Cognizing without there being any cognizer?

[ontological_realist]

Does cognizing necessarily have to have a cognizer or at least some sort of a cognizing apparatus?

In other words is it at all possible that there be cognizing going on without anybody or any thing doing the cognizing? Rain does not need a rainer.

 

[bigfield]

Does cognizing necessarily have to have a cognizer or at least some sort of a cognizing apparatus?

Yes.

In other words is it at all possible that there be cognizing going on without anybody or any thing doing the cognizing? Rain does not need a rainer.

Rain does need a rainer eg. water, frogs, cats and dogs, or men (hallelujah!).

 

[DBT]

Does cognizing necessarily have to have a cognizer or at least some sort of a cognizing apparatus?

In other words is it at all possible that there be cognizing going on without anybody or any thing doing the cognizing? Rain does not need a rainer.

The presence of a brain with sufficient complexity with which to 'cognize.' Cognition being the activity of that brain/apparatus.

 

[bilby]

Does Microsoft Windows need a computer, or can it run in the absence of any computing apparatus?

Same with thinking.

Same with awareness.

They are not physical entities, but they need a physical brain, just as software is not a physical entity, but needs a physical computer.

 

[fromderinside]

The biosphere builds and executes within itself. So rather than needing a brain or cognizer, a being able to build and maintain itself, really doesn't need a special place to do business, execute operations, cognize. I'm pretty sure muscle tissue can be engaged by neural tissue to appear to think and act. I'm pretty sure that the first beings that could tell dark from light and profitably act on it with just a hindbrain and pons, some afferents and efferents, not much of a brain nor is there any evidence of organized cognizing activity going on, yet on it went. I'm pretty sure when we get down to it we'll find what can be called conscious activity going on in single cells. It just seems to b e the nature of living stuff.

 

[DBT]

Yet cognition appears to break down when connectivity between cells fails.

 

[Juma]

Does Microsoft Windows need a computer, or can it run in the absence of any computing apparatus?

Same with thinking.

Same with awareness.

They are not physical entities, but they need a physical brain, just as software is not a physical entity, but needs a physical computer.

The word "enitity" intrigues me: the epitet "physical" also. I assume you mean something like "a separate bunch of atoms" here, correct?

 

[bilby]

Does Microsoft Windows need a computer, or can it run in the absence of any computing apparatus?

Same with thinking.

Same with awareness.

They are not physical entities, but they need a physical brain, just as software is not a physical entity, but needs a physical computer.

The word "enitity" intrigues me: the epitet "physical" also. I assume you mean something like "a separate bunch of atoms" here, correct?

I mean physical.

Software is encoded in the state of the computer that is running it; But you can't take the software out of the computer, because it is a (large) collection of interacting states; it is not a physical object that is added to the computer, which contains the same number of atoms, electrons, quarks, etc. whether or not Windows is installed and/or running.

Patterns require physical material to exist, but they are distinct from those materials. A really simple example is a wave in the ocean - we can watch a wave from a long way off in the distance, and see it approach the shore, crest, and break. It is observably real - an "entity"; an object we can use and discuss - we can interact with it as an entity (for example by riding it on a surfboard - a surfer rides waves, not just water, otherwise millponds would be full of Californians in wetsuits).

The water molecules that are part of the wave offshore remain offshore. And the water molecules that are part of the breaking wave on the beach are totally different water molecules. The wave is a property of the materials of which it is constructed - and those materials change constantly. It is not a material object in its own right. The wave cannot continue on, up the beach and into the hinterland; Without water, the wave ceases to exist. Similarly, consciousness, thought, mind, thinking etc. are patterns in the brain - they depend on the brain to exist, and cannot survive without it; but there are no 'thoughts' that you can remove from a brain with a scalpel; There is no 'soul' that can live on after death, any more than there are ocean waves still propagating a hundred miles inland, and for the same basic reason - the things that people ascribe to souls: Consciousness, thought, mind, self, etc. - require a brain in order to exist, just as an ocean wave requires water in order to exist.

 

[Juma]

The word "enitity" intrigues me: the epitet "physical" also. I assume you mean something like "a separate bunch of atoms" here, correct?

I mean physical.

Software is encoded in the state of the computer that is running it; But you can't take the software out of the computer, because it is a (large) collection of interacting states; it is not a physical object that is added to the computer, which contains the same number of atoms, electrons, quarks, etc. whether or not Windows is installed and/or running.

