sex.

Of course it is, because the dress code is different for each sex.

No, for reasons previously noted. Both are treated the same as both are required to wear something specific. It’s not an instance of men allowed to wear whatever and women must wear X.

Again, that does not change the fact that they're required to wear different things. Again, here is an analogy. Suppose a bar bans interracial couples. Is that disparate treatment on the basis of race? (let's say it happens in 1920, before any laws against that, or for that matter, in 1820).

Well, sure, it is disparate treatment on the basis of race because a Black person is not allowed to go there with a White person, but a White person is allowed to go with a White person, and it's also disparate treatment on the basis of race because a White person is not allowed to go there with a Black person, but a Black person is allowed to go with a White person (well, actually "Black" and "White" are not races, but I know of no word that I can use to name the races without high risk of derail, depending on who's reading).

Of course, it would not be disparate treatment if it is a code for both sexes, in which case it is not based on sex at all, because people of both sexes are told to dress in the same way!
But if it is a code that establishes different clothes for different sexes, obviously it is disparate treatment.

No. Disparate treatment is not telling men to wear suits and women to wear dresses. That is to treat them the same in requiring them to wear something very specific. Your assumption unless a dress code requirement for the two sexes has them dressing the same then it is disparate treatment is not correct. Disparate treatment does not include a dress code requirement in which the two sexes are required to wear different clothing. The fact a dress code does not allow a woman to wear a suit, or a man a dress, is not disparate treatment between the sexes and among the sexes. As the federal circuit courts have nearly unanimously recognized, Title VII was not conceived to prohibit reasonable work place dress codes, even if those dress codes require different dress for men and women. Title VII sought to prohibit a very different kind of disparate treatment, which was discriminatory conduct in hiring men over women or women over men, in creation of job responsibilities for men and women, in evaluating employees for advancement, increased pay, etcetera. Title VII was not conceived to prohibit to prohibit reasonable work place dress codes, even if those dress codes require different dress for men and women.

But of course, if a person is told to wear uniform F or else be fired, and she's told so because she's female, but a male would not be told to wear uniform F or else be fired, then surely one sex is treated differently from the other sex.

A few points. First, this is not parallel to my examples. Simply, my example is dress code requires female employees to wear Y and male employees to wear X, and if they wear something other than that, then they can be terminated.

Second, your example would not by itself constitute as a violation of Title VII because at best all you might have is sex stereotyping but sex stereotyping is not a cause of action under Title VII, does not itself constitute as violation of Title VII, and an employer stating their reasons for the dress code was professionalism, formal atmosphere, would have then not been acting upon any discriminatory intent between the sexes in enacting the dress code and enforcing it.

Actually, it is not the case that people of both sexes are required to adhere to "the" dress code. Rather, females are required to adhere to the dress code for females (something males are not burdened with), and males are required to adhere to the dress code for males (something females are not burdened with). So, the burden is not the same

To the contrary, the burden is the same as both sexes are restricted to wearing what the dress code requires.

because the dress code is different for each sex.

So what? And that is precisely and exactly what the federal circuits have said, so what! A dress code requiring different dress for male and female employees is not the discriminatory conduct Title VII seeks to prohibit. Title VII did not seek to make men and women equal in all respects.

Suppose a bar bans interracial couples.

We are discussing Title VII and employment discrimination, so your analogy is flawed.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

No. Disparate treatment is not telling men to wear suits and women to wear dresses. That is to treat them the same in requiring them to wear something very specific.

I might as well say:

No. Disparate treatment is not telling Black people to only show up with other Black people, and Asians to only show up with other Asians, etc. (by "Black", etc., I mean the races most closely associated with the terms). That is to treat them the same in requiring them to show up with people of a very specific race.", etc. But it's clearly not true. It's different treatment. And the same goes for telling males to wear suits and females to wear dresses.​

Your assumption unless a dress code requirement for the two sexes has them dressing the same then it is disparate treatment is not correct.

It's not an assumption, but an assessment, based on the meaning of the words.

Disparate treatment does not include a dress code requirement in which the two sexes are required to wear different clothing. The fact a dress code does not allow a woman to wear a suit, or a man a dress, is not disparate treatment between the sexes and among the sexes. As the federal circuit courts have nearly unanimously recognized, Title VII was not conceived to prohibit reasonable work place dress codes, even if those dress codes require different dress for men and women. Title VII sought to prohibit a very different kind of disparate treatment, which was discriminatory conduct in hiring men over women or women over men, in creation of job responsibilities for men and women, in evaluating employees for advancement, increased pay, etcetera. Title VII was not conceived to prohibit to prohibit reasonable work place dress codes, even if those dress codes require different dress for men and women.

You're just repeating claims I have repeatedly argued against. My reply is as before.

But of course, if a person is told to wear uniform F or else be fired, and she's told so because she's female, but a male would not be told to wear uniform F or else be fired, then surely one sex is treated differently from the other sex.

A few points. First, this is not parallel to my examples. Simply, my example is dress code requires female employees to wear Y and male employees to wear X, and if they wear something other than that, then they can be terminated.

It is parallel. The fact that you use "X" and "Y" instead of "M" and "F" does not make it not parallel.
Of course, if a person is told to wear Y or else be fired because she is female (that is exactly what happens in your examples; males are not told so), and a person is told to wear X or else be fired because she is male (that is exactly what happens in your examples; females are not told so), then surely they are treated differently.

To the contrary, the burden is the same as both sexes are restricted to wearing what the dress code requires.

No, that is false. The burden is different. The burden put on males is to wear X, and on females, to wear Y (don't you have the letters mixed up, btw?).
So, it is a different burden.

We are discussing Title VII and employment discrimination, so your analogy is flawed.

No, the analogy is right on point. It shows that the treatment in that case would be different for people of different races, and because of their race. Whether they're being treated differently is independent of the law. We might as well set all of the examples in 1820, and the treatment would remain different for different sexes or races depending on the example.

 

[Jarhyn]

This thread:

JM: Separate but equal is equal enough. It isn't disparate treatment to require black female people to use a separate dresscode bathroom because they are both given very specific and equal, if different bathroom dresscode to follow, and see, SCOTUS claims it's not unequal at all because (logical gymnastics)

AM, et. al.: No, it's still not acceptable because separate but equal isn't equal at all, it's just bald discrimination under a guise so as to not seem as objectionable for those who have the power to object.

 

[Jolly_Penguin]

Why do we never hear feminists address women's restrooms as "safe spaces" for women to be away from men?

Trans and toxic feminism aren't at each other's throats as much as one would have predicted.

 

[Jarhyn]

Why do we never hear feminists address women's restrooms as "safe spaces" for women to be away from men?

Trans and toxic feminism aren't at each other's throats as much as one would have predicted.

Probably because we do. There's a whole branch of toxic feminism that claims that trans people aren't real, and it's generally highly intersectional with the same crowd that thinks all a penis can do is rape.

But right now, we appear to be discussing the validity of "Separate But Equal". Strange that JM is so absent for that part of the discussion.