Civil Disobedience

[fast]

Civil disobedience: refusal to obey laws as a way of forcing the government to do or change something

Should we not only expect but also encourage punishment of law breakers even when we might otherwise consider those law breakers hero's for their illegal actions? I'm not so sure moral justification outweighs the greater good of holding people legally accountable for their illegal actions.

That's not to say there cannot be discretion within one's purview in the pursuit of justice (by those charged with upholding the law), but a decision to criminally engage in civil disobedience regardless of moral grounds should not be without even his or her expectation to take responsibility for his or her actions.

Example: If having slaves is legal, and if you (for moral reasons) aid in their escape, and if doing so is clearly illegal, should you be legally punished--even if you are considered a hero for doing so? Shouldn't you expect it? Shouldn't those that praise your actions expect and perhaps even encourage it? Again, punishment need not be severe, as discretion need not be non-existent.

Why would I even have the notion that a morally permissible yet legally forbidden act should have legal consequences, especially if such an act is morally justified? I think the answer lies in some unarticulated principle of obedience driven by an authoritarian atmosphere. I don't know, but we're taught to obey the law, and if we don't like the law to legally participate in a change to it.

Sometimes, we grow weary of trying to right the laws, and when the task seems insurmountable, people choose (and perhaps sometimes morally justifiable so) to act in a manner they know has legal consequences, yet does (I ask) moral grounds truly justify the civil disobedient deeds? Can an argument not be made that the negatives of civil disobedience outweigh the positives of being civily disobedient?

I know there's no persuasive argument to calm those that would rally behind those misbehaving when such misbehavior has a good cause behind it. I guess that's human nature with an emotional appeal destined to burn greatly, but what's the intellectual arguments for both sides, and which side is the rational choice?

I'm personally going to side with what I believe is right, but I can't help shouldering some disdain for those giving up on finding a way to legally bring about positive legal change.

 

[ronburgundy]

Yes, they should be arrested without consideration of their righteousness of their cause. It is kind of the mirror of free speech where people should not be arrested regardless of the unrighteousness, offensiveness of their speech. The legal principle and protecting it from authoritarian abuse is more important other considerations. Consistent application of that principle is what protects it from authoritarian abuse. Inconsistently in application of the law leads inevitably to powerful authorities arbitrarily using the law to their advantage and in ways that erode justice in the long run.

Besides, arresting those who break laws with a just cause is what brings attention to the injustice of those particular laws. If they aren't arrested, then there is not focus on the unjust laws and the laws won't change. Among many civil rights activists getting arrested is almost the point, and pleading guilty or no contest is part of the protest to show the injustice of the law. If they plead not guilty, then they are denying have engaged in the act that they are trying to say should be a legally allowed act.

 

[Bronzeage]

The point of non-violent (there are many kinds) civil disobedience, is to place a government which values its legitimacy, in a position where it must do something most people think is wrong, in order to enforce the law, or remain in power.

NVCD is a delicate balance. In the United States, civil disobedience may get you a disorderly conduct or a trespassing charge. There are countries where you might be beaten, jailed, or simply never seen again.

The whole point of civil disobedience is to get arrested. The purpose is to expose a contradiction between the law of the land and the principles of the land. When civil disobedience was practiced in the US civil rights struggle, all the discriminatory practices which were the target of the action were more than just legal. They were mandated by law.

Anyone who is not willing to face the legal consequences of NVCD should find some other way to pass their time.

 

[fromderinside]

Anyone who is not willing to face the legal consequences of NVCD should find some other way to pass their time.

Wait a minute. People not ready for disobedience get caught up in NVCD all the time. If you are a hanger on in a group wanting to do something you might be swept up in civil disobedience that isn't actually civil Nor just disobedient.

Example. Free speech area at meeting after Kent State at one of the surf universities near LA. Speakers are passionate, Government is nervous witnessed by suits with shades atop several buildings around the FS area, its Friday. One particularly passionate speaker with his crew call for audience which is now about 300 strong plus another 700 or 800 passing to or from lunch to march.

