COLOUR

[fromderinside]

It seems to me that in some models (perhaps those where it is said that, for example, 'the mind only has access to what the eyes provide for it') there is a tendency to explain processes in a very linear, uni-directional way ('in one end, out the other') which tends to involve saying that whatever inputs arrive at the organism externally are what are eventually processed, and by implication that nothing else but those external inputs is being processed. I might call this a 'brain as a camera' model.

FDI wrote

The nervous system has access to color information as the result of light passing through specific bandwidth frequencies of light before language is present for the person to express her choice of sense value. Plenty of time to build a color library. Even one that is accessed inappropriately. So until you have measures from individuals through other than vocal or written modes you have no evidence. Actually I think synesthesia is an interpretation problem in association NS.

As one who believes the human is an evolved being it would be ludicrous for me to presume that some construction of a color library would not already be in place at birth. Two very obvious reasons that is probably so without need to reference literature. Brains are known to be active prior to birth. I once mentioned Donald Lindsey on site. I invited him to visit FSU when I was Psychobiology Fellow in 1975. As you may know he was first to recorded EEG from (his soo) a fetus in 1938- OK so that's evidence. Second the visual system is known to be active prior to birth. So it would be stupid to presume I'd believe otherwise, since it is possible such changes took place before even that through normal taking advantage of mutation evolutionary processes.

My complaint centers on one making claims using unknown attributes as  Synesthesia indicates. One would need evidence at least as strong as that for  Williams syndrome to rule in prenatal existence of capabilities and conditions. So Skepticalbib who has intellectual heartburn claims hand waving. Please don't compound the insult by making other ad hoc judgements based on his over the fence statements which lack support.

Ah ruby sparkes' "given the sheer awesome complexity of the trillions of crisscrossing interconnections, feedback loops and waves of activity" stare at the night sky and wonder approach. Except it isn't a wonder thing. It's mostly a determined thing that owes it's design to successful application and modification of it's abilities and functions through time. You see trillions, I see hundreds, maybe 10s even. Knowledge is a creeping thing. Having it makes connections while those who only look see chaos and mystery.

BTW one can be a hard over input-output gee while still being un-stupid enough to demand or provide evidence. It all comes down to what in and what out. Look at what's being done with the Standard Model.

I marvel at the way you take your intentions and weave them in to support your position. Foam on fluff. Impressive.

I think I'm being a bit over the top here. Sorry.

 

[ruby sparks]

I think I'm being a bit over the top here. Sorry.

I appreciate you saying that.

When I say certain things, especially those of a general nature, I do know that there is so much detail that could be added to them that a person in a specialised area could spend a career adding it, and checking it by rigorous experiment where possible, and I don't doubt that that is what you did in the particular endeavours you were involved in, and as far as I can tell, that's what the relevant scientists in this case also do nowadays. And I am mostly drawing my views from what I have read that has been written by them and others like them. I am not appealing to chaos, mystery, foam, fluff or woo, and nor are they. Speculation, possibly, at times. We are in the philosophy forum after all.

And sometimes, your (understandable and admirable) appetite for detail and detailed descriptions, and impressive knowledge of them, does not, er, enlighten us as regards the specific OP issue (which is mainly about location of colour) and for example I do not disagree with very much of it, if indeed any at all, for example regarding the detailed descriptions of the processes involved, such as transduction. Furthermore, I appreciate that you will know a lot more than I do about those processes and indeed how to measure them. But even if you can get to the top step of the stair you posted an image of previously, it can still be asked where the stair has gotten you to, as regards the OP issue.

And I think it's fair to say that all the processes, no matter how detailed the descriptions of them, can (if reduced to more and more details) be explained by more than one model. I say that because I can't think of one phenomenon that can only be explained by one model. I'm well aware that your model has a different way of, for examle, explaining all the oddities I mentioned in my last post.

And there are almost certainly more than 2 models. Yours and the one I have proposed in the OP differ, and now that koy has reiterated that objects having colour is part of his model, his is slightly different to either of ours. And if Stephen Palmer has progressed his to become an 'ecological' (or 'relationist') model then that's slightly different again.

