Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Marvin Edwards]

All of the events that took place in the restaurant were causally inevitable, but none of them were caused by inevitability. They were all caused by the individual choices of people. The person who opened the restaurant caused the menu. The customers reading the menu caused their dinner orders. The waiter brought the orders to the chef, and the chef caused the dinners, which the waiter then brought back to the customers, along with their bill.

The events were all inevitable, but, so what? Each person was free to choose for themselves what they would order for dinner. Not free of inevitability, but certainly free of coercion and undue influence. And universal causal necessity/inevitability does not change any of the facts about what happened and who did what and who is responsible for paying the bill.

The list of alternate possibilities being presented are realizable by a group of diners, each according to their own proclivities, with only one possible selection in any given moment of the selection process, each and every moment in time.

Of course. And when a person decides for themselves what they will have for dinner, "according to their own proclivities", rather than being forced to eat what someone else chooses for them, it is called "free will", because they are free to make that choice for themselves.

Free will simply means we made that choice for ourselves while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

Free will does not in any way imply freedom from causal inevitability, except to the incompatibilists. They have an irrational notion of freedom and free will.

Incremental states of the brain determining what happens in that instance in time, with no possible alternate action in that moment in time.

Again, you're misusing the notion of possibility. You're assuming that if something will not happen that it cannot happen. But the ability to do something does not magically disappear when we decide not to do it. Just because we wouldn't do it does not mean that we couldn't do it.

Consequently, the action that is determined in any given instance in time is fixed by the state of the brain in that instance, and not 'freely willed.'

When the brain reaches the state of fixing the decision as to what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, it is called a "freely chosen will" or simply "free will".

You're still overlooking the obvious fact that free will assumes that the brain is fixing the choice according to its normal mode of operation. Free will does not in any way presume that the brain is not fixing the choice. The brain is obviously doing the choosing. And the person, whose brain chose to order the salad, will be given the dinner bill.

Determinism is not a free will process.

Determinism includes ALL processes. This includes both those processes where we decide for ourselves what we will do (a free will process), as well as those processes where a choice is forced upon us by someone or something else (a process of coercion or undue influence).

So, one cannot claim that determinism is never a free will process, because sometimes it actually is.

Each state determines the next as events unfold.

Absolutely!

If Fish is chosen, that is the only possible action in that moment in time ...

First, every item on the menu remains a real possibility whether you choose it or not in that moment in time. If the restaurant owner decides to take that item off the menu, then it ceases to be a real possibility. Otherwise, it remains a real possibility regardless of your choices or your actions.

Second, choosing something else remains a real possibility to your own brain even after your actual choice. "I ordered the fish, but I could have ordered the steak instead" is true in both parts. You ordered the fish is true. You could have ordered the steak is also true.

At no point in time was the possibility of ordering the steak a false claim within your own brain. Not before, when it was just an option you considered. Not during, when you decided to order fish instead. Not after, when recalling what you could have done. It was always a real possibility, something that could happen, even if it never would happen.

... That this is indeed ''us'' does not equate to free will.

"Us" (our brain operating in its normal deterministic mode) deciding for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence, does in fact equate to free will.

The brain is responsible in the sense that it is its own state and condition that produces behavioral output.

Exactly.

But as the brain has no choice in the matter of its own condition or how it functions, be it rationally, irrationally or self destructively, it is not morally responsible.

The brain does not choose itself, but it does choose what we will do. It is not responsible for how it happens to be. But it is responsible for how it chooses for us to behave.

The right kind of regulative control to qualify as free will is missing.

Because the brain chooses how we will behave, it has precisely the right kind of regulative control that is required for both free will and responsibility.

No, Harris know his stuff.

Harris knows a lot of things, but he simply lacks the insights required to know the truth of certain matters, like free will, and responsibility, and the pragmatic function of morality in a social community.

Executive control is itself the work of the brain, namely, the prefrontal cortex. The state of the PFC determines how well the regulation or modification of impulses is carried out. The same deterministic rules apply to the PFC as any other brain structure or organ, neural architecture determines function. The PFC offers higher order information processing and rational behaviour.

Exactly. The PFC gets to choose what we will have for dinner, because it can track its calories using an MS Access app. The neurologist you quoted, who specialized in the motor cortex, even admitted he could not address the problem of ordering dinner.

It's a reasonable consideration of brain function in relation to behavior meant to bring better treatment and outcome for offenders who may have PFC damage, chemical imbalances, etc and are literally unable to control their impulses (brain state again) and are simply locked up without hope of getting the treatment they need.

Of course. But I am not suggesting that neuroscience should not inform our courts on matters of neuroscience. I am suggesting that we should not inflict the "determinism versus free will" paradox upon our judges and courts. This paradox has no basis in neuroscience. It is wholly crafted by philosophical abstractions, figurative language, mythical beliefs, and other nonsense that makes otherwise intelligent people say some very stupid things. (Hmm. Does that mean it is literally, "stupefying"?)

Neuroscience? Yes! Paradoxes? NO!

 

[fromderinside]

Justification by talking to your 'self' about the morality of what your 'self' does is a bit over the top. Our vocalizations are heard. That doesn't mean they are responses to what we need to do. They are only vocal reflections of what we are doing.

Yeah, I didn't say that very well. I was trying to describe two things at the same time. One point was that we are limited to the dialog that the brain itself creates to explain itself. The logic of this dialog is being updated by scientific knowledge and discoveries, but we'll never be able to explain ourselves in terms of specific neurons firing in a specific way. The brain is still too small to provide such information, because it would take multiple additional neurons to carry that information about a single neuron, and we end up with an infinitely expanding brain.

So, we're limited to using word symbols for things like "will", and "cause", and "free", etc. The struggle of philosophy and science seems to be in testing our descriptions of reality for adequate functional effectiveness. Oh, and, of course, even that goal statement is itself is made up of the very stuff we're trying to straighten out.

And wtf was my other point? Oh. That the notion of choosing and of freedom and of responsibility are all part of the landscape when discussing the morality of human behavior. When the hard determinist attempts to wipe these concepts from the face of the earth, we lose the essential tools that the human race has evolved over millions of years to cope with its own behaviors.

First, hard determinism is the basis for scientific explanation. Second, the landscape of which you speak are human self described rationales for such as those things you point to as being explained thereby.

Circling the wagons.

The question follows, given that both will and action is causally inevitable (determined), how can it be claimed that will is free?

Can you tell us what can be claimed to be free, if anything, in a deterministic universe?

Incompatibilism: The notion of Free Will is incompatible with determinism.

Sorry, I don't understand your response.

It shouldn't be hard. It's been said many times in many ways. Actions proceed freely, without coercion, as determined.


''If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution taken once and for all. So would a Being, endowed with higher insight and more perfect intelligence, watching man and his doings, smile about man's illusion that he was acting according to his own free will.'' - Albert Einstein

‘Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills’ - Schopenhauer

Yes. Topped off with a cherry in the form of a philosopher's throw-away brain pfhart. Good job.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

First, hard determinism is the basis for scientific explanation.

Nope. We can't even say that determinism, with all its mythology, is the basis for scientific explanation.

What we can say is that science presumes that all events occur "deterministically", AS IF someone or something were setting down the invariable laws of behavior.

Deterministically simply means that given the same cause, the same effect will be produced. (Any variation in the effect would be attributed to as yet unidentified additional causes, "hidden variables").

Second, the landscape of which you speak are human self described rationales for such as those things you point to as being explained thereby.

Our problem is that it is all that we have to go on. A scientific experiment will be interpreted using those human concepts. We can adjust those concepts over time, with new knowledge, and using new extensions to our ordinary senses like telescopes and microscopes. But I suspect it will always come down to finding an explanation that is reasonably consistent with existing explanations.

 

[Jarhyn]

First, hard determinism is the basis for scientific explanation.

Nope. We can't even say that determinism, with all its mythology, is the basis for scientific explanation.

What we can say is that science presumes that all events occur "deterministically", AS IF someone or something were setting down the invariable laws of behavior.

