Compatibilism: What's that About?

[fromderinside]

A paradox is created by false, but believable, suggestions. Take, Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise. Achilles, the fastest runner in the world, confidently gives the tortoise a huge head start. Then Achilles runs to where the tortoise is. But, when he gets there, the tortoise, even going very slowly, has advanced further ahead. So, Achilles runs to where the tortoise is now. But, just as before, the tortoise is now a little farther down the road. So, it is impossible for Achilles to ever catch the tortoise. Right?

What are you trying to say? False premises are interesting? In the material world it is obviously false that giving a lead does not change laws of physics. In your little gem you are exchanging laws of physics with human presumption, to what end? To make a false point or to trap another in to using your flawed reasoning? If this constitutes the sum and substance of your argument to this point you have lost the argument. Take your F. Moveon.org.

 

[DBT]

By 'privileged' I meant autonomous mental access to the means of production, neural activity/information processing, with the ability to modify deterministic activity ...

All activity is deterministic, and there is nothing anyone can do to alter that logical fact.

Exactly, which is why the critical point of regulative control, doing otherwise, is impossible within a determined system, effectively eliminating the possibility of freedom of will. Which in turn compels compatibilists to define free will as 'acting without coercion or according to one's will.'

Which of course is inevitable because once one's will has been formed/determined and action is called for, action must necessarily follow, and it can't be otherwise because there is no otherwise in a determined system.

The only illusion here is that determinism is a causal agent that makes our decisions for us. If she decided for herself what she would do, then she is the causal agent. And that is empirical reality.

But that's not the whole picture, the causal agent (the brain) is being acted upon by information from the external world and the action that is taken is determined by how that information input effects her neural network....''she'' has no say in what goes on in 'her' brain, her thoughts and ruminations emerge in her conscious mind fully formed in response to the information that is being processed unconsciously, her conscious mind is being fed information on what to do even after signals to muscle groups are sent.

An intelligent system, but not a matter of 'free will.'


How Can There Be Voluntary Movement Without Free Will?
''Humans do not appear to be purely reflexive organisms, simple automatons. A vast array of different movements are generated in a variety of settings. Is there an alternative to free will? Movement, in the final analysis, comes only from muscle contraction.

Muscle contraction is under the complete control of the alpha motoneurons in the spinal cord. When the alpha motoneurons are active, there will be movement.

Activity of the alpha motoneurons is a product of the different synaptic events on their dendrites and cell bodies. There is a complex summation of EPSPs and IPSPs, and when the threshold for an action potential is crossed, the cell fires. There are a large number of important inputs, and one of the most important is from the corticospinal tract which conveys a large part of the cortical control.

Such a situation likely holds also for the motor cortex and the cells of origin of the corticospinal tract. Their firing depends on their synaptic inputs. And, a similar situation must hold for all the principal regions giving input to the motor cortex. For any cortical region, its activity will depend on its synaptic inputs. Some motor cortical inputs come via only a few synapses from sensory cortices, and such influences on motor output are clear.

Some inputs will come from regions, such as the limbic areas, many synapses away from both primary sensory and motor cortices. At any one time, the activity of the motor cortex, and its commands to the spinal cord, will reflect virtually all the activity in the entire brain.

Is it necessary that there be anything else?''

Determinism has no interest in the outcome. But she had skin in the game, an interest in seeing the best outcome for herself and perhaps others.

Pretending that some other object was controlling her for its own interests is a delusion created by the false suggestions that build the "determinism versus free will" paradox.

A paradox is created by false, but believable, suggestions. Take, Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise. Achilles, the fastest runner in the world, confidently gives the tortoise a huge head start. Then Achilles runs to where the tortoise is. But, when he gets there, the tortoise, even going very slowly, has advanced further ahead. So, Achilles runs to where the tortoise is now. But, just as before, the tortoise is now a little farther down the road. So, it is impossible for Achilles to ever catch the tortoise. Right?

But it's about function, not control. The brain has evolved to acquire and process information, the information that is acquired by the brain in turn effects the system according to the response that is called for, ie, there is food on the table, it is dinner time, the cook has prepared your favorite dishes, you are hungry........an interaction of information, environment and neural architecture, input, output.

Intelligent, interactive but not freely willed.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

A paradox is created by false, but believable, suggestions. Take, Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise. Achilles, the fastest runner in the world, confidently gives the tortoise a huge head start. Then Achilles runs to where the tortoise is. But, when he gets there, the tortoise, even going very slowly, has advanced further ahead. So, Achilles runs to where the tortoise is now. But, just as before, the tortoise is now a little farther down the road. So, it is impossible for Achilles to ever catch the tortoise. Right?

What are you trying to say? False premises are interesting? In the material world it is obviously false that giving a lead does not change laws of physics. In your little gem you are exchanging laws of physics with human presumption, to what end? To make a false point or to trap another in to using your flawed reasoning? If this constitutes the sum and substance of your argument to this point you have lost the argument. Take your F. Moveon.org.

I'm saying that the notion that "reliable cause and effect is something that one must be free of" is a false suggestion. If a person buys into it they get trapped in a self-induced hoax. And then they begin saying a lot of absurd things that contradict empirical reality. For example, they say that we have no control over what we do, that we have no freedom to choose for ourselves what we will do, they say that it is not really us, when really, it is us. They tell us that it was the Big Bang that decided what we would have for breakfast. You know, it just becomes a big pile up of absurdities. But they are wedded to these absurdities, because it seems so convincing to them that one must be free of reliable causation in order to be "truly" free.

