Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Jarhyn]

@FDI, I am referencing an object and have been, as computers are objects.

It's cute that you want to stamp your feet and play stupid games where you claim computers are not objects, but the fact is, each individual computer, rock, every person in this world is an object, in addition to whatever images those objects may project or contain.

Every material thing in this world is an object.

The planet itself is a very large, complicated object.

So is the solar system.

So is the cat on my lap.

So is the computer in my office.

The latter of these things is an object which is observably in the business of containing a dwarf, also an object (formed of charge patterns among the larger object of which it is a part), with observable properties, one of those properties being some thing that is exactly the machinery that is set up to "open" a "door", and which is set up to check whether the door is open.

It will either succeed or fail at that. It will always find itself there.

And deterministically, he will fail.

And deterministically I can say, without any contradictions or nonsense, "his will to open the door was constrained (not free)"

Marvin, on reading this statement, would be able to understand "he had a series of instructions unto a requirement"; "One of the instructions is to open a door"; "when he executed on this instruction, the door did not open".

It encodes at least these three objective facts about the objects in the system.

All that's missing on computers from you is a single reference which doesn't relate computers to you or your senses. When you manage to disassociate yourself from computers in your specifications of them as objects you might get my attention. Relating computers to yourself and calling the result objective or object is just plain silly. If you are included in the specification then the result is subjective or subject.

Please read the bolded stuff in the scientific method bit I posted before you embarrass yourself any further.

Until then. Yawn.

So, you ARE going to just pretend that pile of silicon, electrons, metal, and other things in my office is not an object.

I suppose you are going to pretend your desk is not an object?

That the phone or computer you are looking at right now is not an object?

Oh, I know, you're going to say YOU are not an object! Would that make you a ghost? Oooh spooky. Would that mean you could walk through walls on account of not being an object?

I guess since it's not an object it must be clipping through the crust of the Earth, all the way... Oh, wait, not even that because if it were affected by gravity it would be an object then.

Gimmie a break FDI.

It's a fucking object no matter what whinges you direct at the idea.

 

[Jarhyn]

First neurons always activate when they are stimulated that's part of their design

Lol. No. Neurons only act if they are stimulated beyond an activation threshold.

And they have no design.

Rather, they have a mechanical function, at least when they are functional as neurons.

And then they have a fun refractory period in which they don't, which is also part of how groups of them (not individual of them, generally) process: one reaction can be (not) another. And in analog ways.

I've been working for some number of years on getting together a model for a neural description language, for the sake of preprogramming neural groups so they can learn from a basic behavioral configuration set down with a compiled initial configuration.

But really, the neuron is an object, and I wouldn't need to know how to munge together an object that has the same fundamental behavior as a network of neurons, but done by groups of electron groups being cogitated by an x86, to know that when I learn something the object that is some large number of neurons in my head is undergoing some change.

Because it is an object, made of material, composed of atoms and electrons, and the odd photon here and there, among other assorted particles, and changes in objects are the only thing that can cause changes in phenomena observed by anyone, from any source, including phenomena such as hallucinations!

You see a blinking light? Yes, that experience means an object in your head is doing something in some particular way.

When I observe the objects that mechanistically produce the Dwarf's behavior, I see a list of instructions, a requirement, and some thing that operates on these in a general way.

When I observe all the objects near the dwarf that will interact with him or that he will interact with over the next 5 units of that Dwarf's time, I can see that he shall "walk" up to the "door", attempt to open it, and then fail.

And when this happens, the language that describes this situation is "the Dwarf's will to 'open' the 'door' was not free; the 'door' was 'locked'."

Of course, this is objective because everything discussed here is an object. Each of these things is the same object it is, no matter who looks at it.

 

[fromderinside]

First neurons always activate when they are stimulated that's part of their design

1. Lol. No. Neurons only act if they are stimulated beyond an activation threshold.

2. I've been working for some number of years on getting together a model for a neural description language, for the sake of preprogramming neural groups so they can learn from a basic behavioral configuration set down with a compiled initial configuration.

3. Of course, this is objective because everything discussed here is an object. Each of these things is the same object it is, no matter who looks at it.

Your presumptions 1 and 2 are so far from the way neurons work. If the only way neurons interacted with outside information were through action potentials elicited by appropriate transmitter substances that would be a very narrow, inaccurate, picture of neural function.

Which, of course, makes all your effort modelling moot including whether what you describe is objective. It's not. Its obviously subjective because the basis you describe is fiction, not real, not how or what neurons do. Oh sure there are action potentials.

But those action potentials are not fixed switches nor even important beyond moving information along. So having no support you statement 3 is moot.

Below are a few gems about neuronal processing illustrating just how limited your interpretations be. I follow up with a few general principles about metabolism and blood flow which further diminish your assertions.