You know how this works. Before rejecting one model in favour of another, we would ideally like to identify something the first one simply can't reasonably explain (as regards the specific OP question I mean). And I don't think that's available to us, because there are some aspects of this matter (including the OP claims) that are unresolved, and each of us is as stuck for conclusive evidence (and methods of obtaining it) as the other is.

 

[fromderinside]

Honey. Sticky that stuff. Doesn't solve our problems but to some it tastes divine.

That foam and fluff thing (mine) wasn't useful.

As for one taking the position that color is in the object one can be right, as you suggest koyaanisqatsi does if one considers it from the perspective of the object existing or evolving in a particular world of light. It is the properties of the thing that give it color even as it is light that provides that environment for that expression. The problem with that view is if it finds itself in different environment of light. So since light contains the information that informs the plant or object light, with it's frequencies and energy levels, carries color.

I'm petty sure koyaanisqatsi actually holds this view as well. Although if one holds that objects have fixed their relation with the world then if that world changes objects carry that information forward. The owner of color? Is it with the source that provides the options in any environment or is it the objects that exist in any environment which has light. Probably a false issue isn't it. Color exists either way.

The above really takes mind out of the discussion though since mind, a product of the object in the environment, is a step down the logical ladder.

 

[skepticalbip]

... snip ...

The mind only has access to what the eyes provide to it.

That assumption makes it difficult to explain how those with synesthesia can hear colors. Certainly you aren't asserting that the chair is humming, but only for them, or are you?

https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/04/150413214343.htm

There are also those with synesthesia who "see" musical tones as colors... others that see specific letters in specific colors even though they are printed in a text, like they may see all p's in red even though we see it in black.

It seems to me that in some models (perhaps those where it is said that, for example, 'the mind only has access to what the eyes provide for it') there is a tendency to explain processes in a very linear, uni-directional way ('in one end, out the other') which tends to involve saying that whatever inputs arrive at the organism externally are what are eventually processed, and by implication that nothing else but those external inputs is being processed. I might call this a 'brain as a camera' model.

But the brain is far, far too actively complicated for that. We could say that in any particular part of the brain that is or becomes involved in visual processing, where an external input arrives (having been transduced etc) there are many other internal inputs from other parts of the brain (to that particular part) that do not come from the external (visual) input at all, but from areas associated with memory, learning, emotion, etc etc. And importantly, signals to and from these areas are happening almost all the time anyway, they are not just activated by the visual input. The visual input is merely mixed into the ongoing flux of them.

In fact, that would be way, way too simplistic (given the sheer awesome complexity of the trillions of crisscrossing interconnections, feedback loops and waves of activity) even at the level of a single neuron, which typically has thousands of its own input connections, all of them functioning at every instant (even when in resting mode). In other words, that neuron has access to a multitude of other input sources, not just those related to the signals generated external to the organism, and not only activated by visual inputs, but happening already, in an ongoing way.

This is one given explanation for why the brain can create outputs that do not match the visual inputs, that are decoupled from them, such as seeing two colours when there is only one external input (colour cube and other related illusions), or retaining colours even though the input has changed (colour constancy). Perhaps the best example is the effect shown in the two images of the bowls of strawberries posted earlier. In that case the external input simply does not involve or include the frequencies normally associated with the colour perceived (one of the images is in fact completely monochrome). Also, as we have said, colour experiences do not need light as an input at all, do not even need it as a trigger. And synesthesia is only one example from many (I made a list at one point in the thread).

All of that tends to generally support the case that colour is effectively created in the brain (albeit normally using transduced light as one ingredient, and in the OP model uncoloured transduced light). Which is far from being an unprecedented process, since it happens routinely for many other brain phenomena, for which the properties created are quite simply not in the external stimuli and are therefore agreed and accepted to be wholly unique to the brain. This is as true of certain basic sub-phenomena (pain, fear, etc etc) as it is of arguably the grand-daddy of them all, consciousness.

I strongly agree with most of that. And what I find interesting is that there are strong indications that synaesthesia has a genetic component. A significant percentage of those with the condition have children, parents, or siblings that also have it. This would seem to mean that it could be created by a mutation in the DNA that codes for the 'hardwiring' of the brain.

