Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Jarhyn]

your own fallacies

If tht is true I'm sure you can go ahead and deconstruct any of those "fallacies". Except you can't. Because they don't exist.

Your rationalizations and excuses were broken from the beginning

Assertion...

You failed to understand the implications of determinism and incompatibilism right at the start, and nothing has changed.

Assertion...

You impose your own interpretations and ague with a Strawman of your own making

Assertion fallacy of you-too fallacy.

I could try to explain for the hundredth time, but the result would be the same as the first time, and every time since.

So, here's the end of your post and you've just done another ad-nauseam of assertions.

Every post, every single one of yours here, is just you restating your premise over and over and over again without the intelligent discourse to actually deconstruct anything I have said. It's called "ad nauseam".

Mostly because you have no answer and near the beginning were even admitting that compatibilism works because it allows selection of sensible definitions pursuant to calculus of responsibility when yours are not sensible.

You walked back away from that quietly but none of us actually forgot that you did it, that you have repeatedly admitted to will being an extant thing, and by gee gosh, by golly, I've managed several times to compute the freedom of wills in an external deterministic system.

Hell, you won't even answer any of Pood's deconstructions of your own references supporting the compatibilist definition.

As you have seen, I understand compatibilism well enough to disagree with other compatibilists about the details... Yet you do not seem to understand hard determinism to disagree with anyone about details.

physical brain process

So a will.

which it does not and cannot regulate.

Assertion fallacy.

Further, it does not need to "regulate" the will in any manner for that will to be "free" with respect to it's requirements.

Refer to Gazzaniga's experiments

Refer to my experiments, then, where in a deterministic system completely absent an "interpreter" function has a will, and in which that will happens to be free (it has an interpreter to interpret the will into physical activity, but that's different from what you are saying).

The process of volition does not equate to free will

It looks like you missed the point then. I'll repeat this for you, an argument rather than an assertion:

Again, you are back to putting carts before horses.

The system has no leverage by which to make any truly unfree thing free nor to make any truly free thing unfree. That is the role here of causal determinism.

I make a will, reality dictates whether it is free or not. I cannot change the laws of physics, I cannot change what is arranged in reality arrayed against my wills, and while I can change my wills I cannot change that who I was in the past demands that I change them.

It always must have been so, that they were either free wills or unfree wills as they were. They would not be free or unfree if not for this fact. Causal necessity and determinism CREATE freedom in the space of a system which holds wills, as @Marvin Edwards has pointed out repeatedly.

Note here that these are simple statements of shared premises. They show the shape of how just willy-nilly attaching "free" in front of a word is in fact inappropriate here.

Your arguments drip of fear. I think mostly, that fear is of using the word "free" appropriately here, in the compatibilist sense.

The fact that you won't even try to do the exercise is telling: you would then have to acknowledge that it works sensibly and that would, as you pointed out, present a problem for your "left brain".

What is happening within the brain is determined by the non-chosen state of the system before the volitional process even begins.

An assertion. And a false one.

The state of the system before the •••(volition) was another chosen state also caused by a •••(volition), which was another chosen state...

The state of the brain is choice functions and wills all the way down, I'm afraid.

It's all wills. And the existence of the will means you can calculate the freedom of the requirements of those wills.

SOME drives you have no leverage over, but they are nonetheless your drives. Even so, once you form a will pursuant to satisfying the drive requirement, that is "your will, pursuant to your own drive."

You can, in fact, reduce the strength of the drive. In it's own way it is a will, though one held initially by default. It can be opposed, but moreover it can also be shaped with time and effort that some folks just can't be arsed to do.

i daresay folks not being arsed to do the work is exactly the reason we built jails (and gallows, when people are particularly 'intractible'. LOL! There's even a word for it!)

The fact that inaccurate outputs get calibrated to accuracy and we don't notice it does not in any way leverage the system away from holding a will.

And once a system holds a will, the sensible definition of "freedom" within causal determinism allows calculation of whether those wills are "free" or not. Because for every "will" in the universe, there is an absolute binary momentary answer to the truth value of whether each and every such "will" is "free" by that definition.

I would invite you to try it out but we have gotten this far without even a passing good-faith attempt to hold the limes.

The freedom doesn't come from the will, though. The freedom comes from causal necessity determining that the will SHALL meet it's requirement.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It has been pointed out that volition is a physical brain process, information processing, where will is formed as a result of that process, which it does not and cannot regulate.

The brain forms an intention, a will to do something. That volition then centers the brain's concentration upon completing that task, until the task is done or the process is interrupted. You are aware of this, because you experienced this concentrated effort as you composed your comment.

Please note that the intention regulated other brain processes as you recalled what you wanted to say, and perhaps evaluated and corrected your words as you went along.

Take note of the wording of your quote, namely the ''process'' - the process by which decisions are made and actions taken

Yes. All of the functions of the brain are processes. Are you trying to obscure the notion of concentration by hiding it away in the notion of process? It's all brain processes. Concentration is a process. Memory recall is a process. Smelling the roses is a process. Perhaps the most generic term in the world is "process", followed closely by "function". To say something is a process obscures the distinct nature of the process, for example, the difference between concentrating the brain's efforts and recalling a memory.

Refer to Gazzaniga's experiments with brain function and narrator function, first information acts upon the system, actions are determined and the narrator function forms a narrative on what is happening, sometimes wildly wrong.

And what is your narrator telling you now? Is it saying that the phantom of the opera composed your comment? Or is it telling you that you sat there at your computer and typed it yourself?

The narrator is getting it right most of the time. Wouldn't you agree?

The process of volition does not equate to free will.

Choosing the volition is the very thing that free will is about. Were you forced at gunpoint to write your comment? Were you under the influence of an irresistible impulse to write it? Or did you decide on your own that you had enough time to respond to everyone in the thread before heading off to work?

Assuming you decided for yourself that you would write your comments, and that you were neither coerced nor unduly influenced to do so, your volition was freely chosen, by you. (Oh, and it was inevitable that it would be so).

What is happening within the brain is determined by the non-chosen state of the system before the volitional process even begins.

Okay. But then you voluntarily chose to logon to IIDB.org and respond to the comments, and that fixed the state of your brain's system that would follow until you finished your comments. Understand?

''Metzinger ... "

Nice article on The Psychology of Volition. I thought the first-person versus third-person views interesting. However, I would not limit the third-person view to others. After all, we don't simply feel that we are causing an action, we actually watch ourselves doing it. I can say that I am the agent that typed this comment because I saw me doing it, and there was no one else around.