Neural Cross-Frequency Coupling: Connecting Architectures, Mechanisms, and Functions https://publications.hse.ru/pubs/share/folder/2kkxq822xv/187031446.pdf

Abstract: Neural oscillations are ubiquitously observed in the mammalian brain, but it has proven difficult to tie oscillatory patterns to specific cognitive operations. Notably, the coupling between neural oscillations at different timescales has recently received much attention, both from experimentalists and theoreticians. We review the mechanisms underlying various forms of this cross-frequency coupling. We show that different types of neural oscillators and cross-frequency interactions yield distinct signatures in neural dynamics. Finally, we associate these mechanisms with several putative functions of cross-frequency coupling, including neural representations of multiple environmental items, communication over distant areas, internal clocking of neural processes, and modulation of neural processing based on temporal predictions

Powerhouse of the mind: mitochondrial plasticity at the synapse​

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0959438818302423

Neurons are highly polarized cells with extraordinary energy demands, which are mainly fulfilled by mitochondria. In response to altered neuronal energy state, mitochondria adapt to enable energy homeostasis and nervous system function. This adaptation, also called mitochondrial plasticity, can be observed as alterations in the form, function and position. The primary site of energy consumption in neurons is localized at the synapse, where mitochondria are critical for both pre- and postsynaptic functions. In this review, we will discuss molecular mechanisms regulating mitochondrial plasticity at the synapse and how they contribute to information processing within neurons.


Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews Astroglia-specific contributions to the regulation of synapses, cognition and behaviour https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/files/174883573/NEUBIOREV_D_20_00065_R1_1.pdf

Astrocytes are heterogeneous population of neural cells with diverse structural, functional and molecular characteristics responsible for homeostasis and protection of the central nervous system (CNS). Unlike neurones, astrocytes do not generate action potentials, but employ fluctuations of cytosolic ions as a substrate for their excitability. Ionic signals are associated with neuronal activity and these signals initiate an array of responses ranging from the activation of plasmalemmal homeostatic transporters to the secretion of numerous signalling molecules including neuromodulators, neurotransmitter precursors, metabolic substrates, trophic factors and cytokines. Thus, astrocytes regulate the synaptic connectivity of the neuronal networks by supporting neurotransmitter metabolism, synaptogenesis, synaptic elimination and synaptic plasticity contributing to cognitive processing including learning, memory, emotions and behaviour. Astroglia-specific regulatory pathways affect the most fundamental properties of neuronal networks from their excitability to synaptic connectivity. Thus, it is the concerted action of glia and neurones, which, by employing distinct mechanisms, produce behavioural outputs of the ultimate control centre that we call the brain

Beyond these there are at least three metabolic patterns in the several types of neurons and there are nutritional and general blood related information passing mechanisms as well.

It's not just simple synapse transmitter substance, cell type, structure source, target and source phenomena. Brains are not like computers nor should we expect them to be pure information switching devices. Yeah, it worked form me at science fair in HS in '57 but hasn't much since.

 

[Jarhyn]

Your presumptions 1 and 2 are so far from the way neurons work.

No, they aren't. Your inability to grasp that neurons are machines that can be assembled to evoke specific behavior is your failure.

Assembling algorithms with purpose is entirely attainable in neural structures it just has not been done yet, in the same way as assembling an algorithm in hardware with an FPGA is a thing.

Your incredulity with the idea that neural structures can be designed does no insult to the design, though.

Its obviously subjective because the basis you describe is fiction, not real, not how or what neurons do. Oh sure there are action potentials

You don't know what it is that I'm describing because the fact is, I don't really expect you to know any of the things you claim to.

Your argument from incredulity does nothing to the reality of what is clearly attainable though.

I don't think you have ever really looked into how neurons create switching behavior, how an algorithm emerges from that mess, and that's all the more pity for you.

You look into the features of a neuron, but sadly you don't look into the organizational model and what impact these alterations have on the timings, activation weights, Connection weights, and thus the graph behavior of the system.

Always the research scientist asking "what is it" rather than "how does behavior arise from this configuration of matter?"

You don't seem to understand how neurons produce behavior, and while that's fine it does not much make sense to claim that they can't do things given the fact that a neural network can implement any behavior of a classic Turing machine.

But moreover, the neuron is an object, made of some lipids, some protein, some ion channels, some enzymes and some bits that react to and emit neurotransmitters.

When someone has thoughts that object changes.

In the same way, the computer is an object. It's just when anyone brings that up you moan and squeal like a stuck pig.

Again, anyone could discover the computer, and completely independently look at it for long enough to discover that it contains a set of very bizarre objects, that have very particular object relationships, one of which is a "will" (although our viewer may use a different word), one of the elements of that will is a "requirement" and in the case of Urist at the door, so to discover that such requirements may be left unmet, and that these are the same things that can be observed by anyone.

Or, I suppose, anyone capable of reverse engineering and mapping a system that lacks it's original symbol definitions and debug information.