For some wild speculation... I can imagine that if this 'ability' of 'seeing' sound in color had occurred early in human evolution that it would have probably been selected for and today be considered 'normal' and some defining color as having both audible tone and EM wavelength. It would have made our sense of hearing much more useful as it would give us a more detailed "sonic sense" of the environment (bats?). This would indicate that, if it is a mutation, that it occurred recently in evolutionary terms, at least after it would have significantly provided better chance of survivability.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Is it with the source that provides the options in any environment or is it the objects that exist in any environment which has light. Probably a false issue isn't it. Color exists either way.

Exactly. For the umpteenth time, it is not a mutually exclusive proposition. Color is at least created in the brain as are all models we have of the objective world. That is the well established condition of the hard problem of consciousness.

That fact, however, does not exclude the notion that it may also be a product of the objective world. Indeed, it argues to affirm this notion, since what we evolved to do is subjectively copy an objective condition. That's what modelling entails.

And, of course, it needs to be as accurate as possible or we die, so it's not like it's a casual thing we just started doing one day out of boredom. It's literally the highest possible stakes that it be as accurate as possible and it has taken hundreds of thousands of years--if not millions--to evolve and hone this ability to accurately model our environment in a painstakingly complicated process.

But, you know, fuck that for a lark in your armchair.

ETA: Oh, right, I forgot, "no one" is arguing that there aren't "objective conditions." They're just ignoring these particular objective conditions, because they are the central fatal flaw in their suppositions.

 

[ruby sparks]

And what I find interesting is that there are strong indications that synaesthesia has a genetic component. A significant percentage of those with the condition have children, parents, or siblings that also have it. This would seem to mean that it could be created by a mutation in the DNA that codes for the 'hardwiring' of the brain.

For some wild speculation... I can imagine that if this 'ability' of 'seeing' sound in color had occurred early in human evolution that it would have probably been selected for and today be considered 'normal' and some defining color as having both audible tone and EM wavelength. It would have made our sense of hearing much more useful as it would give us a more detailed "sonic sense" of the environment (bats?). This would indicate that, if it is a mutation, that it occurred recently in evolutionary terms, at least after it would have significantly provided better chance of survivability.

Interesting speculations. Synesthesia might be fertile ground here.

Here are my speculations, for what they are worth (possibly not much).

As I understand it, in every human brain there aren't individual 'visual processing neurons' and 'auditory processing neurons', there are just 'neurons' (in the functional sense, they may differ in shape or number of connections etc), so the same neuron, in everyone's brain, can be part of ('recruited' for) several completely different processings. In other words, neurons multi-task. One instant they're part of visual processing, the next they're involved in audition, or memory or emotions or whatever. And possibly all of those at the same time. This is offered as part of the explanation for blindsight, in which input signals can take a new route by 'recruiting' new neurons. I think the general principle has to do with brain plasticity.

One explanation offered for synesthesia is that there is too much 'crosstalk' (too many neuronal interconnections are involved at the same time). There is, it is said, always crosstalk. We can notice it, I think, in the McGurk Effect, where two different inputs (via auditory and visual sensors/transducers) are processed more or less simultaneously, and may conflict, but need to be integrated (made sense of) and are generally resolved by priority being given to the visual input (so we hear something that isn't being said but just looks like it is from mouth shape). As such, the output from one input may be inhibited.

A related explanation for synesthesia is that all of our brains have a great deal of neuronal crosstalk, but that in synesthesics, the inhibitory mechanisms which do the resolving are not working as effectively.

Either way, yes, synesthesia does seem to have a genetic component. It has been speculated that in early infant development, the later-to-become-a-synesthesic's young brain, under the guidance of genes, makes too many connections (or, alternatively certain connections are not subsequently 'pruned', in which scenario we would all have been synesthesics initially).

As you say, on the face of it, synesthesia arguably should be adaptive, as it would seem to be an enhancement (a sort of 'supersense'). Or, it may be that it adds confusion. The brain always needs efficiency, because efficiency minimises expenditure of valuable energy while maximising predictive power (which some say is what the brain primarily does). I'm totally guessing, obviously. Way out of my depth.

