Any certainty in the Theory of Justified True Belief?

[Speakpigeon]

I think that the theory of knowledge as justified true belief is typical of analytical philosophy, which is hegemonic in English-speaking countries, and in particular in the United States.

Certainty, however, is a psychological condition and certainty that p doesn't imply p and therefore doesn't imply knowledge that p.

As I understand it, Descartes' idea is that doubt disproves knowledge, an idea he put to very effective use to arrive at the Cogito. However, as a psychological condition, certainty itself seems immune to analysis and therefore of little interest in particular to analytically-minded philosophers.

Is there an overlap?

Certainty applies to beliefs. We have beliefs, and we are certain of some of our beliefs while uncertain of others. Some of the beliefs we are certain of may be actual knowledge. Uncertainty, i.e. doubt, disproves knowledge, according to Descartes, but certainty doesn't prove knowledge.

So, there is perhaps an overlap.

Let's assume p is true. Let's assume further that subject A believes that p, and that A is somehow justified in believing that p. The theory of justified true belief says that, under those assumptions, subject A knows that p. However, what if A has some doubts about believing that p. Descartes would say that therefore A doesn't know that p (the slightest doubt is enough to disprove knowledge).

So, here it seems we have a clear contradiction between the two perspectives, one analytical philosophy, the other a typically "continental" philosophy.

The two perspectives are clearly very different but there is nonetheless a striking similarity in the difference...

According to the JTB theory, a justified true belief is equivalent to knowledge. However, it is unclear that we could ever know that we know p since there is no finite procedure to decide that we know that p is indeed true as required.

So, JTB is logically inconclusive since we don't know how to ascertain the truth of at least one of the premises theorised as necessary to the conclusion.

Descartes has also a problem, though. To disprove that you know p, you need to be able to doubt that p. However, how do you know that you doubt that p? Descartes doesn't offer any procedure to decide that you know something. His procedure is only effective in disproving that you know something. You can prove you don't know that p by being able to doubt that p is true. You cannot prove that you know that p. And, therefore, you cannot prove that it is true that you doubt that p is true.

So, at least as described by Descartes, his view was also logically inconclusive.

Perhaps Bertrand Russell bridged the gap. He made the distinction between propositional knowledge, i.e. subject A knows that p, and knowledge by acquaintance where subject A knows p.

For example, subject A knows that subject B is in pain: This is propositional knowledge. However, subject B is experiencing the pain: Subject B knows pain. This is knowledge by acquaintance, although only so while pain is being experienced. Knowledge by acquaintance reduces to propositional knowledge after the event.

Although I dispute the coherence of the theory of justified true belief, nonetheless it seems to me that its object is propositional knowledge, while Descartes' Cogito is typical of knowledge by acquaintance.

And perhaps the twain shall never meet.
EB

 

[DBT]

Additional information;

Two Analyses of Knowledge

''K-internalism and K-externalism, then, are supported by conflicting intuitions. On the one hand, there is the thought that in order to know, one must have justification in the form of having adequate evidence or reasons. On the other hand, there is the thought that knowledge, resulting from reliable cognitive faculties, is not reserved to humans only. Both of these thoughts are inherently plausible. However, if it is indeed true that animals are not the sort of beings that can have internally justified or unjustified beliefs,



Why not say that knowledge is true belief? The standard answer is that to identify knowledge with true belief would be implausible because a belief that is true just because of luck does not qualify as knowledge. Beliefs that are lacking justification are false more often than not. However, on occasion, such beliefs happen to be true.