Compatibilists would call the latter condition, the one in which Urist fails at the door "unfreeness" as pertains to the will

Still, the structure is there and real, and really composed of objects, even if some of them, like our aforementioned Dwarven Frog is an object that is also an image of a frog.

 

[DBT]

We don't choose our brain, its abilities or its features. Some people suck at chess.

But we do choose  aspects of our brain,  some of it's abilities, some of it's features. Sometimes we study chess and get better at chess.

As conscious entities, we are aspects of our brain. We are whatever a brain is doing. Studying chess, or anything, involves the brain acquiring information. Information that enables the brain to, in the case of chess, understand the rules of the game and the strategies of it.

Some become masters of the game, others find that they don't have the aptitude for serious competition.

No one chooses their aptitude or lack of it. Regardless of aptitude, the brain has the ability to acquire information and respond accordingly. That being its evolutionary role. Nothing to do with free will. Sorry.

We get good at what we practice, and there are many things that folks practice. Of those things (and also of the things of our imaginations), many of us selected a subset, a choice function operated by our brain, of our brain, so our brain choosing, so us choosing which of those many would be the specific ones which we practiced.

Still nothing to do with free will. what we do is a matter of a deterministic interaction of information. Memory function being the key to recognition and response.

And as we are talking about compatibilism, how the idea of free will relates to determinism. Free will being incompatible with determinism because actions/decisions are necessitated by an interaction of information, inputs and memory function, which is the brains software.

If memory function breaks down, it's over. No recognition, no coherent thoughts or actions.

Decision making does not equate to free will. Each state in each incremental moment in time is fixed by the last, which fixes the next. That is determinism.

And there are many things besides practice which operate thus, as a function of the brain's choices, and so our choices, which determine pieces of how we think, our abilities, and objective features of our brain.

But nothing freely willed or freely chosen. Necessitation is not free choice. Necessitation fixes outcome. Fixed outcomes are not freely chosen or willed.

Freely willed requires fully realizable alternatives.

Determinism allows no realizable alternatives; all events proceed as determined, with no deviation, meaning that the notion of free will is incompatible with determinism.

Sometimes the feature is "this neuron right here activates .05 second longer than it used to". It doesn't have to be more than that to be a real feature decided upon by us. Even so, we know it more by the impact it has on the phenomena that is "how we think" directly, rather than through the observation of a modification of timing biases. And that's OK, because one implies the other; our experience couldn't change if our neurons didn't change in some way!

Nothing is freely decided. Each and every state is fixed by prior state which in turn fixes the next, which fixes the next, which fixes the next and the next.....that is determinism.

Do you see any room for free will here?

''We are doing it, therefore free will'' doesn't work.

The system is doing it, the world, life, evolution, the environment, the brain functioning as evolved in relation to its environment as a rational deterministic system.

''At this point certain questions need to be asked: Why does the coercion of a person by another, or the conditions of a brain microchip, or the conditions of a tumor, – nullify the “free will” ability? What part of the “ability” is being obstructed? This almost always comes down to a certain point of “control” that is being minimized, and where that minimized control is coming from (the arbitrary part).

The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

 

[Jarhyn]

It really is kind of sad that people can delude themselves to the point where simple, uncontroversial statements such as "computers are objects" may somehow be rejected.

What kinds of mental twits and contortions must go on so that someone can look at a concrete thing of metal and glass and silicon and fiberglass and think that such things, made of material, are any less an object merely for some trivial aspect of it's history?

Indeed, it is the same computer, the same object if viewed by my brother or my sister. It is the same computer as viewed by an ancient Roman or even an ancient Neanderthal.

The Dwarven frog will be comprised of the same bits no matter who discovers this objective entity lurking among the circuits, will be the same Dwarven frog seen no matter who is doing the "seeing".

You could indeed strip away the interface take off the monitor, make it entirely "headless" as a process... And it would still contain the Dwarven Frog, though fewer unnecessary images of him.

Aristotle or Euler or Riemann would be able to look at the frog and indeed say "that there is a Dwarven Frog, this particular one has an 'injury' to the 'meat' of it's 'right leg' and so 'cannot walk'". Again the terms here are of no consequence. They may invent an entirely new set of tokens to name these things, but they will still fundamentally be the same things because it is the same computer, because the computer is an object.

 

[The AntiChris]

Why does the coercion of a person by another, or the conditions of a brain microchip, or the conditions of a tumor, – nullify the “free will” ability? What part of the “ability” is being obstructed? This almost always comes down to a certain point of “control” that is being minimized, and where that minimized control is coming from (the arbitrary part).

The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

The distinction made by compatibilists (and by all of us when making moral evaluations) is between influences which are morally relevant and those that are not morally relevant. We all take into consideration the factors which influence a moral agent when determining the degree to which someone will or will not be be held morally culpable/blameworthy for their actions.