What does any of this have to say about whether or not colour is created in the brain? I'm not sure. Possibly nothing.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

I can imagine that if this 'ability' of 'seeing' sound in color had occurred early in human evolution

In that vein, how do you know it wasn't? The oldest estimate I've found theorizes that synesthesia has been around since at least 6 BCE. The fact that something on the order of 1 in 100,000 today may have it certainly argues for its long-term propagation, if it is indeed genetic.

that it would have probably been selected for and today be considered 'normal'

Just as equally as it argues for it NOT to have been selected for, because it did not significantly aid in survival due to an inherent inadequacy, aka, "malfunction." Iow, it wasn't selected for because it did not best reflect an objective condition necessary for our continued survival as a species.

This would indicate that, if it is a mutation, that it occurred recently in evolutionary terms, at least after it would have significantly provided better chance of survivability.

Or, if it is a mutation, the only reason it continues to propagate is because our species moved beyond low survivability to higher survivability during the time a mutation occurred, which in turn allowed for something that would otherwise be detrimental in an earlier stage of our evolution (i.e., a failure to accurately model the objective environment resulting in predator advantage against us) to be moot or otherwise benign and thus passed along genetically as a simple matter of dumb propagation.

Iow, it didn't help or hurt the bloodline that began its propagation, so it just piggy-backed along as a vestigial condition that nevertheless got hardcoded in the process, like tonsils or an appendix or tail bones or "wisdom" teeth, etc.

200,000 BCE? Tribal death results in a failure to properly discern poison plants or predators. 6 BCE? I'm bored and the guy who tastes color is interesting, so I think I'll fuck him.

That kind of thing.

What does any of this have to say about whether or not colour is created in the brain?

And we're back. Color IS created in the brain, as with ALL experience. That does not, however mean that it is ONLY created in the brain. Why do you keep repeating something that is firmly established as if you've just invented the wheel?

Can you not discern the difference in the semantics? Is that it? The disconnect seems to always come between "colour" and "is created" as if that means "is ONLY created."

Do you not understand that difference?

Try it this way: The brain creates a color from the information acquired by the cones in the eyes. Simple, straightforward.

So long as you do not falsely conflate "color" with "experience of colorness" you're done with all the obfuscations and vapid semantics games.

 

[ruby sparks]

And what I find interesting is that there are strong indications that synaesthesia has a genetic component. A significant percentage of those with the condition have children, parents, or siblings that also have it. This would seem to mean that it could be created by a mutation in the DNA that codes for the 'hardwiring' of the brain.

For some wild speculation... I can imagine that if this 'ability' of 'seeing' sound in color had occurred early in human evolution that it would have probably been selected for and today be considered 'normal' and some defining color as having both audible tone and EM wavelength. It would have made our sense of hearing much more useful as it would give us a more detailed "sonic sense" of the environment (bats?). This would indicate that, if it is a mutation, that it occurred recently in evolutionary terms, at least after it would have significantly provided better chance of survivability.

Here's an afterthought. Suppose, hypothetically, a form of number synesthesia became the norm, for whatever reason, and seeing or hearing a certain number (either a single digit or a certain string of numbers, possibly for example in base 2 binary, in other words a series of zeros and ones) caused all 'normal' humans to experience, say, red.

Would we then say that that number (or binary code) was red? Bear in mind that as a number or numerical code it could also be a component in (or information for) other processes that have nothing to do with producing colour, as is the case with EM radiation generally (which can also, I believe, be described entirely mathematically, correct me if I am wrong).

The more I think about it, there is something about ascribing colours to either objects or frequencies that just does not seem to make sense. And I'm tempted to ask, 'just what exactly is supposed to be the effing problem with saying that it's brains that create colours'?

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

And I'm tempted to ask, 'just what exactly is the effing problem with saying that brains create colours'?

The fact that you still seem incapable of comprehending that saying so DOES NOT EQUATE TO SAYING that ONLY the brain creates colors.

The more accurate statement would be: Brains recreate (aka, "model") the color information acquired and encoded by the cones in our eyes.