But every freedom we have, to do anything at all, requires reliable cause and effect. Reliable causation is as much us, and what we do, as it is anything else. It is not a separate entity, some external being that takes over our lives. It is us, living, and doing, and choosing.

The determinism "versus" free will paradox is created by the false suggestion that reliable cause and effect is something that constrains us, when actually it is something that enables every freedom that we have. We, ourselves, are a collaborative collection of reliable causal mechanisms that keep our hearts beating and our thoughts flowing.

Oh, and the false suggestion in the Zeno's "Achilles versus the Tortoise" paradox is the notion that Achilles runs to the where the turtle was. Achilles would run to where the turtle will be when he gets there (or a few steps further to win a race).

So, if we're looking for reliable causation, or the laws of nature, we have only to look in a mirror. They are not our enemy, they are us.

 

[fromderinside]

A paradox is created by false, but believable, suggestions. Take, Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise. Achilles, the fastest runner in the world, confidently gives the tortoise a huge head start. Then Achilles runs to where the tortoise is. But, when he gets there, the tortoise, even going very slowly, has advanced further ahead. So, Achilles runs to where the tortoise is now. But, just as before, the tortoise is now a little farther down the road. So, it is impossible for Achilles to ever catch the tortoise. Right?

What are you trying to say? False premises are interesting? In the material world it is obviously false that giving a lead does not change laws of physics. In your little gem you are exchanging laws of physics with human presumption, to what end? To make a false point or to trap another in to using your flawed reasoning? If this constitutes the sum and substance of your argument to this point you have lost the argument. Take your F. Moveon.org.

I'm saying that the notion that "reliable cause and effect is something that one must be free of" is a false suggestion. If a person buys into it they get trapped in a self-induced hoax. And then they begin saying a lot of absurd things that contradict empirical reality. For example, they say that we have no control over what we do, that we have no freedom to choose for ourselves what we will do, they say that it is not really us, when really, it is us. They tell us that it was the Big Bang that decided what we would have for breakfast. You know, it just becomes a big pile up of absurdities. But they are wedded to these absurdities, because it seems so convincing to them that one must be free of reliable causation in order to be "truly" free.

But every freedom we have, to do anything at all, requires reliable cause and effect. Reliable causation is as much us, and what we do, as it is anything else. It is not a separate entity, some external being that takes over our lives. It is us, living, and doing, and choosing.

The determinism "versus" free will paradox is created by the false suggestion that reliable cause and effect is something that constrains us, when actually it is something that enables every freedom that we have. We, ourselves, are a collaborative collection of reliable causal mechanisms that keep our hearts beating and our thoughts flowing.

Oh, and the false suggestion in the Zeno's "Achilles versus the Tortoise" paradox is the notion that Achilles runs to the where the turtle was. Achilles would run to where the turtle will be when he gets there (or a few steps further to win a race).

So, if we're looking for reliable causation, or the laws of nature, we have only to look in a mirror. They are not our enemy, they are us.

Do we decide or do we answer to what we think? I'm fully in the camp that we are ones that answer to what e ware thinking. We're pretty bright has little to do with whether we decide. If what we are doing is answering our subvocal utterances we aren't deciding. we are reporting near time behavior.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

All activity is deterministic, and there is nothing anyone can do to alter that logical fact.

Exactly, which is why the critical point of regulative control, doing otherwise, is impossible within a determined system, effectively eliminating the possibility of freedom of will.

Within a "deterministic" system, every event is causally necessitated by prior events. This includes the choosing event. Choosing necessarily happens. It is unavoidable. And it necessarily happens precisely when, where, and how it happens. This includes every step within the choosing operation, every physical, biological, and mental event.

Among these necessary mental events are the cognition of our options, as two or more things that we "can" choose to do, such as A and B. Once we know our options, we imagine what is likely to happen if we choose A. Then we imagine what is likely to happen if we choose B. If A looks better than B, then A become the thing that "we will do", and B becomes the thing that "we could have done".

Determinism cannot claim that we "could not have chosen B", because "we can choose B" was true at the beginning. When determinists claim that "we could not have chosen B", they create cognitive dissonance, because if "we can choose B" was ever true in the past, then "we could have chosen B" will also be true, forever, in the future.

Determinism can only safely assert that we "would not have chosen B". And, most people would find that to be true. If they had good reasons for choosing A instead of B, then why would they want to choose B? They wouldn't.

Which in turn compels compatibilists to define free will as 'acting without coercion or according to one's will.'

Well, we define "free will" as a choice we make that is "free of coercion and other forms of undue influence" because (a) everyone understands and correctly uses that definition, (b) it makes a meaningful distinction between deliberate acts versus coerced acts versus insane acts, etc., and (c) because this distinction is actually used whenever people assign moral or legal responsibility for a person's actions.

On the other hand, defining "free will" as a choice we make that is "free from causal necessity" creates a paradox, because every freedom we have, to do anything at all, requires reliable cause and effect. So, the philosophical definition is self-contradictory, and cannot reasonably serve as the definition of anything.

Which of course is inevitable because once one's will has been formed/determined and action is called for, action must necessarily follow, and it can't be otherwise because there is no otherwise in a determined system.

Within a deterministic system, each "otherwise" is causally necessary and inevitably must happen. If you encounter an "otherwise" within a deterministic system, then you know that it was unavoidable and had to be there.

It is a simple matter of keeping our event containers straight.
(The Single Deterministic system contains:
(Intelligent species behavior contains:
(Choosing events contain:
(Otherwise's) ) ) ).

The only illusion here is that determinism is a causal agent that makes our decisions for us. If she decided for herself what she would do, then she is the causal agent. And that is empirical reality.