A parade begins. More and more people get caught up in the spirit and join the crowd. Office labels are accidentally? trashed by some of the more enthusiastic as marchers snake though buildings. Soon there are about 1000 people descending on the nearby I 10 - I 605 interchange. Truckers show solidarity by blocking the freeway in all directions. Another two or three thousand students and lookers on gather above the freeways cheering, some drinking in the whole stew now being mixed by CHIPs trying to get traffic moving again.

Nobody is prosecuted. About $20,000 in damage is done to the campus including the destruction of my thesis set up. Truth be told I was part of the demonstration so rebuilding was on me.

On the other hand, the students at Kent State suffered death and arrest as the result of a few hundred students demonstrating.

Yes the demonstration in LA was ostensibly non-violent, it had aspects of civil disobedience, but, actually it was a college mob out to do some fun. There were some of the organizers who tried to keep people from destroying stuff, who were eventually overwhelmed and the freeway thing was just a big party. Nobody was arrested probably because it was LA. Conversely, things at Kent State were pretty bad.

Many were afraid of the pictures taken by the suits with shades. As far as I know no one ever was identified or sanctioned because they were pictured. Facing consequences may or may not been on the minds of those caught up in both events nor were consequences commiserate with failures in organization or damage. Many civil disobedience events in the sixties and in the seventies (Civil rights and Vietnam opposition) were essentially mob actions. Those conducted by whites seemed less organized and less consequential than those organized by blacks. So context and social status might be more important when we talk of 'ready to take "consequences"'.

 

[Valjean]

Working within the system rarely produces substantive social change. Society advances through boots on the streets or after a Klein shock.

 

[Bomb#20]

I'm not so sure moral justification outweighs the greater good of holding people legally accountable for their illegal actions.

That's not to say there cannot be discretion within one's purview in the pursuit of justice (by those charged with upholding the law), but a decision to criminally engage in civil disobedience regardless of moral grounds should not be without even his or her expectation to take responsibility for his or her actions.

Example: If having slaves is legal, and if you (for moral reasons) aid in their escape, and if doing so is clearly illegal, should you be legally punished--even if you are considered a hero for doing so? Shouldn't you expect it? Shouldn't those that praise your actions expect and perhaps even encourage it?

If a guy helps a slave get to Canada, and, in the interest of holding him legally accountable, for the sake of consistent application of the law or for the sake of pressing the government to change the law or for the sake of whatever, you throw him in jail for violating the Fugitive Slave Act, then the guy won't be available to help the next slave escape to Canada. Not seeing how that's the greater good.

In the event that you find yourself on the guy's jury and, in spite of proof that he violated the Act, you stubbornly refuse to convict, do you consider yourself to also be engaging in civil disobedience? Do you think you should be legally punished or otherwise forced to take responsibility for bringing in a not-guilty verdict in the teeth of the facts and the law?

 

[untermensche]

Should we not only expect but also encourage punishment of law breakers even when we might otherwise consider those law breakers hero's for their illegal actions?

Punish somebody for doing good?

That turns the very idea of punishment, which is a bad idea anyway, on it's head.

It's absurd.

You reward people for doing good, especially if it violates some illegitimate law.

 

[Bronzeage]

Anyone who is not willing to face the legal consequences of NVCD should find some other way to pass their time.

Wait a minute. People not ready for disobedience get caught up in NVCD all the time. If you are a hanger on in a group wanting to do something you might be swept up in civil disobedience that isn't actually civil Nor just disobedient.

....

Shit happens.

NVCD requires organization and discipline. It's very easy for non-violence to turn violent, and it often does.

A law that is not, or cannot be enforced is no longer a law. The purpose of civil disobedience to prove a law cannot be enforced by stretching the system to the limit of its power. If the jail holds only 100 people, there's no point to arresting 1000 people. You have to let some people go, and ignore just as many.