So the better question is, why are you so intent on making fuzzy, inaccurate statements that leave open such huge discrepancies in favor of an implication you claim not to hold (depending exclusively on how convenient it is to your response at any given moment)?

Are you arguing that ONLY brains create colors? No. Does saying, "Brains create colors" imply that ONLY brains create colors? Yes.

Do you wish to be precise or pointlessly vague?

 

[ruby sparks]

Are you arguing that ONLY brains create colors?

If you haven't even managed to work out that yes, that is exactly and precisely what I am arguing in favour of (as part of my preferred model) then I can only suggest that in future you actually read the OPs of threads more closely before participating in them.

 

[skepticalbip]

... snip ...

I'm totally guessing, obviously. Way out of my depth.

Me too. But trying, with limited ability, to reason through it is an interesting exercise.

What does any of this have to say about whether or not colour is created in the brain? I'm not sure. Possibly nothing.

Considering that that someone can maybe 'see" the tone g-sharp as yellow with no visual input (no cones firing) implies to me that the source of yellow is the mind not the cones in the retina... that the cones firing only triggers the same neurons as g-sharp.

 

[skepticalbip]

Here's an afterthought. Suppose, hypothetically, a form of number synesthesia became the norm, for whatever reason, and seeing or hearing a certain number (either a single digit or a certain string of numbers, possibly for example in base 2 binary, in other words a series of zeros and ones) caused all 'normal' humans to experience, say, red.

Would we then say that that number (or binary code) was red? Bear in mind that as a number or numerical code it could also be a component in (or information for) other processes that have nothing to do with producing colour, as is the case with EM radiation generally (which can also, I believe, be described entirely mathematically, correct me if I am wrong).

Some people with synaesthesia do see exactly that. They can see, for example, "P" in green, "Q" in blue, and "W" in yellow. If this was normal for the whole population then I am pretty sure that those letters would be assumed to actually be of those colors.

The more I think about it, there is something about ascribing colours to either objects or frequencies that just does not seem to make sense. And I'm tempted to ask, 'just what exactly is supposed to be the effing problem with saying that it's brains that create colours'?

I think it is the human tendency toward anthropocentrism and maybe a bit of egocentrism. It seems to be human nature to think their senses are perfect so whatever they sense must be undeniabley true. This is likely why it took so long to convince people that the Earth revolved around the Sun and that the Earth rotates. After all their senses all told them that the Earth wasn't moving or they could feel the Earth spinning at 1000 mph and revolving about the Sun at 67,000 mph. Plus their sight clearly informed them that all the heavenly bodies were revolving around them.

ETA:
Oops, missed a bit.

You are right. there are no 'color' terms in any scientific model for the behavior of EM radiation. There are terms for frequency/wavelength, h field, e field, c, plank's constant, intensity, permeability and permittivity and angle of incidence of a medium the radiation enters, etc. but no 'color' term.

 

[ruby sparks]

Considering that that someone can maybe 'see" the tone g-sharp as yellow with no visual input (no cones firing) implies to me that the source of yellow is the mind not the cones in the retina... that the cones firing only triggers the same neurons as g-sharp.

The way I have been thinking about this up until now is that it is (arguably) suggestive or supportive of the OP model (colour exists only in the brain) but does not clinch it.

An alternative explanation using another model might be that yes, colour is actually out there as a real property of, let's say, objects, and that our retinal cones detect it (or information about it arriving via light) transduce it into electro-chemical signals (which preserve the information) which then enter the brain and are involved in processes that result in an experience of colour. Under this explanation, in synesthesics, electro-chemical signals derived from similar transductions but this time of auditory inputs, 'hitch a ride on' or 'pollute' the 'channels/processes' that normally result in the brain faithfully recreating (ie mimicking or modelling, or at least in some way representing) the real colour properties that objects actually do have.

In other words, retinal cones are sufficient but not necessary causes (for the psychological modelling of actual object colour properties).