The analysis of knowledge may be approached by asking the following question: What turns a true belief into knowledge? An uncontroversial answer to this question would be: the sort of thing that effectively prevents a belief from being true as a result of epistemic luck. Controversy begins as soon as this formula is turned into a substantive proposal. According to evidentialism, which endorses the JTB+ conception of knowledge, the combination of two things accomplishes this goal: evidentialist justification plus degettierization (a condition that prevents a true and justified belief from being "gettiered"). However, according to an alternative approach that has in the last three decades become increasingly popular, what stands in the way of epistemic luck — what turns a true belief into knowledge — is the reliability of the cognitive process that produced the belief. Consider how we acquire knowledge of our physical environment: we do so through sense experience. Sense experiential processes are, at least under normal conditions, highly reliable. There is nothing accidental about the truth of the beliefs these processes produce. Thus beliefs produced by sense experience, if true, should qualify as instances of knowledge. An analogous point could be made for other reliable cognitive processes, such as introspection, memory, and rational intuition. We might, therefore, say that what turns true belief into knowledge is the reliability of our cognitive processes.''

 

[fromderinside]

For example, subject A knows that subject B is in pain: This is propositional knowledge. However, subject B is experiencing the pain: Subject B knows pain. This is knowledge by acquaintance, although only so while pain is being experienced. Knowledge by acquaintance reduces to propositional knowledge after the event.

EB

Good example.

Makes your position clear. All that is left is to systematically characterize propositional and acquaintance knowledge. I understand from your text that possession and time of pain experience are important in categorizing argument statements as acquaintance knowledge Also you put that argument of observation statements must fall elsewhere which you suggest is in propositional knowledge.

So direct observations, being, and indirect observations, seeing hearing, are different propositions in form and substance.

That poses a problem for me. Since the being observes, hears, feels, smells, senses, are not all propositions subsets of acquaintance?

 

[fast]

First, there are two kinds of certainty that typically crops up in these discussions. One is the kind we associate with confidence. For instance, “he seemed certain about what he saw.” We can have different degrees of certainty (or confidence) in our beliefs. That is not the kind of certainty that is pertinent to the discussion, but it’s good to be mindful of it when it’s used that way and has the unfortunate effect of taking discussions down needless paths.

It’s the other kind of certainty (sometimes referred to as Cartesian certainty) that seems to always be the main barrier to making headway. This kind of certainty is such that it’s impossible to be mistaken in one’s belief. A proponent of the JTB Theory of Knowledge denies that such certainty is a necessary condition of knowledge.

It has always been attested to that the theory is lacking, but it is the best theory we have. What the analysis shows us is that we have not honed in on the sufficient conditions.

The theory is poorly understood by many—even by educators. Disregarding Gettier-type counterexamples, it’s incredibly important that the issues of whether we have knowledge not be summarily dismisses because of issues that seek to address the completely different issue about how we know that we know—which that phrase itself has a couple different interpretations.

One common misunderstanding that strikes at the heart of much confusion is between that of actuality and that of possibility. Consider a person who has a justified belief. In other words, consider that those two necessary conditions are in fact met. The issue then is not whether the person is possibly mistaken but rather actually mistaken. It’s almost always so that we’re possibly mistaken — and so — it’s almost never the case we have certainty—in that Cartesian sense mentioned earlier. But, that certainty is not (not, I say) a necessary condition of knowledge.

If the person with a justified belief so happens to have a true belief (and recall, I’m not considering Gettier-type situations), then it’s not two (but rather three) conditions that have been met. We can argue for days and weeks—years even about how it’s not so that we know that we know or do not know that we know that we know or any number of other issues, but they’re all inevitably distractions.

It is down right silly to think that we are actually mistaken about everything, and it’s equally absurd to raise the bar for knowledge such that it requires the impossibility of mistake. It already disallows the actuality of mistake; hence, if I claim to know but am mistaken, then the condition was never met, but surely there are many-a-times when it is met, and though that might not pave the road for the unachievable certainty so many seek, ... and on and on we go.