But that's not the whole picture, the causal agent (the brain) is being acted upon by information from the external world and the action that is taken is determined by how that information input effects her neural network....''she'' has no say in what goes on in 'her' brain, her thoughts and ruminations emerge in her conscious mind fully formed in response to the information that is being processed unconsciously, her conscious mind is being fed information on what to do even after signals to muscle groups are sent.

You keep trying to build a wall between her and her brain. If her brain has decided that she will order the chef salad for lunch, and she tells the waiter, "I will have the chef salad, please", then, after the meal, does the waiter bring the bill to her brain, or does he bring the bill to her?

We can spend a lifetime studying the neurological details of how all this works. But in the real world, there is no free lunch, and some person must be held responsible to pay for the salad.

An intelligent system, but not a matter of 'free will.'

Free will is when the customer decides for herself, according to her own goals and reasons, what she will order for lunch. And the waiter will bring her the bill, holding her responsible for her deliberate act.

How Can There Be Voluntary Movement Without Free Will?
''Humans do not appear to be purely reflexive organisms, simple automatons. A vast array of different movements are generated in a variety of settings. Is there an alternative to free will? Movement, in the final analysis, comes only from muscle contraction.

Muscle contraction is under the complete control of the alpha motoneurons in the spinal cord. When the alpha motoneurons are active, there will be movement. ...

Sorry, but the notion that the alpha motoneurons are deciding what she will have for lunch is a bit absurd, don't you think?

But it's about function, not control.

That which performs the function of deciding what will happen next is in control.

The brain has evolved to acquire and process information, the information that is acquired by the brain in turn effects the system according to the response that is called for, ie, there is food on the table, it is dinner time, the cook has prepared your favorite dishes, you are hungry........an interaction of information, environment and neural architecture, input, output.

It is dinner time, yes, but this is a restaurant. There is no food on the table (unless you want to eat the ketchup, salt, and pepper). There is just a menu. And, unless you choose what you will have for dinner, and tell the waiter what you will have for dinner, there will be no dinner for you.

You must choose what you will have for dinner. But, that's why you came to a restaurant, to have choices. You can choose the steak. You can choose the lobster. You can choose to keep it simple and have the chef salad. It is totally up to you.

And, it was causally necessary, and inevitable, from any prior point in eternity, that it would be totally up to you, and no other object in the whole physical universe, to make this choice.

So, what will you have for dinner?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Do we decide or do we answer to what we think? I'm fully in the camp that we are ones that answer to what e ware thinking. We're pretty bright has little to do with whether we decide. If what we are doing is answering our subvocal utterances we aren't deciding. we are reporting near time behavior.

Ironically, as you have pointed out, we're talking to ourselves. Words are going out subvocally and coming back in, apparently so that we can review what we are saying and make corrections. I would guess a similar thing is happening as we type out words and read them back to ourselves. Might as well get everyone involved, eh?

Deciding is a formal operation. Choosing inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice. The choice is usually in the form of an "I will" do something. Choosing sets our intention and that intent marshals the body into action carrying out that intent.

A rat in a maze is choosing, and learning from each choice, until he knows exactly which path to take to get to the cheese. And, of course, people in a restaurant, already having found the path with Google Maps, must now choose from the menu what item they will have for dinner.

Even if there were no speaking to oneself, there would still be choosing going on. And it would be our own brains, acting on our behalf, making the decision, consciously or not.

We don't need to look inside the brain to find choosing. We look at the many possibilities on the menu. Then we look at the single specific item that was ordered. And we know from these two facts that choosing happened.

 

[fromderinside]

Do we decide or do we answer to what we think? I'm fully in the camp that we are ones that answer to what e ware thinking. We're pretty bright has little to do with whether we decide. If what we are doing is answering our subvocal utterances we aren't deciding. we are reporting near time behavior.

Ironically, as you have pointed out, we're talking to ourselves. Words are going out subvocally and coming back in, apparently so that we can review what we are saying and make corrections. I would guess a similar thing is happening as we type out words and read them back to ourselves. Might as well get everyone involved, eh?

Deciding is a formal operation. Choosing inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice. The choice is usually in the form of an "I will" do something. Choosing sets our intention and that intent marshals the body into action carrying out that intent.

A rat in a maze is choosing, and learning from each choice, until he knows exactly which path to take to get to the cheese. And, of course, people in a restaurant, already having found the path with Google Maps, must now choose from the menu what item they will have for dinner.

Even if there were no speaking to oneself, there would still be choosing going on. And it would be our own brains, acting on our behalf, making the decision, consciously or not.

We don't need to look inside the brain to find choosing. We look at the many possibilities on the menu. Then we look at the single specific item that was ordered. And we know from these two facts that choosing happened.

During my entire time at university I never participated in a rat study or any animal study that involved scent unless sensing was the objective of the study. Learning studies are designed to attain a particular change in behavior using rewards usually in something like a puzzle box or a Skinner box or a test tank all including a manipulandum. We limit the options to as few as possible usually one. Animals that learn make a choice over trials, almost never in one trial. So its a bit difficult to see that choices are made. We seldom give pretests since doing so would fall into the nature nurture trap.

Uh, the ears require a certain amount of pressure change to hear. So we may not be actually talking to ourselves when we subvocalize. Instead there is feedback from minute variations in muscles produced as information is transferred from speech centers through vocal chords that is sensed by neurons monitoring the vocal chords and fed back to cortex generating confirmation of what was sent from language cortex to vocal apparatus. generating sense of consciousness.