(Sidenote: it is important to remember that that model has it that there are two different types of property than can both be called colour, and crucially, I think, that the object properties are the real colour ones and the psychological properties are merely 'secondary mimics'. Whereas in the OP model it's more or less the other way around and that it is a misnomer to describe object properties as colours because those are really, actually only in the brain).

Suppose, for example, there was a form of auditory-visual synesthesia in which the person saw coloured shapes, or to put it another way that the colours they perceive also had shapes. So they would be 'hearing shapes'. As I understand it this is in fact the way it happens for many auditory-visual synesthesics*.

But the OP model would be in trouble if it tried to claim that shape is not an objective property of external objects.

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*This perception of shape(s) also seems to be the case for phosphenes (another example of the production of colour experiences that does not require light). Phosphenes can (I read) be experimentally induced to appear using electro-cranial magnetism, direct electrical stimulation of neurons, or by administering hallucinogenic drugs, and sometimes via a combination of at least two of those. Apparently, subjects report that such colour phosphenes can also have a variety of shapes, such as those below (illustrated in monochrome):



http://www.oubliette.org.uk/Three.html

That discussion paper is from 1995, but most of the experiments were done in the 1970's, so I don't know how reliable or repeatable they are or were.

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Colour and shape perception are, I think, strongly inter-related and often (though not always or necessarily) perceived in combination (eg in the observation of a strawberry). In the OP model, one property (shape) is taken to be an objective property of external objects and the other property (colour) isn't. This is a problem for the OP model, in that it can't properly explain why making this distinction is necessarily warranted. It (the model) can argue that it is a warranted distinction between shape and pain, for example, with the latter being understood as a uniquely psychological phenomenon only. So, we are back to what I think is the trickiest question. Is colour more like shape (does it belong in that taxonomic category) or is it more like pain (and belong in that category)?

I optimistically imagine that surely there must be a way to resolve that issue, or at least explore it towards an answer, philosophically (eg via logic or rational reasoning) or better still by scientific experiment, but I'm darned if I can think of what way that might be.

 

[fromderinside]

Saying EM has no color is a nonstarter. The topic is light which is a tiny fraction of EM. Yet light is a scientific topic. Since the best reason for considering the Visible spectrum is humans use it. Secondarily, humans see and exploit aspects of it. Since we know that frequency and energy are related, lower frequencies have lower energy levels while higher frequencies have higher energy levels, we know humans who view also arrange their colors IAW EM-light energy.

Having tied all those knots we can move on to whether minds invent color.

Nope. It's as I stated before light is a spectrum of frequencies which impact objects (things and humans). Those need be resolved and have been here earlier. Putting nervous system in the mix only permits color reification through using color information in the nervous system. That's secondary to the fact that light has color and objects have color.

 

[ruby sparks]

....objects have color.

Wtf? A few pages ago you explicitly said no, they didn't!

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Are you arguing that ONLY brains create colors?

If you haven't even managed to work out that yes, that is exactly and precisely what I am arguing in favour of (as part of my preferred model) then I can only suggest that in future you actually read the OPs of threads more closely before participating in them.

You can't even stop yourself from prevaricating when you're attempting to be pedantic.

First, "color only exists in the brain" is not a "model of color;" it is a declaration of fact (an unprovable one at that).

Second, arguing that "ONLY brains create colors" necessitates that you actually definitively exclude even the possibility of color existing outside of the brain--full stop--which isn't possible due to the hard problem and something you have not and cannot do. That's what "ONLY" entails and why you shouldn't use such absolute declaratives.

And no, quoting someone else making the same unprovable assertion does not constitute an objective basis for exclusion.

"Arguing in favor of (as part of my preferred model)" means that you are merely speculating on the possibility that color does not exist outside of the brain as a provisionally held assumption that allows you to get to a "model" of color you have yet to define and that does not necessitate that your foundational assumption be true (because it's unprovable and therefore cannot be established).

But from what you've written itt, you haven't done that. You may genuinely think that you have, but you have not. Your "model" appears to be nothing more than you dancing around your belief that "color ONLY exists in the brain;" not as a provisionally held assumption for the sake of argument, but as a preconceived conclusion that you are merely working backwards from! You haven't "argued for it" you've simply asserted it (or, rather, relied on others who have asserted it) in order to then hold up the assertion as a circular proof; the proposition is the conclusion.