Sometimes it's worse than jail. Civil Rights marchers in the US knew the possibility of being beaten by a policeman was very real. It's difficult to maintain discipline in the face of that.

 

[fast]

Should we not only expect but also encourage punishment of law breakers even when we might otherwise consider those law breakers hero's for their illegal actions?

Punish somebody for doing good?

That turns the very idea of punishment, which is a bad idea anyway, on it's head.

It's absurd.

You reward people for doing good, especially if it violates some illegitimate law.

What do you mean, illegitimate? Laws passed through illegal means?

As to punishing people for doing good, not always. Just when doing so violates law. Bomb says he doesn't see the greater good, but there's a good that comes out of not allowing members of society to choose to act on their own shades of moral views.

 

[fast]

Working within the system rarely produces substantive social change. Society advances through boots on the streets or after a Klein shock.

I don't know how true that is, but I'm not sure I see the relevance. Find a way to bring about substantive social change that aligns with your particular values, but do so within legal limits; otherwise, pay the price for the choices you make that are in violation of the laws others are obligated to obey.

 

[fast]

I'm not so sure moral justification outweighs the greater good of holding people legally accountable for their illegal actions.

That's not to say there cannot be discretion within one's purview in the pursuit of justice (by those charged with upholding the law), but a decision to criminally engage in civil disobedience regardless of moral grounds should not be without even his or her expectation to take responsibility for his or her actions.

Example: If having slaves is legal, and if you (for moral reasons) aid in their escape, and if doing so is clearly illegal, should you be legally punished--even if you are considered a hero for doing so? Shouldn't you expect it? Shouldn't those that praise your actions expect and perhaps even encourage it?

In the event that you find yourself on the guy's jury and, in spite of proof that he violated the Act, you stubbornly refuse to convict, do you consider yourself to also be engaging in civil disobedience? Do you think you should be legally punished or otherwise forced to take responsibility for bringing in a not-guilty verdict in the teeth of the facts and the law?

It depends on the clarity of the law. If there is in fact a loophole, I need not act in the spirit of the law. My duty, my legal duty, not some contrived view based on argumentation, is to follow the letter of the law or be squashed by it. Sure, I might make a moral choice and go with what I just so happen to either feel is right or soundly argue that is right, but neither my feelings nor arguments do any more than invoke moral justification. Moral justification be damned; my legal duty is to obey the law, the same law everyone else is legally bound to follow; how dare I make for a chaotic system of justice by acting against the laws we are all legally expected to follow? Don't think the law is right? Do something, but make sure it's legal; otherwise, pay the price, as you legally should. Moral ought doesn't trump legal ought, at least that's the view being tested here in this thread.

 

[Bomb#20]

In the event that you find yourself on the guy's jury and, in spite of proof that he violated the Act, you stubbornly refuse to convict, do you consider yourself to also be engaging in civil disobedience? Do you think you should be legally punished or otherwise forced to take responsibility for bringing in a not-guilty verdict in the teeth of the facts and the law?

It depends on the clarity of the law. If there is in fact a loophole, I need not act in the spirit of the law. My duty, my legal duty, not some contrived view based on argumentation, is to follow the letter of the law or be squashed by it. Sure, I might make a moral choice and go with what I just so happen to either feel is right or soundly argue that is right, but neither my feelings nor arguments do any more than invoke moral justification. Moral justification be damned; my legal duty is to obey the law, the same law everyone else is legally bound to follow; how dare I make for a chaotic system of justice by acting against the laws we are all legally expected to follow?

Well, that's the viewpoint the judge will want you to have. She'll tell you your legal duty is to enforce the law as she tells it to you; and if she tells you the law incorrectly that's the appellate court's job to fix, not yours. On the other hand, (1) the defendant probably hasn't got the money for an appeal, (2) the witnesses took oaths to tell you the truth but the judge didn't and there's nothing to stop her from lying to you about what the law is, and (3) jury nullification was legal when the 6th Amendment guaranteeing the right to trial-by-jury was passed, and the Constitution has not since been amended to redefine "jury". Look like a loophole to you? Looks like one to me.