Patterns require physical material to exist, but they are distinct from those materials. A really simple example is a wave in the ocean - we can watch a wave from a long way off in the distance, and see it approach the shore, crest, and break. It is observably real - an "entity"; an object we can use and discuss - we can interact with it as an entity (for example by riding it on a surfboard - a surfer rides waves, not just water, otherwise millponds would be full of Californians in wetsuits).

The water molecules that are part of the wave offshore remain offshore. And the water molecules that are part of the breaking wave on the beach are totally different water molecules. The wave is a property of the materials of which it is constructed - and those materials change constantly. It is not a material object in its own right. The wave cannot continue on, up the beach and into the hinterland; Without water, the wave ceases to exist. Similarly, consciousness, thought, mind, thinking etc. are patterns in the brain - they depend on the brain to exist, and cannot survive without it; but there are no 'thoughts' that you can remove from a brain with a scalpel; There is no 'soul' that can live on after death, any more than there are ocean waves still propagating a hundred miles inland, and for the same basic reason - the things that people ascribe to souls: Consciousness, thought, mind, self, etc. - require a brain in order to exist, just as an ocean wave requires water in order to exist.

So i was right then? With "a physical entity" you mean a specific bunch of atoms.

Why i bother? Because for me the movement and structure of atoms and thus behavior of atoms are also physical.

 

[fromderinside]

I mean physical.

Software is encoded in the state of the computer that is running it; But you can't take the software out of the computer, because it is a (large) collection of interacting states; it is not a physical object that is added to the computer, which contains the same number of atoms, electrons, quarks, etc. whether or not Windows is installed and/or running.

Patterns require physical material to exist, but they are distinct from those materials. A really simple example is a wave in the ocean - we can watch a wave from a long way off in the distance, and see it approach the shore, crest, and break. It is observably real - an "entity"; an object we can use and discuss - we can interact with it as an entity (for example by riding it on a surfboard - a surfer rides waves, not just water, otherwise millponds would be full of Californians in wetsuits).

The water molecules that are part of the wave offshore remain offshore. And the water molecules that are part of the breaking wave on the beach are totally different water molecules. The wave is a property of the materials of which it is constructed - and those materials change constantly. It is not a material object in its own right. The wave cannot continue on, up the beach and into the hinterland; Without water, the wave ceases to exist. Similarly, consciousness, thought, mind, thinking etc. are patterns in the brain - they depend on the brain to exist, and cannot survive without it; but there are no 'thoughts' that you can remove from a brain with a scalpel; There is no 'soul' that can live on after death, any more than there are ocean waves still propagating a hundred miles inland, and for the same basic reason - the things that people ascribe to souls: Consciousness, thought, mind, self, etc. - require a brain in order to exist, just as an ocean wave requires water in order to exist.

So i was right then? With "a physical entity" you mean a specific bunch of atoms.

Why i bother? Because for me the movement and structure of atoms and thus behavior of atoms are also physical.

This a real narrowly defined set of movement defined by their being collected into particular biological structures which impose their own rules on atoms and molecules within and between them. So biophysical?

While it is true that in cortex nerves delimit communication, it is not so true outside cortex. These fumctions were evolved from the more primitive processes which served before the more modern became functional. I think having a specialized suite of cells is nice to point to and call cognizer, but, it is not true that cognizing is limited to them. Which brings me back to single cell exhibitions akin to cognizing. How does producers on the far side of a cell 'know' to produce reducing materials when potential food is being detected on the outside of the cell? Stuff is going on here.

 

[bilby]

I mean physical.

Software is encoded in the state of the computer that is running it; But you can't take the software out of the computer, because it is a (large) collection of interacting states; it is not a physical object that is added to the computer, which contains the same number of atoms, electrons, quarks, etc. whether or not Windows is installed and/or running.

Patterns require physical material to exist, but they are distinct from those materials. A really simple example is a wave in the ocean - we can watch a wave from a long way off in the distance, and see it approach the shore, crest, and break. It is observably real - an "entity"; an object we can use and discuss - we can interact with it as an entity (for example by riding it on a surfboard - a surfer rides waves, not just water, otherwise millponds would be full of Californians in wetsuits).

