Compatibilism: What's that About?

[fromderinside]

You don't have to be a crude Christian baiter with me since I'm not a believer. Nor am I interested anything other than communication/information processing. Information theory was one of my teaching areas.

I care not a whit about your pseudo analytic interpretations of what I write since it all all fits on the same pin head.

Note the difference your tome vs my short story.

 

[Jarhyn]

You don't have to be a crude Christian baiter with me since I'm not a believer. Nor am I interested anything other than communication/information processing. Information theory was one of my teaching areas.

I care not a whit about your pseudo analytic interpretations of what I write since it all all fits on the same pin head.

Note the difference your tome vs my short story.

Yes, note the difference between your argument from ignorance and the fact that while I see you often argue what "can't" be the case from stunning positions of ignorance, not once talking about what CAN be accomplished by neurons but only religious insistence on what can't.

It is clear that you do not know how things go from "transistors" to "it can program/build itself". That's fine, but then you shouldn't make such arguments from ignorance as "it can't program itself".

I can't reach you, and I can't teach you because you don't want to learn.

You are absolutely a believer. You are a believer that you are a slave to fate.

There's nothing tht can be done to offer the understanding of why we have free will to someone who WANTS to not have control over their own life, not even the small shreds that life may have.

Even so, it's possible to not have control over a great many things, even among the things you do have control of.

All of this is an exercise in representation theory: the fact that multiple systems in drastically different places may have the same mechanics for some purpose, and operating the states of one solves for the state of the other without directly observing the other operating thus.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

If you ordered the Chef Salad then you will be expected to pay for it before you leave the restaurant. Whether your "I will have the Chef Salad, please" was produced entirely beneath your conscious awareness or not, it was you, the person, that placed the order, and you, the person, that is responsible for the bill.

Not having access to the means of production that form and govern your own conscious existence, creates the impression of free will and conscious agency.

Then how do you account for the behavior of the waiter, who brought you the bill for that salad you ordered? Was the waiter's impression that you deliberately ordered that salad an illusion? How did the waiter become victim to your illusion?

An illusion that is exposed when something goes wrong with the mechanism and that sense of agency and control disintegrates.

Uh, like you confronting the illogic of asserting that everyone is experiencing your illusion?

It doesn't matter that it's defined as 'you' because as a mechanism that is not subject to control or regulation through will or wish, it is a mechanism where free will plays no part in the running of the show.

Your choosing to order the salad was you running the show. And because you were running the show, you got billed for the salad you ordered.

You don't choose brain condition, function, nor control its information processing activity regardless of it being 'you.'

The list of things that you didn't choose, no matter how long, does not eliminate a single item from the list of things that you do choose. You chose to order the salad, and you'll not be allowed to leave the restaurant until you pay for it.

To insist that this is free will is wrong.

Free will is when you choose for yourself what you will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Did you or didn't you order the forking salad? Was anyone holding a gun to your head? Do you wish to plead insanity? If not, then it was a choice of your own free will.

Unless, of course, you are defining "free will" in some way that makes it impossible. And if you're doing that, then you'll need to justify using a definition that serves no purpose but to make free will impossible.

 

[fromderinside]

You don't have to be a crude Christian baiter with me since I'm not a believer. Nor am I interested anything other than communication/information processing. Information theory was one of my teaching areas.

I care not a whit about your pseudo analytic interpretations of what I write since it all all fits on the same pin head.

Note the difference your tome vs my short story.

Yes, note the difference between your argument from ignorance and the fact that while I see you often argue what "can't" be the case from stunning positions of ignorance, not once talking about what CAN be accomplished by neurons but only religious insistence on what can't.

It is clear that you do not know how things go from "transistors" to "it can program/build itself". That's fine, but then you shouldn't make such arguments from ignorance as "it can't program itself".

I can't reach you, and I can't teach you because you don't want to learn.

You are absolutely a believer. You are a believer that you are a slave to fate.

There's nothing tht can be done to offer the understanding of why we have free will to someone who WANTS to not have control over their own life, not even the small shreds that life may have.