 

[Jarhyn]

Why does the coercion of a person by another, or the conditions of a brain microchip, or the conditions of a tumor, – nullify the “free will” ability? What part of the “ability” is being obstructed? This almost always comes down to a certain point of “control” that is being minimized, and where that minimized control is coming from (the arbitrary part).

The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

The distinction made by compatibilists (and by all of us when making moral evaluations) is between influences which are morally relevant and those that are not morally relevant. We all take into consideration the factors which influence a moral agent when determining the degree to which someone will or will not be be held morally culpable/blameworthy for their actions.

I would say more, we take into consideration factors which allow us to more adequately prevent "harm" by whatever measure.

It does not matter whether he killed 27 people because he was poisoned by his neighbor with lead so to become a psychopath, or whether he killed 27 people because he was born that way of his mother, or whether he saw a violent scene on TV at just the right time at just the right age in just the right inflection that he was born of this by mere happenstance.

What matters is that it is today, and he killed 27 people. That is enough to segregate him from the means and opportunities to do such a thing.

We would do the same in constraining a runaway .50cal or in constraining a rabid dog.

The rest is more determining how to follow up on the situation, being able to ascertain what is necessary to ensure either no more wills to kill 27 people, and/or ensuring that no future wills to do so are left free to their requirement of bodies on the floor.

The cause of his malfunction might give hints on how to prevent the will from existing in new instantiations: either in removing the lead poisoner, or in identifying educational requirements to prevent the genotype from actualizing into a phenotype, or in identifying when someone has become this thing at an early age and keeping an eye on the situation.

When the thing has happened, and even on near misses, there is culpability regardless. Oftentimes it is a matter of determining additional culpability.

 

[The AntiChris]

When the thing has happened, and even on near misses, there is culpability regardless.

If I understand you correctly then I think I disagree.

It seems to me that it's quite possible for someone to cause a negative event but, because of circumstances, be excused of all culpability. It may be necessary (for public safety) to restrain/segregate that person but this segregation would not necessarily imply any culpability.

 

[Jarhyn]

When the thing has happened, and even on near misses, there is culpability regardless.

If I understand you correctly then I think I disagree.

It seems to me that it's quite possible for someone to cause a negative event but, because of circumstances, be excused of all culpability. It may be necessary (for public safety) to restrain/segregate that person but this segregation would not necessarily imply any culpability.

The culpability to segregation is the culpability I speak of. I am a utilitarian in terms of justice and ethics: we do what we do to prevent trouble, not for the sake of revenge or harm, or at least we ought not for such sakes as revenge or harm.

The only role of the phrase "culpability" in my worldview is the role in discussing what needs be done to clean up the problem and keep the situation from arising yet again, if such can be prevented at all.

I know for some folks, they think it means doing something bad to the 'culpable' in addition to trying to repair or constrain whatever system caused the problems, but for me, a person's culpability amounts entirely to what we have a responsibility to undertake in preventing the issue from happening again, and no more.

Both are culpable, both the well meaning idiot and the malevolent psychopath, the former is culpable to an education and the latter is probably culpable to an incarceration to keep them away from potential victims. Both are culpable in the immediate followup, pending investigation, to constraint.

 

[The AntiChris]

The only role of the phrase "culpability" in my worldview is the role in discussing what needs be done to clean up the problem and keep the situation from arising yet again, if such can be prevented at all.

Ok. We're using quite different meanings of 'culpability'.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Free will is when our choosing is free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.

Dictionaries merely express word usage.

It is good to know how words are commonly used if you want to communicate. Most people do not define free will as requiring "freedom from causal necessity". That's the point. And "freedom from causal necessity" is never used to assess a person's responsibility for their actions, so it is truly odd that anyone would suggest it should be required of free will.

The brain plays chess because it has the capacity (neural architecture) and has acquired the necessary information. It matters not how the input is acquired, it's the inherent state of the system that determines ability.

The brain plays chess because someone asked it, "Hey, do you want to learn how to play chess?". And the brain said, "Yes".

We don't choose our brain, its abilities or its features.

Quite so. No one ever said to us, "Hey, we have a bunch of brains here. Would you like to choose one?".

When the brain breaks down we call someone, a doctor, to treat the condition.

Indeed.

If will has no agency, cannot regulate brain activity or make a difference to outcomes or behaviour, it is not 'free will' regardless of how many times it's asserted.

The causal mechanism is straightforward:
1. The brain encounters a problem that requires it to make a decision, such as the need to choose from the restaurant menu what we will order for dinner.
2. The brain decides, for various reasons, that we will order the Chef Salad.
3. The brain's will to order the Chef Salad causes it to trigger the appropriate motor functions to speak to the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

Recognizing a problem, deciding what to do, and acting upon that deliberate intent are all part of the brain's causal agency.

If I decide that I will eat an apple right now, then I will get an apple and eat it. The intention to eat the apple motivates and directs my actions until the apple is eaten. There is nothing in neuroscience that contradicts this.

