Are words immaterial?

[Kharakov]

Is the wind made of matter?

If it isn't, then what is it made of?

Can we define matter as any elementary particle?

Isn't the proper response "blow me"?

No, wait! You just dismally misread Juma. He just meant to ask whether THE MIND, not the wind, was made of matter. Makes more sense, yes?

Can't you recognise a typo for a typo man?

And, asking about "the wind" would have been a patent derail.

Something just to blow the thread off-course.
EB

Not at all. The wind was the intended word. It is a perfect example of something physical.

Matter is mind blowing, isn't it?

 

[DBT]

Energy/Matter is not to be taken lightly. Its existence and nature is the ultimate mystery despite of how familiar with it we may think we are. As for 'non material 'things' - that 'stuff' goes way beyond mystery into the realm of 'imaginary.'

 

[ryan]

What about my thought experiment about dying in a space capsule? The matter is conserved before and after, but something else is not. If it is not conserved, then it is not matter as we know it.

It probably is conserved in the normal way that information is stored by the brain, synaptic connections, dendrites, information in the form and shape of proteins, receptors vacant or occupied, etc, etc, all being 'frozen' at the point of brain death.

If there is no sensation, then how can it be conserved?

The thing missing being electrical activity...which is a physical activity.

Yes, but the matter is conserved during and after electrical activity.

So Ryan, what do you think happens to the physical electrochemical process when that ceases at the point of death?

The energies transfer. I assume that all processes continue to evolve more or less the way they are expected to.

And how does your non physical element, not being composed of matter/energy, supposed interact with the physical components of the brain?

I don't know.

Not being subject to natural laws of conservation of energy, where does it come from? Where does it go? How does it interact?

There might be an infinite number of possible explanations given what we know; it would be futile to give some of them.

How does it explain consciousness?

I don't know.

 

[DBT]

It probably is conserved in the normal way that information is stored by the brain, synaptic connections, dendrites, information in the form and shape of proteins, receptors vacant or occupied, etc, etc, all being 'frozen' at the point of brain death.

If there is no sensation, then how can it be conserved?

As information. If the dead brain could be reanimated, this being the hope of those who place their hope in cryogenics, the sensation, including the last thought before death, is experienced once again. The missing element not being the stored information, but the agency of animation: the electrochemical activity of a live brain.


Quote:
''Due to the intrinsic electrical properties and the connectivity of thalamic neurones two groups of corticothalamic loops are generated, which resonate at a frequency of 40 Hz. The specific thalamo-cortical loops give the content of cognition and the no specific loop, the temporal binding required for the unity of the cognitive experience. Consciousness is then, a product of the resonant thalamo-cortical activity, and the dialogue between the thalamus and cortex, the process that generates subjectivity, the unique experience we all recognized as the existence of the "self".

Yes, but the matter is conserved during and after electrical activity.

That's right, but no possibility of animation once the electrochemical activity permanently shuts down (brain death)

The energies transfer. I assume that all processes continue to evolve more or less the way they are expected to.

But what energy transfer? 'Non material' cannot be defined as 'energy' because energy is a material phenomena. So what is being transferred?

 

[ryan]

If there is no sensation, then how can it be conserved?

As information. If the dead brain could be reanimated, this being the hope of those who place their hope in cryogenics, the sensation, including the last thought before death, is experienced once again. The missing element not being the stored information, but the agency of animation: the electrochemical activity of a live brain.


Quote:
''Due to the intrinsic electrical properties and the connectivity of thalamic neurones two groups of corticothalamic loops are generated, which resonate at a frequency of 40 Hz. The specific thalamo-cortical loops give the content of cognition and the no specific loop, the temporal binding required for the unity of the cognitive experience. Consciousness is then, a product of the resonant thalamo-cortical activity, and the dialogue between the thalamus and cortex, the process that generates subjectivity, the unique experience we all recognized as the existence of the "self".

Please refer to what I put in bold.