It's identical to saying, "Imagine for a moment that humans can fly" in order for you to then conclude "humans can fly!" Well, no, imagining that we can fly in no way proves that we can fly and asking us to imagine we can fly provisionally in order for you to get to your model of how we can accomplish flight only to then pull the rug out and say "humans can fly" doesn't cut it.

That's what you are doing itt no matter how much you dissemble and prevaricate. Your "model" isn't something else or even a "model"; it is "only brains create colors." You aren't "arguing for it"; you are simply declaring that it is true and, worse, using the declaration that it is true to prove that it is true.

 

[fromderinside]

....objects have color.

Wtf? A few pages ago you explicitly said no, they didn't!

There you go. Thought matures.

Later I wrote to koyaansiqatsa after reading his analysis. I saw the parallel between light having color and reached the conclusion since both views included frequencies it really matters not which is deemed to have color. One consists of frequencies that don't display other than white and black while the other is sensitive to only selected frequencies. They both have color and both employ EM (light) frequency consistent with how EM energy relates to thermodynamics of energy.

The statement:

Although if one holds that objects have fixed their relation with the world then if that world changes objects carry that information forward. The owner of color? Is it with the source that provides the options in any environment or is it the objects that exist in any environment which has light. Probably a false issue isn't it. Color exists either way.

The change of color in sodium light is explained and accounted.

I went on to show that man was in the object class. Mind is therefore a derivative of being human. So if mind invents color it is derivative to the nature of humans determined by what they sense and process in the environment which is where I've been re humans all along.

So it's not important what the nervous system does with frequency (color) information because all that is is the nervous system evolving to better handle how aspects of color; hue, shade, intensity, shadows and interference, works as means for remaining fit in an environment where color is important.

 

[skepticalbip]

Considering that that someone can maybe 'see" the tone g-sharp as yellow with no visual input (no cones firing) implies to me that the source of yellow is the mind not the cones in the retina... that the cones firing only triggers the same neurons as g-sharp.

The way I have been thinking about this up until now is that it is (arguably) suggestive or supportive of the OP model (colour exists only in the brain) but does not clinch it.

An alternative explanation using another model might be that yes, colour is actually out there as a real property of, let's say, objects, and that our retinal cones detect it (or information about it arriving via light) transduce it into electro-chemical signals (which preserve the information) which then enter the brain and are involved in processes that result in an experience of colour. Under this explanation, in synesthesics, electro-chemical signals derived from similar transductions but this time of auditory inputs, 'hitch a ride on' or 'pollute' the 'channels/processes' that normally result in the brain faithfully recreating (ie mimicking or modelling, or at least in some way representing) the real colour properties that objects actually do have.

In other words, retinal cones are sufficient but not necessary causes (for the psychological modelling of actual object colour properties).

(Sidenote: it is important to remember that that model has it that there are two different types of property than can both be called colour, and crucially, I think, that the object properties are the real colour ones and the psychological properties are merely 'secondary mimics'. Whereas in the OP model it's more or less the other way around and that it is a misnomer to describe object properties as colours because those are really, actually only in the brain).

I think that a major problem here is one of the earlier questions I tried to have clarified, "What is the definition of color that is being used?" In the series of events from the object to the mind's interpretation there are several different definitions being used. This would seem to mean that we are arguing a category error. Certainly there is some property of an object that is eventually interpreted by our mind as color just as sugar has a chemical property that is eventually interpreted by our mind as 'sweet' when the sugar chemically interacts with the taste buds. The fact that our mind interprets the final stimulus as 'color' or 'sweet' in no way means that the mind's interpretation of the final stimulus is a property of the original object. It only implies that the original object has some property that interacts with our sense organs through some process.

Vague language leads to misunderstanding and/or confused thinking. Without a specific definition of 'color' there is no coherent 'analysis'. I propose that 'color' be defined as the mental event experienced when specific neurons fire. If it is strictly defined as either a wavelength or a property of an object then it can not be a mental perception.