Your brain decides before you the conscious entity, a construct of the brain, is aware of the decision, the action is brought to mind milliseconds after initiation.

That's okay. It is still my own brain making the choice, free of coercion and undue influence. So, it's still a freely chosen "I will get an apple and eat it".

It is information processing, not free will.

It is both information processing and free will. Information processing is how choosing to eat an apple works! And, if I am free to make this choice for myself, then it is a choice of my own free will.

The intention to eat the apple was not freely willed.

The intention (will) to eat the apple was freely chosen. That is exactly what free will is.

It's the tail end of a long process that began before the decision and action took place.

Apparently that long process only takes a few seconds, so that doesn't bother me at all.

We are talking about determinism, where all actions are necessitated, not freely willed.

And it doesn't bother me that all actions are causally necessitated. What would really bother me would be if someone pointed a gun at me and forced me to eat an orange instead of an apple.

We all want to be free of coercion and undue influence. But no one wants to be free of reliable cause and effect. That's just crazy.

That's determinism. No escape clause.

Why do you think anyone would want to escape reliable cause and effect? Every freedom they have, to do anything at all, REQUIRES reliable cause and effect.

What we will inevitably do by causal necessity is exactly identical to us just being us, doing what we choose to do. It is what we would have done anyway! That is not a meaningful constraint. It is not something that anyone can or needs to "escape from".

The information that is your prior experience evolves into your current action, which evolves into future actions. At no point do you freely choose an action. One action evolves into the next within an intricate weave of causality.

Like I just said, there is no need for me to escape the orderly sequence of events, which happen to include me feeling hungry, deciding to have an apple, then getting an apple from the kitchen, and then eating it. WHAT IS THE PROBLEM??

Mental events are physical events. Electrochemical events. What we imagine or think is a physical activity that is equally subject to the deterministic activity of the physical world as everything else.

Unfortunately, our brains are not large enough to track or cope with the electrochemical events. The brain therefore organizes sensory data into a model of reality consisting of objects, events, thoughts, feelings, etc.

We cannot learn to play baseball by first learning the positions of the atoms in the ball and the bat. Instead we reduce them into two simple objects that we can manipulate with our hands and arms to cause the event, "swinging" the "bat" to "hit" the "ball".

A common daydream being, 'if only I could go back in time knowing what I know now' - knowledge that would change the system and produce different outcomes, more informed decisions, avoiding pitfalls and errors....a nice little fantasy.

Ironically, that is exactly how the scientific method works. Instead of a daydream, we have a hypothesis. We experiment to test that hypothesis. When a test fails, we imagine going back to try something different, modifying that daydream into a new hypothesis, and continuing this process until we find the best explanation of what is going on.

But how much progress do you think science would make if it never considered what it could have done otherwise?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Your presumptions 1 and 2 are so far from the way neurons work.

No, they aren't. Your inability to grasp that neurons are machines that can be assembled to evoke specific behavior is your failure.

Assembling algorithms with purpose is entirely attainable in neural structures it just has not been done yet, in the same way as assembling an algorithm in hardware with an FPGA is a thing.

Your incredulity with the idea that neural structures can be designed does no insult to the design, though.

Its obviously subjective because the basis you describe is fiction, not real, not how or what neurons do. Oh sure there are action potentials

You don't know what it is that I'm describing because the fact is, I don't really expect you to know any of the things you claim to.

Your argument from incredulity does nothing to the reality of what is clearly attainable though.

I don't think you have ever really looked into how neurons create switching behavior, how an algorithm emerges from that mess, and that's all the more pity for you.

You look into the features of a neuron, but sadly you don't look into the organizational model and what impact these alterations have on the timings, activation weights, Connection weights, and thus the graph behavior of the system.

Always the research scientist asking "what is it" rather than "how does behavior arise from this configuration of matter?"

You don't seem to understand how neurons produce behavior, and while that's fine it does not much make sense to claim that they can't do things given the fact that a neural network can implement any behavior of a classic Turing machine.

But moreover, the neuron is an object, made of some lipids, some protein, some ion channels, some enzymes and some bits that react to and emit neurotransmitters.

When someone has thoughts that object changes.

In the same way, the computer is an object. It's just when anyone brings that up you moan and squeal like a stuck pig.

Again, anyone could discover the computer, and completely independently look at it for long enough to discover that it contains a set of very bizarre objects, that have very particular object relationships, one of which is a "will" (although our viewer may use a different word), one of the elements of that will is a "requirement" and in the case of Urist at the door, so to discover that such requirements may be left unmet, and that these are the same things that can be observed by anyone.

Or, I suppose, anyone capable of reverse engineering and mapping a system that lacks it's original symbol definitions and debug information.

Compatibilists would call the latter condition, the one in which Urist fails at the door "unfreeness" as pertains to the will

Still, the structure is there and real, and really composed of objects, even if some of them, like our aforementioned Dwarven Frog is an object that is also an image of a frog.