Even so, it's possible to not have control over a great many things, even among the things you do have control of.

All of this is an exercise in representation theory: the fact that multiple systems in drastically different places may have the same mechanics for some purpose, and operating the states of one solves for the state of the other without directly observing the other operating thus.

Fit this into your interpretation of representation theory of mind.

This paper rejected the analogy between neurocognitive activity and a computer. It was shown that the analogy results from assuming that the properties of the models used in computational cognitive neuroscience (e.g., information, representation, etc.) must also exist in the system being modelled (e.g., the brain). In section Scientific Models in Neuroimaging, we have seen how computational models offer a link between the collected data (e.g., behavioural or neuroimaging) and a possible explanation of how it was generated (i.e., a theory). While the usefulness of computational models is unquestionable, it does not follow that neurocognitive activity should literally possess the properties used in the model (e.g., information, representation). The last section offered an alternative account of neurocognitive activity bringing together the EECS and the formalisms of DCST. While both these accounts individually reject the mind as a computer metaphor, they rarely explicitly work together. The last section has shown how the cooperation between EECS’s characterisation of cognition and DCST’s formalisms offers a sustained and cohesive programme for explaining neurocognitive activity, not as a machine but as a biologically situated organism. Mainly this link was made by focusing on DCM of neurocognitive activity.

From: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8789682/

(please note I actually referenced the material leading to the conclusion I quoted. You actually have something with which to work)

 

[Jarhyn]

You don't have to be a crude Christian baiter with me since I'm not a believer. Nor am I interested anything other than communication/information processing. Information theory was one of my teaching areas.

I care not a whit about your pseudo analytic interpretations of what I write since it all all fits on the same pin head.

Note the difference your tome vs my short story.

Yes, note the difference between your argument from ignorance and the fact that while I see you often argue what "can't" be the case from stunning positions of ignorance, not once talking about what CAN be accomplished by neurons but only religious insistence on what can't.

It is clear that you do not know how things go from "transistors" to "it can program/build itself". That's fine, but then you shouldn't make such arguments from ignorance as "it can't program itself".

I can't reach you, and I can't teach you because you don't want to learn.

You are absolutely a believer. You are a believer that you are a slave to fate.

There's nothing tht can be done to offer the understanding of why we have free will to someone who WANTS to not have control over their own life, not even the small shreds that life may have.

Even so, it's possible to not have control over a great many things, even among the things you do have control of.

All of this is an exercise in representation theory: the fact that multiple systems in drastically different places may have the same mechanics for some purpose, and operating the states of one solves for the state of the other without directly observing the other operating thus.

Fit this into your interpretation of representation theory of mind.

This paper rejected the analogy between neurocognitive activity and a computer. It was shown that the analogy results from assuming that the properties of the models used in computational cognitive neuroscience (e.g., information, representation, etc.) must also exist in the system being modelled (e.g., the brain). In section Scientific Models in Neuroimaging, we have seen how computational models offer a link between the collected data (e.g., behavioural or neuroimaging) and a possible explanation of how it was generated (i.e., a theory). While the usefulness of computational models is unquestionable, it does not follow that neurocognitive activity should literally possess the properties used in the model (e.g., information, representation). The last section offered an alternative account of neurocognitive activity bringing together the EECS and the formalisms of DCST. While both these accounts individually reject the mind as a computer metaphor, they rarely explicitly work together. The last section has shown how the cooperation between EECS’s characterisation of cognition and DCST’s formalisms offers a sustained and cohesive programme for explaining neurocognitive activity, not as a machine but as a biologically situated organism. Mainly this link was made by focusing on DCM of neurocognitive activity.

From: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8789682/

(please note I actually referenced the material leading to the conclusion I quoted. You actually have something with which to work)

Hand waving and masturbatory head-scratching.

Nothing in that abstract offered any meaning beyond "we, the researcher's, fail to see how the representation theoretical neurocognitive model is actually constructed so we reject even the idea that there is information in there being processed by a mechanism".

It's nothing but a yawn and watching sophists pretend at sophistry.