 

[fromderinside]

Actually if philosophy is informed by science those who practice it should accept as the case that we can't know truth since we are limited in our ability to access information about whatever it is we consider. A probabilistic model, quantum theory, of that which is 'beyond' measure should suffice as the exemplar for that view. Another is found in neuroscience where psychophysics resorts to permitting 'chance' set the baseline for abilities to perceive and sense. In both there are operable systems and tools developed for the study of those realms. It's just that something is going to be missing in whatever is determined to be 'true' beyond a level we can verify.

For instance time of decay event in quantum physics is replaced by averaged evidence from many events to produce decay functions in time which works well in macro analysis. We don't know what causes the event or whether it is the result of many events hidden from our observation. Uncertainty/indeterminacy.

The above is but one example where our lack of access to information limits our ability to characterize logically.

The fact that we are limited to the vicinity of earth where we recently found there may be billions of habitable planets in the universe capable of producing intelligent beings also signals that we know very little about what is knowable.

Prior to Hubble we had no idea the universe was more than the milky way. Now we're confused as to whether the universe is speeding up or slowing down it's expansion.

etc.

my opinion only.

 

[fast]

Actually if philosophy is informed by science those who practice it should accept as the case that we can't know truth since we are limited in our ability to access information about whatever it is we consider.

And there is an example of certainty creeping it’s way in. Here “know” is used as a substitute for certainty. Others are sometimes more obvious and would say things like “we don’t really Know the things we think we do.” We do in fact really know many of the things we think we do, but true, we are possibly mistaken, and of course, if we are mistaken, then the truth condition hasn’t been met.

 

[DBT]

There are things that are so certain that very few, if any, question these things or argue over them. They have become articles of 'common knowledge'

 

[fromderinside]

What exactly is meant by "....calling a spade a spade"?*



*^{_{Ronalraygun example}}.

 

[fast]

There are things that are so certain that very few, if any, question these things or argue over them. They have become articles of 'common knowledge'

And that’s how the non-philosophizing populace uses the term, “knowledge”—in such a way that does not hold it to a practically unachievable bar. When the conditions are met, we do know, and when the conditions are not met, we do not; that’s why when we learn that what we thought was the truth but isn’t, we (most of us anyway) refrain from saying we actually knew what we thought we did.

When we overthink is sometimes where we question what was so obvious before us. When we recognize that we don’t ‘know that we know’ or become cognizantly aware that we might possibly be mistaken about what we take for granted as common knowledge, the seeds of doubt manifest and what stares us in the face is that we cannot guarentee that what we think is true is in fact so; we easily conjure scenarios that demonstrate the ease in which we can be in error. That’s the underpinning slope that takes us over the embankment and we begin to twist our everyday understanding of knowledge into something it is not.

Knowledge isn’t where the conditions are provably met; it’s when they are met. I know my social security number. Many know there’s. Sure, among us, there’s gonna be a small fraction who will have gone thinking they are error free and will claim to know just as surely as the rest of us, but while those scant few don’t know what they think they do, the rest of us (per the JTB theory) do know just what we think we do despite that lingering possibility the truth is otherwise.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Assumes a reliable beliefs system. The same kind of fact produces the same kind of belief. Is that enough?

No.

Because, suppose two real objects: O1 and O2. The reliable beliefs system produces two corresponding beliefs: B1 and B2. To say that the system is reliable is to say that whenever O1 is similar to O2, B1 will be similar to B2. Like a map.

However, with this kind of system, which is like, apparently, our own, what the subject knows are B1 and B2, not O1 and O2. All his experience will be built from things like B1 and B2, never things like O1 and O2. The map, not the territory.

Such a system will be effective in keeping us alive and finding our way in the world. Yet, we won't ever even have a clue what O1 and O2 are or what the territory really is.

Science is merely the process of substituting more detailed beliefs to the basic B1 and B2. A more detailed map. 10.000th instead of 1,000,000th scale. Perhaps.

And what do you know of O1 and O2 when all you have are B1 and B2. All you know are B1 and B2 and the relation between B1 and B2. You know the map, not the territory.

