Compatibilism: What's that About?

[pood]

DBT,

Once again, you conflate determinism with hard determinism. Determinism is the verified, empirical observation that effects reliably follow causes; i.e. David Hume’s “constant conjunction” formulation.

Hard determinism is an inference from determinism, which requires justification. And yet even your own definition of hard determinism (which you erroneously call determinism) is inaccurate to your own purposes. I realize you are getting these definitions from others, some of whom are noted philosophers etc., yet their credentials don’t stop them from being wrong. Another label for hard determinism might be predeterminism.

You keep saying the future is “fixed” as a matter of natural law. As I have previously pointed out, this definition does not suit your purposes because “fixity” doesn’t imply fatalism or predeterminism. Of course the whole history of the world is fixed! But what fixes it, or what is fixing it? In part, human free will helps fix the historical record.

What you really need to be saying is something like, “natural law, in conjunction with antecedent events, entails all future events, including human acts.” The word “entails” captures much more precisely what you are arguing for, than the word “fixes.”

As it happens, of course, natural law entails nothing of the kind, because, as both Marvin and I have noted, natural law is not PREscriptive, it is DEscriptive. What we call “natural law” takes it truth from the way the world is, and not the other way around —that the way the world is, takes its truth from natural law, as you assume. Once “natural law” is properly defined, as Norman Swartz has noted, the supposed conflict between determinism and free will cannot even be coherently formulated. Swartz doesn’t even call his position compatibilism, because he says saying that determinism is compatible with free would be as odd and superfluous as saying that noses are compatible with itches. The opposite of determinism is not free will — the opposite is INdeterminism.

I await your long-sought explanation of why evolution favored brains that remember, foresee, evaluate, ponder and choose, when according to you, all these abilities are illusions. Note again I am not asking for a functionalist account of neurons firing, etc. I am asking you to explain how these illusions, as you would have them, increase population fitness. I continue to argue that if hard determinism were true, complex brains would be useless, and we would all be philosophical zombies carrying out a pre-programmed subroutine with no conscious awareness, because such awareness would be utterly useless in such a world and hence would not be favored by natural selection.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The issue is simply the question of freedom within a determined system.

Yes. And there are plenty of freedoms within a determined system so long as we do not create a logical paradox by trying to include "freedom from being within a determined system" among those freedoms!

Once we stop including logically impossible freedoms, we are still left with all of the logically possible freedoms, the freedoms that everyone enjoys every day. Like freedom of speech, or freedom from cruel or unusual punishments, or freedom to drive on the public roads, or freedom to decide for ourselves all of the millions of things that we may choose to do.

As long as we do not include silly things, like "freedom from causal necessity" or "freedom from ourselves" or "freedom from reality", etc., then we still find a cornucopia of freedoms to enjoy.

Actions that are determined are not just freely performed, but necessarily performed, they must happen as determined; the bird freed from its cage is able to 'freely' fly wherever it wishes to go.....but is this free will?

Yes. Assuming that the cage door is open, the bird can decide to stay in the cage or choose to fly away. He is free to choose to do either one. Whichever option he selects will, of course, have been causally necessary from any prior point in eternity. But, then again, what event is not? So, no worries there.

Its actions are necessitated unimpeded actions, the bird must necessarily act according to its will and its will is fixed by antecedents, so it cannot choose otherwise

The only meaningful and relevant antecedent was us opening the door of the cage. What the bird does next is up to the bird.

''the way things are at a time t and the way things go thereafter being fixed as a matter of natural law.''

What part of the bird's choosing to stay, or choosing to go, violates natural law? The bird is a natural, living organism. Whatever the bird does is compatible with its nature. Its nature is not an external force acting upon the bird. It is the bird itself, acting naturally.

The notion of the laws of nature "fixing" things is superstitious nonsense. The bird itself will either fly or wait around to see what his dinner will be. The behavior of the bird dictates the laws of nature.

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. "

Yes. But choosing to actually do X is determined by the chooser.

"Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. "

Well, that depends upon what they desire to do. The desire to have sex with a woman had best be constrained by something, otherwise it is rape. You know that, right?

At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate).