I disagree with the author, Chris Frith, that only humans have an inner experience of agency. Other animals also have eyes and can see themselves doing what they observe others doing. And, like us, they must know the difference between "us" and "that which is not us" in order to navigate themselves around obstacles.

Another interesting point he made was the evolutionary advantage of behaving unpredictably. I had wondered when reading the Libet experiment how the mind interpreted Libet's instruction to the subjects to do something "whenever they had the urge to do so". Frith suggests that predators had an easy task with prey that behaved predictably, so there was a survival advantage to species that evolved the capability of behaving unpredictably.

Frith discussed the sense of agency being inferred from a "binding" of the feeling of intention with the observation of the outcome. And he discussed some of the experiments that manipulated that connection in various ways. But you can read about that yourself if you're curious. Oh, and that includes the experiment that DBT quoted.

He then went into a discussion of responsibility and the sense of regret we feel when we realize we could have done something that was morally better.

He discussed punishment from the standpoint of evolution, its role in social cooperation, and how it shows up in different forms at different ages of a child's development. Children from 6 to 9 months old begin to treat intentional acts differently than unintentional acts. So the notion of "intention" appears to be hard-coded in our DNA.

I disagree with Frith's suggestion that our sense of first-person agency begins with social interactions. I believe it begins with the toddlers first experiences of controlling their own hands, feet, toys, first steps, etc. It wants something and does what he needs to get it, whether crying from the crib, or feeding himself, or using his legs to get around like the grownups.

Anyway, it was an interesting article. Thanks, DBT. However, it doesn't actually change anything in this discussion.

 

[fromderinside]

I could try to explain for the hundredth time, but the result would be the same as the first time, and every time since.

Exactly. Even if the brain IS like a computer -- particularly if is like a computer, in fact -- then my use of a computational engine demonstrably capable of •••'s that are themselves demonstrably capable of being °°° blasts the argument right out of the water.

Of course, I also defend my position that AS the brain is capable of executing an arbitrary series of parsed instructions, and because a computer is a system which executed arbitrary series of parsed instructions by definition, then by definition of what a computer is, the brain is "like" it, insofar as the brain is it, and also something else much more interesting.

Let me bring Sabine Hossenfleder to explain why a scientist or mathematical scientist should not confuse science with philosophy. Her admonishment is "physicists should not do metaphysics".

I tried to make that point by saying one should not confuse subjective with objective which you have been trying to impose throughout your metaphysical posing's.



I admit that I sometimes cross the line by using physics to center our discussions of on the limits on using physiological data as philosophical 'evidence' for limits of philosophical deterministic compatibilism.

 

[Jarhyn]

You can, in fact, reduce the strength of the drive. In it's own way it is a will, though one held initially by default

I might also note, this will is not necessarily held directly by the same agent or even system that does drive fulfillment. It could be endocrine in origin, or endocrine through some nervous interface. I have some expectations on now something like that would have to work, and that gives me some hints when it comes time to actually start dissecting brains.

And there's no guarantee that drive fulfillment is in any way guaranteed to actually care all that much about fulfilling the drives.

In the beginning it might just be a straight shot to reflexive response. Is?

I wouldn't doubt it any which way, just some prepackaged response.

But it's prepackaged in a particular place, in a particular way, and that reflexive response can be broken, generally through great effort.

Some reflexes "we" are not "close enough" to for to "reach".

It really comes down to a matter of access.

Putting together enough systems theory for fully describing how a human mind functions well enough to actually find some observable piece of it from that logical structure in the physical state structure would be a neat trick, but it's entirely possible, because as has been mentioned it's all a machine and machines can be understood no matter how much people flail when asked to try.

The bigger problem though is that some people don't get that end to end it all integrates into an object.

All the machine code? Those instructions aren't "subjective", but have physical object properties. They have to, or nothing would actually happen.

The same MUST be true about the brain IF the universe is "deterministic".

Let me bring Sabine Hossenfleder to explain why a scientist or mathematical scientist should not confuse science with philosophy

First I make clear A: I will watch exactly ZERO videos. If you can't type up her argument in a summary, you can accept that it will not be watched nor cared about.

You can find any number of idiots blowing hard about anything on YouTube, and if MrIntelligentDesign is getting his shit ignored, so are you.

An argument from authority is an argument from authority is an... You get the idea.

Second, you still don't understand that this is all about objects.

DNA is only "subjective" absent the object of the interpreter proteins. Then it's literally 'machine code' and an object process.

Once you have the brain, the list on the paper is no longer subjective but has object meaning to the brain.

Now, regardless of what some pompass idiot (Sabine) says about not being philosophical and using math, combined with physics, to reverse engineer stuff... That's just fucking dumb.

As I've said, nothing is actually "subjective" in the world of the dwarves. It's all concrete objects, even if those concrete objects don't exactly look like "dwarves" until they are rendered into pixels and have various aspects of their holographic geometry rendered "subjectively" on the interface.

Of course, it would be FDI who doesn't understand that when I'm not talking about the marks on the screen, I'm talking about the concrete realities of the processor and memory and field properties.

Of course FDI says "Mario is not real" ignoring for a moment the fact that Mario IS real exactly as "a distributed group of bits on a binary field of memory of a computational engine".

The reality is that once we know enough physics, things some people call "subjective" have their "object form" understood.

At any rate, the object clearly has the capability to hold a "will: a series of instructions unto a requirement", and that requirement will necessarily either be met or it will not. "Free" is the word we use to denote when the requirement shall be met.

These are compatible with deterministic systems and moreover enable objectively useful logic: if the will is not free to the requirement to a drive TRY SOMETHING ELSE!

There's a huge selective pressure in fact to gauge provisional freedoms on wills.

But moreover the will is very clearly there.

In short, FDI, YOU should not attempt to use Philosophy ("subjective, objective") not metaphysics to try to handwave away experimentally verified data; that the human is capable of arbitrary list execution; that the human can emulate a Turing machine; that a Turing machine can hold a will; that a Turing machine can calculate whether a will is provisionally "free" and that we can observe and externally calculate the real freedom of the deterministic system inside the Turing machine.

All these things are not up for discussion but moreover are purely borne out by knowing enough physics and math as OBJECTIVE. That we discuss things like complex field states in a memory as "dwarf" is merely because it is more straightforward than saying "a complex field state"

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I could try to explain for the hundredth time, but the result would be the same as the first time, and every time since.