The situation can be modelled to that of knowing only words. Words have a similar relation to things as beliefs have to objects. And what would you know of the world from only knowing the words even precisely describing the world?

Think also of a computer. We are like a computer with only 0's and 1's to represent the world without the ability to verify that the world is really made of 0's and 1's.

Reliability is good. We survive. But we survive without the need to know the world. We only need to know whatever contents in our minds that may be representing the world to us.

We know our mind. That's consciousness. But it's really our brain that makes sure we survive. However, even our brain is part of the world, not part of our consciousness so we don't even know our brain, or indeed we don't know that we even have something like a brain to begin with, or what kind of thing a brain is, let alone what may be the properties of an actual brain.

And that's assuming the system is reliable. But, how could you possibly know it is? Even being alive doesn't tell you that because being alive in the world is itself is really the belief that you are alive in the world, which may well have nothing to do with the reality of it.

In any case, it is enough, presumably, to believe and trust your beliefs, including your naive realism belief that you know the world.

And if it's not enough, what else could we possibly do?!

Well, at least it might be worth to give it a thought and stop pretending you know things you don't.
EB

 

[fast]

When I look up and see the reflection of a pretty blonde in the mirror, while it is true that I did not see her directly, I did see her. No? Why, because it is only the reflection I actually saw?

When I turn about and gaze directly at her, then it’s still not the case I saw her? Because our brains could only detect a mental percept?

I cannot sense the ground beneath me because I can only access some internal map and therefore can never be so certain that it’s impossoble to be mistaken?

When I looked at the reflection and saw that she was blonde, I could be mistaken, but even if I am not, I cannot infallibly declare knowledge, but that (I keep saying) is no matter. Even if there is a percept between what my brain senses (an internal mental percept) and what outward things that served as sensory input, when I say (I) saw something, that encapsulates whatever my brain is capable of directly sensing). I am sensing the territory no matter the limitations my brain can receive signals from an internalized map.

If I say I know something and am not mistaken in my justified true belief, then more times than not, I know what I say I do.

 

[DBT]

Though incomplete, our information about the world is being tested against an objective reality as we go about our daily lives...incomplete information does not mean that we know nothing, or that every aspect of the world is uncertain.

.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Objective reality is a subjective construct. It is at best the subjective impression different people may have that they somehow share the same subjective belief as what they subjectively believe would be other people. All objectivity is irredeemably subjective. Objectivity is a particular kind of subjectivity. You can only test your beliefs against other beliefs. Everything you come to think is at the most a process inside your brain. It doesn't go out of your brain to possibly touch the reality of things. The brain receives data and that's all it could possibly know of: data, not the real things beyond the data. It can't ascertain the source of the data or even the reality of any source. All it can do is process the data and present the data in such a way as to make sense and this is what you will be aware of, i.e. a subjective model of the outside world entirely based on the data that your brain cannot possibly verify the source of.

Of course, we're free to believe what we want. We can believe, rationally, that the model produced by our brain is reliable and accurate. Less plausibly, we can believe that the real world outside is really like the subjective model of it presented to us by our brain. Still, believing this is already a stretch. It's called, for good reason, "naive realism". And if you accept that the actual world isn't anything like what your subjective model of it says, then what do you know of the world?

And, yes, the lovely blonde you see walking past you is in fact all a made-up cartoon part of your subjective model. It's in fact all inside your mind. You know it as such and you know it because it is inside your mind. You don't know whatever it is, if anything, which may be the real object beyond your subjective representation.
EB

 

[DBT]

Objective reality is that which doesn't cater or conform to anyones assumptions or beliefs, desires, hopes, fears or wishes, ie, the Universe at Large.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Objective reality is based on what we observe. It is an inference from observation. Observations are all entirely subjective. Whatever you somehow infer is also an idea inside your mind. Sure, you want to think of it as existing outside your mind and I do to. But we shouldn't confuse what we mean (the outside world) and what we mean it with. We mean the outside world but what we mean it with is just another idea inside our mind, a subjective thing. We know the idea, not what the idea is an idea of.