Meanwhile, us actual engineers are over here ignoring such self-fellating bullshit and just using the model of the neurons to make functional hardware that accomplishes representation, the retention of information, and the execution of function on the basis of "as 'above', so 'below'".

As has been demonstrated, neurons can accomplish any arrangement of switching structures as may be available in a computer.

Saying that neurological systems are somehow less capable of holding wills, or that their wills are somehow LESS full featured than the tiny little ant-brained things on my hard drive is cute, but wrong.

They hold objects. The objects fulfil as artifacts the definition of "wills". Some of them fulfill the requirement of "freedom", insofar as they shall result in having particular goal reified, a second artifact rendered back alongside the first which matches. Others are constrained insofar as the requirement of them shall not be reified.

Our brains, as they are, are capable of all this and more.

 

[fromderinside]

You don't have to be a crude Christian baiter with me since I'm not a believer. Nor am I interested anything other than communication/information processing. Information theory was one of my teaching areas.

I care not a whit about your pseudo analytic interpretations of what I write since it all all fits on the same pin head.

Note the difference your tome vs my short story.

Yes, note the difference between your argument from ignorance and the fact that while I see you often argue what "can't" be the case from stunning positions of ignorance, not once talking about what CAN be accomplished by neurons but only religious insistence on what can't.

It is clear that you do not know how things go from "transistors" to "it can program/build itself". That's fine, but then you shouldn't make such arguments from ignorance as "it can't program itself".

I can't reach you, and I can't teach you because you don't want to learn.

You are absolutely a believer. You are a believer that you are a slave to fate.

There's nothing tht can be done to offer the understanding of why we have free will to someone who WANTS to not have control over their own life, not even the small shreds that life may have.

Even so, it's possible to not have control over a great many things, even among the things you do have control of.

All of this is an exercise in representation theory: the fact that multiple systems in drastically different places may have the same mechanics for some purpose, and operating the states of one solves for the state of the other without directly observing the other operating thus.

Fit this into your interpretation of representation theory of mind.

This paper rejected the analogy between neurocognitive activity and a computer. It was shown that the analogy results from assuming that the properties of the models used in computational cognitive neuroscience (e.g., information, representation, etc.) must also exist in the system being modelled (e.g., the brain). In section Scientific Models in Neuroimaging, we have seen how computational models offer a link between the collected data (e.g., behavioural or neuroimaging) and a possible explanation of how it was generated (i.e., a theory). While the usefulness of computational models is unquestionable, it does not follow that neurocognitive activity should literally possess the properties used in the model (e.g., information, representation). The last section offered an alternative account of neurocognitive activity bringing together the EECS and the formalisms of DCST. While both these accounts individually reject the mind as a computer metaphor, they rarely explicitly work together. The last section has shown how the cooperation between EECS’s characterisation of cognition and DCST’s formalisms offers a sustained and cohesive programme for explaining neurocognitive activity, not as a machine but as a biologically situated organism. Mainly this link was made by focusing on DCM of neurocognitive activity.

From: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8789682/

(please note I actually referenced the material leading to the conclusion I quoted. You actually have something with which to work)

Hand waving and masturbatory head-scratching.

Nothing in that abstract offered any meaning beyond "we, the researcher's, fail to see how the representation theoretical neurocognitive model is actually constructed so we reject even the idea that there is information in there being processed by a mechanism".

It's nothing but a yawn and watching sophists pretend at sophistry.

Meanwhile, us actual engineers are over here ignoring such self-fellating bullshit and just using the model of the neurons to make functional hardware that accomplishes representation, the retention of information, and the execution of function on the basis of "as 'above', so 'below'".

As has been demonstrated, neurons can accomplish any arrangement of switching structures as may be available in a computer.

Saying that neurological systems are somehow less capable of holding wills, or that their wills are somehow LESS full featured than the tiny little ant-brained things on my hard drive is cute, but wrong.

They hold objects. The objects fulfil as artifacts the definition of "wills". Some of them fulfill the requirement of "freedom", insofar as they shall result in having particular goal reified, a second artifact rendered back alongside the first which matches. Others are constrained insofar as the requirement of them shall not be reified.