Nope. We ascribe free will only to species that are capable of imagining alternative options, evaluating these options, and then choosing for themselves what they will do. Animals that act upon instinct alone do not have free will.

Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.''

Morality is species specific. What is good for the lioness is bad for the antelope, and vice versa. And if a lion develops an appetite for human flesh, then she will be put down, like an incorrigible serial killer.

Cold comfort in Compatibilism

Actually, compatibilism is warm and comfy. You get your freedoms and your free will, and you also get reliable cause and effect which you can put to good use to attain the things you need. You no longer have to fear causal necessity or determinism. They're still around, but they have been defanged.

 

[fromderinside]

The existence of choice depends on 'mechanism', on reliable cause and effect.

'game theory' or 'choice math' depending on how you want to word it is a thing.

Do you deny that 'game theory' describes a real thing?

Do you agree that Determinism

is the concept that events within a given paradigm are bound by causality in such a way that any state (of an object or event) is completely determined by prior states

If so then choice must be defined as events in the paradigm in which one imputes causality.

As for the rest, I've studied various evolutionary game paradigms, in every case the science comes down on the side of individual fitness. That means initial claims based on game theory requiring group, kin, or coevolutionary selection had to be modified to the point where they came back to the basic evolutionary game of individual fitness whether individual or a single mother's genes defined the population.

Now in your game you can say anything you think your reader might comprehend. But scientifically you have to adhere to the statement quoted above in making that statement. So are you or are you not going to operationally define the elements (choice) relative to prior states.

 

[fromderinside]

So @fromderinside @DBT:

Is it possible for a human being to use game theory to make better choices?

Edit: or, how would you reword the above statement to fit your hard determinism?

Because there is a truth there, in that statement. Game theory was invented by humans for the sake of making better "choices". That is it's entire function in the ecosystem of math.

Do you think game theory is meaningless mental masturbation? Otherwise, what process do you think "improves" and how would you even use language to meaningfully discuss it without bringing choice into it as a concept?

Countered on Indeterminism thread. Operations required. It's for you to answer.

 

[DBT]

So @fromderinside @DBT:

Is it possible for a human being to use game theory to make better choices?

Edit: or, how would you reword the above statement to fit your hard determinism?

Because there is a truth there, in that statement. Game theory was invented by humans for the sake of making better "choices". That is it's entire function in the ecosystem of math.

Do you think game theory is meaningless mental masturbation? Otherwise, what process do you think "improves" and how would you even use language to meaningfully discuss it without bringing choice into it as a concept?

My hard determinism?

No, the definition of determinism is the same for both sides.

The distinction lies between compatibility and incompatibility of 'free will'

I argue that the term is redundant. It doesn't represent cognition, decision making, the drivers of human behaviour, the nature and function of neural networks, inputs or outputs....that compatibilism rests upon a carefully selected and worded definition.

That's all.

 

[DBT]

Determined is not free.

If this were the case then nothing within a deterministic universe could be free.

Although you don't admit it, you're effectively arguing that any use of the word 'free', in any circumstance, is mistaken.

The distinctions between will, so called 'free will' and unimpeded actions have been described over and over and over......yet you make a remark like that. Why? Have you not been reading my posts?

I should learn by now.

Whenever you say "determined is not free", what you really mean is "determined will is not free". This is misleading. You do realise the two claims aren't synonymous don't you?

It's not misleading. You just seem unwilling to contemplate the implications of determinism.

What is determined is not free to do otherwise. As pointed out, freedom of choice demands the possibility to have done otherwise.

Determinism doesn't allow alternate actions. Without alternate actions there is no freedom of will.

Determined actions, of course proceed freely without impediment or restriction. The action is determined.

It's not hard to grasp. Will is necessitated by antecedents, related actions proceed without restriction or restraint. Labelling necessitated will and related actions as 'free will' doesn't represent determined will or any determined action that follow.

If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

 

[DBT]

DBT,

Once again, you conflate determinism with hard determinism. Determinism is the verified, empirical observation that effects reliably follow causes; i.e. David Hume’s “constant conjunction” formulation.

No, I don't. The definition of determinism is exactly the same for both sides of the debate. Freedom of will simply rests on the definition of free will given by compatibilism.