Objective facts are subjective ideas of what we think exists as inferred from our subjective observations. I see a tree, my perception is a subjective event, and I infer the existence of what we call a tree, in the outside world, an objective tree, but my idea of this objective tree is still inside my mind. You never get to know anything except subjective events. And some of these events are beliefs of an objective world. You know the belief, not the world itself, if any.

Still, there's no problem in believing there's an outside world. Even if there isn't, things still are going as if there was one, so far at least.
EB

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Objective reality is a subjective construct. It is at best the subjective impression different people may have that they somehow share the same subjective belief as what they subjectively believe would be other people. All objectivity is irredeemably subjective. Objectivity is a particular kind of subjectivity. You can only test your beliefs against other beliefs. Everything you come to think is at the most a process inside your brain. It doesn't go out of your brain to possibly touch the reality of things. The brain receives data and that's all it could possibly know of: data, not the real things beyond the data. It can't ascertain the source of the data or even the reality of any source. All it can do is process the data and present the data in such a way as to make sense and this is what you will be aware of, i.e. a subjective model of the outside world entirely based on the data that your brain cannot possibly verify the source of.

Of course, we're free to believe what we want. We can believe, rationally, that the model produced by our brain is reliable and accurate. Less plausibly, we can believe that the real world outside is really like the subjective model of it presented to us by our brain. Still, believing this is already a stretch. It's called, for good reason, "naive realism". And if you accept that the actual world isn't anything like what your subjective model of it says, then what do you know of the world?

And, yes, the lovely blonde you see walking past you is in fact all a made-up cartoon part of your subjective model. It's in fact all inside your mind. You know it as such and you know it because it is inside your mind. You don't know whatever it is, if anything, which may be the real object beyond your subjective representation.

Welcome to your first freshman bong hit. I know this will come as a shock to you, but you didn't make any of that shit up or discover it on your own. This has been well debated for millenia.

We can only infer information about our world. We call this (inaccurately), "knowledge." So what? Every sentient/self-aware being has a fundamental choice to make due to a simple, brute fact: the observer can't know (i.e., directly experience) the observed. We must either accept that our senses are more-or-less accurately relating an objective reality, or don't accept it.

Those who don't accept it can only do so academically, however, because, no matter what, they are acting as if they live in an objective reality in countless ways, so unless all they do is sit in a corner rocking back and forth with their eyes closed their entire lives, they will automatically be reacting as if they live in an objective reality.

So, what are we basing the ability/efficacy to infer upon? Likewise, a myriad of different elements. All kinds of known brain disorders and physically based cognitive effects evidence how our brains--nearly across the board--process/distort reality, like natural and drug-induced hallucinations (and what kind of drug gives what kind of hallucination); dreams, and how it is that, while in a dream "we" are rarely aware that it's a dream and yet the second we wake up from a dream, we are suddenly, somehow, aware that we were dreaming (thus implying that there is some sort of meta-mechanism involved); and all manner of identity/memory/malfunction like alzheimer's and dementia and schizophrenia and DID/Multiple Personality and PTSD, etc, etc., etc.

Iow, there is literally a mountain of empirical evidence, including shared responses/consensus and even something as simple as watching your dog suddenly start barking whenever another dog is on a TV screen. If you break that down, that alone means that a dog's brain is equally "fooled" by our technology that creates "reality" in ones and zeroes and millions of tiny color pixels turning on and off with a screen "refresh" rate every 60 times per second, to the point where a dog can not just recognize another dog, but feel it is so real that it must take up position like it would if that dog were actually in the room.

Think about that for a moment. It's one thing for humans--an entire unique species, more-or-less--to have developed technology that allows us to mimic our reality, but the same technology acting in the same manner for us also allows a completely different species to react in the same manner, regardless of the fact that what they're actually looking at is millions of tiny light projectors turning on and off and changing colors millions of times per second.