Exactly. Even if the brain IS like a computer -- particularly if is like a computer, in fact -- then my use of a computational engine demonstrably capable of •••'s that are themselves demonstrably capable of being °°° blasts the argument right out of the water.

Of course, I also defend my position that AS the brain is capable of executing an arbitrary series of parsed instructions, and because a computer is a system which executed arbitrary series of parsed instructions by definition, then by definition of what a computer is, the brain is "like" it, insofar as the brain is it, and also something else much more interesting.

Let me bring Sabine Hossenfleder to explain why a scientist or mathematical scientist should not confuse science with philosophy. Her admonishment is "physicists should not do metaphysics".

I tried to make that point by saying one should not confuse subjective with objective which you have been trying to impose throughout your metaphysical posing's.



I admit that I sometimes cross the line by using physics to center our discussions of on the limits on using physiological data as philosophical 'evidence' for limits of philosophical deterministic compatibilism.

This is really ironic considering she has several YouTube videos where she seems happy to cross that line herself.

 

[DBT]

your own fallacies

If tht is true I'm sure you can go ahead and deconstruct any of those "fallacies". Except you can't. Because they don't exist.

What do you think I have been doing for the last six months? Of course it doesn't matter what is said or explained or provided for your education, and it has, it all comes to naught because you are invested in your faith in compatibilism....this regardless of your own definition of determinism which does not allow freedom of choice, where will plays no part in how actions unfold within the system, where all actions are fixed by initial state and how things unfold thereafter, no alternative, no regulation by will or wish......yet you cling to a flawed definition of compatibility that's designed to give the impression - if one doesn't scratch a little deeper - of freedom of will

This regardless of the fact that how a determined system has absolutely nothing to do with either will or free will;



Jarhyn - A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.

Which means no alternate actions and that will has no regulatory ability, that will itself is fixed by antecedents.

Free will within a determined system? Nah, you are dreaming.

 

[DBT]

It has been pointed out that volition is a physical brain process, information processing, where will is formed as a result of that process, which it does not and cannot regulate.

The brain forms an intention, a will to do something. That volition then centers the brain's concentration upon completing that task, until the task is done or the process is interrupted. You are aware of this, because you experienced this concentrated effort as you composed your comment.

Please note that the intention regulated other brain processes as you recalled what you wanted to say, and perhaps evaluated and corrected your words as you went along.

The brain forms an intention because information acquired by the senses acts upon the system to form an intention, an determined by information exchange, not will or wish.

Take note of the wording of your quote, namely the ''process'' - the process by which decisions are made and actions taken

Yes. All of the functions of the brain are processes. Are you trying to obscure the notion of concentration by hiding it away in the notion of process? It's all brain processes. Concentration is a process. Memory recall is a process. Smelling the roses is a process. Perhaps the most generic term in the world is "process", followed closely by "function". To say something is a process obscures the distinct nature of the process, for example, the difference between concentrating the brain's efforts and recalling a memory.

It is all brain processes, but the point is that there are no willed or freely willed brain processes. What results is determined by the state and condition of the system in each and every instance in time; you say something in one moment only to regret it in the next.

Physical state and condition determine actions, not will, which emerges as a result of state and not as its driver.

''Even more fantastic examples of the left hemisphere at work come from the study of neurological disorders. In a complication of stroke called anosognosia with hemiplegia, patients cannot recognize that their left arm is theirs because the stroke damaged the right parietal cortex, which manages our body’s integrity, position, and movement.

The left-hemisphere interpreter has to reconcile the information it receives from the visual cortex—that the limb is attached to its body but is not moving—with the fact that it is not receiving any input about the damage to that limb.

The left-hemisphere interpreter would recognize that damage to nerves of the limb meant trouble for the brain and that the limb was paralyzed; however, in this case the damage occurred directly to the brain area responsible for signaling a problem in the perception of the limb, and it cannot send any information to the left-hemisphere interpreter.

The interpreter must, then, create a belief to mediate the two known facts “I can see the limb isn’t moving” and “I can’t tell that it is damaged.” When patients with this disorder are asked about their arm and why they can’t move it, they will say “It’s not mine” or “I just don’t feel like moving it”—reasonable conclusions, given the input that the left-hemisphere interpreter is receiving.'' - Michael Gazzinga

Refer to Gazzaniga's experiments with brain function and narrator function, first information acts upon the system, actions are determined and the narrator function forms a narrative on what is happening, sometimes wildly wrong.

And what is your narrator telling you now? Is it saying that the phantom of the opera composed your comment? Or is it telling you that you sat there at your computer and typed it yourself?

The narrator is getting it right most of the time. Wouldn't you agree?

Whether it is getting it right or wrong is not subject to will or wish. As with the example given above, the state of the system determines whether the narrator gets it right or wrong.

The process of volition does not equate to free will.

Choosing the volition is the very thing that free will is about. Were you forced at gunpoint to write your comment? Were you under the influence of an irresistible impulse to write it? Or did you decide on your own that you had enough time to respond to everyone in the thread before heading off to work?

The volitional process is determined by the activity, state and condition of the brain, where a patient may believe that the arm that doesn't move as willed is not their arm.

Assuming you decided for yourself that you would write your comments, and that you were neither coerced nor unduly influenced to do so, your volition was freely chosen, by you. (Oh, and it was inevitable that it would be so).

What is happening within the brain is determined by the non-chosen state of the system before the volitional process even begins.

Okay. But then you voluntarily chose to logon to IIDB.org and respond to the comments, and that fixed the state of your brain's system that would follow until you finished your comments. Understand?

Voluntary choice doesn't pop out of a vacuum. A whole series of events brought me to this forum and determines whatever I respond to or ignore while online.

We are talking about determinism.

''Metzinger ... "

Nice article on The Psychology of Volition. I thought the first-person versus third-person views interesting. However, I would not limit the third-person view to others. After all, we don't simply feel that we are causing an action, we actually watch ourselves doing it. I can say that I am the agent that typed this comment because I saw me doing it, and there was no one else around.

I disagree with the author, Chris Frith, that only humans have an inner experience of agency. Other animals also have eyes and can see themselves doing what they observe others doing. And, like us, they must know the difference between "us" and "that which is not us" in order to navigate themselves around obstacles.

His comment is ambiguous, perhaps he meant the absence of higher order reasoning and moral agency, I don't know. We don't usually consider animals to be moral agents (which takes a certain kind of brain). However, it is clear that other animals are conscious and are able to act within their environment intelligently and rationally.