Occasionally we do hear what we subvocalize which produces other outcomes and we ae confused when external speech is also present in the system at the same time.

Your arguments are just logical presumptions based on your model of how we process information, produce consciousness.

If the ear heard what was said it would need another system to separate that from received external speech.

Good luck finding that. remember speech perceptions does discriminate between external sources already. There should be quite a build up in latency of processing if these systems also had to distinguish self-generated speech from externally generated speech.

If we went to all the evolution of generating a homunculus why isn't there more communication between that and speech processing auditory cortex if it were needed to differentiate inner from outer hearing.

 

[DBT]

That which performs the function of deciding what will happen next is in control.

Brain function, how we think and what we do is related to architecture and interaction of information, inputs, memory, etc, rather than 'control.'

Information acquired by the senses acts upon the system. The brain doesn't control what the senses acquire, it responds according to its architecture and memory function.

Goldberg brings his description of frontal dysfunction to life with insightful accounts of clinical cases. These provide a good description of some of the consequences of damage to frontal areas and the disruption and confusion of behavior that often results. Vladimir, for example, is a patient whose frontal lobes were surgically resectioned after a train accident. As a result, he is unable to form a plan, displays an extreme lack of drive and mental rigidity and is unaware of his disorder. In another account, Toby, a highly intelligent man who suffers from attention deficits and possibly a bipolar disorder, displays many of the behavioral features of impaired frontal lobe function including immaturity, poor foresight and impulsive behavior.''

It is dinner time, yes, but this is a restaurant. There is no food on the table (unless you want to eat the ketchup, salt, and pepper). There is just a menu. And, unless you choose what you will have for dinner, and tell the waiter what you will have for dinner, there will be no dinner for you.

You must choose what you will have for dinner. But, that's why you came to a restaurant, to have choices. You can choose the steak. You can choose the lobster. You can choose to keep it simple and have the chef salad. It is totally up to you.

And, it was causally necessary, and inevitable, from any prior point in eternity, that it would be totally up to you, and no other object in the whole physical universe, to make this choice.

So, what will you have for dinner?

What you select comes to mind in response to what you see on the menu and the tastes or aversions that have developed over your lifetime.

You may have had a good idea of what to order before you arrived at the restaurant, which was probably chosen because its menu happens to appeal to your taste.

Or feel adventurous, let someone make the choice for you - ''try this'' - come what may.

Regardless, it's all information processing carried out by the brain and brought to conscious mind as events progress. Input, processing, response.


Pattern Recognition;
''Neuroscientists have repeatedly pointed out that pattern recognition represents the key to understanding cognition in humans. Pattern recognition also forms the very basis by which we predict future events, i e. we are literally forced to make assumptions concerning outcomes,and we do so by relying on sequences of events experienced in the past.''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Brain function, how we think and what we do is related to architecture and interaction of information, inputs, memory, etc, rather than 'control.'

No. The whole point of the brain is to exercise control. The infant acquires the skill of crawling and the toddler the skill of walking to control where he goes. Later, he learns to control an automobile. Control is what the brain is all about.

Control is why we care about causation. We control viral diseases like Polio and Measles by knowing that they are caused by a virus and that our bodies can be primed to fight a virus through vaccination.

Freedom is why we care about causation. These diseases used to affect thousands of children every year. But now we are free of their harmful effects.

Information acquired by the senses acts upon the system. The brain doesn't control what the senses acquire, it responds according to its architecture and memory function.

No, not that either. Where we decide to go, and what we decide to do, controls what we experience. What we choose to hear and what we choose to ignore controls the information that enters.

Goldberg brings his description of frontal dysfunction to life with insightful accounts of clinical cases. These provide a good description of some of the consequences of damage to frontal areas and the disruption and confusion of behavior that often results. Vladimir, for example, is a patient whose frontal lobes were surgically resectioned after a train accident. As a result, he is unable to form a plan, displays an extreme lack of drive and mental rigidity and is unaware of his disorder. In another account, Toby, a highly intelligent man who suffers from attention deficits and possibly a bipolar disorder, displays many of the behavioral features of impaired frontal lobe function including immaturity, poor foresight and impulsive behavior.''

The quote from Goldberg supports what I am saying. When he reports that a patient whose frontal lobe injuries prevent him from forming a plan and causing a lack of drive, he is reminding us that a normal brain forms plans and has such drive. "Drive" also goes by the name "will". And another patient Goldberg recalls, with attention deficits and bipolar disorder displays "immaturity, poor foresight and impulsive behavior". This also indicates that the normal brain is capable of deliberate conscious attention, foresight, and mature control of their behavior.

The point of the brain is to enable us to exercise some control, of ourselves and of our environment. Mental illness and brain injuries can compromise this normal ability to exercise responsible control. That is why a significant mental illness can constitute an undue influence that calls for medical and psychiatric treatment, rather than normal rehabilitation in a correctional facility.

What you select comes to mind in response to what you see on the menu and the tastes or aversions that have developed over your lifetime. You may have had a good idea of what to order before you arrived at the restaurant, which was probably chosen because its menu happens to appeal to your taste. Or feel adventurous, let someone make the choice for you - ''try this'' - come what may. Regardless, it's all information processing carried out by the brain and brought to conscious mind as events progress. Input, processing, response.

The process you're referring to is called "choosing". And, it is we ourselves, via our brains, that perform this choosing. And, as you mentioned, our choice will in all cases be reliably caused. Whether what we order in the restaurant is an old favorite, or whether we "feel adventurous" and want something new, or simply following the advice of a friend, it is still up to us to decide.