Don't think the law is right? Do something, but make sure it's legal; otherwise, pay the price, as you legally should. Moral ought doesn't trump legal ought, at least that's the view being tested here in this thread.

"I was just following orders."

 

[fast]

It depends on the clarity of the law. If there is in fact a loophole, I need not act in the spirit of the law. My duty, my legal duty, not some contrived view based on argumentation, is to follow the letter of the law or be squashed by it. Sure, I might make a moral choice and go with what I just so happen to either feel is right or soundly argue that is right, but neither my feelings nor arguments do any more than invoke moral justification. Moral justification be damned; my legal duty is to obey the law, the same law everyone else is legally bound to follow; how dare I make for a chaotic system of justice by acting against the laws we are all legally expected to follow?

Well, that's the viewpoint the judge will want you to have. She'll tell you your legal duty is to enforce the law as she tells it to you; and if she tells you the law incorrectly that's the appellate court's job to fix, not yours. On the other hand, (1) the defendant probably hasn't got the money for an appeal, (2) the witnesses took oaths to tell you the truth but the judge didn't and there's nothing to stop her from lying to you about what the law is, and (3) jury nullification was legal when the 6th Amendment guaranteeing the right to trial-by-jury was passed, and the Constitution has not since been amended to redefine "jury". Look like a loophole to you? Looks like one to me.

Don't think the law is right? Do something, but make sure it's legal; otherwise, pay the price, as you legally should. Moral ought doesn't trump legal ought, at least that's the view being tested here in this thread.

"I was just following orders."

Of course you were following orders. You were supposed to. It is your sworn duty to do so. People are depending on you to do so. You don't get to invoke your morals when you are counted on to follow orders. If you can't overcome your moral convictions born of who knows where, maybe you should not be in a position where others can feel safe to count on you to do as told. Your confidence that 'following selected orders is immoral' has no place in the military when each and everyone else counts on you to not invoke what YOU think is right.

People can care about what they think is right and wrong all they want, but think as they might, they damn well better not act on it, as their varying multi-shades of morally related thoughts corrupt the strength that comes with being able to depend on the chain of command being followed to the T.

The idea that a morally righteous action is somehow superior to a legally bound action is being questioned, so arguing that it's wrong to follow morally corrupt orders carries the same weight as a circular argument. Your duty, obligation, and responsibility is to carry out the very wrong things you're instructed to do, and if you take it upon yourself to defy those with the legal right to give those commands, then you legally deserve to pay (and possibly dearly) for your defiance.

Of course, if you're obligated to not follow certain orders and you do so anyway, then no, "just following orders" doesn't cut it.

 

[untermensche]

You don't get to invoke your morals when you are counted on to follow orders.

That is many times when morals are needed most.

If only more people followed their morals as opposed to orders.

It would be a much better world.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Moral ought doesn't trump legal ought, at least that's the view being tested here in this thread.

It seems tautological to me that moral ought morally trumps legal ought. In which sense are you using "trump" here?

The idea that a morally righteous action is somehow superior to a legally bound action is being questioned, so arguing that it's wrong to follow morally corrupt orders carries the same weight as a circular argument.

It seems tautological that a morally righteous action is morally superior to a legally bound but immoral action. In which sense are you counting superiority here?
Maybe you're trying to question whether it's ever morally permissible to break the law in order to bring about legal changes, or whether it's ever morally permissible to break the law at all?

It seems clear to me that the answer is affirmative in both cases, as Bomb#20's examples showed. By the way, "I was just following orders." is what some Nazi officers said.

You don't get to invoke your morals when you are counted on to follow orders.