Deterministically simply means that given the same cause, the same effect will be produced. (Any variation in the effect would be attributed to as yet unidentified additional causes, "hidden variables").

Second, the landscape of which you speak are human self described rationales for such as those things you point to as being explained thereby.

Our problem is that it is all that we have to go on. A scientific experiment will be interpreted using those human concepts. We can adjust those concepts over time, with new knowledge, and using new extensions to our ordinary senses like telescopes and microscopes. But I suspect it will always come down to finding an explanation that is reasonably consistent with existing explanations.

Holy shit I missed that FDI asspull.

As I've said, once you know all of "basic" physics, you can infer all of "macro-physics" from that and pure math. That is not a subjective thing. It is an objective, universal truth at that point.

This is exactly why I can talk about dwarves objectively. They are in a fully "solved" physics.

 

[DBT]

I'm pretty sure I fully understand your objections to free will (no need to constantly repeat them).

I'm not sure you do. I know you say you do, but that's not the same.

You shouldn't mistake disagreement with non-understanding.

The nature of the questions strongly suggests it. Questions that have been answered numerous time.....it's not as if this is our first day on the job.

I completely agree agree with you that libertarian free will is a non-starter (for all the reasons you repeatedly enumerate).

Good.

I disagree with you about compatibilist free will. In order to challenge your position, I need to understand your reasons for rejecting compatibilism.

The reasons have been given for the last six months or so in this round, and a span of years on other occasions. The argument is still the same.

To repeat;

Basically, what we do is fixed by antecedents which determine conditions now - the decision and related action taken - which is neither willed or subject to regulations. Actions taken not being willed but determined, there is no claim for free will to be made.

Compatibilism relies on careful wording and selection of conditions; acting according to one's will without coercion in order to give an impression of freedom of will. Which of course ignores the deterministic nature and means of production of will and action.

In other words, within a determined system, nothing is freely willed.

As far as I can tell, the reason you reject compatibilist free will is because it's not "real" (i.e. libertarian) free will - its a sham. In other words your objection to the notion of compatibilist free will is that it is an incorrect use of the word 'free' (you seem to imply that 'free' is being used in an inappropriate context in the case of compatibilism).

No, as explained above, there is no claim for free will to be made. Compatibilists offer a definition based on flawed premises.

Your questions suggest that you don't.

My questions tend to focus on establishing what criteria you employ when deciding when it is appropriate to use the word free in a deterministic universe (so we can talk sensibly about our differences) .

To date, I've been completely unsuccessful in this endeavour

Really? Did you miss the part where it is explained that determined actions must proceed freely as determined? That, if determined, an action is freely performed as determined? Not only freely performed, but necessarily performed....after all, we are talking about determinism where everything must necessarily proceed as determined.

 

[The AntiChris]

I disagree with you about compatibilist free will. In order to challenge your position, I need to understand your reasons for rejecting compatibilism.

The reasons have been given for the last six months or so in this round, and a span of years on other occasions. The argument is still the same.

To repeat;

Basically, what we do is fixed by antecedents which determine conditions now - the decision and related action taken - which is neither willed or subject to regulations. Actions taken not being willed but determined, there is no claim for free will to be made.

Compatibilism relies on careful wording and selection of conditions; acting according to one's will without coercion in order to give an impression of freedom of will. Which of course ignores the deterministic nature and means of production of will and action.

In other words, within a determined system, nothing is freely willed.

I'm obviously not making myself clear.

I know you don't accept that will can be ever be free in a deterministic universe. In order to understand your rejection of any form of free will I'm asking you if anything other than will in a deterministic universe can be claimed to be free? Is, for example, the term 'free speech' a legitimate use of the word free in your opinion?

Without wanting to put words in your mouth, if you do accept that 'free speech' is an acceptable use of the word free, then I'd want to understand why you believe speech which, like everything else in a deterministic universe, is "fixed by antecedents" can be described as free but will can't.

 

[DBT]

All of the events that took place in the restaurant were causally inevitable, but none of them were caused by inevitability. They were all caused by the individual choices of people.

Not so. People act and function within their immediate environment. The actions that are taken is an interaction of what the environment presents and the brain state of person in that situation.

Given determinism, one person necessarily takes this option and someone else (a different brain and state) necessarily takes their option,

It is the state of the system as a whole, the environment, the people/brains/minds, that determines outcomes for each and every action and response.

You don't appear to be referring to determinism at all. The impression I get from what you said is a non- deterministic world that can be molded to our will.

That is not how determinism works, not by your own definition. That is Libertarian Free Will.

The person who opened the restaurant caused the menu. The customers reading the menu caused their dinner orders. The waiter brought the orders to the chef, and the chef caused the dinners, which the waiter then brought back to the customers, along with their bill.

The events were all inevitable, but, so what? Each person was free to choose for themselves what they would order for dinner. Not free of inevitability, but certainly free of coercion and undue influence. And universal causal necessity/inevitability does not change any of the facts about what happened and who did what and who is responsible for paying the bill.

Antecedents, each and every actor is brought to their action by everything that went before. An untouchable living in the slums of Mumbai is presented with a whole different range of conditions than a Wall Street Banker out on the Town with his friends...

The list of alternate possibilities being presented are realizable by a group of diners, each according to their own proclivities, with only one possible selection in any given moment of the selection process, each and every moment in time.

Of course. And when a person decides for themselves what they will have for dinner, "according to their own proclivities", rather than being forced to eat what someone else chooses for them, it is called "free will", because they are free to make that choice for themselves.

'Decides for oneself' is a matter of brain state and condition, not will, not free will. The conscious mind/person has no access or control of the means of production, what goes on in the brain. The state of the brain is the state of the person, what the brain decides is determined by an interaction of inputs and memory, not will.

It isn't will that acts, regulates or decides, but non-chosen brain state,

What is left for Compatibilism, bare bones, is a carefully crafted definition.

Harris knows a lot of things, but he simply lacks the insights required to know the truth of certain matters, like free will, and responsibility, and the pragmatic function of morality in a social community.

Which is of course something that a Compatibilist would have to say.

To act rationally doesn't take free will, it takes a functional, rational brain. If brain function breaks down, personality, character and behaviour follows.

character,
Exactly. The PFC gets to choose what we will have for dinner, because it can track its calories using an MS Access app. The neurologist you quoted, who specialized in the motor cortex, even admitted he could not address the problem of ordering dinner.

The function of the PFC is determined by neural architecture. Higher order information processing. The state of the system equates to actions taken. No free will, like some sort of Holy Spirit, is involved in what is a matter of function.

''Personality changes can originate from two sources following a brain injury. These are:

• Physiological changes in the brain, which physically affect how the brain stores and processes information, as well as makes decisions
• Emotional reactions to the life changes that occur following an injury

Some of the most common behavioural and emotional problems people with traumatic brain injury include:

• Verbal and physical outbursts
• Impulsive behaviour
• Negativity
• Intolerance
• Apathy
• Lack of empathy
• Egocentricity
• Rigidity and inflexibility
• Risky behaviour
• Lack of motivation or initiative
• Poor judgement and disinhibition

It's a reasonable consideration of brain function in relation to behavior meant to bring better treatment and outcome for offenders who may have PFC damage, chemical imbalances, etc and are literally unable to control their impulses (brain state again) and are simply locked up without hope of getting the treatment they need.

Of course. But I am not suggesting that neuroscience should not inform our courts on matters of neuroscience. I am suggesting that we should not inflict the "determinism versus free will" paradox upon our judges and courts. This paradox has no basis in neuroscience. It is wholly crafted by philosophical abstractions, figurative language, mythical beliefs, and other nonsense that makes otherwise intelligent people say some very stupid things. (Hmm. Does that mean it is literally, "stupefying"?)

Neuroscience? Yes! Paradoxes? NO!

Free will need not to come into it unless someone is beating that drum. It's a matter of how the brain functions in relation to human behaviour, a question of why someone thinks and acts as they do;

On the neurology of morals
''Patients with medial prefrontal lesions often display irresponsible behavior, despite being intellectually unimpaired. But similar lesions occurring in early childhood can also prevent the acquisition of factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior.''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

All of the events that took place in the restaurant were causally inevitable, but none of them were caused by inevitability. They were all caused by the individual choices of people.