We seem to be getting further from an understanding of what color is and the process through which we sense it as more vague terms are being introduced:
. Words like transduce can mean many things and it seems to be used by fromd to imply something like "a color of light" is transformed into "a color of a nerve impulse". Clearer language would seem to me to be more like a description of the photoelectric effect... sufficient energy in photons will cause the photoreceptor to fire (generate a bioelectric impulse).
. Information is another term that can have a plethora of meanings. In the case of the photoreceptors firing, fromd seems to be using it to mean a full description of color. The 'information' from the photoreceptor passed to the nerve fiber in the optic nerve is simply a bioelectric impulse when the photoreceptor fires.

Suppose, for example, there was a form of auditory-visual synesthesia in which the person saw coloured shapes, or to put it another way that the colours they perceive also had shapes. So they would be 'hearing shapes'. As I understand it this is in fact the way it happens for many auditory-visual synesthesics*.

But the OP model would be in trouble if it tried to claim that shape is not an objective property of external objects.

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*This perception of shape(s) also seems to be the case for phosphenes (another example of the production of colour experiences that does not require light). Phosphenes can (I read) be experimentally induced to appear using electro-cranial magnetism, direct electrical stimulation of neurons, or by administering hallucinogenic drugs, and sometimes via a combination of at least two of those. Apparently, subjects report that such colour phosphenes can also have a variety of shapes, such as those below (illustrated in monochrome):

View attachment 27522

http://www.oubliette.org.uk/Three.html

That discussion paper is from 1995, but most of the experiments were done in the 1970's, so I don't know how reliable or repeatable they are or were.

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Colour and shape perception are, I think, strongly inter-related and often (though not always or necessarily) perceived in combination (eg in the observation of a strawberry). In the OP model, one property (shape) is taken to be an objective property of external objects and the other property (colour) isn't. This is a problem for the OP model, in that it can't properly explain why making this distinction is necessarily warranted. It (the model) can argue that it is a warranted distinction between shape and pain, for example, with the latter being understood as a uniquely psychological phenomenon only. So, we are back to what I think is the trickiest question. Is colour more like shape (does it belong in that taxonomic category) or is it more like pain (and belong in that category)?

I optimistically imagine that surely there must be a way to resolve that issue, or at least explore it towards an answer, philosophically (eg via logic or rational reasoning) or better still by scientific experiment, but I'm darned if I can think of what way that might be.

Interesting stuff there. Definately something I will need to think through before I could formulate a response.

 

[ruby sparks]

I think that a major problem here is one of the earlier questions I tried to have clarified, "What is the definition of color that is being used?"

That is a very good point. How many threads here have we seen this request made as a prerequisite to having a shared discussion?

In some ways, is it not sightly unusual that we are being asked to accept numerous definitions? In a way, I think it is. At times in this thread, colour has been defined by those not accepting the implied OP definition (colour as a brain experience only) as existing in at least 4 ways in 4 different places (in light, in objects, in the optic nerve and in the brain).

To my mind, the models that have colour, in different forms, in all 4 places are, I think, guilty of stretching definitions too far and just being confused, imprecise and profligate.

However, imo, the model that has it only in/of objects and in/of brains (possibly the most naturally intuitive model for the average human) is arguably definitionally precise, because it is saying that objects have the real, objective, actual colour and that the brain experience is merely a secondary representation or psychological model of this. This is colour on a par with shape. It is also the distinction between 'red' and 'redness'. Red qualia are allowed, but only as mimics of 'true red'.

Even then, it might arguably be helpful and clarifying not to use the same term for what are very different phenomena with different properties.

But more fundamentally, and no matter how precise its two related but different definitions are, in my opinion it is simply wrong. I would quite strongly claim that objects are not in fact actually coloured at all. Imo, that is probably a mistake, and an illusion of perception (a form of mental projection), and the model that has objects as coloured is falling for it.

As for light, I'm not particularly convinced at all. Seems pretty unlikely, imo. Ditto the optic nerve.

I propose that 'color' be defined as the mental event experienced when specific neurons fire.

I'll second that. Nicely precise, and just for good measure I think we might have both Galileo Galilei and Isaac Newton on our committee.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]