Are words immaterial?

[Juma]

It tells you something about the qualities of this part of the ocean.

is there a part of the ocean that isnt water?

 

[DBT]

Material has definable properties: mass, charge, spin, orientation, position, velocity. Properties that can be examined and tested, while the term 'non material' - presumably being the absence of matter - implies that there are no properties to examine and no way to test this 'non material' ..... whatever it is. Even saying 'whatever it is' seems wrong because by definition, it is not physical, so it is nothing. It's the realm of Ghosts. 'Non material' consciousness is the proposition of a ghost in the machine.

The elementary particles of the world which make up matter are like words in a book. And the sensory experience is like the act of reading. The latter just cannot come from the latter.

Different combinations of particles are different combinations of particles; there are no objective wholes outside of the mind.

That still doesn't address the following:

1- what is the nature of this ''non material?''
2-how does this 'non material' emerge from the material activity of the brain?
3- how does this 'non material' interact with the material world?
4- how does the proposition of 'non material consciousness' explain 'experience'...how does it help us understand 'experience?'

 

[ryan]

Different combinations of particles are different combinations of particles; there are no objective wholes outside of the mind.

I would have thought that's precisely what you were trying to say with your insistance on structure being non-material in the sense of not being matter per se. In other words, you should be saying that objective wholes do exist outside the mind as immaterial physical things just like structures in the physical world exist outside the mind as immaterial physical things.
EB

This argument is much different than the argument I was making with words/structures. The point about words being structures is one thing, but now I am willing to argue that sensory experiences of words/structures are another completely different kind of immaterial.

By "dualism" I really mean a major contrast like happy to sad, black to white, soft hard, etc, or [from Wikipedia] "In philosophy of mind, dualism is the position that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical, or that the mind and body are not identical".

 

[ryan]

The elementary particles of the world which make up matter are like words in a book. And the sensory experience is like the act of reading. The latter just cannot come from the latter.

Different combinations of particles are different combinations of particles; there are no objective wholes outside of the mind.

That still doesn't address the following:

1- what is the nature of this ''non material?''

We are the nature and everything else it is. It is our sense of being.

2-how does this 'non material' emerge from the material activity of the brain?

Physicists hope to reach "the bottom" of it all one day. They will no longer have to ask how or why to understand except for when they want to be philosophical and just make guesses.

We may be at "the bottom" with the consciousness or we may not. There may not be any reason to ask how. But if there is, I certainly don't know enough to say.

3- how does this 'non material' interact with the material world?

This of course is a tough question for dualists (By "dualism" I mean, [from Wikipedia] "In philosophy of mind, dualism is the position that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical, or that the mind and body are not identical") This is what I mean by mind-body dualism.

The fact that we can't seem to "find" or observe qualia/sensory experience is a sign that it may only be indirectly observable. Its effect is its claim to exist and possibly has an element of free will, and we know that it can be affected.

4- how does the proposition of 'non material consciousness' explain 'experience'...how does it help us understand 'experience?'

It may make it harder for us to understand it.

 

[Togo]

Is proposing 'material' as a solution for something we don't understand a solution? Or are they both equally vague?

Material has definable properties: mass, charge, spin, orientation, position, velocity. Properties that can be examined and tested, while the term 'non material' - presumably being the absence of matter - implies that there are no properties to examine and no way to test this 'non material' ..... whatever it is.

But this is the problem. Subjective experiences do not have mass, charge, spin, orientation, position, velocity, etc. Nor do abstract concepts like '3' or 'experimental controls'. So when someone insists that these must be 'material', what do they mean? Either they're saying that the abstract concept '3' has mass, which seems silly, or they're expanding the definition of 'material' to include things that don't have the properties you're talking about. Is it better to insist that everything is material, even if that leaves us with no properties that are unique to material things, or is it better to divide things into material or immaterial?

 

[untermensche]

But this is the problem. Subjective experiences do not have mass, charge, spin, orientation, position, velocity, etc. Nor do abstract concepts like '3' or 'experimental controls'. So when someone insists that these must be 'material', what do they mean? Either they're saying that the abstract concept '3' has mass, which seems silly, or they're expanding the definition of 'material' to include things that don't have the properties you're talking about. Is it better to insist that everything is material, even if that leaves us with no properties that are unique to material things, or is it better to divide things into material or immaterial?

Color is an example of the immaterial.

You can't touch green, you can't smell it, you can't measure it.

It is something you experience. All you can measure is the light that causes your brain to create the experience of green.

I think though, as the thing that experiences green, we can assign too much significance to the experience.

Some actually think they see the gods because they can experience green.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Different combinations of particles are different combinations of particles; there are no objective wholes outside of the mind.

I would have thought that's precisely what you were trying to say with your insistance on structure being non-material in the sense of not being matter per se. In other words, you should be saying that objective wholes do exist outside the mind as immaterial physical things just like structures in the physical world exist outside the mind as immaterial physical things.
EB

This argument is much different than the argument I was making with words/structures. The point about words being structures is one thing, but now I am willing to argue that sensory experiences of words/structures are another completely different kind of immaterial.

Sorry, I really just don't understand.

I was talking about whether objective wholes can exist outside of the mind. If they don't then there are no structures outside the mind, and therefore no immaterial structures, yet something you apparently have insisted they existed out there, whereby apparently contradicting yourself.

By "dualism" I really mean a major contrast like happy to sad, black to white, soft hard, etc, or [from Wikipedia] "In philosophy of mind, dualism is the position that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical, or that the mind and body are not identical".

You think that proponents of mind/matter dualism see it as a kind of "major contrast like happy to sad, black to white, soft hard, etc"?!

For example, seeing that one can go from white to black and back (or happy to sad and back etc.) through a seemingly continuous change, then one should be able to go for matter to mind and vice versa through some equivalent to a continuous change, like for example if the mind is nothing else but a property of matter.

If so, I don't know what you are talking about.
EB

 

[ryan]

Different combinations of particles are different combinations of particles; there are no objective wholes outside of the mind.

I would have thought that's precisely what you were trying to say with your insistance on structure being non-material in the sense of not being matter per se. In other words, you should be saying that objective wholes do exist outside the mind as immaterial physical things just like structures in the physical world exist outside the mind as immaterial physical things.
EB

This argument is much different than the argument I was making with words/structures. The point about words being structures is one thing, but now I am willing to argue that sensory experiences of words/structures are another completely different kind of immaterial.

Sorry, I really just don't understand.

I was talking about whether objective wholes can exist outside of the mind. If they don't then there are no structures outside the mind, and therefore no immaterial structures, yet something you apparently have insisted they existed out there, whereby apparently contradicting yourself.

It seems as though fundamental parts can exist outside of the mind, but the structures that we define around these fundamental parts are immaterial sensations of reality in our minds.

By "dualism" I really mean a major contrast like happy to sad, black to white, soft hard, etc, or [from Wikipedia] "In philosophy of mind, dualism is the position that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical, or that the mind and body are not identical".

You think that proponents of mind/matter dualism see it as a kind of "major contrast like happy to sad, black to white, soft hard, etc"?!

For example, seeing that one can go from white to black and back (or happy to sad and back etc.) through a seemingly continuous change, then one should be able to go for matter to mind and vice versa through some equivalent to a continuous change, like for example if the mind is nothing else but a property of matter.

If so, I don't know what you are talking about.
EB

Yes, those are the closet examples of the contrast of mind and body that I can think of; I know no examples of contrasts as great as mind and body.