Our brains, as they are, are capable of all this and more.

Uh, the material I posted was a conclusion, drawn from the information presented in the article, not an abstract.

Ah playing the elitist engineering card. Worked in that environment AS A POSTDOC PHD for about 35 years under the thumb of WE'RE EN-GIN-EERS. Don't be sniffy, I like engineers I like the way the way they are pragmatic and resort to their engineering documents for most every problem.

My problem is they got that information from scientists, they depend on scientists to do the experiments leading to new information in their books but they denigrate scientists at the drop of a hat as too thinky just as you just did without a shred of evidence and put scientists under their thumb in the workplace.

If you need evidence just look at your organization. Which guide controls negotiations and management, certainly not scientists.

Yes we scientists are chained to to the "its never a fact" rule which you delightedly just pointed out as your excuse to dismiss good research from the government, which provides the data you enshrine in your guides, no less.

As to the bolded bit humans aren't machines they aren't "designed" They evolve which means they respond to situational stuff like relative fitness. Your taking of 'facts' is flawed since machines and beings don't adhere to the same rules for decisions. I guess some things are just too logical for you to get your arms around.

ASIDE: Sorry about your recent bus adventure. I hate buses. I had access to rail but I chose to drive 50 miles each day each way because I value my privacy, yes even with bumper-to-bumper as it usually was passing LAX and UCLA in the 405. Probably why we decided to retire in a village on the Oregon coast. Now it's fifty miles to Walmart and Safeway and Doctor's another 100 miles in Eugene.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

You don't have to be a crude Christian baiter with me since I'm not a believer. Nor am I interested anything other than communication/information processing. Information theory was one of my teaching areas.

I care not a whit about your pseudo analytic interpretations of what I write since it all all fits on the same pin head.

Note the difference your tome vs my short story.

Yes, note the difference between your argument from ignorance and the fact that while I see you often argue what "can't" be the case from stunning positions of ignorance, not once talking about what CAN be accomplished by neurons but only religious insistence on what can't.

It is clear that you do not know how things go from "transistors" to "it can program/build itself". That's fine, but then you shouldn't make such arguments from ignorance as "it can't program itself".

I can't reach you, and I can't teach you because you don't want to learn.

You are absolutely a believer. You are a believer that you are a slave to fate.

There's nothing tht can be done to offer the understanding of why we have free will to someone who WANTS to not have control over their own life, not even the small shreds that life may have.

Even so, it's possible to not have control over a great many things, even among the things you do have control of.

All of this is an exercise in representation theory: the fact that multiple systems in drastically different places may have the same mechanics for some purpose, and operating the states of one solves for the state of the other without directly observing the other operating thus.

Fit this into your interpretation of representation theory of mind.

This paper rejected the analogy between neurocognitive activity and a computer. It was shown that the analogy results from assuming that the properties of the models used in computational cognitive neuroscience (e.g., information, representation, etc.) must also exist in the system being modelled (e.g., the brain). In section Scientific Models in Neuroimaging, we have seen how computational models offer a link between the collected data (e.g., behavioural or neuroimaging) and a possible explanation of how it was generated (i.e., a theory). While the usefulness of computational models is unquestionable, it does not follow that neurocognitive activity should literally possess the properties used in the model (e.g., information, representation). The last section offered an alternative account of neurocognitive activity bringing together the EECS and the formalisms of DCST. While both these accounts individually reject the mind as a computer metaphor, they rarely explicitly work together. The last section has shown how the cooperation between EECS’s characterisation of cognition and DCST’s formalisms offers a sustained and cohesive programme for explaining neurocognitive activity, not as a machine but as a biologically situated organism. Mainly this link was made by focusing on DCM of neurocognitive activity.

From: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8789682/

(please note I actually referenced the material leading to the conclusion I quoted. You actually have something with which to work)

This stuff is, generally speaking, over my head. But I did read the first few pages. It is ironic that we would be using the model of a computer to derive a better understanding of the mind, because the computer is an attempt to duplicate the functions of mind. So, coming up with a model of how the mind works would have come first, before the computer could even be imagined.