The water molecules that are part of the wave offshore remain offshore. And the water molecules that are part of the breaking wave on the beach are totally different water molecules. The wave is a property of the materials of which it is constructed - and those materials change constantly. It is not a material object in its own right. The wave cannot continue on, up the beach and into the hinterland; Without water, the wave ceases to exist. Similarly, consciousness, thought, mind, thinking etc. are patterns in the brain - they depend on the brain to exist, and cannot survive without it; but there are no 'thoughts' that you can remove from a brain with a scalpel; There is no 'soul' that can live on after death, any more than there are ocean waves still propagating a hundred miles inland, and for the same basic reason - the things that people ascribe to souls: Consciousness, thought, mind, self, etc. - require a brain in order to exist, just as an ocean wave requires water in order to exist.

So i was right then? With "a physical entity" you mean a specific bunch of atoms.

Why i bother? Because for me the movement and structure of atoms and thus behavior of atoms are also physical.

Yes, I understand; English is not precise at all in this context, and 'physical' can have either meaning.

I use the words that I think mean to others what they mean to me, as do we all.

But English is great for expressing new and hitherto unspoken ideas; and crap at expressing anything precisely; that's why physicists prefer mathematics.

For the record, while I think I understand what you mean when you say 'atoms', I tend to think of that word as implying a positive nucleus of protons and electrons balanced by electrons; rather than in the alternative sense of 'indivisible components of matter'.

Which I think, from context, is what you mean.

English sucks for precision. But it's great for discussing broad-based concepts.

 

[fast]

Does cognizing necessarily have to have a cognizer or at least some sort of a cognizing apparatus?

In other words is it at all possible that there be cognizing going on without anybody or any thing doing the cognizing? Rain does not need a rainer.

The presence of a brain with sufficient complexity with which to 'cognize.' Cognition being the activity of that brain/apparatus.

No cognition without activity, for sure, but must cognition be characterized as the activity itself? If you have an appetite, there is a physical cause for it, but an appetite is immaterial, even if the cause isn't. Language is such that we can rightfully say that non physical things exist without fear of reprisal when there is a physical basis for such things, but instead of recognizing the permissibility that language affords us, so many people, especially scientists, scamper for that which can only be detected and what results is a detachment from ordinary language usage. It's no wonder experts stipulatively define, "mind" as they do.

 

[DBT]

The presence of a brain with sufficient complexity with which to 'cognize.' Cognition being the activity of that brain/apparatus.

No cognition without activity, for sure, but must cognition be characterized as the activity itself? If you have an appetite, there is a physical cause for it, but an appetite is immaterial, even if the cause isn't. Language is such that we can rightfully say that non physical things exist without fear of reprisal when there is a physical basis for such things, but instead of recognizing the permissibility that language affords us, so many people, especially scientists, scamper for that which can only be detected and what results is a detachment from ordinary language usage. It's no wonder experts stipulatively define, "mind" as they do.

''but an appetite is immaterial''

Appetite may not necessarily be immaterial (what physical process is immaterial in a material world?), but probably a complex interaction of inputs (ion flow/physical electrical impulses), processing (neurotransmitters/connectivity), stimulating nerves between stomach and brain that are represented as as a sensation of hunger and a desire for food. All being related to the physical activity of the CNS. Similar to colour perception relating to wavelength interpretation and mental representation in the form of patterns of firings and so on.

 

[fast]

No cognition without activity, for sure, but must cognition be characterized as the activity itself? If you have an appetite, there is a physical cause for it, but an appetite is immaterial, even if the cause isn't. Language is such that we can rightfully say that non physical things exist without fear of reprisal when there is a physical basis for such things, but instead of recognizing the permissibility that language affords us, so many people, especially scientists, scamper for that which can only be detected and what results is a detachment from ordinary language usage. It's no wonder experts stipulatively define, "mind" as they do.

''but an appetite is immaterial''

Appetite may not necessarily be immaterial (what physical process is immaterial in a material world?), but probably a complex interaction of inputs (ion flow/physical electrical impulses), processing (neurotransmitters/connectivity), stimulating nerves between stomach and brain that are represented as as a sensation of hunger and a desire for food. All being related to the physical activity of the CNS. Similar to colour perception relating to wavelength interpretation and mental representation in the form of patterns of firings and so on.

(what physical process is immaterial in a material world?)

It's not the physical process that is immaterial. It's what it gives rise to that is immaterial. The leap from material to immaterial is a function of language. When you speak of the complex interactions, you speak of a physical process, but this physical cause of an appetite is not the appetite itself. You have an appetite because of the underlying physical processes, and in no way does regarding the language derivative conclusion that what gives rise to the immaterial undermine the reality of the underlying physical processes.