"Input, processing, response"? Yes. The menu is our input, the processing is us applying an evaluation of our options based upon any number of factors, but mostly our own interests, and finally the response, "I will have the steak dinner, please", the freely chosen "I will" that controls what happens next. The waiter brings us the meal, we eat it, and the waiter brings us the bill, holding us responsible for our deliberate act of placing the order.

Pattern Recognition;
''Neuroscientists have repeatedly pointed out that pattern recognition represents the key to understanding cognition in humans. Pattern recognition also forms the very basis by which we predict future events, i e. we are literally forced to make assumptions concerning outcomes,and we do so by relying on sequences of events experienced in the past.''

Right. Prediction is the first reason we care about causation. Without reliable cause and effect we cannot predict the outcome of our actions. Without the ability to predict the result of our action we will have no control of the outcome. And, without the ability to control what happens next, we have no freedom.

Reliable cause and effect gives us our ability to predict. The ability to predict gives us control. The ability to control what happens next gives us our freedom to do what we want to do.

And that is why "freedom from reliable cause and effect (causal necessity)" is an irrational notion. Without reliable causation there is no freedom to do anything at all. Freedom requires a deterministic universe. Every freedom we have, to do anything at all, is enabled by reliable cause and effect.

The hard determinist's interpretation of reliable causation, as a monster that strips us of our control and our freedom, is spreading a false view of reliable cause and effect. The fact that we ourselves have prior causes does not change the fact that we ourselves are the true prior causes of new events.

 

[ZiprHead]

Thread re-opened.

 

[TomC]

Free will is an illusion based on an incomplete understanding of the underlying deterministic processes. Compatibilism ignores this and attempts to define free will into existence through semantics.

I only got this far in the thread before I realized it had been locked, because I tried to respond and couldn't. The staff unlocked it. Thanks guys.

Full disclosure: I'm not well versed in philosophy.

I never understood "compatibilism". But reading this, it sounds like me. I see "free will" as an illusion, created by our inability to recognize our own motivations. We humans aren't really all that smart or perceptive. Illusions are an extremely important part of the human experience. That's just how we are.

From horizons to literature to randomness to ideologies to mathematics, the human experience is dominated by abstractions. Things that have no objective existence. But we don't define them into existence.

I see free will the same way. It is abstract, but very real.

What I find aggravatingly dishonest is theists insisting that free will has objective existence. Because otherwise their omnimax benevolent God becomes utterly incoherent and internally inconsistent. That's the whole point to much of Genesis. Claiming that God is Almighty. The reason He appears to be a bumbling sky king, with superpowers, is because we humans have free will and are therefore responsible for all the suffering.

Eve tied God's Hands.

Tom

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Free will is an illusion based on an incomplete understanding of the underlying deterministic processes. Compatibilism ignores this and attempts to define free will into existence through semantics.

I only got this far in the thread before I realized it had been locked, because I tried to respond and couldn't. The staff unlocked it. Thanks guys.

Full disclosure: I'm not well versed in philosophy.

I never understood "compatibilism". But reading this, it sounds like me. I see "free will" as an illusion, created by our inability to recognize our own motivations. We humans aren't really all that smart or perceptive. Illusions are an extremely important part of the human experience. That's just how we are.

From horizons to literature to randomness to ideologies to mathematics, the human experience is dominated by abstractions. Things that have no objective existence. But we don't define them into existence.

I see free will the same way. It is abstract, but very real.

What I find aggravatingly dishonest is theists insisting that free will has objective existence. Because otherwise their omnimax benevolent God becomes utterly incoherent and internally inconsistent. That's the whole point to much of Genesis. Claiming that God is Almighty. The reason He appears to be a bumbling sky king, with superpowers, is because we humans have free will and are therefore responsible for all the suffering.

Eve tied God's Hands.

Tom

When I first ran into the determinism "versus" free will paradox, I don't think the word "compatibilism" was in use. I was a teenager in the public library who had just read something by Spinoza that suggested free will did not exist due to every event being reliably caused by prior events. This bothered me, so I tried to come up with someway to escape inevitability. I decided this would be easy to do. The next time I had a choice between any two things, say A and B, and I found myself leaning heavily toward A, I would simply choose B instead. So easy. But then it occurred to me that my desire to thwart inevitability had just made B the inevitable choice. So, to escape inevitability, I had to choose A.

Hmm. It was an infinite loop. No matter what I chose, there would always be a reason that caused my choice to be inevitable! That's when it dawned on me. The only reason for my choice changes was to escape inevitability. But the only person in the room was me. I had imagined inevitability as something that I had to escape. But inevitability wasn't there. Only I was. And it occurred to me that, if inevitability actually were such an entity, it would be sitting in the corner laughing at me, for having caused me such distress just by thinking about it.

Once I realized that what I would inevitably do was exactly identical to me just being me, doing whatever I chose to do, inevitability ceased to be a problem. It was not a real constraint. It was precisely what I would have done anyway.

So, from my perspective, causal necessity is not a threat to free will. Free will is nothing more or less than what we choose to do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Free will was never free from reliable causation. And it needn't be, because reliable cause and effect is not a meaningful or relevant constraint.

The initial illusion, is that reliable cause and effect (causal necessity) is some kind of causal agent exercising control over us (hard determinism). That illusion creates the second illusion, that we must be free of reliable cause and effect in order to have free will (libertarian free will). Both are illusions.

As you point out, it is a matter of abstractions. Causal necessity is an abstraction that consolidates all of the simple cause and effect events into one notion.

But reliable cause and effect is instantiated daily, as we reliably cause events, like fixing breakfast, driving to work, etc. And free will is instantiated daily as people decide for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence.