Not so. People act and function within their immediate environment. The actions that are taken is an interaction of what the environment presents and the brain state of person in that situation.

And, exactly how is that different from what I said? The restaurant is that "environment" you mention. The people are acting and functioning within the restaurant. Note that the "acting and functioning" includes sitting at the table, browsing the menu, and "interacting" with the environment by telling the waiter what they will have for dinner.

All of the events are exactly the same.

Given determinism, one person necessarily takes this option and someone else (a different brain and state) necessarily takes their option,

And, given both determinism and free will, one person necessarily takes this option and someone else (a different brain and state) necessarily takes their option. However, in the absence of free will and the presence of coercion, the brain and state of the guy with a gun will decide what everyone orders for dinner.

It is the state of the system as a whole, the environment, the people/brains/minds, that determines outcomes for each and every action and response.

But that is where your story of events breaks down. The waiter brings each customer their bill, because each customer is responsible for their own deliberate dinner order. THE WAITER DOES NOT BRING THE BILL TO ANY SINGLE ENTITY THAT INVOLVES THE RESTAURANT AND THE CUSTOMERS AS A WHOLE. That would be an incompatibilist's fantasy.

You don't appear to be referring to determinism at all. The impression I get from what you said is a non- deterministic world that can be molded to our will. That is not how determinism works, not by your own definition. That is Libertarian Free Will.

Wow! You really have not understood a word I've said, have you?

The person who opened the restaurant caused the menu. The customers reading the menu caused their dinner orders. The waiter brought the orders to the chef, and the chef caused the dinners, which the waiter then brought back to the customers, along with their bill.

The events were all inevitable, but, so what? Each person was free to choose for themselves what they would order for dinner. Not free of inevitability, but certainly free of coercion and undue influence. And universal causal necessity/inevitability does not change any of the facts about what happened and who did what and who is responsible for paying the bill.

Antecedents, each and every actor is brought to their action by everything that went before.

Of course. That is always the case for every event. But the most meaningful and relevant antecedent causes of human events are typically the humans themselves. There are earthquakes and tornadoes and many other things that we do not cause. But there are thousands of things that we do cause, like building restaurants that offer other humans the ability to choose from a list of many possible dinners the dinner they will have tonight.

An untouchable living in the slums of Mumbai is presented with a whole different range of conditions than a Wall Street Banker out on the Town with his friends...

And, yes, we cause many social inequities as well. But here's the key point: DETERMINISM DOES NOT CAUSE ANYTHING. So, if you're unhappy about these inequities, then you'll have to take responsibility for correcting them. Determinism will not pay for your salad, and it will not fix our social problems. So, if you have the mythical view that determinism is some causal agent that goes around determining what will happen next, then you've deluded yourself and you are deluding others. So, knock it off, kid.

'Decides for oneself' is a matter of brain state and condition, not will, not free will. The conscious mind/person has no access or control of the means of production, what goes on in the brain. The state of the brain is the state of the person, what the brain decides is determined by an interaction of inputs and memory, not will.

"Will" is a brain state and condition. Why do you keep pretending that "will" is something separate from the brain?
"Decision-making" is a function of the brain that chooses what the person will have for dinner. Why do you ignore this fact of neuroscience?

"Inputs" such as the restaurant menu, and "memory" which recalls the foods we like and dislike, are part of the "decision-making" function that fixes our "intention/will" upon a specific dinner which is the antecedent cause of our telling the waiter, "I will have the chef salad, please".

This description covers both determinism and free will in the exact same empirical action. OBVIOUSLY THEY ARE COMPATIBLE.

What is left for Compatibilism, bare bones, is a carefully crafted definition.

Ironically, it is not a "carefully crafted" definition at all. It is the ordinary notion of free will, the one that everyone understands and correctly applies, that compatibilists embrace. It is a definition that everyone already uses when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions.

The incompatibilists argue for the irrational notion of "freedom from causal necessity", and half of them (the hard determinist branch) will themselves argue that it is an absurd notion. But only the compatibilists can explain why it is absurd.

As to neuroscience, compatibilism is not threatened by any facts coming from science. We assume that the normal brain is responsible for all our deliberate choices, unless coerced or unduly influenced. And one of those undue influences is any significant brain injury or mental illness that affects a person's ability to form a rational choice.

 

[fromderinside]

Of course. But I am not suggesting that neuroscience should not inform our courts on matters of neuroscience. I am suggesting that we should not inflict the "determinism versus free will" paradox upon our judges and courts. This paradox has no basis in neuroscience. It is wholly crafted by philosophical abstractions, figurative language, mythical beliefs, and other nonsense that makes otherwise intelligent people say some very stupid things. (Hmm. Does that mean it is literally, "stupefying"?)

Neuroscience? Yes! Paradoxes? NO!

I agree except in reverse to your preferences. We have determinism. 'nuf sed.

KISS!

 

[Jarhyn]

Of course. But I am not suggesting that neuroscience should not inform our courts on matters of neuroscience. I am suggesting that we should not inflict the "determinism versus free will" paradox upon our judges and courts. This paradox has no basis in neuroscience. It is wholly crafted by philosophical abstractions, figurative language, mythical beliefs, and other nonsense that makes otherwise intelligent people say some very stupid things. (Hmm. Does that mean it is literally, "stupefying"?)

Neuroscience? Yes! Paradoxes? NO!

I agree except in reverse to your preferences. We have determinism. 'nuf sed.

KISS!

Some word salad there from the FDI in response. Kind of what I expected.

Here us folks are discussing things in a systematic approach that is nearing a proper mathematical understanding of determinism and causality and some people are just waving their hands around and throwing conflation at the idea.

Starting from a fully physically "solved" superdeterministic (albeit simulated; no less superdeterministic) universe, we can observe an entity holding a list of instructions unto a requirement. The instructions must result in a fixed series of actions. They are a function designed of pure, flawless, perfect math, an object in the truest, most hard-theoretical way.

That series of instructions will execute, and things will happen. Fields will change. A "door" will have an attempt made against it to open it.

The door will not open.

A requirement of the list of instructions will fail.

We compatibilists call this situation, in a determinism "unfreeness" of the "will: list of instructions". It has not satisfied the drive which it was formed against: "to 'fight'" (again, fighting is defined in the field interaction model, the very physics of this universe).

Now, for a moment, we may look at what the dwarf has, as far as systemic processes linked to it's existence.

It does not have any thing telling it what the will is, or reviewing it, short of simple execution.

It does not even have neurons. It has a truth table, and switches that implement that truth table.

It has not satisfied the goal of the will.

And so it can do nothing but the result of what it is and the field properties that define it: it must "tantrum", again something physically defined in the laws of it's universe as a concrete thing.

And so, a will happens, "to tantrum". This will, as you would so have it, is to walk across the room and flip a statue. Again, concretely defined interactions of the basic physics of it's universe.

The transistors of the machine cogitate, a will is generated on the basis of that dwarf's personal traits. The dwarf has no direct control over those traits. NONE. ZERO!

A statue is selected by the machine that generates wills in the dwarf's process definition, again... Physically a concrete fundamental interaction.

The will is passed to the dwarf's executive loop, and the dwarf walks across the room, and the statue flips. The tantrum has been thrown. The will's requirement is satisfied.

We compatibilists call this situation of the will "freeness".

Superdeterministic universe.

No neurons.

No narrator.

Wills that are conditionally free or unfree still yet remain.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Of course. But I am not suggesting that neuroscience should not inform our courts on matters of neuroscience. I am suggesting that we should not inflict the "determinism versus free will" paradox upon our judges and courts. This paradox has no basis in neuroscience. It is wholly crafted by philosophical abstractions, figurative language, mythical beliefs, and other nonsense that makes otherwise intelligent people say some very stupid things. (Hmm. Does that mean it is literally, "stupefying"?)

Neuroscience? Yes! Paradoxes? NO!