If Urist were a real person in a real world, then Urist being unable to open the door would mean he is "not free to open the door". Urist may choose to attempt to open the door repeatedly, and he is free to choose so. "Free will" would mean that Urist is free to choose what he will do. Being unable to open the door would mean his freedom to open the door was removed. But his freedom to choose to attempt to open the door, his freedom to choose "I will try again", versus, "I will not try again", is where free will comes into play. The "freedom to open the door" is a different kind of freedom, just like freedom of speech, or free of charge, would be different kinds of freedom.

 

[Jarhyn]

Your presumptions 1 and 2 are so far from the way neurons work.

No, they aren't. Your inability to grasp that neurons are machines that can be assembled to evoke specific behavior is your failure.

Assembling algorithms with purpose is entirely attainable in neural structures it just has not been done yet, in the same way as assembling an algorithm in hardware with an FPGA is a thing.

Your incredulity with the idea that neural structures can be designed does no insult to the design, though.

Its obviously subjective because the basis you describe is fiction, not real, not how or what neurons do. Oh sure there are action potentials

You don't know what it is that I'm describing because the fact is, I don't really expect you to know any of the things you claim to.

Your argument from incredulity does nothing to the reality of what is clearly attainable though.

I don't think you have ever really looked into how neurons create switching behavior, how an algorithm emerges from that mess, and that's all the more pity for you.

You look into the features of a neuron, but sadly you don't look into the organizational model and what impact these alterations have on the timings, activation weights, Connection weights, and thus the graph behavior of the system.

Always the research scientist asking "what is it" rather than "how does behavior arise from this configuration of matter?"

You don't seem to understand how neurons produce behavior, and while that's fine it does not much make sense to claim that they can't do things given the fact that a neural network can implement any behavior of a classic Turing machine.

But moreover, the neuron is an object, made of some lipids, some protein, some ion channels, some enzymes and some bits that react to and emit neurotransmitters.

When someone has thoughts that object changes.

In the same way, the computer is an object. It's just when anyone brings that up you moan and squeal like a stuck pig.

Again, anyone could discover the computer, and completely independently look at it for long enough to discover that it contains a set of very bizarre objects, that have very particular object relationships, one of which is a "will" (although our viewer may use a different word), one of the elements of that will is a "requirement" and in the case of Urist at the door, so to discover that such requirements may be left unmet, and that these are the same things that can be observed by anyone.

Or, I suppose, anyone capable of reverse engineering and mapping a system that lacks it's original symbol definitions and debug information.

Compatibilists would call the latter condition, the one in which Urist fails at the door "unfreeness" as pertains to the will

Still, the structure is there and real, and really composed of objects, even if some of them, like our aforementioned Dwarven Frog is an object that is also an image of a frog.

If Urist were a real person in a real world, then Urist being unable to open the door would mean he is "not free to open the door". Urist may choose to attempt to open the door repeatedly, and he is free to choose so. "Free will" would mean that Urist is free to choose what he will do. Being unable to open the door would mean his freedom to open the door was removed. But his freedom to choose to attempt to open the door, his freedom to choose "I will try again", versus, "I will not try again", is where free will comes into play. The "freedom to open the door" is a different kind of freedom, just like freedom of speech, or free of charge, would be different kinds of freedom.

No, the fact that he decided to try in the first place was enough. He chose to try to open the door because he knew that was the only path to where he needed to be to fight.

He had no freedom to open the door, at least not in the timeframe he wished to open it, on account of the door being locked.

It is not entirely impossible for this to cause problems, as regards certain doors and Dwarven cats, funny enough.

Like dwarves, Dwarven cats have wills. They can't do as many things but there are fewer ways to get them to do anything or stay anywhere.

It is hard to herd Dwarven cats to say the least.

One state of a door, ass opposed to "locked" is "tightly closed".

In the tightly closed states, Dwarven cats can design to go to the place on the other side of the door and devise a path through that place.

The issue with this is that they cannot.

Because it is obstinate (perhaps because it is very much like a normal cat), it will repeatedly try to go through the door that is closed against it.

It will try so hard to go through the door it will... Well, the effect is that the frame rate just straight tanks, often for hours of real time at a time, until the cat finally decides to give up on the door for a while.

It took me a very long time to discover this little quirk of the deterministic system.

Still, such is not necessary for that one will, the will to open the door, to be free or not.

All that is necessary is that he wanted to go through, did a series of things, and did not go through.

I understand you want to talk about that one specific will, the will to decide for yourself what you will do.

I want to discuss the primitives underneath the concept, simply for the sake of blowing away the foundation of hard determinism using an immediate example.

Its really the symmetry of the justification of will that I would rather discuss, though.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

...
All that is necessary is that he wanted to go through, did a series of things, and did not go through.