As to God's problem, if an entity is omniscient and omnipotent, then it is also omni-responsible. Free will provides no "get out of jail free" card for God.

 

[fromderinside]

The hard determinist's interpretation of reliable causation, as a monster that strips us of our control and our freedom, is spreading a false view of reliable cause and effect. The fact that we ourselves have prior causes does not change the fact that we ourselves are the true prior causes of new events.

We only behave in response to change, What exits us is only compensates to the extent we have been impacted. Our output is based on what is sensed. What exits us is cause to only the thing or event to which we are responding. We don't cause.

Our reaction doesn't become cause. That does not make us causal. Whatever exits from us is effect from external cause. Yes we are external to what we react. That doesn't make us causal since we are reacting. It's a lame claim to say our response is cause since we are generally reactive beings. Think of things this way :whatever we do is effect." We convert food to usable energy but that is purely mechanical, er, biological. We are thermodynamic middlemen. No intent formed. No information in no response. Information in to what we react is a effect of our position relative to our situation which is keeping things the way they are.

We may deceive ourselves that we intend something when all we do is react.

It's turtles all the way down.

 

[DBT]

No. The whole point of the brain is to exercise control. The infant acquires the skill of crawling and the toddler the skill of walking to control where he goes. Later, he learns to control an automobile. Control is what the brain is all about.

Control of muscle groups and motor actions, balance, coordination,etc, is not the same as 'control' in the form of 'able to choose otherwise' - which of course is impossible within a determined system.

Obviously, given the subject matter, I was not talking about developing physical skills. This is about freedom of will and the nature of decision making, not body function.

The issue is the ability to otherwise under precisely the same circumstances.

Control is why we care about causation. We control viral diseases like Polio and Measles by knowing that they are caused by a virus and that our bodies can be primed to fight a virus through vaccination.

Freedom is why we care about causation. These diseases used to affect thousands of children every year. But now we are free of their harmful effects.

Yeah, still unrelated to the issue of free will, the ability to have done otherwise.

The necessity of regulative control, which is absent within a determined system

Quote;

If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:

1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise

2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control

3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible

4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable

5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

The quote from Goldberg supports what I am saying. When he reports that a patient whose frontal lobe injuries prevent him from forming a plan and causing a lack of drive, he is reminding us that a normal brain forms plans and has such drive. "Drive" also goes by the name "will". And another patient Goldberg recalls, with attention deficits and bipolar disorder displays "immaturity, poor foresight and impulsive behavior". This also indicates that the normal brain is capable of deliberate conscious attention, foresight, and mature control of their behavior.

The normal brain simple functions according to its condition, which is what damaged brains do, which is what happens with chemical imbalances, lesions, trauma, etc, etc....each brains output according to its condition producing adaptive or maladaptive behaviour based on non chosen condition.


''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents.''

The point of the brain is to enable us to exercise some control, of ourselves and of our environment. Mental illness and brain injuries can compromise this normal ability to exercise responsible control. That is why a significant mental illness can constitute an undue influence that calls for medical and psychiatric treatment, rather than normal rehabilitation in a correctional facility.

Control within a deterministic system? A system that doesn't entail the ability to do otherwise, determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable.

Right. Prediction is the first reason we care about causation. Without reliable cause and effect we cannot predict the outcome of our actions. Without the ability to predict the result of our action we will have no control of the outcome. And, without the ability to control what happens next, we have no freedom.

Reliable cause and effect gives us our ability to predict. The ability to predict gives us control. The ability to control what happens next gives us our freedom to do what we want to do.

And that is why "freedom from reliable cause and effect (causal necessity)" is an irrational notion. Without reliable causation there is no freedom to do anything at all. Freedom requires a deterministic universe. Every freedom we have, to do anything at all, is enabled by reliable cause and effect.

The hard determinist's interpretation of reliable causation, as a monster that strips us of our control and our freedom, is spreading a false view of reliable cause and effect. The fact that we ourselves have prior causes does not change the fact that we ourselves are the true prior causes of new events.

But determinism is more than 'reliable cause and effect' and prediction. Determinism fixes outcomes as a matter of natural law.....and fixed outcomes - no possible alternative - are not freely chosen outcomes. They are determined outcome. Determined by elements beyond our control; brain condition, be it healthy or damaged.

Freely chosen outcomes, by definition, require regulative control, entailing possible alternatives in any given instance, to have done otherwise.




''It is unimportant whether one's resolutions and preferences occur because an ''ingenious physiologist'' has tampered with one's brain, whether they result from narcotics addiction, from ''hereditory factor, or indeed from nothing at all.'' Ultimately the agent has no control over his cognative states.

So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunty, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce. After all, we do not have occasion to choose our dominant proclivities.'' - Prof. Richard Taylor -Metaphysics.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The hard determinist's interpretation of reliable causation, as a monster that strips us of our control and our freedom, is spreading a false view of reliable cause and effect. The fact that we ourselves have prior causes does not change the fact that we ourselves are the true prior causes of new events.

... What exits us is cause to only the thing or event to which we are responding. We don't cause.

I don't think one can say on the one hand that our reactions cause effects, and then claim that we don't do any causing. Even if every action were a reaction, we would still be doing a heck of a lot of causing.

Our reaction doesn't become cause. That does not make us causal. Whatever exits from us is effect from external cause. Yes we are external to what we react. That doesn't make us causal since we are reacting.

No, that's still not making sense to me. Let's try an example. The Covid-19 virus reacts to its external environment by invading living cells and using that cell's material to reproduce itself. Do we, or do we not, consider the virus to be the "cause" of a disease?