Notice how they/you use the term "a product of ...". With "material systems", the product is always material that went through a process. There must be material products/effects/results from the "the resonant thalamo-cortical activity" that are already accounted for, but there is also another product. This other product is something that does not need to be there in order to conserve the matter. It is something extra that is not accounted for before it emerges; all material products are accounted for before they are produced.

So there is another product; a product that comes from material but not in terms of its inherent "substance" (I used "substance" because I don't know what the hell to call it).

 

[DBT]

As information. If the dead brain could be reanimated, this being the hope of those who place their hope in cryogenics, the sensation, including the last thought before death, is experienced once again. The missing element not being the stored information, but the agency of animation: the electrochemical activity of a live brain.


Quote:
''Due to the intrinsic electrical properties and the connectivity of thalamic neurones two groups of corticothalamic loops are generated, which resonate at a frequency of 40 Hz. The specific thalamo-cortical loops give the content of cognition and the no specific loop, the temporal binding required for the unity of the cognitive experience. Consciousness is then, a product of the resonant thalamo-cortical activity, and the dialogue between the thalamus and cortex, the process that generates subjectivity, the unique experience we all recognized as the existence of the "self".

Please refer to what I put in bold.

Notice how they/you use the term "a product of ...". With "material systems", the product is always material that went through a process. There must be material products/effects/results from the "the resonant thalamo-cortical activity" that are already accounted for, but there is also another product. This other product is something that does not need to be there in order to conserve the matter. It is something extra that is not accounted for before it emerges; all material products are accounted for before they are produced.

So there is another product; a product that comes from material but not in terms of its inherent "substance" (I used "substance" because I don't know what the hell to call it).

It's just a matter of semantics. You may fuse two or more elements that produces an alloy that has its own set of characteristics. The alloy being composed of its constituent parts. The alloy may be said to a product of the forging process.

Neural activity comes together within a given 'work space' to form the electrochemical element of conscious representation of information. Nothing is actually separate, but a quality that is not present within the individual parts (neurons) is formed by the activity of the structure as a whole working in concert.

 

[ryan]

Please refer to what I put in bold.

Notice how they/you use the term "a product of ...". With "material systems", the product is always material that went through a process. There must be material products/effects/results from the "the resonant thalamo-cortical activity" that are already accounted for, but there is also another product. This other product is something that does not need to be there in order to conserve the matter. It is something extra that is not accounted for before it emerges; all material products are accounted for before they are produced.

So there is another product; a product that comes from material but not in terms of its inherent "substance" (I used "substance" because I don't know what the hell to call it).

It's just a matter of semantics. You may fuse two or more elements that produces an alloy that has its own set of characteristics. The alloy being composed of its constituent parts. The alloy may be said to a product of the forging process.

Neural activity comes together within a given 'work space' to form the electrochemical element of conscious representation of information. Nothing is actually separate, but a quality that is not present within the individual parts (neurons) is formed by the activity of the structure as a whole working in concert.

Are you saying that there is no distinction between the activity in the brain during its sensory experiences and the sensual experiences? I hope not because they seem very different.

Imagine a scenario where brain A observes brain B observing a pencil. Brain B is at location B'. How can brain A and brain B ever agree on what happened at location B'? Brain A will say that there was a brain (brain B) at location B', but brain B will say that there was an image of a pencil, along with many other sensual experiences at location B'.

 

[Juma]

Imagine a scenario where brain A observes brain B observing a pencil. Brain B is at location B'. How can brain A and brain B ever agree on what happened at location B'? Brain A will say that there was a brain (brain B) at location B', but brain B will say that there was an image of a pencil, along with many other sensual experiences at location B'.

And why couldnt brain A conclude the same? Body A would of course need some measurements devices because human bodies cannot "see" such data directly.

 

[DBT]

It's just a matter of semantics. You may fuse two or more elements that produces an alloy that has its own set of characteristics. The alloy being composed of its constituent parts. The alloy may be said to a product of the forging process.