I think it's kinda silly to look for something like a mind or appetite, not be able to find it, like we can a chair or table, then just demand that the (underlying notion that if something exists that it must exist somewhere) take over and say that the activity responsible for these things be the things themselves. It's like saying the class of all cats must be amidst the neural activity of the brain since the class of all cats cannot be detected in the material world. The desperation to attach physicality to everything is so strong that people declare that what can't be found (but yet exists) as being somewhere no matter outlandish it might sound.

Language. It turns controversy's into dynasties.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Does cognizing necessarily have to have a cognizer or at least some sort of a cognizing apparatus?

In other words is it at all possible that there be cognizing going on without anybody or any thing doing the cognizing? Rain does not need a rainer.

There does not seem to be any formal contradiction either way. Let's assume that there is a form of cognising which is not done, or supported, or caused, by something else, material or otherwise. So presumably all that the cognising process would know would be itself. So, how would that be a problem at all?

Of course, people tend to also believe things, i.e. beyond what they actually know, and we do tend to believe that, in the material world, some specific material support needs to exists for knowledge to exist too.
EB

 

[DBT]

''but an appetite is immaterial''

Appetite may not necessarily be immaterial (what physical process is immaterial in a material world?), but probably a complex interaction of inputs (ion flow/physical electrical impulses), processing (neurotransmitters/connectivity), stimulating nerves between stomach and brain that are represented as as a sensation of hunger and a desire for food. All being related to the physical activity of the CNS. Similar to colour perception relating to wavelength interpretation and mental representation in the form of patterns of firings and so on.

(what physical process is immaterial in a material world?)

It's not the physical process that is immaterial. It's what it gives rise to that is immaterial. The leap from material to immaterial is a function of language. When you speak of the complex interactions, you speak of a physical process, but this physical cause of an appetite is not the appetite itself. You have an appetite because of the underlying physical processes, and in no way does regarding the language derivative conclusion that what gives rise to the immaterial undermine the reality of the underlying physical processes.

I think it's kinda silly to look for something like a mind or appetite, not be able to find it, like we can a chair or table, then just demand that the (underlying notion that if something exists that it must exist somewhere) take over and say that the activity responsible for these things be the things themselves. It's like saying the class of all cats must be amidst the neural activity of the brain since the class of all cats cannot be detected in the material world. The desperation to attach physicality to everything is so strong that people declare that what can't be found (but yet exists) as being somewhere no matter outlandish it might sound.

Language. It turns controversy's into dynasties.

Language relates to something, something seen, something felt, something experienced or something imagined. The problem is not necessarily language, but accessing the mechanisms of experience, the perception of hunger or clour. Access to the means of generating and forming of experience, colour, taste, feeling, etc, does not appear to be possible from the perspective of conscious perception, which in turn places an apparently impenetrable barrier for language to define or descibe what is happening.

How are we to descibe hunger or colour perception as immaterial when we don't know how the experience is produced?

What does 'immaterial' even mean in this context?

 

[fast]

(what physical process is immaterial in a material world?)

It's not the physical process that is immaterial. It's what it gives rise to that is immaterial. The leap from material to immaterial is a function of language. When you speak of the complex interactions, you speak of a physical process, but this physical cause of an appetite is not the appetite itself. You have an appetite because of the underlying physical processes, and in no way does regarding the language derivative conclusion that what gives rise to the immaterial undermine the reality of the underlying physical processes.

I think it's kinda silly to look for something like a mind or appetite, not be able to find it, like we can a chair or table, then just demand that the (underlying notion that if something exists that it must exist somewhere) take over and say that the activity responsible for these things be the things themselves. It's like saying the class of all cats must be amidst the neural activity of the brain since the class of all cats cannot be detected in the material world. The desperation to attach physicality to everything is so strong that people declare that what can't be found (but yet exists) as being somewhere no matter outlandish it might sound.

Language. It turns controversy's into dynasties.

Language relates to something, something seen, something felt, something experienced or something imagined. The problem is not necessarily language, but accessing the mechanisms of experience, the perception of hunger or clour. Access to the means of generating and forming of experience, colour, taste, feeling, etc, does not appear to be possible from the perspective of conscious perception, which in turn places an apparently impenetrable barrier for language to define or descibe what is happening.

How are we to descibe hunger or colour perception as immaterial when we don't know how the experience is produced?

What does 'immaterial' even mean in this context?