 

[pood]

This is really ironic considering she has several YouTube videos where she seems happy to cross that line herself.

Indeed so. I like Sabine. I read her blog. I’ve even read a number of her peer-reviewed papers, including on her mind-bending superdeterminism and I’m trying to work my way through her “free will function” paper.

That said, Sabine does not seem to recognize that all science is shot through with philosophy, as Norman Swartz put it. It is absolutely unavoidable. In one of her blog discussions, when she still had comments open, Sabine refused to take a stand on the existence of an extrernal world. That’s just about as philosophical as it gets.

 

[pood]

Rebutting hard determinist Sabine Hossenfelder Note that hard determinism is, um, a philosophical stance.

Rebutting hard determinist Jerry Coyne

 

[Jarhyn]

What do you think I have been doing for the last six months?

Making unargued assertions, and arguments from authorities who make unargued assertions. Pood, Myself, and Marvin, AntiChris have all deconstructed every one of these in parallel, and done so from different directions.

Of course it doesn't matter what is said or explained or provided for your education baldly or fallaciously asserted

FTFY

your own definition of determinism which does not allow freedom of choice

choice and "freedom" here operate in different modes. Choice happens UPON freedom, and is the determinant of which of a set of wills is ultimately free, but "freedom of choice" is a misnomer.

The will has a selection criterion, and the agent makes a choice. The will to choose is free and freely held, the choice is determined and causally necessary.

When we say "he has the freedom to choose (between things)", really we are saying "these are the wills that are provisionally free based on observable contingents, from which one shall be chosen such that ONLY ONE of the presented wills MAY be free, and maybe not even that one!"

When we say "he has the freedom to choose (by himself free of coercion)" really we are saying something much larger, but I'm not discussing that with you yet. First we need language that is commonly shared and understood so that when I use all the words that mess unpacks into, you aren't throwing a tantrum over the fact that those were the words used to describe it.

It has something to do with the former, but we can't even really discuss that sensibly until you at least agree to entertain letting "free" in the context pertain to "when a will shall meet its requirement", and a will as "a series of instructions unto a requirement".

will plays no part in how actions unfold within the system

Will absolutely plays a part in how actions unfold within the system. It is literally the word used to describe the list of instructions being acted on in a context.

Now, you might not call a great many things within this framework which are technically "wills" as such, but that's what they are.

It is, in any discussion wherein there is a determinism, possible to draw a line around some thing and say "what's going to happen?"

The dwarf's "will" to open the door is exactly why he tried. That determined how that dwarf's action unfolded within the system. It's physically demonstrated that's how it was determined. Just as the dwarf's "will" to fight determined how that dwarf would end up locked in that room in the first place, granted that happened in slightly more "mysterious ways"... mostly me being tired of having dwarves murdered by that psychopath.

Which means ... that will has no regulatory ability

and then you just baldly assert a not-even-wrong statement. Wills need no "regulatory ability" upon themselves to be "free". They can and absolutely do have these things but I'm not discussing that with you yet. First we need language that is commonly shared and understood so that when I use all the words that I need to unpack that clusterfuck of a not-even-wrong, you aren't throwing a tantrum over the fact those were the words used to describe it.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It has been pointed out that volition is a physical brain process, information processing, where will is formed as a result of that process, which it does not and cannot regulate.

The brain forms an intention, a will to do something. That volition then centers the brain's concentration upon completing that task, until the task is done or the process is interrupted. You are aware of this, because you experienced this concentrated effort as you composed your comment.

Please note that the intention regulated other brain processes as you recalled what you wanted to say, and perhaps evaluated and corrected your words as you went along.

The brain forms an intention because information acquired by the senses acts upon the system to form an intention, an determined by information exchange, not will or wish.

That intention is also called a "will". That same will is used by the brain to direct subsequent information processing directly related to that specific task. One brain process leads to another brain process that leads to another brain process, etc. Some of those processes happen to be choosing processes that manage traffic and other processes happen to be intentions that drive the whole process in that chosen direction.

The point I'm trying to get across here is that the intention is both an output and an input. The reliably caused intention then reliably causes subsequent processes which may include forming additional intentions which may reliably cause additional processes.

The will/intention/volition is not simply the final process. It is both driven by prior processes and in turn drives subsequent processes.

So, we cannot validly claim that the will is not involved in determining the brain's processes. It is a key determinant, because it moves all other processes toward an ultimate action.

Take note of the wording of your quote, namely the ''process'' - the process by which decisions are made and actions taken

Yes. All of the functions of the brain are processes. Are you trying to obscure the notion of concentration by hiding it away in the notion of process? It's all brain processes. Concentration is a process. Memory recall is a process. Smelling the roses is a process. Perhaps the most generic term in the world is "process", followed closely by "function". To say something is a process obscures the distinct nature of the process, for example, the difference between concentrating the brain's efforts and recalling a memory.

It is all brain processes, but the point is that there are no willed or freely willed brain processes. What results is determined by the state and condition of the system in each and every instance in time; you say something in one moment only to regret it in the next.

The will to answer these posts was the specific state of your brain's system which caused you to write this comment.

Physical state and condition determine actions, not will, which emerges as a result of state and not as its driver.

Perhaps you could explain then what actually "drove" you to write these comments? Do you want to bump it up to the Universe, and then explain why the Universe was interested in responding to this IIDB thread? Perhaps you'd like to bump it up to Causal Necessity, and explain why causal necessity was concerned about the ideas being expressed here?

So, metaphorically speaking, who or what is driving your bus? I'm saying that your chosen intention is sitting in the driver's seat.

Voluntary choice doesn't pop out of a vacuum. A whole series of events brought me to this forum and determines whatever I respond to or ignore while online. We are talking about determinism.

Amen! Every event is always reliably caused by an infinitely long chain of prior events. But, since we don't have the necessary eternity that is required to list this chain for any event, we generally limit our concerns to the most meaningful and relevant links in the chain. These are usually the links that are closest to the event in question. As we trace back through the prior causes of prior causes, each of them becomes less direct and more incidental. Less meaningful and more irrelevant.

So, when we speak of these comments that you and I are posting, the most meaningful cause of our comments is us choosing to sit down at our computers, read each others comment, and post our responses. After this intention has been successfully completed, we move on to other intentions, such as going to work or having brunch.