Also, I liked this especially: "Some scientists and philosophers are compelled to add yet another layer. They suppose a metaphor between the work of a scientist constructing models/representations and neuronal activity (Poldrack, 2020). This means that the brain at work also theorises, constructs, and tests a model, thereby delivering representations. "

The mind is already constructing a representational model of itself.

But, like I said, this stuff is mostly over my head.

 

[DBT]

To insist that this is free will is wrong.

Free will is when you choose for yourself what you will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Did you or didn't you order the forking salad? Was anyone holding a gun to your head? Do you wish to plead insanity? If not, then it was a choice of your own free will.

Unless, of course, you are defining "free will" in some way that makes it impossible. And if you're doing that, then you'll need to justify using a definition that serves no purpose but to make free will impossible.

That is the label applied by compatibilists. The distinction between external force, coercion, undue influence, etc, and acting according to your will without external restrictions still fails to establish freedom of will because of internal necessitation.

Necessitation is not freedom. Acting without being forced is still acting through necessitation, not free will.

''At this point certain questions need to be asked: Why does the coercion of a person by another, or the conditions of a brain microchip, or the conditions of a tumor, – nullify the “free will” ability? What part of the “ability” is being obstructed? This almost always comes down to a certain point of “control” that is being minimized, and where that minimized control is coming from (the arbitrary part).

The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

 

[fromderinside]

The mind is already constructing a representational model of itself.

But, like I said, this stuff is mostly over my head.

Ever wonder why the brain has between 16 and 40 representations of a face in-residence at any moment. Not very parsimonious.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The distinction between external force, coercion, undue influence, etc, and acting according to your will without external restrictions still fails to establish freedom of will because of internal necessitation. Necessitation is not freedom. Acting without being forced is still acting through necessitation, not free will.

And there we have it. Hard determinists define free will as "freedom from causal necessity". But is it possible to be free from cause and effect? No. It is not possible. Every freedom we have requires the ability to cause some effect. To be free from cause and effect is to lose every freedom we have. So, "freedom from causal necessity" is an irrational notion, and cannot be the definition of anything real.

On the other hand, we can be free from coercion. And we can be free from significant mental illness. And we can be free from other extraordinary influences that would prevent us from choosing for ourselves what we will do.

Because deciding for ourselves what we will do, can actually be free from coercion and other undue influences, it is a very possible freedom. In fact, it is the normal state of things for most of our decisions. And it is very obvious in examples such as choosing what we will order for dinner in a restaurant.

This free will is meaningful and relevant. It is the free will that is used when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions. If they are adults, of sound mind, and they knowingly chose to do it, then they are held responsible. We ordered the dinner, of our own free will, so we are responsible for paying for it.

So, what about causal necessity? Causal necessity takes care of itself. Every event is always causally necessitated by prior events and inevitably must happen. And this will include events where we decide for ourselves what we will do, as well as events where we are forced to do something we would prefer not to do. Both types of event are included within the set of all causally necessitated events. And, we distinguish the two types of events by calling one "a freely chosen will" and the other "a will imposed upon us".

We can define a meaningful and relevant "free will", free from coercion and undue influence. Or we can define an irrational "free will", free from cause and effect. The only sensible thing seems to be to use the meaningful and relevant definition, and dispose of the irrational one.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The mind is already constructing a representational model of itself.

But, like I said, this stuff is mostly over my head.

Ever wonder why the brain has between 16 and 40 representations of a face in-residence at any moment. Not very parsimonious.

I suppose multiple representations would provide a way to check its results.

 

[Jarhyn]

The mind is already constructing a representational model of itself.

But, like I said, this stuff is mostly over my head.

Ever wonder why the brain has between 16 and 40 representations of a face in-residence at any moment. Not very parsimonious.

I suppose multiple representations would provide a way to check its results.

Not only that but they are representations in different aspects of what I can only call "face math".

And let's not ignore that FDI says there are multiple representations of a face immediately after trying to convince us that the brain does not serve representation.