Hunger is something, but it is not some thing. I can't touch hunger, but I can have an effect on it (by, oh say) eating. I can't touch hunger because it has no material form, but I can have an effect on it because the biological processes have a physical basis. A doctor or scientist can cut one open and touch or detect the individual physical elements that are apart of the material substances that make us hungry, but all those microscopic (and macroscopic?) things and material events are not some thing that is itself hunger.

If I tell you that I have an appetite, you can't reach in and take it as if it were a bone. You could take my heart, and soon enough, I would no longer have an appetite, so you can have an effect on my appetite (because there are physical causes for an appetite), but you cannot touch my appetite, as there is no material form for it--just material form of the physical components serving as a cause for it.

 

[DBT]

Language relates to something, something seen, something felt, something experienced or something imagined. The problem is not necessarily language, but accessing the mechanisms of experience, the perception of hunger or clour. Access to the means of generating and forming of experience, colour, taste, feeling, etc, does not appear to be possible from the perspective of conscious perception, which in turn places an apparently impenetrable barrier for language to define or descibe what is happening.

How are we to descibe hunger or colour perception as immaterial when we don't know how the experience is produced?

What does 'immaterial' even mean in this context?

Hunger is something, but it is not some thing. I can't touch hunger, but I can have an effect on it (by, oh say) eating. I can't touch hunger because it has no material form, but I can have an effect on it because the biological processes have a physical basis. A doctor or scientist can cut one open and touch or detect the individual physical elements that are apart of the material substances that make us hungry, but all those microscopic (and macroscopic?) things and material events are not some thing that is itself hunger.

If I tell you that I have an appetite, you can't reach in and take it as if it were a bone. You could take my heart, and soon enough, I would no longer have an appetite, so you can have an effect on my appetite (because there are physical causes for an appetite), but you cannot touch my appetite, as there is no material form for it--just material form of the physical components serving as a cause for it.

That's roughly what I meant by the perception of our experience, hunger, pain, etc, not having access to the neural structure or means (electrochemical activity) of production, and thereby being unable to perceive the physical aspect of not only the process that forms experience, but the experience itself.

Otherwise, how can something tangible, felt, experienced, be 'immaterial?' What does this mean? How does it work?

 

[Juma]

Language relates to something, something seen, something felt, something experienced or something imagined. The problem is not necessarily language, but accessing the mechanisms of experience, the perception of hunger or clour. Access to the means of generating and forming of experience, colour, taste, feeling, etc, does not appear to be possible from the perspective of conscious perception, which in turn places an apparently impenetrable barrier for language to define or descibe what is happening.

How are we to descibe hunger or colour perception as immaterial when we don't know how the experience is produced?

What does 'immaterial' even mean in this context?

Hunger is something, but it is not some thing. I can't touch hunger, but I can have an effect on it (by, oh say) eating. I can't touch hunger because it has no material form, but I can have an effect on it because the biological processes have a physical basis. A doctor or scientist can cut one open and touch or detect the individual physical elements that are apart of the material substances that make us hungry, but all those microscopic (and macroscopic?) things and material events are not some thing that is itself hunger.

If I tell you that I have an appetite, you can't reach in and take it as if it were a bone. You could take my heart, and soon enough, I would no longer have an appetite, so you can have an effect on my appetite (because there are physical causes for an appetite), but you cannot touch my appetite, as there is no material form for it--just material form of the physical components serving as a cause for it.

You cant touch movement either. You cant touch physical processes. Yet they are definitely not "immaterial". (Whatever that is supposed to mean)

 

[fast]

Hunger is something, but it is not some thing. I can't touch hunger, but I can have an effect on it (by, oh say) eating. I can't touch hunger because it has no material form, but I can have an effect on it because the biological processes have a physical basis. A doctor or scientist can cut one open and touch or detect the individual physical elements that are apart of the material substances that make us hungry, but all those microscopic (and macroscopic?) things and material events are not some thing that is itself hunger.

If I tell you that I have an appetite, you can't reach in and take it as if it were a bone. You could take my heart, and soon enough, I would no longer have an appetite, so you can have an effect on my appetite (because there are physical causes for an appetite), but you cannot touch my appetite, as there is no material form for it--just material form of the physical components serving as a cause for it.

You cant touch movement either. You cant touch physical processes. Yet they are definitely not "immaterial". (Whatever that is supposed to mean)

That's right, movement cannot be touched. Touch that which moves all we might please, but movement shall we never touch. Movement is not "immaterial" (and I know both what that means and what it is supposed to mean), but movement is immaterial (yet whether it's 'immaterial' is anyone's guess.)