All of the brain processes were marshalled to complete this task, to satisfy that deliberately chosen intent. That intent was the most meaningful and relevant cause of our respective commenting events.

 

[DBT]

What do you think I have been doing for the last six months?

Making unargued assertions, and arguments from authorities who make unargued assertions. Pood, Myself, and Marvin, AntiChris have all deconstructed every one of these in parallel, and done so from different directions.

You must be blind to anything and everything that you don't agree with. Neither you or the others have deconstructed a thing.

Incompatibilism is not hard to grasp. It's unassailable.

A determined action has no possible alternative. What is determined proceeds freely as determined, fixed, unalterable, set by antecedents.

Given that determined actions are not freely willed, chosen, subject to regulation or change, there is no claim to be made for free will.

Compatibilism tries to circumvent this by redefining free will in a way to make it appear compatible with determinism, uncoerced actions.....never mind that uncoerced actions are determined, fixed and set by elements beyond the scope of will.

It's a sham.

 

[DBT]

It has been pointed out that volition is a physical brain process, information processing, where will is formed as a result of that process, which it does not and cannot regulate.

The brain forms an intention, a will to do something. That volition then centers the brain's concentration upon completing that task, until the task is done or the process is interrupted. You are aware of this, because you experienced this concentrated effort as you composed your comment.

Please note that the intention regulated other brain processes as you recalled what you wanted to say, and perhaps evaluated and corrected your words as you went along.

The brain forms an intention because information acquired by the senses acts upon the system to form an intention, an determined by information exchange, not will or wish.

That intention is also called a "will".

That is equivocation. It isn't the 'intention' that determines the response, but the state of the system, the underlying information processing activity that forms intention, thought, action, milliseconds later, including the narrative (the narrator function).

That same will is used by the brain to direct subsequent information processing directly related to that specific task. One brain process leads to another brain process that leads to another brain process, etc. Some of those processes happen to be choosing processes that manage traffic and other processes happen to be intentions that drive the whole process in that chosen direction.

But that's not how it works.

Again;
''The brain is not a unified entity but an amalgamation of modules with different operating characteristics and agendas. Grasping the modular nature of the brain enables us to understand and accept experiences that would otherwise be confusing and disturbing.

Neurobiologically, the self is not a unified whole. Neuroscientists say the brain is like a committee—and a fractious one at that, with members frequently arguing with each other about what to do.

When brains in operation are observed, internal disputes are indicated by high rates of firing in the nerve tracts connecting the conflicting modules. This is the physical basis of what Freud called “intrapsychic conflict.”

There is even a module (the anterior cingulate cortex) that functions like a mediator trying to resolve conflicts between the other modules.''

The point I'm trying to get across here is that the intention is both an output and an input. The reliably caused intention then reliably causes subsequent processes which may include forming additional intentions which may reliably cause additional processes.

But ''reliable causation'' isn't something that 'our will' uses for it's own ends. There is no free will agency within neural networks, what is done is purely a matter of an interaction of information between cells and networks.

There is no desired outcome. What happens is a consequence of the state of the system in any given instance.

The will/intention/volition is not simply the final process. It is both driven by prior processes and in turn drives subsequent processes.

Nope, as shown by the evidence from neuroscience, that's not how the brain as a determinist rational system works. Evidence has been provided in abundence.

So, we cannot validly claim that the will is not involved in determining the brain's processes. It is a key determinant, because it moves all other processes toward an ultimate action.

Well, we can and we have shown causal links between the state of the system and its output. Cells and networks clearly operate on the basis of architecture and function, not will, and any alteration to makeup, structure, chemical balance, etc, shows itself in the behaviour of the individual;

On the neurology of morals
''Patients with medial prefrontal lesions often display irresponsible behavior, despite being intellectually unimpaired. But similar lesions occurring in early childhood can also prevent the acquisition of factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior.''

Prefrontal Cortex damage:
'The 20-year-old female subject studied by Damasio et al. was intelligent and academically competent, but she stole from her family and other children, abused other people both verbally and physically, lied frequently, and was sexually promiscuous and completely lacking in empathy toward her illegitimate child. In addition, the researchers say, "She never expressed guilt or remorse for her misbehavior'' ''Both of the subjects performed well on measures of intellectual ability, but, like people with adult-onset prefrontal cortex damage, they were socially impaired, failed to consider future consequences when making decisions, and failed to respond normally to punishment or behavioral interventions.

"Unlike adult-onset patients, however," the researchers say, "the two patients had defective social and moral reasoning, suggesting that the acquisition of complex social conventions and moral rules had been impaired." While adult-onset patients possess factual knowledge about social and moral rules (even though they often cannot follow these rules in real life), Damasio et al.'s childhood-onset subjects appeared unable to learn these rules at all. This may explain, the researchers say, why their childhood-onset subjects were much more antisocial, and showed less guilt and remorse, than subjects who suffered similar damage in adulthood.''

''Goldberg brings his description of frontal dysfunction to life with insightful accounts of clinical cases. These provide a good description of some of the consequences of damage to frontal areas and the disruption and confusion of behavior that often results. Vladimir, for example, is a patient whose frontal lobes were surgically resectioned after a train accident. As a result, he is unable to form a plan, displays an extreme lack of drive and mental rigidity and is unaware of his disorder. In another account, Toby, a highly intelligent man who suffers from attention deficits and possibly a bipolar disorder, displays many of the behavioral features of impaired frontal lobe function including immaturity, poor foresight and impulsive behavior''

 

[Jarhyn]

You must be blind to anything and everything that you don't agree with

Neither you or the others have deconstructed a thing.

This is straight up counterfactual.

We deconstruct your false dichotomy virtually every single post: it does not follow that just because causal necessity says one alternative will happen that no "alternatives" exist. They merely exist as unfree wills. But we already knew those wills were unfree.

Incompatibilism is not hard to grasp. It's unassailable

Spoken like a true Bible believing Christian.

determined action has no possible alternative

A false dichotomy there, your go-to.

A will determined to be free may make many other wills unfree. The unfree wills are "unrealized alternatives".

Alternatives for not need to be realized for them to have been alternatives.

That's how choice works: many enter, one alternative leaves. It's like Thunderdome that way. Choice functions happen. DEAL WITH IT.

Given that determined actions are not freely willed

And then you go back to your false dichotomy.

It is not "given" at all. Determined actions MAY be willed (in fact are always "willed" by that definition of will), and are so because at least one will in the system is "free".