I agree except in reverse to your preferences. We have determinism. 'nuf sed.

KISS!

We have determinism and it just happens to include everything, even free will.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Of course. But I am not suggesting that neuroscience should not inform our courts on matters of neuroscience. I am suggesting that we should not inflict the "determinism versus free will" paradox upon our judges and courts. This paradox has no basis in neuroscience. It is wholly crafted by philosophical abstractions, figurative language, mythical beliefs, and other nonsense that makes otherwise intelligent people say some very stupid things. (Hmm. Does that mean it is literally, "stupefying"?)

Neuroscience? Yes! Paradoxes? NO!

I agree except in reverse to your preferences. We have determinism. 'nuf sed.

KISS!

Some word salad there from the FDI in response. Kind of what I expected.

Here us folks are discussing things in a systematic approach that is nearing a proper mathematical understanding of determinism and causality and some people are just waving their hands around and throwing conflation at the idea.

Starting from a fully physically "solved" superdeterministic (albeit simulated; no less superdeterministic) universe, we can observe an entity holding a list of instructions unto a requirement. The instructions must result in a fixed series of actions. They are a function designed of pure, flawless, perfect math, an object in the truest, most hard-theoretical way.

That series of instructions will execute, and things will happen. Fields will change. A "door" will have an attempt made against it to open it.

The door will not open.

A requirement of the list of instructions will fail.

We compatibilists call this situation, in a determinism "unfreeness" of the "will: list of instructions". It has not satisfied the drive which it was formed against: "to 'fight'" (again, fighting is defined in the field interaction model, the very physics of this universe).

Now, for a moment, we may look at what the dwarf has, as far as systemic processes linked to it's existence.

It does not have any thing telling it what the will is, or reviewing it, short of simple execution.

It does not even have neurons. It has a truth table, and switches that implement that truth table.

It has not satisfied the goal of the will.

And so it can do nothing but the result of what it is and the field properties that define it: it must "tantrum", again something physically defined in the laws of it's universe as a concrete thing.

And so, a will happens, "to tantrum". This will, as you would so have it, is to walk across the room and flip a statue. Again, concretely defined interactions of the basic physics of it's universe.

The transistors of the machine cogitate, a will is generated on the basis of that dwarf's personal traits. The dwarf has no direct control over those traits. NONE. ZERO!

A statue is selected by the machine that generates wills in the dwarf's process definition, again... Physically a concrete fundamental interaction.

The will is passed to the dwarf's executive loop, and the dwarf walks across the room, and the statue flips. The tantrum has been thrown. The will's requirement is satisfied.

We compatibilists call this situation of the will "freeness".

Superdeterministic universe.

No neurons.

No narrator.

Wills that are conditionally free or unfree still yet remain.

The only problem here is that none of the characters have a will of their own. It is your own will that is in play throughout the game.

 

[Jarhyn]

Of course. But I am not suggesting that neuroscience should not inform our courts on matters of neuroscience. I am suggesting that we should not inflict the "determinism versus free will" paradox upon our judges and courts. This paradox has no basis in neuroscience. It is wholly crafted by philosophical abstractions, figurative language, mythical beliefs, and other nonsense that makes otherwise intelligent people say some very stupid things. (Hmm. Does that mean it is literally, "stupefying"?)

Neuroscience? Yes! Paradoxes? NO!

I agree except in reverse to your preferences. We have determinism. 'nuf sed.

KISS!

Some word salad there from the FDI in response. Kind of what I expected.

Here us folks are discussing things in a systematic approach that is nearing a proper mathematical understanding of determinism and causality and some people are just waving their hands around and throwing conflation at the idea.

Starting from a fully physically "solved" superdeterministic (albeit simulated; no less superdeterministic) universe, we can observe an entity holding a list of instructions unto a requirement. The instructions must result in a fixed series of actions. They are a function designed of pure, flawless, perfect math, an object in the truest, most hard-theoretical way.

That series of instructions will execute, and things will happen. Fields will change. A "door" will have an attempt made against it to open it.

The door will not open.

A requirement of the list of instructions will fail.

We compatibilists call this situation, in a determinism "unfreeness" of the "will: list of instructions". It has not satisfied the drive which it was formed against: "to 'fight'" (again, fighting is defined in the field interaction model, the very physics of this universe).

Now, for a moment, we may look at what the dwarf has, as far as systemic processes linked to it's existence.

It does not have any thing telling it what the will is, or reviewing it, short of simple execution.

It does not even have neurons. It has a truth table, and switches that implement that truth table.

It has not satisfied the goal of the will.

And so it can do nothing but the result of what it is and the field properties that define it: it must "tantrum", again something physically defined in the laws of it's universe as a concrete thing.

And so, a will happens, "to tantrum". This will, as you would so have it, is to walk across the room and flip a statue. Again, concretely defined interactions of the basic physics of it's universe.

The transistors of the machine cogitate, a will is generated on the basis of that dwarf's personal traits. The dwarf has no direct control over those traits. NONE. ZERO!

A statue is selected by the machine that generates wills in the dwarf's process definition, again... Physically a concrete fundamental interaction.

The will is passed to the dwarf's executive loop, and the dwarf walks across the room, and the statue flips. The tantrum has been thrown. The will's requirement is satisfied.

We compatibilists call this situation of the will "freeness".

Superdeterministic universe.

No neurons.

No narrator.

Wills that are conditionally free or unfree still yet remain.

The only problem here is that none of the characters have a will of their own. It is your own will that is in play throughout the game.

They do have wills, and they do hold those wills, so they are theirs and determined from their needs which are determined from their personalities.

The only will as I "play" through the game is "to watch the screen", perhaps, and hit pause when something fucked up happens so I can see what exactly it is and (well, in the example I do nothing, so as to not spoil the example created through superdeterminism).

They are their wills as much as their ability to have wills is my will.

Again, causal necessity, creation by a god, same difference. As has been demonstrated, they hold wills, and those wills are of them, defined by their needs.

And those wills may be "free". Or "not free".

But in the moment they are executing their wills they are most assuredly wills unique to and created from their unique existence.

Sometimes the one legged dwarf dwarf trips and his crutch goes flying, then they must "cancel job, find crutch".

I didn't do that. That's their will. They absolutely must do the thing they are going to do, but it's still their will and owing to the fact that the crutch did not fall into the pool of magma, it is an "apparently" free will. The system is only capable of assigning such on the basis of revealed quantum events.

The problem is that there is a revealed quantum event coming up. The dwarf is going to trip on the way to the magma. That's going to set off the spinning blade trap he trips into. The spinning blade trap is going to... Well I'm sorry Urist, but...

So his apparently free will was not actually free. Reality revealed that.

If I reloaded the world a day before he tripped and watched it, he would again hold a will, he would again trip, and again be in need of burial lest he become a ghost.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Of course. But I am not suggesting that neuroscience should not inform our courts on matters of neuroscience. I am suggesting that we should not inflict the "determinism versus free will" paradox upon our judges and courts. This paradox has no basis in neuroscience. It is wholly crafted by philosophical abstractions, figurative language, mythical beliefs, and other nonsense that makes otherwise intelligent people say some very stupid things. (Hmm. Does that mean it is literally, "stupefying"?)

Neuroscience? Yes! Paradoxes? NO!

I agree except in reverse to your preferences. We have determinism. 'nuf sed.

KISS!

Some word salad there from the FDI in response. Kind of what I expected.

Here us folks are discussing things in a systematic approach that is nearing a proper mathematical understanding of determinism and causality and some people are just waving their hands around and throwing conflation at the idea.

Starting from a fully physically "solved" superdeterministic (albeit simulated; no less superdeterministic) universe, we can observe an entity holding a list of instructions unto a requirement. The instructions must result in a fixed series of actions. They are a function designed of pure, flawless, perfect math, an object in the truest, most hard-theoretical way.

That series of instructions will execute, and things will happen. Fields will change. A "door" will have an attempt made against it to open it.

The door will not open.

A requirement of the list of instructions will fail.