For me, that alone is incontrovertible proof that we exist in an objective reality. Is it first dependent upon my accepting that there is, in fact, a "dog" creature that exists independently of my subjective experience of that "dog" creature? Yes, but again, that goes back to the fundamental--PRIME--question we must all individually answer.

Why in the world would another species see what we see in our technological reconstruction of reality--itself mimicking what our brains evidently do; i.e., reduce the infinite amount of information into a "redacted" or "truncated," I guess, reflection of it--unless there actually is an objective reality that both species can independently assess as the same and is being in any way accurately reconstructed?

We are all "brains in vats," it's just that the "vat" is actually a skull. And yes, in theory, we--the constructed self--have no way of confirming whether or not it's all just some matrix-like machine manipulating our senses or not, but at the same time, as with our dream states, we do seem to have some sort of innate capacity to determine our objective conditions. Call it "telemetry;" call it whatever you want, but the brain/body is directly connected to the trillions of bits of information that the brain/body directly experiences as a physical condition of existing in a quantum universe.

So what we're really talking about is the constructed self; the animated analogue that our brains maintain and update and augment and imbue with literally everything and use now primarily for social interaction, but were evidently created initially--however many tens of thousands of years ago in our evolution-- for survival purposes; for strategic abstract problem solving scenarios.

In short, the brain/body experiences; the constructed analogue self is imbued by the brain with a drastically edited down version of any given experience (like a low resolution video) for the purposes of general feedback and social interaction and that's basically where we will always be.

Whoop dee fuckin do. Why this ever goes beyond freshman bong sessions is anyone's guess, but it always does in some form of argument from incredulity; like we're all supposed to just go, "WOW! Ok, everyone stop what they're doing. Reality is a construct!"

Yeah, we know. And...?

 

[fast]

I can (and do) directly experience the outward objective world.

My brain cannot do that no more than can my brain drive itself to the local convenience store, but I can.

My brain cannot directly experience the outward objective world. It’s not like it can reach out and touch the objects of the outer objective world. Perhaps the brain can detect only the snapshot-like inner percepts (the map), but I (oh, the great me) can and does so with great ease.

The limitations of one is not the limitations of the other—at least it’s not a 1:1 ratio. Of course, there can be no me without a brain, but there is more to me than my brain. I have a body with senses—senses that sense the world. There is no medium between me and the outer objective world—unlike the brain which can only directly sense inner things.

My brain doesn’t know things. My eyes don’t see things. My ears don’t hear things. I know things. I see things. And yes, I hear things, but don’t take that the wrong way, lol.

When I speak of the objective world, that’s different than if I’m speaking of the subjective world—or the mental immaterial mind that IS SAID TO exist because of the quite material and physical functioning brain (and central nervous system). Language massively complicates things. I do believe the mind exists, but I have a rather broad scope for the term. The construct used to describe this realm exists, but don’t let me go down that road.

Instead, let us turn from the metaphysical to the epistemological. My stance (on the metaphysical side) is that the world is out there. If there was no actual planet, where would the trees grow to undergo that fancy photosynthesis thingy that allowed dinosaurs to breath? On the epistemological side, while my brain doesn’t know stuff, I (that would be me, not the necessary organ for there to be me) do know things.

However, could I be mistaken? Not likely, but definitely a logical possibility. But like I keep saying, a possibility of mistake does not matter. An analysis of the JTB Theory of Knowledge yields a necessary truth condition, but what’s important is not that the belief MUST be true. What’s important is that the belief IS true.

That I’m not mistaken (not that I cannot be mistaken) is the key. If we hold the bar for something to be knowledge so high that mistakes can’t even be logically possible, then I dare say that how fluent non-philosophizing speakers of language use the term is quite different.