In the moment nothing as per the will itself is beyond it's scope, and nothing has to be. How it came to be does not impact that it is, now, as it is.

The dwarf's will to open the door came as a result of an absurd and deterministic process but in the moment he is opening the door that process has evolved into a momentary state.

In that momentary state, they are now a dwarf with a will to open a door, and that will to open a door is not free.

Despite the dwarf not choosing that his will be unfree, despite the dwarf not having a choice but to tantrum, his will to tantrum is free, even if not freely held. The will to turn over the statue is a freely held will, and he does freely choose that over say, the stool. And it turns out this is a free will as well.

Simultaneously in this system:
The dwarf holds a will.

The will is held in a causally necessary way; the will MUST either be free or unfree, and the dwarf fundamentally cannot decide which any given will is.

The dwarf makes meaningful choices.

The system is entirely determined and everything that happens as a result of "untampered" determinism must happen (unless the system is tampered with).

Even so, unlike with our reality we can actually experiment with contingent logic: IF the door were unlocked, THEN the will would be free, and at least 5 more dwarves get hacked to death with battle axes.

If I were an intelligent observer inside this system capable of locking doors, I could make the observation "this dwarf kills other dwarves. This dwarf is in a room. If I lock the door to this room, his will to kill dwarves cannot possibly remain free. I am a dwarf. I like living. Therefore if I wish my will to live is made more likely free by locking this door and letting that other murderous bastard rot."

This is all based on an as-yet unrealized will whose requirement (make a given will that is mutually exclusive to my own observably not-free) shall be satisfied when it is realized.

These definitions then start to inform rational activities pursuant to justice and self-preservation.

Of course, again, it is not the agent that decides whether a will is "free" with respect to a requirement. That is the process of causal necessity.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Incompatibilism is not hard to grasp. It's unassailable.

Unassailable? It's a simple paradox that is easily unraveled. All events are reliably caused, including those events where we choose for ourselves what we will do, as well as those events where we don't.

A determined action has no possible alternative.

And yet within the set of determined events we find ourselves facing choices between literal menus of real possibilities, any one of which we are able to choose. And, we choose what we, ourselves, decide to choose.

What is determined proceeds freely as determined, fixed, unalterable, set by antecedents.

And one of those antecedents happen to be us. To claim it is not us, is delusional, a departure from empirical reality.

Given that determined actions are not freely willed, chosen, subject to regulation or change, there is no claim to be made for free will.

The claim to free will is simple. Free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. It does not require freedom from causation, because no freedom ever does.

Compatibilism tries to circumvent this by redefining free will in a way to make it appear compatible with determinism, uncoerced actions.....never mind that uncoerced actions are determined, fixed and set by elements beyond the scope of will.

Compatibilism doesn't circumvent anything. It takes everything into account, including perfectly reliable causation in which we are not hidden from view as the causal agents that we truly are, and the freely chosen intentions that drive our deliberate behavior. Our actions are both reliably caused and the reliable cause of subsequent events. Don't go calling us blind if you fail to see us doing our own thing within the causal chain.

Incompatibilism is a sham. A little joke we play upon ourselves until we get over it. Here's hoping you get over it soon.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It isn't the 'intention' that determines the response, but the state of the system,

INTENTION IS A STATE OF THE SYSTEM.

You seem to be looking at a photograph while ignoring the movie. The term "process" is about the ongoing changes happening from microsecond to microsecond within the brain. There is a hand-off of information from one brain area to the next, each section summarizing and encoding the data and presenting its results to the next section. Neuroscience attempts to map the sequence of processes to specific functional areas within the brain tissue. This mapping helps doctors to identify the location of lesions or injuries that alter our behavior by damaging specific functions.

the underlying information processing activity that forms intention, thought, action, milliseconds later, including the narrative (the narrator function).

And who is listening to the narration? The brain is. And it may like or dislike what it hears. And that may trigger additional information processing. You've got both bottom-up causation and top-down causation going on within the same brain. It's a cooperative enterprise between multiple functional areas.

That same will is used by the brain to direct subsequent information processing directly related to that specific task. One brain process leads to another brain process that leads to another brain process, etc. Some of those processes happen to be choosing processes that manage traffic and other processes happen to be intentions that drive the whole process in that chosen direction.

But that's not how it works.

It's precisely how it does work. Read it yourself in your own quote:

Again;
''The brain is not a unified entity but an amalgamation of modules with different operating characteristics and agendas. Grasping the modular nature of the brain enables us to understand and accept experiences that would otherwise be confusing and disturbing.

Neurobiologically, the self is not a unified whole. Neuroscientists say the brain is like a committee—and a fractious one at that, with members frequently arguing with each other about what to do.

When brains in operation are observed, internal disputes are indicated by high rates of firing in the nerve tracts connecting the conflicting modules. This is the physical basis of what Freud called “intrapsychic conflict.”

There is even a module (the anterior cingulate cortex) that functions like a mediator trying to resolve conflicts between the other modules.''

If the brain's modules simply compete without negotiating a settlement we would be a total mess. Instead, the brain is able to form a united front, to concentrate its attention upon completing a task, to carry out a will. And the whole body may be called upon to participate in the endeavor. For example, the chosen will to have dinner at Ruby Tuesdays involves getting into the car and driving there. The chosen will to have a Chef Salad for dinner results in us giving the waiter that dinner order. Then there is the will to pay the cashier on the way out, and the will to go home, to sleep till the next morning arrives. Intention is driving the bus.

The point I'm trying to get across here is that the intention is both an output and an input. The reliably caused intention then reliably causes subsequent processes which may include forming additional intentions which may reliably cause additional processes.

But ''reliable causation'' isn't something that 'our will' uses for it's own ends.

We use it all the time in everything we do. Getting into a car, starting the motor, backing up, and driving to Ruby Tuesdays is all about us using "reliable causation" for our own ends. You may have heard me suggest earlier that reliable cause and effect is essential for every freedom we have to do anything at all.

And that is why "freedom from reliable causation" is a paradoxical notion: How can one be free of that which freedom itself requires?

There is no free will agency within neural networks, what is done is purely a matter of an interaction of information between cells and networks.

The same applies to the transistors embedded in the chips on our computers. Neither the individual transistors nor the individual neurons have any clue as to what they are doing or what the fork is going on.

There is no desired outcome.

And yet there is a desired outcome. You know, that dinner at Ruby Tuesdays.