I do nothing more than point out why the compatibilist definition of free will fails to prove its proposition.

Which is essentially because compatibilism is founded upon carefully selected terms and wording.

Terms and wording that do not represent cognition, brain state and function, social conditioning, the nature of decision making or motor action.

For instance;

Movement Intention After Parietal Cortex Stimulation in Humans;
''Parietal and premotor cortex regions are serious contenders for bringing motor intentions and motor responses into awareness. We used electrical stimulation in seven patients undergoing awake brain surgery.

Stimulating the right inferior parietal regions triggered a strong intention and desire to move the contralateral hand, arm, or foot, whereas stimulating the left inferior parietal region provoked the intention to move the lips and to talk.

When stimulation intensity was increased in parietal areas, participants believed they had really performed these movements, although no electromyographic activity was detected. Stimulation of the premotor region triggered overt mouth and contralateral limb movements.

Yet, patients firmly denied that they had moved. Conscious intention and motor awareness thus arise from increased parietal activity before movement execution.''

 

[DBT]

The issue is simply the question of freedom within a determined system.

Yes. And there are plenty of freedoms within a determined system so long as we do not create a logical paradox by trying to include "freedom from being within a determined system" among those freedoms!

There are plenty of common references to freedom that are not to the underlying nature of reality, a determined world. As pointed out, George swings his golf club freely, the bird flies freely, you are free to watch TV or read a book, says absolutely nothing about the nature of the mechanisms and means of these freely performed actions. \

The references are based on surface appearances, not determinism, not neurology, not chemistry, not physics or causality, just shallow observations and references.

Common language. You can say George acted according to his will, or you could say George acted according to his free will, but given the nature of cognition, the former is a more accurate description and the latter includes 'free' as a redundancy.

Once we stop including logically impossible freedoms, we are still left with all of the logically possible freedoms, the freedoms that everyone enjoys every day. Like freedom of speech, or freedom from cruel or unusual punishments, or freedom to drive on the public roads, or freedom to decide for ourselves all of the millions of things that we may choose to do.

As long as we do not include silly things, like "freedom from causal necessity" or "freedom from ourselves" or "freedom from reality", etc., then we still find a cornucopia of freedoms to enjoy.

The question of free will relates not to actions performed without coercion, but how will and action is produced. Determined actions are not coerced, proceed unimpeded, yet not freely willed.

Not freely willed because freedom is defined by absence of necessity, yet will is necessitated by nature. Will is not free to do otherwise. What it does is necessitated. In other words, we lack the right kind of control.

It seems that we are either caused, and our actions are caused events, or we are free. The middle, compatibilism, is excluded. - Dr Craig Ross 2007

Actions that are determined are not just freely performed, but necessarily performed, they must happen as determined; the bird freed from its cage is able to 'freely' fly wherever it wishes to go.....but is this free will?

Yes. Assuming that the cage door is open, the bird can decide to stay in the cage or choose to fly away. He is free to choose to do either one. Whichever option he selects will, of course, have been causally necessary from any prior point in eternity. But, then again, what event is not? So, no worries there.

What the bird does is determined by countless factors the bird is not even aware of. More than likely, it is the birds instinct to fly that drives it to exist its cage and take wing. Its action is instinctive.

Its actions are necessitated unimpeded actions, the bird must necessarily act according to its will and its will is fixed by antecedents, so it cannot choose otherwise

The only meaningful and relevant antecedent was us opening the door of the cage. What the bird does next is up to the bird.

What the bird does basically depends on whether it's domesticated or wild. If domesticated, feeling at home, the bird is likely to stay. I say likely because there may be elements at work that an observer has no access to.

''the way things are at a time t and the way things go thereafter being fixed as a matter of natural law.''

What part of the bird's choosing to stay, or choosing to go, violates natural law? The bird is a natural, living organism. Whatever the bird does is compatible with its nature. Its nature is not an external force acting upon the bird. It is the bird itself, acting naturally.

What the bird does depends on what is going in its brain. The bird as a conscious entity has no awareness of what is going on its brain or what is driving its impulses or desires.