See, this is what happens. We have to stay within the rails. As soon as we get in the grip of a theory, we take certain words and broaden their scope to extremes. Yes, I do know my name. No, I am not imbued with God-like certainty. But, that’s just it; I don’t have to prove that mistake is an impossibility.

If fifty thousand people have a justified belief for what their name is, it’s acceptable to claim knowledge. When it turns out that one of the fifty thousand people’s belief was false, then notice:

49,999 cases of a justified true belief and
1 case of a justified false belief.

So, he thought he knew but didn’t. The JTB theory of knowledge isn’t an epistemological road map that will help out the next set of fifty thousand people who also so happens to have one mistake maker in the crowd.

Now, you want to deny that anyone actually knows. Well, they do know: 49,999 of them anyway.

It’s curious, even if our brains could directly sense the objective world we are all apart, that doesn’t negate the possibility of mistake.

 

[DBT]

Our brain is an aspect of the physical world detecting other aspects of the physical world, EMR waves, patterns, etc, and forming an internal representation of that information, be it an accurate mental representation or not, it is being tested by the world at large as we negotiate our way through it.

 

[DBT]

Subjective and Objective

''Subjective and objective are adjectives that describe two different ways of knowing.

Objective refers to objects and events in the world that anyone can, in principle, observe. Subjective refers to feelings and experiences that depend on the individual's own particular viewpoint and traits.''

Objective knowledge.

Anyone can look through a telescope; therefore, looking through a telescope provides objective knowledge (see, however, Hetherington, 1983) and see that the planet Jupiter has moons around it. In the 16th century, Galileo (Figure 1) pointed his primitive telescope at Jupiter and was the first person to see these moons.

His opponents in the great debate that was raging over the nature of the universe could have looked through the telescope and seen the same thing, but they refused. They wanted to preserve their belief in an eternally changeless and perfect universe which remained just as God had created it. To preserve this belief, they applied the way of knowing about the world they understood: logical argumentation rather than objective observation. Galileo was acting as a modern scientist; his opponents were not.

Bias and objectivity.

Objectivity includes the idea of the absence of bias in observation. Unfortunately, no individual can be fully unbiased, no matter how hard s/he tries. Everyone comes with preconceptions, preferences, desires, etc., which they often cannot even recognize they have and often have a very hard time shedding them, when the biases are pointed out. The scientific enterprise approaches the goal of being unbiased by the debate between people having different sets of biases.''

The Objective Reality

''The objective reality is the collection of things that we are sure exist independently of us. Every person is able, in principle, to verify every aspect of the objective reality. Anything that cannot be verified in this way is not part of the objective reality. The 20m tall ironbark tree in my neighbour's yard is part of the objective reality. It's presence can be verified by any person by simply looking at it, or a surveyor determining its position, by taking a photo of it etc. Moreover, the absence of the tree would imply that the tree does not belong to the objective reality.

Recall that the sensation of seeing the colour red lies in our subjective world. To make a direct comparison with the objective reality first note that the colour of light is related to the light's wavelength, i.e. the distance between adjacent waves that the light is made of. Now consider a device, called a spectroscope, for measuring the wavelength of light in terms of a small fraction of a metre. Such a device can be used to establish objectively that a beam of light is red based solely on the measured value of the wavelength. The wavelength value can be checked and verified (or otherwise) by any person. When technicians compare their measurements of the wavelength they are comparing elements of the objective reality and not sensory information.''

 

[fromderinside]

Reality is. Objective reality is what one thinks is objective reality is either by accepting that which may be gathered observation, experience, and experimental results presented as current theory or a summation of one sensing what is about one as processed by one. IOW there are two extreme possibilities, general objective reality and personal objective reality, implying there are a number of other possibilities between them.

What we seem to be arguing about is whether what one has determined or what one's species has determined is objective reality.

Seems to me that if we accept that language requires common agreement which can be justified by most everyone using it then the superior of the two positions is that of general objective reality.