Every living organism is biologically driven to survive, thrive, and reproduce. Each species is the cause of changes in its own environment, whether it be trees growing into a forest or the bees pollenating them. No living organism is merely an effect. Every effect is itself a cause.

To claim otherwise would deny the fundamental meaning of causal necessity!

It's a lame claim to say our response is cause since we are generally reactive beings. Think of things this way :whatever we do is effect."

A lame claim? It's a simple observation of nature. And if "whatever we do is effect", then why wouldn't this be true of our each of our prior causes as well? If we must pass that test then so must those prior causes. You would no longer have "causal necessity", because you would no longer have any "causes".

We convert food to usable energy but that is purely mechanical, er, biological.

And where did we get the food? Well, we got the food from the grocery store, but the food was caused by the farmers. The farmers caused the food to grow by causing the land to be tilled, causing the seeds to be planted, causing the ground to be fertilized and watered, causing the wheat and corn to be harvested.

We are thermodynamic middlemen. No intent formed. No information in no response. Information in to what we react is a effect of our position relative to our situation which is keeping things the way they are.

I'm pretty sure that the truckers and the packagers and the salesmen are the middlemen between us and the farmer.

We may deceive ourselves that we intend something when all we do is react.

Actually, taking your viewpoint seriously would be a self-deception. Humans have evolved words and concepts that help us to describe a real world rich in its variety and functions. The hard determinists seem intent upon removing these tools of our survival one by one. First goes "free will", then goes "responsibility", then goes "self", and now even "causation" exits stage right until nothing is left. All of our meaningful distinctions disappear one by one until:

It's turtles all the way down.

Well, let's hope that one of those turtles can drive a tractor...

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... The issue is the ability to otherwise under precisely the same circumstances. ...
... Yeah, still unrelated to the issue of free will, the ability to have done otherwise. ...
... Control within a deterministic system? A system that doesn't entail the ability to do otherwise, determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable. ...
...and fixed outcomes - no possible alternative ...
...entailing possible alternatives in any given instance, to have done otherwise. ...

So, where does the notion of "an ability to have done otherwise" come from? It comes from the context of uncertainty. The best way to keep things straight is to consider this simple reminder: "When we are uncertain what will happen, we imagine what can happen, to be better prepared for what does happen".

For example, we're driving down the road and we see a traffic light up ahead. The light is currently red. But will it remain red, or, will it turn green by the time we get there? We don't know. Our context is uncertainty. We cannot say for certain what will happen.

But we can say for certain what can happen. The light can remain red and the light can turn to green. Both of these are real possibilities. However, only one of them will be the single actuality. We just don't know yet which one that will be. So, just to be safe, as we get closer to the traffic light, we slow down, in case it remains red. But then, as we arrive, it turns green. So, we resume our speed and drive through the light.

If someone were to ask us, "Why did you slow down?", our answer would be "Because the light could have remained red". This "could have" refers to the fact that "the light can remain red" was true earlier, and "could have" is simply the past tense of "can". If "this can happen" was ever true in the past, then "this could have happened" will forever be true in the future.

Now, if our passenger in the car is a hard determinist, he may insist that, "There was never a real possibility that the light could have remained red, because it was causally necessary, from the time of the Big Bang, that the light would be green." And he asks again, "So, why did you slow down?" How are we to answer? The only way to answer is to explain to him, repeatedly and in excruciating detail, the difference between something that "can" happen versus something that "will" happen.

Something that "will" happen will certainly happen. But something that "can" happen may happen, or, it may never happen. And when we say that something "could have" happened, we are always logically implying that it definitely did not happen. And that reflects the truth of the situation with the traffic light. When we say it "could have" remained red, we are confirming that it definitely did not remain red. So, our use of "could have" remains a truthful and accurate depiction of what actually did and did not happened.

So, how does this apply to free will? Well, free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence (significant mental illness, hypnosis, manipulation, authoritative command, etc.). Free will is simply a freely chosen "I will". What

Every decision happens in a context of uncertainty. "Will I choose A or will I choose B? I don't know yet, I'm still uncertain". All I know for certain is that "I can choose A" is true and that "I can choose B" is also true. Either of these can happen, but I don't know yet which one will happen. So, let me think about it. I imagine the likely outcome of choosing A. And then I imagine the likely outcome of choosing B. At this point it seems to me that A is the better choice. So, I will choose A, even though I could have chosen B.

Both "I will choose A" and "I could have chosen B" are true statements of fact. One implies that "I did choose A" and the other implies that "I did not choose B".

So, that's how these two separate notions, "will" and "can" actually work in the real world. We cannot conflate or confuse them without screwing things up.

Now, what are the implications of this distinction to the definition of determinism? Well, it turns out that the traditional saying that "determinism means that you could not have done otherwise" is actually false. What the definition should say instead is that "determinism means that you would not have done otherwise".

If it is necessary that "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" must be true in order to actually begin to make a decision, then there will always be an "I will choose A" and an "I could have chosen B" whenever a choosing event appears in the causal chain. Both are guaranteed by causal necessity and logical necessity.

To wrap up, this actually makes a lot of sense: People naturally object when told that they "could not have chosen otherwise", because they saw the "I can choose B" happen right in front of them, and thus conclude logically that "I could have chosen B" must also be true. And they are not having an illusion. They are simply using the words correctly.

But people would be less likely to object if told that they "would not have have chosen otherwise" under the same circumstances. After all, if they had good reasons for choosing A, then why would they choose B? Something would have to change, perhaps new information, before they would choose B instead of A.