The notion of the laws of nature "fixing" things is superstitious nonsense. The bird itself will either fly or wait around to see what his dinner will be. The behavior of the bird dictates the laws of nature.

It's not just 'laws of nature,' but ''given a specified way things are at a time t'' - which means the causal relationship between the objects and events of the world.

In this instance, the bird's genetic makeup, brain state, past experience, circumstances, how long its been in the cage, how it got there, etc, etc...

Actually, compatibilism is warm and comfy. You get your freedoms and your free will, and you also get reliable cause and effect which you can put to good use to attain the things you need. You no longer have to fear causal necessity or determinism. They're still around, but they have been defanged.

I'm sure compatibilism is warm and comfy for its believers, but warm and comfy doesn't prove the proposition. Nor does its carefully selected terms and conditions that don't really relate to the means of action production;

''It is unimportant whether one's resolutions and preferences occur because an ''ingenious physiologist'' has tampered with one's brain, whether they result from narcotics addiction, from ''hereditary factor, or indeed from nothing at all.'' Ultimately the agent has no control over his cognitive states.

So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunity, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce. After all, we do not have occasion to choose our dominant proclivities.'' - Prof. Richard Taylor -Metaphysics.

 

[Jarhyn]

So @fromderinside @DBT:

Is it possible for a human being to use game theory to make better choices?

Edit: or, how would you reword the above statement to fit your hard determinism?

Because there is a truth there, in that statement. Game theory was invented by humans for the sake of making better "choices". That is it's entire function in the ecosystem of math.

Do you think game theory is meaningless mental masturbation? Otherwise, what process do you think "improves" and how would you even use language to meaningfully discuss it without bringing choice into it as a concept?

My hard determinism?

No, the definition of determinism is the same for both sides.

The distinction lies between compatibility and incompatibility of 'free will'

I argue that the term is redundant. It doesn't represent cognition, decision making, the drivers of human behaviour, the nature and function of neural networks, inputs or outputs....that compatibilism rests upon a carefully selected and worded definition.

That's all.

I argue that it does not, and is not.

I posed a simple question to you:

Is it possible for a human being to use game theory to make better choices?
Reword terms of you need to.

Compatibilism relies on a carefully selected and worded definition for the same reason that math relies on a carefully selected and worded definition of "set" and "identity" and "transitive".

Carefully worded and selected definitions when discussing topics on a level wherein mechanical function of ideas is possible was the entire point.

I repeat: Is it possible for a human being to use game theory to make better choices?

 

[Jarhyn]

The existence of choice depends on 'mechanism', on reliable cause and effect.

'game theory' or 'choice math' depending on how you want to word it is a thing.

Do you deny that 'game theory' describes a real thing?

Do you agree that Determinism

is the concept that events within a given paradigm are bound by causality in such a way that any state (of an object or event) is completely determined by prior states

If so then choice must be defined as events in the paradigm in which one imputes causality.

As for the rest, I've studied various evolutionary game paradigms, in every case the science comes down on the side of individual fitness. That means initial claims based on game theory requiring group, kin, or coevolutionary selection had to be modified to the point where they came back to the basic evolutionary game of individual fitness whether individual or a single mother's genes defined the population.

Now in your game you can say anything you think your reader might comprehend. But scientifically you have to adhere to the statement quoted above in making that statement. So are you or are you not going to operationally define the elements (choice) relative to prior states.

You are not understanding the meaning of 'game theory' here.

I am not talking "evolutionary game theory" as a discipline of philosophy though you clearly also do not understand where that has come in the last 10 years either:

I am talking about mathematical game theory, the math that, for instance, discusses "why can't FDI beat even a small child at Tic Tac Toe?"

We can get on to bigger applications like it's implications for ethics later.

I'm not going to respond further to this though on this side because it belongs to the other thread, on compatibilism.

 

[The AntiChris]

Whenever you say "determined is not free", what you really mean is "determined will is not free". This is misleading. You do realise the two claims aren't synonymous don't you?

It's not misleading. You just seem unwilling to contemplate the implications of determinism.

You either aren't reading what I'm saying or you don't understand what I'm saying.

Either way, you're not responding to what I've written.