Further, I've looked through what's going on not just in the code of an aircraft simulator but the active data structures that "code" stores and interacts with.

You would be surprised how many representations exist of the plane's altitude. It's a simple number and there are several versions, derived from several sources, kept separate, balanced into yet another version of that number. It is buffered and carried hither and thither, in all these different sources and permutations.

If you gave me a year and a million dollars, I could disassemble the code enough to find everywhere the concept of altitude is applied, in every abstract way, and because it's an airplane, I guarantee you I would find copies in no less than a thousand places across it's memory operations and systems.

Humans are not about altitude but about faces.

I'm kind of shocked it's only 16-40.

Parsimony does not serve against risk.

 

[fromderinside]

Ever wonder why the brain has between 16 and 40 representations of a face in-residence at any moment. Not very parsimonious.

I suppose multiple representations would provide a way to check its results.

Not only that but they are representations in different aspects of what I can only call "face math".

And let's not ignore that FDI says there are multiple representations of a face immediately after trying to convince us that the brain does not serve representation.

Further, I've looked through what's going on not just in the code of an aircraft simulator but the active data structures that "code" stores and interacts with.

You would be surprised how many representations exist of the plane's altitude. It's a simple number and there are several versions, derived from several sources, kept separate, balanced into yet another version of that number. It is buffered and carried hither and thither, in all these different sources and permutations.

Humans are not about altitude but about faces.

I'm kind of shocked it's only 16-40.

Parsimony does not serve against risk.

Processing data is representation? Who'da thunk a silicon and graphite type woulda supposed such. Clearly you think there is cognition behind the processing. So what are the mechanisms of cognition? Certainly not evolution. Evolution would produce cognition a result of the capability for data representation not be the genitor of it.

Got it. God put it there righteously. After all it's cogito ergo sum.

 

[Jarhyn]

Processing data is representation

Yes it is. Never mind that YOU are the one that called it this.

Data is a representation of other things, but whose math of operation operates as if operating the other thing, so as to allow someone to figure out how something will operate, or how it may be operated, without having to directly operate it.

As to what "cognition" is, it's not entirely important to the conversation, other than to note that it is about taking something uncorrelated to the problem that produces chaos, merely calling that the answer, and then testing the math (making a wild guess at how the math works, on a mechanical level),.

You are right to say that evolution is not, in fact, the origin of representation.

It is instead the driver of a single concept of "success". This provides a reason for it to emerge, but it is not, as you observe, the genitor of it.

It is merely a fact implied by the structure of the system.

Just as any system capable of hosting cellular automata with imperfect replication will have emergent evolution, just like evolution is an emergent aspect of a system, representation is something that will emerge anywhere there is some concept of success, even in systems whose success parameters never evolved in the first place.

Where did it come from? You're the one putting it on "God".

It's no more "god" than the corollary of finite choice, itself an implication of the axioms of math.

 

[fromderinside]

Jarhyn wrote: You would be surprised how many representations exist of the plane's altitude.

Actually no I wouldn't. If we place floppy bits about two inches apart over a wing and attach velocity and direction recorders to every one then run the whole thing through a nationwide compute system in a wind tunnel there are a few representations just to measure air flow an turbulence. And this is done for almost every conceivable configuration of equipment and attitude.

Both commercial and military are compulsive about knowing possible parameter of flight and controls, just as are human engineers about configurations and situations for pilots, crew, and human cargo.

My specialties were human performance, flight control, and systems degradation among others over the years. I was also a SW test and evaluation scientist and project manager for such as EA-6B and F14. I even designed destructive SW evaluations methods that are still in use. Can't trust those darn bits at altitude yano.

 

[fromderinside]

You are right to say that evolution is not, in fact, the origin of representation.

It is instead the driver of a single concept of "success". This provides a reason for it to emerge, but it is not, as you observe, the genitor of it.

It is merely a fact implied by the structure of the system

Move-on.whatever

As for the structure of the system my guess is nature is chaotic with respect to living things.

So according you your structure of system statement you need propose an unpredictable generator.