That looks like a moral judgment (if it's not, what do you mean?)
To use Bomb#20's pretty decisive example, let's say that Hans is counted on to follow orders and gas all of those Jews (men, women, children, all of course civilians) to death in the concentration camp, but he chooses not to follow the orders. Is he behaving immorally?

Btw, sometimes a person is counted on to follow orders by some people, and counted on to ignore those orders by other people. For example, maybe Konstantin is a Russian agent in the UK. He's counted on by Putin to assassinate one of Putin's opponents, and he's counted on by people in the UK who doesn't know he's an agent not to assassinate anyone. Also, from a strictly legal perspective (leaving morality aside, and going by a positivist take on legality), if he follows Putin's orders, he breaks UK law, but if he doesn't, he breaks Russian law (let's say there is one).

 

[fast]

It seems tautological to me that moral ought morally trumps legal ought.

Yes, of course, but you're the one that added "morally" into the mix.

In which sense are you using "trump" here?

in whatever sense avoids adding morals into the mix.

It seems tautological that a morally righteous action is morally superior to a legally bound but immoral action. In which sense are you counting superiority here?

You did it again. You added "morally" into the mix. I'm trying to avoid that. I tried with "trump" earlier and later with "superior."

Which should we do (in a neutral and impartial sense--that doesn't throw morally into the mix) in choosing between either following a code based on legal ought versus moral ought? It's circular to argue that we should choose to do what's morally right when faced with an immoral legal ought if you're basing that on the fact it's immoral to do otherwise. So what; if it's legally wrong not to do it, we legally ought to do it even if it's morally wrong. Choose sides much?

You're going to choose ethical behavior over an actual legal duty? Because it's the right thing to do? I'm not asking what we should do in a moral sense. That doesn't come across as unbiased and neutral. Doing what's right is under question here (when faced with legally obligated immoral behavior), so the 'what should I do' question in this context should exclude any attempt at throwing "morally" into the mix.

Maybe you're trying to question whether it's ever morally permissible to break the law in order to bring about legal changes, or whether it's ever morally permissible to break the law at all?

It may very well be morally permissible to break the law, but that doesn't infer you shouldn't be legally punished for your illegal actions. You don't get a free get out of trouble card just because your actions just so happen to be morally justified. I have to play by the same legal rules as everyone else, and if I break the law when my actions are not immoral and the punishment has a legal basis, I'm going to be seethingly bitter when the the punishment for another for the same infraction is based instead on morals.

[You don't get to invoke your morals when you are counted on to follow orders] looks like a moral judgment (if it's not, what do you mean?)

It's not a legally acceptable option.

To use Bomb#20's pretty decisive example, let's say that Hans is counted on to follow orders and gas all of those Jews (men, women, children, all of course civilians) to death in the concentration camp, but he chooses not to follow the orders. Is he behaving immorally?

I wouldn't say he's behaving immorally. Heck, I'll go on to even say it's a morally acceptable action. The issue is whether he should be legally punished. And by, "should," I am trying very hard not to invoke a morally based question. If I asked if a speeding motorist should get a speeding ticket, you wouldn't think I was asking a moral question unless perhaps I brought heroic actions into play.

People who deliberately break the law while their actions are being characterized as civil disobedience should be punished for their illegal actions even if what they are doing is morally permissible. Some people believe we shouldn't punish people that have the courage to stand up and do what's morally right. Let their illegal actions slide, they say. Don't hold them accountable, they think. Why? Because what they were doing was a good and just act!

Hell no, Big Bubba says. He says beat the hell out of them until they can't walk, if that's a legally permissible thing to do.

So, what should we do? In the neutral sense. Not what is the moral thing to do. Bubba says we should follow the law, but some people don't think that's right and therefore not the right thing to do. That's what you call justifying illegal behavior. Amazing how morals keep getting thrown into the mix.