Intentions and desires are emergent properties of the evolved brain. Desires first showed up in the universe with the first living organism, in the form of biological drives to survive, thrive, and reproduce. Intentions first showed up in the universe with the first intelligent species.

What happens is a consequence of the state of the system in any given instance.

The "state" of the system in any given instant is a photograph. The system processing is a live action movie. A "mental process" is not a material object, but rather a series of rapid changes happening within a material object.
When the process stops, the brain reverts to a lump of inert matter, just like a machine that is turned off.

But the brain's processing provides us with the ability to model reality, imagine possibilities, evaluate our options, and choose what we will do. All of these higher-level functions are supported by processes running upon the neural infrastructure.

We cannot describe our lives or even our thoughts in terms of individual neurons firing. But we do have a host of concepts that enable us to communicate with each other what we are doing and why we are doing it.

The will/intention/volition is not simply the final process. It is both driven by prior processes and in turn drives subsequent processes.

Nope, as shown by the evidence from neuroscience, that's not how the brain as a determinist rational system works. Evidence has been provided in abundence.

Then you're not correctly understanding the neuroscience. Consider for example your interpretation of Dr. Shapiro's comment versus my own. He dissects the brain into modules but then pulls it all back together in the last sentence:
"There is even a module (the anterior cingulate cortex) that functions like a mediator trying to resolve conflicts between the other modules.''

In order for an intelligent species to survive, the brain's modules must cooperate to determine a single course of action for the body. The body must act as a whole, thus the brain must do the same.

So, we cannot validly claim that the will is not involved in determining the brain's processes. It is a key determinant, because it moves all other processes toward an ultimate action.

Well, we can and we have shown causal links between the state of the system and its output. Cells and networks clearly operate on the basis of architecture and function, not will,

Without will, the system as a whole person has no determined function at all. Will encapsulates a specific function that the person will perform. Choosing that will determines which intention gets to drive the bus.

and any alteration to makeup, structure, chemical balance, etc, shows itself in the behaviour of the individual;

That's right. The system depends upon all of its parts reliably performing their functions. When there is illness or injury within the brain, specific functions may be compromised or event destroyed. These can result in significant behavioral changes, including immoral or illegal actions. And when this is the case, then the criminal offender should be treated medically and psychiatrically to address the underlying cause of their behavior.

 

[fromderinside]

Rebutting hard determinist Sabine Hossenfelder Note that hard determinism is, um, a philosophical stance.

Rebutting hard determinist Jerry Coyne

Great. So what do you make of a 'belief' sufficing as argument for or against anything?

 

[DBT]

You must be blind to anything and everything that you don't agree with

I know that in your own mind you believe that you are right and that it's me who is not 'getting it' - however, there has been more than sufficient material provided on neuroscience, cognition, agency expert, analysis, arguments from incompatibilism, etc, for your enlightenment, yet your remarks have shown that you either fail to understand any of it, or you just disregard all that is said or provided.

Worse, you equate function and will without understanding that by doing so it can be claimed that computers have free will and other absurdities, which you have already expressed.


So, no, it's definitely you.

''Goldberg brings his description of frontal dysfunction to life with insightful accounts of clinical cases. These provide a good description of some of the consequences of damage to frontal areas and the disruption and confusion of behavior that often results. Vladimir, for example, is a patient whose frontal lobes were surgically resectioned after a train accident. As a result, he is unable to form a plan, displays an extreme lack of drive and mental rigidity and is unaware of his disorder. In another account, Toby, a highly intelligent man who suffers from attention deficits and possibly a bipolar disorder, displays many of the behavioral features of impaired frontal lobe function including immaturity, poor foresight and impulsive behavior.''

''It is unimportant whether one's resolutions and preferences occur because an ''ingenious physiologist' has tampered with one's brain, whether they result from narcotics addiction, from 'hereditary factor, or indeed from nothing at all.' Ultimately the agent has no control over his cognitive states. So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunity, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce. After all, we do not have occasion to choose our dominant proclivities.' - Prof. Richard Taylor

 

[DBT]

It isn't the 'intention' that determines the response, but the state of the system,

INTENTION IS A STATE OF THE SYSTEM.

You seem to be looking at a photograph while ignoring the movie. The term "process" is about the ongoing changes happening from microsecond to microsecond within the brain. There is a hand-off of information from one brain area to the next, each section summarizing and encoding the data and presenting its results to the next section. Neuroscience attempts to map the sequence of processes to specific functional areas within the brain tissue. This mapping helps doctors to identify the location of lesions or injuries that alter our behavior by damaging specific functions.

You are jumping too far forward; neural architecture/evolved function and input is the state of system, which could be fully functional, partly damaged or compromised beyond the ability to function rationally.

Intention implies an intender that molds events or conditions according to will or plan. The brain doesn't work like that.

The state of the system, which is not chosen or intended, is the state of us, how we think, what we think and what we do, intention is the output of processing. Processing is determined by the state and condition of neural networks, not free will.

the underlying information processing activity that forms intention, thought, action, milliseconds later, including the narrative (the narrator function).

And who is listening to the narration? The brain is. And it may like or dislike what it hears. And that may trigger additional information processing. You've got both bottom-up causation and top-down causation going on within the same brain. It's a cooperative enterprise between multiple functional areas.

The role of the narrator function is to interpret (not always correctly) actions that are formed by an interaction of information. Narrator function, emerging after action initiation, doesn't have regulatory control. The action is initiated unconsciously, signals sent to muscle groups, then the narrator function is informed through different channels.

There is no free will to be found here.

That same will is used by the brain to direct subsequent information processing directly related to that specific task. One brain process leads to another brain process that leads to another brain process, etc. Some of those processes happen to be choosing processes that manage traffic and other processes happen to be intentions that drive the whole process in that chosen direction.

Will is not the driver. Input, form and function is the driver, the result is will and action. The will to overindulge because it's pleasurable may be in conflict with the will to abstain because it's not healthy to overindulge, a battle of wills within the system. One opposing the other.

Free will? Not at all.

But that's not how it works.

It's precisely how it does work. Read it yourself in your own quote:

Again;
''The brain is not a unified entity but an amalgamation of modules with different operating characteristics and agendas. Grasping the modular nature of the brain enables us to understand and accept experiences that would otherwise be confusing and disturbing.

Neurobiologically, the self is not a unified whole. Neuroscientists say the brain is like a committee—and a fractious one at that, with members frequently arguing with each other about what to do.