I see no evidence of that from you. You are so wrapped with within system thinking you just can't break free.

 

[Jarhyn]

You are right to say that evolution is not, in fact, the origin of representation.

It is instead the driver of a single concept of "success". This provides a reason for it to emerge, but it is not, as you observe, the genitor of it.

It is merely a fact implied by the structure of the system

Move-on.whatever

As for the structure of the system my guess is nature is chaotic with respect to living things.

So according you your structure of system statement you need propose an unpredictable generator.

I see no evidence of that from you. You are so wrapped with within system thinking you just can't break free.

'your guess'

I guess we're done here.

If you think I'm wrapped up with within-system thinking you haven't read ANY of my posts, I guess.

 

[fromderinside]

You are right to say that evolution is not, in fact, the origin of representation.

It is instead the driver of a single concept of "success". This provides a reason for it to emerge, but it is not, as you observe, the genitor of it.

It is merely a fact implied by the structure of the system

Move-on.whatever

As for the structure of the system my guess is nature is chaotic with respect to living things.

So according you your structure of system statement you need propose an unpredictable generator.

I see no evidence of that from you. You are so wrapped with within system thinking you just can't break free.

'your guess'

I guess we're done here.

If you think I'm wrapped up with within-system thinking you haven't read ANY of my posts, I guess.

Geez. By within system thinking I refer to your approach to analysis using a particular methodology.

 

[DBT]

The distinction between external force, coercion, undue influence, etc, and acting according to your will without external restrictions still fails to establish freedom of will because of internal necessitation. Necessitation is not freedom. Acting without being forced is still acting through necessitation, not free will.

And there we have it. Hard determinists define free will as "freedom from causal necessity". But is it possible to be free from cause and effect? No. It is not possible. Every freedom we have requires the ability to cause some effect. To be free from cause and effect is to lose every freedom we have. So, "freedom from causal necessity" is an irrational notion, and cannot be the definition of anything real.

Nope, I was referring to the compatibilist definition of free will as 'free from certain external elements that constrain our will, force, coercion, undue influence, yet compatibilists ignore the ultimate constraint on will: internal necessity.

It's not a matter of being 'free from causal necessity,' just that the notion of free will is not compatible with necessity, be it external or internal.

That given inner necessity, which sets our will before it is even experienced, the idea of free will, that will is somehow free because actions follow unimpeded as determined, is not compatible with determinism.


What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

So, what about causal necessity? Causal necessity takes care of itself. Every event is always causally necessitated by prior events and inevitably must happen. And this will include events where we decide for ourselves what we will do, as well as events where we are forced to do something we would prefer not to do. Both types of event are included within the set of all causally necessitated events. And, we distinguish the two types of events by calling one "a freely chosen will" and the other "a will imposed upon us".

The point is that we don't 'decide for ourselves,' we cannot act in isolation, instead, we are aspects of a system where all the actions within the system are entailed by a progression of events as the system evolves.

''The increments of a normal brain state is not as obvious as direct coercion, a microchip, or a tumor, but the “obviousness” is irrelevant here. Brain states incrementally get to the state they are in one moment at a time. In each moment of that process the brain is in one state, and the specific environment and biological conditions leads to the very next state. Depending on that state, this will cause you to behave in a specific way within an environment (decide in a specific way), in which all of those things that are outside of a person constantly bombard your senses changing your very brain state. The internal dialogue in your mind you have no real control over.''

We can define a meaningful and relevant "free will", free from coercion and undue influence. Or we can define an irrational "free will", free from cause and effect. The only sensible thing seems to be to use the meaningful and relevant definition, and dispose of the irrational one.

I am not defining free will as 'free from cause and effect.'

The argument is that the idea of freedom of will is not compatible with determinism, incompatibilism, that the definition given by compatibilists is not sufficient to prove the proposition because acting according to one's will is, as with will itself, a necessitated action within an evolving system of fixed events.

 

[Jarhyn]

Geez. By within system thinking I refer to your approach to analysis using a particular methodology

So, word salad it is then. Just an ad-hom against "a particular methodology"