We compatibilists call this situation, in a determinism "unfreeness" of the "will: list of instructions". It has not satisfied the drive which it was formed against: "to 'fight'" (again, fighting is defined in the field interaction model, the very physics of this universe).

Now, for a moment, we may look at what the dwarf has, as far as systemic processes linked to it's existence.

It does not have any thing telling it what the will is, or reviewing it, short of simple execution.

It does not even have neurons. It has a truth table, and switches that implement that truth table.

It has not satisfied the goal of the will.

And so it can do nothing but the result of what it is and the field properties that define it: it must "tantrum", again something physically defined in the laws of it's universe as a concrete thing.

And so, a will happens, "to tantrum". This will, as you would so have it, is to walk across the room and flip a statue. Again, concretely defined interactions of the basic physics of it's universe.

The transistors of the machine cogitate, a will is generated on the basis of that dwarf's personal traits. The dwarf has no direct control over those traits. NONE. ZERO!

A statue is selected by the machine that generates wills in the dwarf's process definition, again... Physically a concrete fundamental interaction.

The will is passed to the dwarf's executive loop, and the dwarf walks across the room, and the statue flips. The tantrum has been thrown. The will's requirement is satisfied.

We compatibilists call this situation of the will "freeness".

Superdeterministic universe.

No neurons.

No narrator.

Wills that are conditionally free or unfree still yet remain.

The only problem here is that none of the characters have a will of their own. It is your own will that is in play throughout the game.

They do have wills, and they do hold those wills, so they are theirs and determined from their needs which are determined from their personalities.

The only will as I "play" through the game is "to watch the screen", perhaps, and hit pause when something fucked up happens so I can see what exactly it is and (well, in the example I do nothing, so as to not spoil the example created through superdeterminism).

They are their wills as much as their ability to have wills is my will.

Again, causal necessity, creation by a god, same difference. As has been demonstrated, they hold wills, and those wills are of them, defined by their needs.

And those wills may be "free". Or "not free".

But in the moment they are executing their wills they are most assuredly wills unique to and created from their unique existence.

Sometimes the one legged dwarf dwarf trips and his crutch goes flying, then they must "cancel job, find crutch".

I didn't do that. That's their will. They absolutely must do the thing they are going to do, but it's still their will and owing to the fact that the crutch did not fall into the pool of magma, it is an "apparently" free will. The system is only capable of assigning such on the basis of revealed quantum events.

The problem is that there is a revealed quantum event coming up. The dwarf is going to trip on the way to the magma. That's going to set off the spinning blade trap he trips into. The spinning blade trap is going to... Well I'm sorry Urist, but...

So his apparently free will was not actually free. Reality revealed that.

If I reloaded the world a day before he tripped and watched it, he would again hold a will, he would again trip, and again be in need of burial lest he become a ghost.

In order to have a will of his own, Urist must be able to disobey your will, and do something you may not like, for example, destroying the spinning blade trap, or worse, reprogramming your computer to do his will rather than yours. That is only impossible for Urist because you did not want to create something with a will of its own. (Asmiov's Three Laws of Robotics).

 

[fromderinside]

In order to have a will of his own, Urist must be able to disobey your will, and do something you may not like, for example, destroying the spinning blade trap, or worse, reprogramming your computer to do his will rather than yours. That is only impossible for Urist because you did not want to create something with a will of its own. (Asmiov's Three Laws of Robotics).

Lest we forget the "laws" were developed in a fictional setting as sauce for those who needed certainty in the forties, fifties and early sixties, by a scientist of note and possibly the greatest SF writer ever, when I was reading them.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

In order to have a will of his own, Urist must be able to disobey your will, and do something you may not like, for example, destroying the spinning blade trap, or worse, reprogramming your computer to do his will rather than yours. That is only impossible for Urist because you did not want to create something with a will of its own. (Asmiov's Three Laws of Robotics).

Lest we forget the "laws" were developed in a fictional setting as sauce for those who needed certainty in the forties, fifties and early sixties, by a scientist of note and possibly the greatest SF writer ever, when I was reading them.

My favorite is the Foundation trilogy, especially with the Mule. Greatest climatic scene ever written:

Mule: “Yes. Too late—Too late—Now I see it.”
“Now you see it,” agreed the First Speaker, “and now you don’t.”

Asimov, Isaac. Second Foundation (p. 77). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

 

[DBT]

All of the events that took place in the restaurant were causally inevitable, but none of them were caused by inevitability. They were all caused by the individual choices of people.

Not so. People act and function within their immediate environment. The actions that are taken is an interaction of what the environment presents and the brain state of person in that situation.

And, exactly how is that different from what I said? The restaurant is that "environment" you mention. The people are acting and functioning within the restaurant. Note that the "acting and functioning" includes sitting at the table, browsing the menu, and "interacting" with the environment by telling the waiter what they will have for dinner.

All of the events are exactly the same.

It's different because you add the label of free will where it doesn't apply. As shown by evidence from neuroscience, brain function, information processing and action initiation isn't a matter of will. The option that is taken is determined by the information state of the system, life experiences/memory/ environment, not will. So why call it free will?

Given determinism, one person necessarily takes this option and someone else (a different brain and state) necessarily takes their option,

And, given both determinism and free will, one person necessarily takes this option and someone else (a different brain and state) necessarily takes their option. However, in the absence of free will and the presence of coercion, the brain and state of the guy with a gun will decide what everyone orders for dinner.

Free will doesn't come into it. The brain acquires and processes information deterministically and responds regardless of the situation.
The distinction here is acting according to one's will or against it. Will is necessitated in both circumstances, so to say; forced against one's will being the correct way to put it. We have will, plain will....the impulse to do this or that, which is determined by the underlying process.

It is the state of the system as a whole, the environment, the people/brains/minds, that determines outcomes for each and every action and response.

But that is where your story of events breaks down. The waiter brings each customer their bill, because each customer is responsible for their own deliberate dinner order. THE WAITER DOES NOT BRING THE BILL TO ANY SINGLE ENTITY THAT INVOLVES THE RESTAURANT AND THE CUSTOMERS AS A WHOLE. That would be an incompatibilist's fantasy.

That's nothing like what I said. Each customer makes their [determined] choice, and they are billed for the meal they ordered.

The option they take is determined - we are talking about determinism - by countless inputs, the restaurant menu, ambience, what their preferences are, how they feel on the day, suggestions that are made, etc, which is processed and the thought ''I'll have Steak'' coming to mind.

The work is done unconsciously with the result brought to attention at the point a decision is made, as in determined, fixed by the system, inputs, processing, output.

Definition of freedom
1: the quality or state of being free: such as
a: the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action - Merriam Webster

You don't appear to be referring to determinism at all. The impression I get from what you said is a non- deterministic world that can be molded to our will. That is not how determinism works, not by your own definition. That is Libertarian Free Will.

Wow! You really have not understood a word I've said, have you?

So we are now going down this path? I understand what you are saying, but being an incompatibilist, obviously do not agree with it.

I said what I said because of remarks like - ''Each person was free to choose for themselves what they would order for dinner'' - when in fact determinism doesn't allow freedom of choice.

Each and every decision and each and every action is necessitated by antecedents, and not willed or freely chosen.

If X, then Y. No exceptions, no alternatives.

The person who opened the restaurant caused the menu. The customers reading the menu caused their dinner orders. The waiter brought the orders to the chef, and the chef caused the dinners, which the waiter then brought back to the customers, along with their bill.

The events were all inevitable, but, so what? Each person was free to choose for themselves what they would order for dinner. Not free of inevitability, but certainly free of coercion and undue influence. And universal causal necessity/inevitability does not change any of the facts about what happened and who did what and who is responsible for paying the bill.

The person who opened the restaurant has their own history of events that brought them to the point of opening and running a restaurant. It's didn't happen out of the blue.

Antecedents, each and every actor is brought to their action by everything that went before.

Of course. That is always the case for every event. But the most meaningful and relevant antecedent causes of human events are typically the humans themselves. There are earthquakes and tornadoes and many other things that we do not cause. But there are thousands of things that we do cause, like building restaurants that offer other humans the ability to choose from a list of many possible dinners the dinner they will have tonight.

