It does not require me to call it a choice for it to work, either.
I'm not convinced DBT will find this persuasive.
Call it whatever floats your boat (as you must). Without the possibility of doing otherwise, no realizable alternatives,
all events proceeding as they must rather than how they are chosen (no alternatives), the notion of free will is incompatible with determinism.
''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. '' - Oxford university press scholarship.
In other words, Compatibilism - as defined - fails to make a case.
The alternatives were and always will have been realiz
able in the context. There is only one which will be realiz
ed.
As to
desert-responsibility, that's a whole different can of worms.
Again you descend to fatalism in the bolded portion. It is not
predetermined but
determined by course. There are still then responsible agents for decisions.
Perhaps we may look at a different situation, which requires less work getting to "last Thursday".
Let's imagine a fortress wherein there is a dwarf walking down the hall. This dwarf wishes to FIGHT and is walking down the long drawbridge to the dining hall to do that. With an axe. Oh, it's Urist again...
Now let me ask, DBT, if a gremlin pulls a lever and drops Urist into a pit of magma, how many dwarves will die?
If no gremlins pull the lever, how many dwarves will die?
Multiple choice even: your options are -1, 0, 1, and 5.
Let's look at Urist leaving the dining hall.
Something happened in there and Urist is COVERED with blood. So is the dining hall.
Clearly if Urist had not been in the equation, no other dwarf would have chosen in that moment to paint the dining hall red.
Moreover, we can ask the question "will he do this every time he fights?"
I can then hack "fight" back in and even observe the system to flag me and have me come take a look the next time it is back on it's own as a function of the dwarf's free will.
And there the chowhall gets painted red again.
So, it seems that desert-responsibility doesn't really see any challenges on account of the fact that the elements of the system that were problems, being removed for being problems, result.
It seems that desert responsibility is more about terminating behavioral waves moving through the deterministic space, and so desert responsibility, at least with the utilitarian focus of preventing outcomes which constrain our freedoms and our wills in such permanent ways.