Neural activity comes together within a given 'work space' to form the electrochemical element of conscious representation of information. Nothing is actually separate, but a quality that is not present within the individual parts (neurons) is formed by the activity of the structure as a whole working in concert.

Are you saying that there is no distinction between the activity in the brain during its sensory experiences and the sensual experiences? I hope not because they seem very different.

No, I said that there is no need to propose an extraneous element to explain a physical structure, its function, process or whatever effects it produces. The product being the sum total of the parts and their activity.

Just as the individual parts of a computer cannot function as an information processor until they are assembled in the correct order and power is applied, consciousness is feature of the activity of neural networks.

 

[Togo]

Are you saying that there is no distinction between the activity in the brain during its sensory experiences and the sensual experiences? I hope not because they seem very different.

No, I said that there is no need to propose an extraneous element to explain a physical structure, its function, process or whatever effects it produces. The product being the sum total of the parts and their activity.

But we are proposing something extra. Our existing account of how the brain works doesn't show how subjective experiences occur. So you can say there is a need for an extra something to explain that. Which means we end up discussing whether that extra something is best described as physical, or not.

Just as the individual parts of a computer cannot function as an information processor until they are assembled in the correct order and power is applied, consciousness is feature of the activity of neural networks.

But is it a physical feature? Or an immaterial feature? Making it a feature of an existing something, rather than a something in it's own right, doesn't in itself help solve the problem. We've still not got away from whether processes are necessarily physical.

 

[ryan]

Imagine a scenario where brain A observes brain B observing a pencil. Brain B is at location B'. How can brain A and brain B ever agree on what happened at location B'? Brain A will say that there was a brain (brain B) at location B', but brain B will say that there was an image of a pencil, along with many other sensual experiences at location B'.

And why couldnt brain A conclude the same? Body A would of course need some measurements devices because human bodies cannot "see" such data directly.

I am not sure what you mean by "measurement"; measure what?

 

[ryan]

Are you saying that there is no distinction between the activity in the brain during its sensory experiences and the sensual experiences? I hope not because they seem very different.

No, I said that there is no need to propose an extraneous element to explain a physical structure, its function, process or whatever effects it produces. The product being the sum total of the parts and their activity.

Just as the individual parts of a computer cannot function as an information processor until they are assembled in the correct order and power is applied, consciousness is feature of the activity of neural networks.

But I have said already that the processes are necessary for the experiences; I don't think that they are completely extraneous. For me this sensory experience is analogous to an orange emerging every time ten apples are put in a certain position. Obviously the emergence of an orange is easier to observe than the emergence of a sensory experience which is probably why this whole subject is so controversial.

 

[Juma]

And why couldnt brain A conclude the same? Body A would of course need some measurements devices because human bodies cannot "see" such data directly.

I am not sure what you mean by "measurement"; measure what?

Doesnt matter.

 

[DBT]

No, I said that there is no need to propose an extraneous element to explain a physical structure, its function, process or whatever effects it produces. The product being the sum total of the parts and their activity.

Just as the individual parts of a computer cannot function as an information processor until they are assembled in the correct order and power is applied, consciousness is feature of the activity of neural networks.

But I have said already that the processes are necessary for the experiences; I don't think that they are completely extraneous. For me this sensory experience is analogous to an orange emerging every time ten apples are put in a certain position. Obviously the emergence of an orange is easier to observe than the emergence of a sensory experience which is probably why this whole subject is so controversial.

Do neuroscientists believe that consciousness as a form of neural activity is controversial? Who is saying that this is controversial?

Your analogy is wrong because it assumes that consciousness cannot emerge from neural activity while the evidence supports the proposition that consciousness is a form of neural activity, and not something that is unrelated...like an orange that happens to be growing on an apple tree.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Is the wind made of matter?

If it isn't, then what is it made of?

Can we define matter as any elementary particle?

Isn't the proper response "blow me"?

No, wait! You just dismally misread Juma. He just meant to ask whether THE MIND, not the wind, was made of matter. Makes more sense, yes?

Can't you recognise a typo for a typo man?