Each and every one with their own set of circumstances, genetic makeup, life experiences, mental and physical abilities, opportunities as they present.....a slum dweller in Mumbai working as cleaner is not going to decide to open a new restaurant in Manhattan.

An untouchable living in the slums of Mumbai is presented with a whole different range of conditions than a Wall Street Banker out on the Town with his friends...

And, yes, we cause many social inequities as well. But here's the key point: DETERMINISM DOES NOT CAUSE ANYTHING. So, if you're unhappy about these inequities, then you'll have to take responsibility for correcting them. Determinism will not pay for your salad, and it will not fix our social problems. So, if you have the mythical view that determinism is some causal agent that goes around determining what will happen next, then you've deluded yourself and you are deluding others. So, knock it off, kid.

Determinism is cause and effect. each and every effect a cause and each and every cause an effect forming a web of entwined, immutable, fixed events.

''Each state of the universe and its events are the necessary result of its prior state and prior events. ("Events" change the state of things.) Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation") - Marvin Edwards.

If X, then Y, no deviation, no alternatives.

What is left for Compatibilism, bare bones, is a carefully crafted definition.

Ironically, it is not a "carefully crafted" definition at all. It is the ordinary notion of free will, the one that everyone understands and correctly applies, that compatibilists embrace. It is a definition that everyone already uses when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions.

The incompatibilists argue for the irrational notion of "freedom from causal necessity", and half of them (the hard determinist branch) will themselves argue that it is an absurd notion. But only the compatibilists can explain why it is absurd.

As to neuroscience, compatibilism is not threatened by any facts coming from science. We assume that the normal brain is responsible for all our deliberate choices, unless coerced or unduly influenced. And one of those undue influences is any significant brain injury or mental illness that affects a person's ability to form a rational choice.

Here is a fairly reasonable summary by a Uni Student;

''The compatibilists use the hypothetical translation of can to defend claims against compatibilism. “I would have done otherwise, if I had wanted to do, and I could have wanted otherwise.” But when we take this statement and try to further analyze it, it turns into “I would have done otherwise, if I had wanted to do, and I would have wanted otherwise, if I had wanted to want otherwise … and I could have wanted otherwise”. The argument has the flaw of infinite regress. This leads incompatibilists to say that the version of can that the compatibilists use must be flawed, and that the compatibilist’s entire defense rests on a version of ‘can’ they made up, so it is not a strong argument anyway.’'

''Compatibilism seems to makes perfect sense when you first look at it, but when you look at the opposing arguments you can see the holes within the compatibilist theory. I believe we are subject to conditioning from our schools, friends, parents and other groups, and our actions reflect the way they have taught us.

However, they have been taught by their own parents and schools and so on. Our conditioning is a reflection of their conditioning, and this can lead back many generations. Of course we cannot change the laws of nature, so that stands valid for me. We have no choice over the family or social situation we were born into. My wants and desires are formed because of my own social training. Even though I may want to go out with my friends – a desire formed because of my belief that it would be fun and being social is important, along with my past experiences of other good nights – I know that if I do, I will not be able to get up for my important lecture the next morning.

I want and desire two different things, and it would seem I have a choice. I have been taught by my parents that education is very important, I know I can see my friends at other times, and that I would rather not fail the year, so I ‘decide’ to go home. I see these as first-order and second-order desires, relating to long and short term hopes.

It is our conditioning that governs our actions, and choice is just an illusion, a testing of our conditioning. As for discipline and reward, people have to be reprimanded for doing things that are deemed socially unacceptable. While they may not be ultimately responsible, they have to be made an example of, in order to influence a person who may have previously had criminal tendencies. With reward, it may influence others who see the praise being received into wanting to act more like that person.

While compatibilism may be semi-convincing, it is hard to stand for the position without recognizing its flaws. As philosophers, logical flaws are a major irritation, and cannot be ignored easily.''

 

[Jarhyn]

Of course. But I am not suggesting that neuroscience should not inform our courts on matters of neuroscience. I am suggesting that we should not inflict the "determinism versus free will" paradox upon our judges and courts. This paradox has no basis in neuroscience. It is wholly crafted by philosophical abstractions, figurative language, mythical beliefs, and other nonsense that makes otherwise intelligent people say some very stupid things. (Hmm. Does that mean it is literally, "stupefying"?)

Neuroscience? Yes! Paradoxes? NO!

I agree except in reverse to your preferences. We have determinism. 'nuf sed.

KISS!

Some word salad there from the FDI in response. Kind of what I expected.

Here us folks are discussing things in a systematic approach that is nearing a proper mathematical understanding of determinism and causality and some people are just waving their hands around and throwing conflation at the idea.

Starting from a fully physically "solved" superdeterministic (albeit simulated; no less superdeterministic) universe, we can observe an entity holding a list of instructions unto a requirement. The instructions must result in a fixed series of actions. They are a function designed of pure, flawless, perfect math, an object in the truest, most hard-theoretical way.

That series of instructions will execute, and things will happen. Fields will change. A "door" will have an attempt made against it to open it.

The door will not open.

A requirement of the list of instructions will fail.

We compatibilists call this situation, in a determinism "unfreeness" of the "will: list of instructions". It has not satisfied the drive which it was formed against: "to 'fight'" (again, fighting is defined in the field interaction model, the very physics of this universe).

Now, for a moment, we may look at what the dwarf has, as far as systemic processes linked to it's existence.

It does not have any thing telling it what the will is, or reviewing it, short of simple execution.

It does not even have neurons. It has a truth table, and switches that implement that truth table.

It has not satisfied the goal of the will.

And so it can do nothing but the result of what it is and the field properties that define it: it must "tantrum", again something physically defined in the laws of it's universe as a concrete thing.

And so, a will happens, "to tantrum". This will, as you would so have it, is to walk across the room and flip a statue. Again, concretely defined interactions of the basic physics of it's universe.

The transistors of the machine cogitate, a will is generated on the basis of that dwarf's personal traits. The dwarf has no direct control over those traits. NONE. ZERO!

A statue is selected by the machine that generates wills in the dwarf's process definition, again... Physically a concrete fundamental interaction.

The will is passed to the dwarf's executive loop, and the dwarf walks across the room, and the statue flips. The tantrum has been thrown. The will's requirement is satisfied.

We compatibilists call this situation of the will "freeness".

Superdeterministic universe.

No neurons.

No narrator.

Wills that are conditionally free or unfree still yet remain.

The only problem here is that none of the characters have a will of their own. It is your own will that is in play throughout the game.

They do have wills, and they do hold those wills, so they are theirs and determined from their needs which are determined from their personalities.

The only will as I "play" through the game is "to watch the screen", perhaps, and hit pause when something fucked up happens so I can see what exactly it is and (well, in the example I do nothing, so as to not spoil the example created through superdeterminism).

They are their wills as much as their ability to have wills is my will.

Again, causal necessity, creation by a god, same difference. As has been demonstrated, they hold wills, and those wills are of them, defined by their needs.

And those wills may be "free". Or "not free".

But in the moment they are executing their wills they are most assuredly wills unique to and created from their unique existence.

Sometimes the one legged dwarf dwarf trips and his crutch goes flying, then they must "cancel job, find crutch".

I didn't do that. That's their will. They absolutely must do the thing they are going to do, but it's still their will and owing to the fact that the crutch did not fall into the pool of magma, it is an "apparently" free will. The system is only capable of assigning such on the basis of revealed quantum events.

The problem is that there is a revealed quantum event coming up. The dwarf is going to trip on the way to the magma. That's going to set off the spinning blade trap he trips into. The spinning blade trap is going to... Well I'm sorry Urist, but...

So his apparently free will was not actually free. Reality revealed that.

If I reloaded the world a day before he tripped and watched it, he would again hold a will, he would again trip, and again be in need of burial lest he become a ghost.

In order to have a will of his own, Urist must be able to disobey your will, and do something you may not like, for example, destroying the spinning blade trap, or worse, reprogramming your computer to do his will rather than yours. That is only impossible for Urist because you did not want to create something with a will of its own. (Asmiov's Three Laws of Robotics).