We are bound by law to follow the law. We are not afforded the legal luxury of invoking our morals, and until laws are changed to reflect a moral justice system, we should refrain from doing what's right by handing get out of trouble cards and instead hold the do gooders legally accountable for their just and moral actions that include breaking the law.

A little twisted, but I'm just testing the waters.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Yes, of course, but you're the one that added "morally" into the mix.

Right, and I pointed this out because usually in this forum (and also in the context of some of your questions), morality is the evaluative framework from which one is meant to assess what trumps what. But I asked what other framework you had in mind, which brings us to:

in whatever sense avoids adding morals into the mix.

But that does not explain it, because the term "trump" only makes sense relative to different evaluative frameworks.
Tautologically, a moral ought morally trumps a legal ought, and a legal ought legally trumps a moral ought.
So, if we rule out both morality and legality as the framework for evaluating what trumps what, then what framework would you like to discuss?

You did it again. You added "morally" into the mix. I'm trying to avoid that. I tried with "trump" earlier and later with "superior."

Not quite the same, because in this case, you said that "The idea that a morally righteous action is somehow superior to a legally bound action is being questioned...", and I was pointing out that a morally righteous action is trivally somehow (i.e., in some way) superior to a legally bound but immoral action. In which way? In the moral way.

Still, I get you may be trying to question whether a morally righteous action is superior to a legally bound but immoral action from the perspective of some other specific evaluative framework (i.e., a framework from which one can evaluate superiority or inferiority, other than the moral framework), but unless you specify the framework, given that you set aside the usual framework (i.e., the moral one), there is no way to discuss the matter.

Which should we do (in a neutral and impartial sense--that doesn't throw morally into the mix) in choosing between either following a code based on legal ought versus moral ought?

But the issue is that "should" depends on frameworks.
We morally should do what we morally ought to do (tautologically). But if you're thinking of a different "should", what is that? If it's a means-to-ends "should", then that depends on the agent's ends.

It's circular to argue that we should choose to do what's morally right when faced with an immoral legal ought if you're basing that on the fact it's immoral to do otherwise. So what; if it's legally wrong not to do it, we legally ought to do it even if it's morally wrong. Choose sides much?

But unless you choose a "side" (as in "a framework from which to evaluate matters", an evaluative point of view from which to assess the "should"), there is nothing to discuss, it seems to me.

You're going to choose ethical behavior over an actual legal duty? Because it's the right thing to do? I'm not asking what we should do in a moral sense. That doesn't come across as unbiased and neutral. Doing what's right is under question here (when faced with legally obligated immoral behavior), so the 'what should I do' question in this context should exclude any attempt at throwing "morally" into the mix.

But what "should" would that be?
If it's a means-to-ends "should", then it depends on one's goals, so the answer depends on the person and the situation.

It may very well be morally permissible to break the law, but that doesn't infer you shouldn't be legally punished for your illegal actions.

That's a different question, because that's not about what you should do, but about what others should do (i.e., should they punish you?). But then again, is that second "should" a moral one, or some other "should"? If it's a means-ends "should", then it depends on the goals of those other people.

You don't get a free get out of trouble card just because your actions just so happen to be morally justified.

If that's not a moral judgment - but it seriously sounds like it -, then what does "you don't get" means?
Is it an assessment of what it actually happens? Well, if so, then that depends on the case. Sometimes you get it, sometimes you don't.
If it's something else, what does it mean?

I have to play by the same legal rules as everyone else, and if I break the law when my actions are not immoral and the punishment has a legal basis, I'm going to be seethingly bitter when the the punishment for another for the same infraction is based instead on morals.

No, you do not have to. You can break the rules. If the "have to" means that you morally ought to, then no, you don't have to, either.
If that "have to" means somethng else, what does it mean?

As to whether you're going to be bitter, etc., if that's a report of your own psychology, alright, but I'm not sure what relevance it has. If it's a moral judgment that you morally should not be seethingly bitter, etc., I'm not sure you shouldn't; it depends on the case. If it's some other sort of judgment, what does it mean?