I understand you want to talk about that one specific will, the will to decide for yourself what you will do.

I want to discuss the primitives underneath the concept, simply for the sake of blowing away the foundation of hard determinism using an immediate example.

Its really the symmetry of the justification of will that I would rather discuss, though.

Freedom, generally, is the ability to do what you want. We want to decide for ourselves what we will do. What is the difference between a "want" and a "will"? We often do not get to choose what we want to do. But we always get to choose what we will do.

Urist wants to fight. What will he do about that want? He understands that behind the door there is an arena where those who want to fight can satisfy that desire by fighting. So he tries to open the door. But the door won't open. So, instead of going to the arena where it is okay to fight, he walks down the street beating up on everyone he encounters. When he gets home he beats up his wife and children.

Those are bad choices. He needs to find some other way to expend his fighting energy. Perhaps he'll choose to go to the gym instead and punch the bag, or pump some iron. Then he can come home and kiss his wife and kids.

Same want, but different choices, with different outcomes. We don't always get to choose what we want, but we usually do get to choose what we will do about them.

 

[DBT]

Why does the coercion of a person by another, or the conditions of a brain microchip, or the conditions of a tumor, – nullify the “free will” ability? What part of the “ability” is being obstructed? This almost always comes down to a certain point of “control” that is being minimized, and where that minimized control is coming from (the arbitrary part).

The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

The distinction made by compatibilists (and by all of us when making moral evaluations) is between influences which are morally relevant and those that are not morally relevant. We all take into consideration the factors which influence a moral agent when determining the degree to which someone will or will not be be held morally culpable/blameworthy for their actions.

Functional/adaptive brain/minds in contrast to dysfunctional/maladaptive brain/minds, punishment designed to deter those who can be deterred from breaking the law.....nothing to do with free will.

Play 'pin the free will label' tells us nothing about human behaviour or why some act irrationally.


Free Will as a Matter of Law

''This chapter confronts the issue of free will in neurolaw, rejecting one of the leading views of the relationship between free will and legal responsibility on the ground that the current system of legal responsibility likely emerged from outdated views about the mind, mental states, and free will. It challenges the compatibilist approach to law (in which free will and causal determinism can coexist). The chapter argues that those who initially developed the criminal law endorsed or presupposed views about mind and free will that modern neuroscience will aid in revealing as false. It then argues for the relevance of false presuppositions embedded in the original development of the criminal law in judging whether to revise or maintain the current system. In doing so, the chapter shares the view that neuroscientific developments will change the way we think about criminal responsibility.''

 

[The AntiChris]

Functional/adaptive brain/minds in contrast to dysfunctional/maladaptive brain/minds, punishment designed to deter those who can be deterred from breaking the law.....nothing to do with free will.

Yes, I know you dogmatically refuse to accept that the term 'free will' can apply to anything other than the nonsensical, libertarian, counter-causal incompatibilist version of free will.

Play 'pin the free will label' tells us nothing about human behaviour or why some act irrationally.

I'm not aware that any theory of free will has ever been intended as a scientific explanation of human behaviour/rationality.

Nothing changes.

 

[Jarhyn]

punishment designed to deter those who can be deterred from breaking the law

Punishment designed to deter  what exactly?

Oh yeah, to deter  people from making  choices by their own volition to break the law.

So, punishment, the threat of it is a  constraint upon the will of those who can be deterred from breaking the law.

The words you have spoken translate to an acknowledgement that wills exist, and may be constrained selectively by doing things...

 

[DBT]

Free will is when our choosing is free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less. freely will.

An assertion. Necessitation is being ignored. Necessitated actions are not freely willed actions.

Dictionaries merely express word usage.

It is good to know how words are commonly used if you want to communicate. Most people do not define free will as requiring "freedom from causal necessity". That's the point. And "freedom from causal necessity" is never used to assess a person's responsibility for their actions, so it is truly odd that anyone would suggest it should be required of free will.

Definitions alone prove nothing. People define all sorts of things that don't exist, God, gods, Angels, Demons......

People refer to these things every day, ''thank God that our Janet did well at school,'' ''Let us pray to the Lord....''

The issue of free will is related to the role of will, how the brain works and how decisions and actions are made based on science and evidence, not slapping labels onto carefully selected conditions...which is Cherry Picking.

The brain plays chess because it has the capacity (neural architecture) and has acquired the necessary information. It matters not how the input is acquired, it's the inherent state of the system that determines ability.

The brain plays chess because someone asked it, "Hey, do you want to learn how to play chess?". And the brain said, "Yes".

That doesn't explain the means and mechanisms. It doesn't happen through magic.

We don't choose our brain, its abilities or its features.

Quite so. No one ever said to us, "Hey, we have a bunch of brains here. Would you like to choose one?".

The non-chosen state of the system determines how you think and respond.

When the brain breaks down we call someone, a doctor, to treat the condition.

Indeed.