No, he need not.

Look at my definitions carefully. Also pay attention to what my will is in this carefully: my will is the very definition of his "causal necessity".

I have no will beyond "this is how causality is necessitated in universe D".

He has a will that derived from that causal necessity, and while he lacks the ability to break the trap, he does have the ability to not trip, even without his crutch.

As you have said, you don't need to be free of causal necessity to be free of constraints within context of events in your causality.

It's unlikely in any given situation that he will reach his crutch, but ultimately his will is either free (he reaches the crutch) or not (he reaches spinning death).

He doesn't have the capacity to see how dangerous it is to make the attempt. He lacks the overall mechanism that would say "that's really dumb". His will generating process, unfortunately, lacks the means to say "examine each step; if step is unsafe, will is not free, select different crutch."

He does have a will of his own, just like you do, though. He's just a fair bit dumber than 2 year old.

The fact is, the thing he did that I did not like was the last time he tripped after a spider bite, and tumbled into the spinning blade trap and started needing a crutch. He causally necessitated a need for more crutches to be made, which causally necessitated a woodcutter to also get in a horrible accident which necessitated a need for more crutches so a need for more wood...

In this thought experiment a lot of dwarves died over that severed leg. Not Urist though. I honestly would have rather the trap got him the first time but it didn't.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It's different because you add the label of free will where it doesn't apply. As shown by evidence from neuroscience, brain function, information processing and action initiation isn't a matter of will. The option that is taken is determined by the information state of the system, life experiences/memory/ environment, not will. So why call it free will?

Why call it "free will"? Because that's what people have always called the event in which a person is free to decide for themselves what they will do! The will is being freely chosen by the person themselves.

Why call a cat a "cat", or call a dog a "dog"? Because not all animals are the same kind of animal!

In the same fashion that we want to distinguish a cat from a dog, we also want to distinguish between a person acting deliberately from a person coerced to act against their will and a person who is incapable of thinking rationally.

The whole point of having names is to easily distinguish one thing from another.

So, we have the name "free will" for a deliberate choice we make for ourselves, and we have "coercion" for a choice imposed upon us by the guy with a gun, and we have "mental illness" for a choice made by an unsound mind.

These things need to be dealt with differently, so we call them by different names to keep straight which is which.

Oh, and of course, all events are always equally deterministic, so pointing out that this or that mental event is "deterministic" doesn't tell us anything that we don't already know. It is useless information.

But it is useful to know whether the person's actions were freely chosen, or coerced, or unduly influenced.

So, you've got to make your case as to why we should not distinguish between a freely chosen action, versus a coerced action, versus an action caused by mental illness. Your notion that they are all deterministic, so they should all be called "determinism" and nothing else, is as silly as saying that all animals should just be called "animals" without separate words for "dogs" and "cats".

You are destroying a significant and useful distinction. And that just makes us all dumber.

The brain acquires and processes information deterministically and responds regardless of the situation.

Yes. Cats and dogs and fishes are all "animals". But we still need to tell the Pet Store owner what kind of animal we're looking for.

The distinction here is acting according to one's will or against it.

Exactly, and that is an important distinction when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions.

Will is necessitated in both circumstances, so to say; forced against one's will being the correct way to put it. We have will, plain will....the impulse to do this or that, which is determined by the underlying process.

Everything is always causally necessitated in all circumstances. Just like all animals are always animals. But it is still necessary to distinguish dogs from cats and fishes. And it is still necessary to distinguish between voluntary, coerced, and unduly influenced actions.

Each customer makes their [determined] choice, and they are billed for the meal they ordered.

Correct. It was causally inevitable that each customer would deterministically determine their choice, and that they would each be held responsible for their paying their bill.

The option they take is determined - we are talking about determinism - by countless inputs, the restaurant menu, ambience, what their preferences are, how they feel on the day, suggestions that are made, etc, which is processed and the thought ''I'll have Steak'' coming to mind.

Yes. But we still have the practical problem: who is responsible for paying the bill? We cannot bill "ambiance" for the dinner. So, rather than the "countless inputs" being asked to divvy up the check according to their respective shares in the person's calculation as to what the person would order, the bill is presented to the single individual whose brain actually decided to place the order.

Oh, and we can't bill determinism, because determinism is not an entity that is responsible for anything. It's just an idea, a concept. It's never even an influence on anyone's decisions to do anything.

But we do have an actual person, there, sitting at the table. And all of the countless inputs are now integral parts of how that person is operating. And that person's own functioning will resolve all of those influences into a single dinner order.

The work is done unconsciously with the result brought to attention at the point a decision is made, as in determined, fixed by the system, inputs, processing, output.

And what difference does that make? None!

All of the relevant inputs are still being processed by the person as they choose what they will have for dinner. The person is free to make that choice for themselves. So, the "I will have the Chef Salad, please" is still the product of the person. And that is why the person is responsible for the bill.

Definition of freedom
1: the quality or state of being free: such as
a: the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action - Merriam Webster

Wow. You're still using that definition of "freedom", rather than the Merriam-Webster definition of "free will", in order to sneak in the notion of necessity. You already know, because I've pointed it out to you many times now, that "causal necessity" is not the "necessity" being used there. The necessity above is an external necessity, such as a legal necessity to drive within the posted speed limit. That necessity can be present or absent, that is, it is something that you can actually be free of, as when you drive on the Autobahn in Germany.

But causal necessity is universal. It is not a necessity that is ever absent. So it is not something that anyone can be free of. In fact, it is not anything that anyone would ever need to be free of, because it is not a meaningful constraint. What we will inevitably do is exactly identical to us just being us, doing what we choose to do. It is "what we would have done anyway" and that is not a meaningful constraint.

I said what I said because of remarks like - ''Each person was free to choose for themselves what they would order for dinner'' - when in fact determinism doesn't allow freedom of choice.

But, determinism does allow a choice free of coercion and undue influence, so determinism does allow freedom of choice. It just doesn't allow freedom from reliable cause and effect.

The incompatibilist claim that our choices must be free from cause and effect in order to be free is clearly not the case. Our choices can be free from coercion and undue influence, even though they cannot be free from cause and effect.

And, unless you actually believe that our choices can, under some circumstances, be free from cause and effect, your insistence that this is the only thing "free" choice can mean is not only false and but also insincere (or, sincerely deluded).

The person who opened the restaurant has their own history of events that brought them to the point of opening and running a restaurant. It's didn't happen out of the blue.

Yes. But if restaurant customers contract salmonella from poorly cooked food, they will not be suing his history of prior causes. They will sue the person who chose to ignore the food safety regulations.

Determinism is cause and effect. each and every effect a cause and each and every cause an effect forming a web of entwined, immutable, fixed events.

Yes. But determinism never causes any effects. It never determines anything. And cause and effect never causes anything. Only the actual objects and forces that make up the physical universe can be said to cause events. Cause and effect are the notions we use to describe the interactions between these objects and forces as they cause events. Determinism is the belief that the objects and forces behave in a reliable fashion, in fact, so reliable that it would be theoretically possible to predict any future event given sufficient knowledge of what all of these objects and forces happen to be doing right now.

But determinism itself never determines anything. And causation itself never causes anything.

Only the actual objects and the actual forces between them can actually cause actual events. And, we happen to be one of those actual objects, that go about in the world causing stuff to happen, and doing so for our own goals and reasons, and according to our own interests.

''Each state of the universe and its events are the necessary result of its prior state and prior events. ("Events" change the state of things.) Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation") - Marvin Edwards.

I do love it when you quote me! Please, feel free to quote anything you like. For example, quote this:

Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less. This event is the necessary result of our prior state and our prior events. We are natural objects, whose behavior can potentially be explained entirely by natural scientific laws, and our behavior will proceed reliably, without deviation, according to reliable physical, biological, and rational causal mechanisms.

The compatibilist definition of free will is not a "carefully crafted definition" at all. It is the ordinary notion of free will, the one that everyone understands and correctly applies, when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions.