It's not a legally acceptable option.

But then I don't know what you were getting at. Bomb#20 wasn't saying it was a legally acceptable option in a positivistic legal sense (on a natural law view, it is a legally acceptable option sometimes, but then we're talking morality again).

I wouldn't say he's behaving immorally. Heck, I'll go on to even say it's a morally acceptable action. The issue is whether he should be legally punished. And by, "should," I am trying very hard not to invoke a morally based question.

But in that case, I would ask what "should" that is. I mean, it's a passive voice "should", so it's about what some other people should do to him. If it's not a moral "should" but a means-ends "should", whether they should punish him depends on their goals, which are not specified.

If I asked if a speeding motorist should get a speeding ticket, you wouldn't think I was asking a moral question unless perhaps I brought heroic actions into play.

That depends on context, but in nearly all contexts, I would think that's either a moral "should" or (less probable) a legal "should". But in the context of your questions, both the legal and the moral "should" lead to trivial tautologies. So, I would ask you what that "should" is.

People who deliberately break the law while their actions are being characterized as civil disobedience should be punished for their illegal actions even if what they are doing is morally permissible.

What "should" is that? (also, given it's passive voice, who should punish them? In the moral sense, whether they should be punished may be equivalent in context to whether they deserve to be punished, but you're not asking in the moral sense, so what are you saying?)

Some people believe we shouldn't punish people that have the courage to stand up and do what's morally right.

If that's a moral "should", we're back to moral assessments, though now there is no tautology, since the issue is how others should behave.
If that's not a moral "should", I don't know what is. A statement like the one I'm quoting is a statement I normally would interpret as a containing a moral "should".

Let their illegal actions slide, they say. Don't hold them accountable, they think. Why? Because what they were doing was a good and just act!

But when "they" say that, they almost invariably are making a moral judgment, and a recommendation based on it.

Hell no, Big Bubba says. He says beat the hell out of them until they can't walk, if that's a legally permissible thing to do.

But that's a statement about the preferences of Big Bubba, it seems to me, unless it's a moral judgment, in case please clarify and we can talk.

So, what should we do? In the neutral sense. Not what is the moral thing to do. Bubba says we should follow the law, but some people don't think that's right and therefore not the right thing to do. That's what you call justifying illegal behavior. Amazing how morals keep getting thrown into the mix.

I don't think there is a neutral sense. How can there be a "should" without a perspective from which to evaluate it?

We are bound by law to follow the law.

That's trivially tautological. For that matter, we're bound by moral law to follow moral law.

We are not afforded the legal luxury of invoking our morals, and until laws are changed to reflect a moral justice system, we should refrain from doing what's right by handing get out of trouble cards and instead hold the do gooders legally accountable for their just and moral actions that include breaking the law.

What "should" is that in "we should refrain"?

A little twisted, but I'm just testing the waters.

I'm afraid I don't understand you. Philosopher Sharon Street believes in an "overall should", but she thinks (I think) that's a means-end "should" from an agent's perspetive counting all goals. So, it depends on the agent's goal.
Some philosophers believe in an overall "should" that might not be a moral one, or one from an agent's perspective. I don't understand such "should" assertions.

 

[fast]

That post has helped a lot. I'm going to let this digest awhile. Meanwhile, I'll continue to ponder: If, legally speaking, we should do what we should legally do, and if morally speaking, we should do what we should morally do, and if there is a clash between what we should do in those competing regards, then it seems to me that what we should do should depend on whether a higher order framework guides us in choosing whether to do what we should legally do or to do what we morally should do.