External input alters the brain. Therapy, not free will, alters brain function. The patient seeks help because they are unable to help themselves.

If will has no agency, cannot regulate brain activity or make a difference to outcomes or behaviour, it is not 'free will' regardless of how many times it's asserted.

The causal mechanism is straightforward:
1. The brain encounters a problem that requires it to make a decision, such as the need to choose from the restaurant menu what we will order for dinner.
2. The brain decides, for various reasons, that we will order the Chef Salad.
3. The brain's will to order the Chef Salad causes it to trigger the appropriate motor functions to speak to the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

Yes, all the work of acquiring and processing information is done unconsciously, the result presented in conscious form.

No free will involved.

Recognizing a problem, deciding what to do, and acting upon that deliberate intent are all part of the brain's causal agency.

If I decide that I will eat an apple right now, then I will get an apple and eat it. The intention to eat the apple motivates and directs my actions until the apple is eaten. There is nothing in neuroscience that contradicts this.

The brain processes information and generates deliberation. The brain has no choice but to acquire and process information because that is its evolutionary role.


Abstract
This review deals with the physiology of the initiation of a voluntary movement and the appreciation of whether it is voluntary or not. I argue that free will is not a driving force for movement, but a conscious awareness concerning the nature of the movement. Movement initiation and the perception of willing the movement can be separately manipulated. Movement is generated subconsciously, and the conscious sense of volition comes later, but the exact time of this event is difficult to assess because of the potentially illusory nature of introspection. Neurological disorders of volition are also reviewed. The evidence suggests that movement is initiated in the frontal lobe, particularly the mesial areas, and the sense of volition arises as the result of a corollary discharge likely involving multiple areas with reciprocal connections including those in the parietal lobe and insular cortex. - M . Hallett Clinical Neurophysiology , Volume 118 , Issue 6.

Your brain decides before you the conscious entity, a construct of the brain, is aware of the decision, the action is brought to mind milliseconds after initiation.

That's okay. It is still my own brain making the choice, free of coercion and undue influence. So, it's still a freely chosen "I will get an apple and eat it".

Everything in the universe has its own makeup and interaction with the environment. The makeup (not chosen) of each brain determines the behaviour of that brain in relation to its environment.

''At this point certain questions need to be asked: Why does the coercion of a person by another, or the conditions of a brain microchip, or the conditions of a tumor, – nullify the “free will” ability? What part of the “ability” is being obstructed? This almost always comes down to a certain point of “control” that is being minimized, and where that minimized control is coming from (the arbitrary part).

The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

It is information processing, not free will.

It is both information processing and free will. Information processing is how choosing to eat an apple works! And, if I am free to make this choice for myself, then it is a choice of my own free will.

Free will is being inserted into the narrative. A narrative that doesn't require free will as an explanation for brain function or human behaviour.

The intention to eat the apple was not freely willed.

The intention (will) to eat the apple was freely chosen. That is exactly what free will is.

Determinism doesn't allow alternative. The intention to eat the apple is necessitated, not freely chosen. Chosen implies the possibility to have done otherwise, determinism doesn't allow alternate actions: there is no other possibility - in that instance, only the apple, nothing else.

It's the tail end of a long process that began before the decision and action took place.

Apparently that long process only takes a few seconds, so that doesn't bother me at all.

Brain activity only takes milliseconds, but as a deterministic system, the world began its inexorable progression of events long before it came to you selecting an apple, with no possible alternate action.

''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

Ironically, that is exactly how the scientific method works. Instead of a daydream, we have a hypothesis. We experiment to test that hypothesis. When a test fails, we imagine going back to try something different, modifying that daydream into a new hypothesis, and continuing this process until we find the best explanation of what is going on.

But how much progress do you think science would make if it never considered what it could have done otherwise?

Considering what ''could have been done otherwise'' is a part of the learning process. It's an exercise in imagination which provides a different outcome in the future.

The past states of the system evolving into the present and future states of the system.


The process of evolving events allows no alternate actions at any point in time.

That is the nature of determinism.

If you are not talking about determinism, compatibilism is irrelevant.

You can't have it both ways, if the events progress deterministically, there is no possible deviation or alternate action.


What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

 

[Jarhyn]

Necessitation is being ignored

Yes, "necessitation" is being ignored because "necessitation" does no work. Rather it says how all the stuff that exists together accomplishes work.

Necessitated actions are not freely willed actions.

This is just an assertion fallacy.

It is your job to support this assertion and you have not.

It appears in fact that you violated your own assertion of fact:

punishment designed to deter those who can be deterred from breaking the law

Punishment designed to deter  what exactly?

Oh yeah, to deter  people from making  choices by their own volition to break the law.

So, punishment, the threat of it is a  constraint upon the will of those who can be deterred from breaking the law.

The words you have spoken translate to an acknowledgement that wills exist, and may be constrained selectively by doing things...