The incompatibilists argue for the irrational notion of "freedom from causal necessity", and half of them (the hard determinist branch) will themselves argue that it is an absurd notion. But only the compatibilists can explain why it is absurd.

As to neuroscience, compatibilism is not threatened by any facts coming from science. We assume that the normal brain is responsible for all our deliberate choices, unless coerced or unduly influenced. And one of those undue influences is any significant brain injury or mental illness that affects a person's ability to form a rational choice.

Here is a fairly reasonable summary by a Uni Student;

And here is a fairly reasonable summary by me:

In a Nutshell

“Free will” is when we decide for ourselves what we will do, free of coercion or other undue influence.

“Determinism” asserts that the behavior of objects and forces in our universe provides perfectly reliable cause and effect, and thus, at least in theory, is perfectly predictable.

Because reliable cause and effect is neither coercive nor undue, it poses no threat to free will. A meaningful constraint would be a man holding a gun to our head, forcing us to do his will. But reliable causation is not such a force. It is simply how we operate as we go about being us, doing what we do, and choosing what we choose.

Because our decisions are reliably caused by our own purpose, our own reasons, and our own interests, our deliberate choosing poses no threat to determinism. Choosing is a deterministic process. And this process is authentically performed by us, according to our own purpose, reasons, and interests.

As it turns out, every choice we make for ourselves is both freely chosen and reliably caused. Thus, the concepts of free will and determinism are naturally compatible.

The illusion of conflict is created by a logic error called the “reification fallacy“. This happens when we mistakenly treat the concept of “reliable cause and effect” as if it were an external force controlling our choices, as if it were not actually us, simply being us and doing what we do.

But concepts are not “things” that cause. Only the actual objects themselves, and the forces they naturally exert upon other objects, can cause events to happen.

When empirically observed, we find that we exist in reality as physical objects, living organisms, and an intelligent species. As living organisms, we act purposefully to survive, thrive, and reproduce. As an intelligent species, we act deliberately by imagination, evaluation, and choosing. And, when we act upon our choices, we are forces of nature.

Reliable cause and effect is not an external force. It is us, and the rest of the physical universe, just doing what we do. Those who try to turn it into a boogeyman robbing us of our choices are empirically mistaken.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Of course. But I am not suggesting that neuroscience should not inform our courts on matters of neuroscience. I am suggesting that we should not inflict the "determinism versus free will" paradox upon our judges and courts. This paradox has no basis in neuroscience. It is wholly crafted by philosophical abstractions, figurative language, mythical beliefs, and other nonsense that makes otherwise intelligent people say some very stupid things. (Hmm. Does that mean it is literally, "stupefying"?)

Neuroscience? Yes! Paradoxes? NO!

I agree except in reverse to your preferences. We have determinism. 'nuf sed.

KISS!

Some word salad there from the FDI in response. Kind of what I expected.

Here us folks are discussing things in a systematic approach that is nearing a proper mathematical understanding of determinism and causality and some people are just waving their hands around and throwing conflation at the idea.

Starting from a fully physically "solved" superdeterministic (albeit simulated; no less superdeterministic) universe, we can observe an entity holding a list of instructions unto a requirement. The instructions must result in a fixed series of actions. They are a function designed of pure, flawless, perfect math, an object in the truest, most hard-theoretical way.

That series of instructions will execute, and things will happen. Fields will change. A "door" will have an attempt made against it to open it.

The door will not open.

A requirement of the list of instructions will fail.

We compatibilists call this situation, in a determinism "unfreeness" of the "will: list of instructions". It has not satisfied the drive which it was formed against: "to 'fight'" (again, fighting is defined in the field interaction model, the very physics of this universe).

Now, for a moment, we may look at what the dwarf has, as far as systemic processes linked to it's existence.

It does not have any thing telling it what the will is, or reviewing it, short of simple execution.

It does not even have neurons. It has a truth table, and switches that implement that truth table.

It has not satisfied the goal of the will.

And so it can do nothing but the result of what it is and the field properties that define it: it must "tantrum", again something physically defined in the laws of it's universe as a concrete thing.

And so, a will happens, "to tantrum". This will, as you would so have it, is to walk across the room and flip a statue. Again, concretely defined interactions of the basic physics of it's universe.

The transistors of the machine cogitate, a will is generated on the basis of that dwarf's personal traits. The dwarf has no direct control over those traits. NONE. ZERO!

A statue is selected by the machine that generates wills in the dwarf's process definition, again... Physically a concrete fundamental interaction.

The will is passed to the dwarf's executive loop, and the dwarf walks across the room, and the statue flips. The tantrum has been thrown. The will's requirement is satisfied.

We compatibilists call this situation of the will "freeness".

Superdeterministic universe.

No neurons.

No narrator.

Wills that are conditionally free or unfree still yet remain.

The only problem here is that none of the characters have a will of their own. It is your own will that is in play throughout the game.

They do have wills, and they do hold those wills, so they are theirs and determined from their needs which are determined from their personalities.

The only will as I "play" through the game is "to watch the screen", perhaps, and hit pause when something fucked up happens so I can see what exactly it is and (well, in the example I do nothing, so as to not spoil the example created through superdeterminism).

They are their wills as much as their ability to have wills is my will.

Again, causal necessity, creation by a god, same difference. As has been demonstrated, they hold wills, and those wills are of them, defined by their needs.

And those wills may be "free". Or "not free".

But in the moment they are executing their wills they are most assuredly wills unique to and created from their unique existence.

Sometimes the one legged dwarf dwarf trips and his crutch goes flying, then they must "cancel job, find crutch".

I didn't do that. That's their will. They absolutely must do the thing they are going to do, but it's still their will and owing to the fact that the crutch did not fall into the pool of magma, it is an "apparently" free will. The system is only capable of assigning such on the basis of revealed quantum events.

The problem is that there is a revealed quantum event coming up. The dwarf is going to trip on the way to the magma. That's going to set off the spinning blade trap he trips into. The spinning blade trap is going to... Well I'm sorry Urist, but...

So his apparently free will was not actually free. Reality revealed that.

If I reloaded the world a day before he tripped and watched it, he would again hold a will, he would again trip, and again be in need of burial lest he become a ghost.

In order to have a will of his own, Urist must be able to disobey your will, and do something you may not like, for example, destroying the spinning blade trap, or worse, reprogramming your computer to do his will rather than yours. That is only impossible for Urist because you did not want to create something with a will of its own. (Asmiov's Three Laws of Robotics).

No, he need not.

Look at my definitions carefully. Also pay attention to what my will is in this carefully: my will is the very definition of his "causal necessity".

I have no will beyond "this is how causality is necessitated in universe D".

He has a will that derived from that causal necessity, and while he lacks the ability to break the trap, he does have the ability to not trip, even without his crutch.

As you have said, you don't need to be free of causal necessity to be free of constraints within context of events in your causality.

It's unlikely in any given situation that he will reach his crutch, but ultimately his will is either free (he reaches the crutch) or not (he reaches spinning death).

He doesn't have the capacity to see how dangerous it is to make the attempt. He lacks the overall mechanism that would say "that's really dumb". His will generating process, unfortunately, lacks the means to say "examine each step; if step is unsafe, will is not free, select different crutch."

He does have a will of his own, just like you do, though. He's just a fair bit dumber than 2 year old.

The fact is, the thing he did that I did not like was the last time he tripped after a spider bite, and tumbled into the spinning blade trap and started needing a crutch. He causally necessitated a need for more crutches to be made, which causally necessitated a woodcutter to also get in a horrible accident which necessitated a need for more crutches so a need for more wood...

In this thought experiment a lot of dwarves died over that severed leg. Not Urist though. I honestly would have rather the trap got him the first time but it didn't.

While Urist operates according to your will, neither Nature nor Evolution, our "creators", have any will of their own. Unlike Urist, we were not created by design. Our design independently evolved, simply by surviving and reproducing. And there are tons of life forms that were able to successfully do this, and probably millions of more tons of life forms that didn't work out.

For example, imagine a variation in our species that lacked hunger. It would simply starve to death, without pain, and go extinct.