When brains in operation are observed, internal disputes are indicated by high rates of firing in the nerve tracts connecting the conflicting modules. This is the physical basis of what Freud called “intrapsychic conflict.”

There is even a module (the anterior cingulate cortex) that functions like a mediator trying to resolve conflicts between the other modules.''

If the brain's modules simply compete without negotiating a settlement we would be a total mess. Instead, the brain is able to form a united front, to concentrate its attention upon completing a task, to carry out a will. And the whole body may be called upon to participate in the endeavor. For example, the chosen will to have dinner at Ruby Tuesdays involves getting into the car and driving there. The chosen will to have a Chef Salad for dinner results in us giving the waiter that dinner order. Then there is the will to pay the cashier on the way out, and the will to go home, to sleep till the next morning arrives. Intention is driving the bus.

You may ne overinterpreting the term 'negotiating.' There is no dialogue between structures, just that the most imperative action wins out.

You may intend to cross the road, but suddenly a car comes around the corner and you jump back, the imperative to leap back overrules your desire to cross the road. Or your love of chocolate overrules your desire to abstain and you overeat regardless of feeling bad after the fact.

The Limbic System​

''The Limbic System is the area of our brain that is solely focused on ensuring our survival. As information enters our brain through our sensory systems, the way our brain analyzes everything that is happening around us will affect the way we identify and perceive anything considered threatening. If something is determined to be a threat, our bodies immediately execute the freeze, flight, or fight response to either distance ourselves from the threat, or prepare to fight and kill the threat in order for us to stay alive. There will be an article posted later this week that discusses how the Limbic System actually processes this information, but what is important for anyone trying to analyze behavior, is how the body displays the flight or fight response.''

Summary​

Wherever we find ourselves in the world, the way that the Limbic System controls the behavior of the people around us will be the same. Because this process is occurring outside of our conscious awareness, the way a person’s body language and behavior shows a limbic system response will provide us with the non-verbal communication we need to make accurate predictions. This is what makes the profiling domains universally applicable and not culturally specific. This is the “Why” when it comes to analyzing behavior. This is the underlying cause, so once it is understood and once observers can use these responses to stress to make conclusions about a person emotional state (Dominant vs. Submissive, Uncomfortable vs. Comfortable, and Interested vs. Uninterested) they will be able to harness the information that is ignored by so many others.

The point I'm trying to get across here is that the intention is both an output and an input. The reliably caused intention then reliably causes subsequent processes which may include forming additional intentions which may reliably cause additional processes.

Function is the driver of intention and action. Function comes before intention. Physical state and condition comes before function.

A baby is born with the neural hardware, instincts and means with which to learn, adapt and intend.

An order, first the means, neural networks, a brain able to acquire and process information - function - then action and intention.

 

[Jarhyn]

however, there has been more than sufficient material provided on neuroscience, cognition, agency expert, analysis, arguments from incompatibilism, etc,

You have provided red herrings about neurology and cognition which have been discussed and addressed and flushed using dwarf determinism: neurons are not necessary nor applicable to the concept in the first place, given the definition of a will here as "a series of instructions into a requirement".

Your arguments from incompatibilism are not-even-wrong because they are circular and do not address the definitions of compatibilists. "No Libertarian free will" does not get you to "therefore no compatibilist free will".

The only way you get to "therefore no compatibilist free will" is to actually pick up compatibilist definitions, unpack the whole definition, and show a compatibilist construction that yields a contradiction that states a will as both free AND unfree in the same way.

by doing so it can be claimed that computers have free will and other absurdities

Ah, now here's an interesting point: I do claim computers can have wills. I do claim computers' wills can be free or unfree. It is in fact a corralary of the definitions I use.

You consider it an "absurdity" to claim that humans have "free will*"! Why would I consider someone who believes such nonsense so religiously on ANY thing they deny "free will*" of?

It seems you have some religious need for computers to lack these capabilities? What is your grounds for considering it an "absurdity" beyond it merely being something you find distasteful for whatever reason?

We are mechanical systems in a deterministic environment. Computers are mechanical systems in a deterministic environment.

Our universe has a lot of absurd things in it. You are an absurdity. As am I. Nature does not abhor absurdities but is in fact chock full of them, it being an absurdity itself.

Rather than asking whether it's an absurdity perhaps you would be better served by asking "is this absurdity how the absurdity of nature happens to function?

And the answer to that question is going to be "yes, computers have wills; those wills may be free."

Vladimir, for example, is a patient whose frontal lobes were surgically resectioned after a train accident. As a result, he is unable to form a plan, displays an extreme lack of drive and mental rigidity and is unaware of his disorder

See, this is an interesting part which in fact proves my contention that the brain, particularly the part of brain that I impugn as "the seat of consciousness" is in fact capable of production, execution, and cessation of "wills". I feel bad for Vlad dying like that, to be continued by the less interesting parts of his brain.

He got shoved into "the Chinese room" or "reactive automatic action" or "mere reaction".

It's like what happens in an office when the boss just up and quits and the employees are all too dumb to take over for them. It pretty well indicates that before the frontal lobe went off, there was a boss.

It just happens that the unreliable interpreter function, essentially the guy that relays messages between the boss and the employees well, that guy is still alive and so nobody is any the wiser that the boss is gone. Nobody ever really saw the boss directly.

But it's interesting you use as an example something that proves that the brain normally possesses the regulatory ability to form a plan, execute the plan, etc..

At any rate, Vlad still does have "wills" but they are more simple linkages that, lacking the ability to form complex wills, are much less likely to be free.

So Vlad still has a will, the will is still either free or not, he just now lacks the capacity to exert the regulatory control over them to displace the reactive wills with more measured and considered ones.

In the same way, the line following robot doesn't need the ability to create wills for themselves at all for them to hold a will, for the will to be free. When you calculate the causality of that will being held, you come to me and my will, held by myself freely, and created by my prefrontal cortex (me, btw), and you can say "the robot has the will to follow the line. That will was 'free' as of the last time I looked at it. It held the will to follow the line because I held the free will to put that will there, and I did so 'because I wanted to'."

Now, "because I wanted to" is a pretty big statement. It encodes a lot of stuff and is doing a lot of work here. But you are not yet to the point where we can discuss what that means, implies, or any of that. It is not germane yet to the discussion as to where wills come from and why and what impacts that has on 'responsibilities'.

In the end, the only impact that it really has between where a drive comes from is whether we let you go "free", whether we put you in a corrective environment, or whether we put you in a hole.

*Really, "wills which have binary freedom value"