''It is unimportant whether one's resolutions and preferences occur because an ''ingenious physiologist'' has tampered with one's brain, whether they result from narcotics addiction, from ''hereditory factor, or indeed from nothing at all.'' Ultimately the agent has no control over his cognative states. So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunty, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce. After all, we do not have occasion to choose our dominant proclivities.'' - Prof. Richard Taylor -Metaphysics.

No, professor Taylor. It is very very important to distinguish between cases where someone is tampering with a person's brain versus a person's own choice without such manipulation. You are destroying a meaningful distinction with a meaningless abstraction. So, knock it off, prof. You really should know better.

 

[pood]

Let’s consider the argument mooted above by DBT:

1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise

2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control

3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible

4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable

5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

The above argument is invalid because 5., the conclusion, simply does not follow from 1-4.

The argument runs aground on P. 4, not because P. 4 is false, but because it simply fails to do the work it is advertised to do. I take it P. 4 is intended to refute P. 1. Since that must be the case, an additional premise is required, viz., 5. Because determinate actions are are fixed and unchangeable, an agent could not have acted otherwise.

Add that necessary premise, and the argument is now valid, but it’s unsound! That is, the newly inserted premise is false.

And hence collapses the entire hard deterministic enterprise. Their main argument is either invalid or it is valid but unsound.

I’ll try to show the precise problem a bit later — why the premise is false — but I wanted to get this out there because I keep seeing this silly argument. Marvin is doing such a marvelous job he needs no help, I’ll say that. And he ought to be teaching a college course in this and dispelling Pereboom and Taylor and all the others. Not only is his argument correct in my view, he is articulating it with a verve and clarity that few academic philosophers can match.

 

[pood]

From 4: determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable. From this we are meant to infer, it seems, that no one could have done, other that what they did, because determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable.

Except this does not follow. Because a determinate action is fixed and unchangeable, it does not follow that said action could not have been otherwise.

Today it’s true that a few days ago, I had turkey for Thanksgiving. That is a fixed and unchangeable fact of history. But — obviously! — it doesn’t follow from this that I had to have turkey — I could quite easily have had something else, and had I done so, that “something else” would have been “fixed and unchangeable.”

I suspect what the hard determinist is gesturing at, though, is that the future is fixed and unchangeable, because of antecedent events combined with the so-called laws of nature. If the future is fixed and unchangeable, the argument goes, I have no free will, because I cannot change the future (do other than what I am determined to do).

The argument still doesn’t go through. Free will does not require the ability to change the past, present, or future. It only requires the ability to help, in some small measure, make the past, present, and future, be, what they were, are, and will be. To change the future would be to violate the law of noncontradiction, to both do and not do something at the same time, and no account of free will requires this.

If it is true today that next Thanksgiving, I will also have turkey just as I did this past Thanksgiving, then sure enough, I will have turkey next Thanksgiving. But it doesn’t follow that I MUST have turkey. I could easily do otherwise, and if I do, then today a different proposition about what I eat next Thanksgiving would be true.

 

[DBT]

From 4: determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable. From this we are meant to infer, it seems, that no one could have done, other that what they did, because determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable.

Except this does not follow. Because a determinate action is fixed and unchangeable, it does not follow that said action could not have been otherwise.

Today it’s true that a few days ago, I had turkey for Thanksgiving. That is a fixed and unchangeable fact of history. But — obviously! — it doesn’t follow from this that I had to have turkey — I could quite easily have had something else, and had I done so, that “something else” would have been “fixed and unchangeable.”

I suspect what the hard determinist is gesturing at, though, is that the future is fixed and unchangeable, because of antecedent events combined with the so-called laws of nature. If the future is fixed and unchangeable, the argument goes, I have no free will, because I cannot change the future (do other than what I am determined to do).

The argument still doesn’t go through. Free will does not require the ability to change the past, present, or future. It only requires the ability to help, in some small measure, make the past, present, and future, be, what they were, are, and will be. To change the future would be to violate the law of noncontradiction, to both do and not do something at the same time, and no account of free will requires this.

If it is true today that next Thanksgiving, I will also have turkey just as I did this past Thanksgiving, then sure enough, I will have turkey next Thanksgiving. But it doesn’t follow that I MUST have turkey. I could easily do otherwise, and if I do, then today a different proposition about what I eat next Thanksgiving would be true.

What you do now is fixed by the information condition of your brain in this instance in time. Consequently what you do now is is the only realizable option available to you in this instance in time. That is the nature of determinism.

If any old thing is possible for you in any moment in time, it's not determinism.

 

[steve_bank]

Both rocks and bodies are determined by physical laws.

Your nervous system is electrical. Does a neuron know anything? Your sense of self is the sum of a number of discrete states at any given time. Analogous to digital video. It looks like continuous motion, in reality it is a sequence of still images changing faster than the persistence of the eye.

Your brain is a biological computer, just not of the Turing Machine form of a PC processor. Your neural net has logic functions at the neuron level. You would need to understand Boolean Algebra, digital logic, and state machines to see it.

John Lily went off the deep end a bit combining LSD with salt water isolation tanks as in the movie Altered States, but it is a good read. He staed by doing research on live dolphin brans until he concluded they were aware thinking creatures with a language.

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Did you ever catch the "Fringe" tv series? The guy had a tank in his lab and used it in the first episode. (Great series by the way, John Noble's character was amazing...in both universes).

No, I grew out of that stuff in the 70s. In the Center of The Cyclone Lilly described vivid hallucinations in the tank with LSD, like having a conversation with Moses. He drifted into woo paranormal.