I shouldn't ask which is the better choice (to do as we legally should OR to do as we morally should), since fairness and impartiality is doomed from the start given the semantic intertwinememt. Maybe I should ask which is more important. Objectively.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Just a minor addition:
It seems to me (though it might be arguable) that a legal "ought" (or "should") isn't a special kind of "ought", but a means-to-ends "ought" in which the end is to avoid illegal behavior.
Whether that's also the case of the (usual) moral "ought" is debatable. But in any event, the fact is that one needs an evaluative framework (or perspective, or whatever one prefers to call it) to assess the ought/should.
As for your new points:

If, legally speaking, we should do what we should legally do, and if morally speaking, we should do what we should morally do, and if there is a clash between what we should do in those competing regards, then it seems to me that what we should do should depend on whether a higher order framework guides us in choosing whether to do what we should legally do or to do what we morally should do.

But again you need a framework for assessing "higher order"; usually, it's implicit that the moral framework is that one.
By the way, a legal "should" can also conflict with a legal "should", on a positivist account of law (but on a natural law account, you're already talking about morality), since laws can clash.
For example, Ilya is a KGB agent in the US during the Cold War. He's been ordered to assassinate a Soviet dissident. Let's say the USSR did pass a law that requires that agents follow orders.
So, he legally shouldn't kill the dissident if "legally" means US law, but he legally should kill the dissident if "legally" means Soviet law.
Whether Soviet law was actually like that is not the issue; it's a hypothetical example, but in any case, it is true that spies are sometimes legally (country X) required to do things that are illegal (country Y).

Maybe I should ask which is more important. Objectively.

The "objectively" here suggests the question is what's more morally important, but that's ruled out by your previous words.
Also, we can talk about what's more important to such-and-such agent, but that seems to be ruled out by the "objectively" part.
Maybe it's what's more important from the perspective of achieving such-and-such goal, or from the perspective of such-and-such evaluative framework for importance?
But if so, it depends on the goal or framework.
I don't know how else to understand the question.

 

[fromderinside]

Maybe I should ask which is more important. Objectively.

The "objectively" here suggests the question is what's more morally important, but that's ruled out by your previous words.
Also, we can talk about what's more important to such-and-such agent, but that seems to be ruled out by the "objectively" part.
Maybe it's what's more important from the perspective of achieving such-and-such goal, or from the perspective of such-and-such evaluative framework for importance?
But if so, it depends on the goal or framework.
I don't know how else to understand the question.

When we go trying to parse society, an agreement among citizens in terms of morality and objectivity, presuming the two are not congruent we are committing three logical errors. Agreements aren't objectively drawn, morality isn't inherent in agreement, and agreements may include moral and objective elements some of which, after Rumsfeld, are known knowns.

We cobble together laws meant to assure maximum compliance with 'important' or germinal elements of that agreement if that agreement that, ideally, includes overriding purpose and objective and, as in our case, is one that includes choice and laws.

With the drawing of the agreement there is the social expectation of compliance with law, and as you point out, there is the presumed responsibility to behave IAW the overall charter for which the laws were drawn.

It is this tension between expectation of compliance and presumed purpose and objectives of the agreement with which we now deal.

Currently we are focusing on the inclusiveness of 'we the people' against the laws of individual prohibition and constraint among groups and individuals. We focus on where laws were written by one group which provides them privilege over other groups that lead to expected discriminatory outcomes.

It is not the fault of the group that wrote the laws since conditions when written suggested differences that need be maintained. These differences are no longer relevant to good order.

It is the responsibility of that group to now accept that things have changed and that laws need be re written and sanctions changed to bring we the people into current relevance. Obviously some are uncomfortable with such changes and those people align on the side of law and order. On the other hand those suffering 'injustice' break laws perceived as discriminarory and protest sanctions seen as unfair.

It is here where existing laws and social built-in biases need yield to the call of we the people generating new law more balanced and enforceable in modern conditions.

If one wants to make this moral issue or insist one look things objectively one is just adding extra color, muddying up, the real issues that need addressing. Protest and violence need be given some leeway until those clinging to the past realize they are better off by including more in the charter. Nothing moral about it. Not objective at all. Just a case of process adjusting to conditions.

Have fun.