 

[pood]

I just wonder if this thread and the thread on compatibilsm could be merged, to avoid confusion, because both threads at this point are mainly discussing compatibilism. The only difference is that this thread has the added subject, not too often touched upon, of indeterminism. I think the compatiblist discussion kind of moved over here after the other thread was locked for awhile due to trolling.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

There are plenty of common references to freedom that are not to the underlying nature of reality, a determined world.

Common references are the source of definitions. People outside of these discussions do not reference "a determined world" at all, because it has no meaning and no significance to any practical human matter. The notion of "a determined world" is a disease spread through false but believable suggestions that trap people in a paradox.

The truth is that all events are the natural result of prior events. This notion goes by the name "History".

As pointed out, George swings his golf club freely, the bird flies freely, you are free to watch TV or read a book, says absolutely nothing about the nature of the mechanisms and means of these freely performed actions.

Freedom is our ability to do things. If George can no longer swing his golf club freely, because he has a pulled muscle in his shoulder, the mechanism will be examined by an Orthopedist, who will recommend treatment. And all of George's golfing buddies will sympathize, and share their own stories of injuries on the golf course.

The nature of the mechanism is not some hidden philosophical secret. We just take them for granted until they stop working. Then we see a doctor, who knows all about the mechanism and how to restore its function, so that George is free once more to swing his golf club.

The references are based on surface appearances, not determinism, not neurology, not chemistry, not physics or causality, just shallow observations and references.

Well, not everyone is a neurologist, and a chemist, and a physicist.

On the other hand, everyone is quite aware of causality! They tell George, "You've done something to strain your shoulder", showing that they assume a world of reliable cause and effect. Then they tell him "You should see your orthopedist", showing that they assume a physical causal mechanism involving muscles and tendons.

Common language. You can say George acted according to his will, or you could say George acted according to his free will, but given the nature of cognition, the former is a more accurate description and the latter includes 'free' as a redundancy.

It is only necessary to add "free" to will when there is some question as to whether someone acted voluntarily versus being forced to act against their will, for example, by coercion, manipulation, or insanity.

That is a very important distinction. So, no, we cannot drop the adjective "free" from free will without losing that significant distinction.

The problem here is not with common usage. The problem is the nonsensical definition created by philosophy, "freedom from causal necessity". Nobody uses that definition outside of philosophy, because it is irrational and paradoxical. But academic philosophy loves paradoxes, no matter the damage that they cause.

The question of free will relates not to actions performed without coercion, but how will and action is produced. Determined actions are not coerced, proceed unimpeded, yet not freely willed.

The fact is that no actions are ever free of prior causes.
If the action is freely chosen, then it will still be "causally" necessary.
If the action is coerced, then it will still be "causally" necessary.
If the action is accidental, then it will still be "causally" necessary.
If the action is insane, then it will still be "causally" necessary.

To say that the action is causally determined blurs all meaningful distinctions. And, we humans become very dumb and incompetent when we fail to make meaningful distinctions. (The book, "The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat", comes to mind).

Not freely willed because freedom is defined by absence of necessity, yet will is necessitated by nature.

"Necessitated by nature" is the same thing as causally necessary, and it swallows up all meaningful distinctions in a generality.

Free will is when it is our own nature that decides what we will do, rather than the nature of the guy with a gun that decides what we will do. You would bury this significant distinction in your generality.

Will is not free to do otherwise. What it does is necessitated. In other words, we lack the right kind of control.

Everything is always causally necessitated. But there are meaningful distinctions as to who or what is doing the causing. If we are deciding for ourselves what we will do, then we are controlling what we do. If someone holding a gun to our head is deciding what we will do, then he is controlling us against our will.

It seems that we are either caused, and our actions are caused events, or we are free. The middle, compatibilism, is excluded. - Dr Craig Ross 2007

A false, but believable suggestion. It sounds true, so we are drawn into the mental trap, but it is empirically false. This is how the paradox of determinism "versus" free will is spread and sustained.

When we are the most meaningful and relevant cause of our actions, then we are held responsible.
When someone with a gun is the most meaningful and relevant cause of our actions, then he is held responsible.

Either we are free to decide for ourselves what we will do, or the guy with the gun is controlling us against our will and he is deciding for us what we will do.