And, asking about "the wind" would have been a patent derail.

Something just to blow the thread off-course.
EB

Not at all. The wind was the intended word. It is a perfect example of something physical.

Sure. Humourless wind it is then.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Are you saying that there is no distinction between the activity in the brain during its sensory experiences and the sensual experiences? I hope not because they seem very different.

Imagine a scenario where brain A observes brain B observing a pencil. Brain B is at location B'. How can brain A and brain B ever agree on what happened at location B'? Brain A will say that there was a brain (brain B) at location B', but brain B will say that there was an image of a pencil, along with many other sensual experiences at location B'.

Suppose I could remember certain memories my parents had. I don't know, maybe something before I was born, a very long time ago. Maybe something in the DNA in our neurons could do that for us, like "coding" souvenirs to be transmitted to offspring. I wonder if you then couldn't accept that we could have the same experience of the same memory?
EB

 

[ryan]

But I have said already that the processes are necessary for the experiences; I don't think that they are completely extraneous. For me this sensory experience is analogous to an orange emerging every time ten apples are put in a certain position. Obviously the emergence of an orange is easier to observe than the emergence of a sensory experience which is probably why this whole subject is so controversial.

Do neuroscientists believe that consciousness as a form of neural activity is controversial? Who is saying that this is controversial?

It is controversial; please see, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/#TheCon and http://plato.stanford.edu/search/searcher.py?query=consciousness .

Your analogy is wrong because it assumes that consciousness cannot emerge from neural activity while the evidence supports the proposition that consciousness is a form of neural activity, and not something that is unrelated...like an orange that happens to be growing on an apple tree.

But I do believe it emerges. No posts of mine say it doesn't.

 

[ryan]

Are you saying that there is no distinction between the activity in the brain during its sensory experiences and the sensual experiences? I hope not because they seem very different.

Imagine a scenario where brain A observes brain B observing a pencil. Brain B is at location B'. How can brain A and brain B ever agree on what happened at location B'? Brain A will say that there was a brain (brain B) at location B', but brain B will say that there was an image of a pencil, along with many other sensual experiences at location B'.

Suppose I could remember certain memories my parents had. I don't know, maybe something before I was born, a very long time ago. Maybe something in the DNA in our neurons could do that for us, like "coding" souvenirs to be transmitted to offspring. I wonder if you then couldn't accept that we could have the same experience of the same memory?
EB

I guess. But the same experience isn't the other's experience.

The point of the thought experiment is to show that there are two completely different accounts for what happens at a certain point due to the duality of body and mind.

 

[Kharakov]

Is the wind made of matter?

If it isn't, then what is it made of?

Can we define matter as any elementary particle?

Isn't the proper response "blow me"?

No, wait! You just dismally misread Juma. He just meant to ask whether THE MIND, not the wind, was made of matter. Makes more sense, yes?

Can't you recognise a typo for a typo man?

And, asking about "the wind" would have been a patent derail.

Something just to blow the thread off-course.
EB

Not at all. The wind was the intended word. It is a perfect example of something physical.

Sure. Humourless wind it is then.
EB

That blows.

 

[DBT]

Do neuroscientists believe that consciousness as a form of neural activity is controversial? Who is saying that this is controversial?

It is controversial; please see, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/#TheCon and http://plato.stanford.edu/search/searcher.py?query=consciousness .

Can you quote the parts that question the proposition that it is the brain that generates consciousness? Where is the argument for a non material component? Who are the supporters for the presence of a ghost in the machine?

But I do believe it emerges. No posts of mine say it doesn't.

Then let's take an orange tree as a example of properties. An orange tree has a hard wooden trunk, bark, roots that burrow into the ground, unpalatable leaves...yet it produces a soft, succulent delicious fruit, unlike any other aspect of the tree. The fruit is like no other part of the tree. It is completely different. How is this possible? Is it the work of a non material agency? According to the reasoning that experience is nothing like conscious neural activity (how do you know), the orange is nothing like the plant it grows on.