In either case, all of the events will be reliably caused. But in one case we are acting of our own freely chosen will (free will).

The fact that the free will event was caused does not negate the fact that the meaningful and relevant cause was our own choice.

What the bird does depends on what is going in its brain. The bird as a conscious entity has no awareness of what is going on its brain or what is driving its impulses or desires.

Despite the bird's lack of self-knowledge, if the cage door is open, he is free to fly away, and if the cage door is closed, he is not free.

The same applies to George's golf swing. If his shoulder is in good working order then he is free to swing his club. If not, then he is no longer free to play golf, and he will seek professional help for his shoulder. George's freedom to swing his club does not rely upon an intimate understanding of what his neurons are doing, or even how his should works. He is either objectively free to swing his golf club or he is objectively not free to swing the club.

It's not just 'laws of nature,' but ''given a specified way things are at a time t'' - which means the causal relationship between the objects and events of the world. In this instance, the bird's genetic makeup, brain state, past experience, circumstances, how long its been in the cage, how it got there, etc, etc...

Yes, the current state of all things at time t and its events will reliably cause the next state of all things at time t+1 and its events. But we humans cannot deal with the state of all things at either of those points in time. So, that fact, though logically true, is not meaningful or relevant to any significant human events, like deciding what I will have for breakfast.

The meaningful and relevant cause of what I will have for breakfast is my own choosing from my available options. And free will is about whether I am free to make this choice for myself, or whether someone else is deciding what I will eat whether I like it or not. In either case, it will always be causally necessitated by someone or something. Here's hoping it will be me.

''It is unimportant whether one's resolutions and preferences occur because an ''ingenious physiologist'' has tampered with one's brain, whether they result from narcotics addiction, from ''hereditary factor, or indeed from nothing at all.''

Another professor professing nonsense. How can he fail to see that IT IS VERY IMPORTANT WHETHER AN ''INGENIOUS PHYSIOLOGIST'' HAS TAMPERED WITH ONE'S BRAIN versus a person deciding for themselves what they will do.

Ultimately the agent has no control over his cognitive states.

Another false, but believable suggestion. The truth is that our cognitive states will themselves be the causes of other cognitive states. (It's that state at t and state at t+1 thing that causal necessity implies). And that is what we experience. One thing being the cause of the next thing. (For example, my breakfast is now ready, so I'll finish up and go eat it now).

So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunity, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce. After all, we do not have occasion to choose our dominant proclivities.'' - Prof. Richard Taylor -Metaphysics.

And this is the common you can't have free will because unless you can be "free from yourself" argument. Whose will would it be if you were free from yourself? Someone else's.

 

[fromderinside]

Common references are the source of definitions. People outside of these discussions do not reference "a determined world" at all, because it has no meaning and no significance to any practical human matter. The notion of "a determined world" is a disease spread through false but believable suggestions that trap people in a paradox.

The truth is that all events are the natural result of prior events. This notion goes by the name "History".


Freedom is our ability to do things. If George can no longer swing his golf club freely, because he has a pulled muscle in his shoulder, the mechanism will be examined by an Orthopedist, who will recommend treatment. And all of George's golfing buddies will sympathize, and share their own stories of injuries on the golf course.

The nature of the mechanism is not some hidden philosophical secret. We just take them for granted until they stop working. Then we see a doctor, who knows all about the mechanism and how to restore its function, so that George is free once more to swing his golf club.

Two objections.
1. Indeterminism would destroy science which is demonstrably the most powerful tool man has developed ever.
2. Free will has no mechanism for existence in either a determined or undetermined world. Cause and effect eliminated choice and lack of cause and effect negates motive.

 

[fromderinside]

So @fromderinside @DBT:

Is it possible for a human being to use game theory to make better choices?

Edit: or, how would you reword the above statement to fit your hard determinism?

Because there is a truth there, in that statement. Game theory was invented by humans for the sake of making better "choices". That is it's entire function in the ecosystem of math.

Do you think game theory is meaningless mental masturbation? Otherwise, what process do you think "improves" and how would you even use language to meaningfully discuss it without bringing choice into it as a concept?

My hard determinism?

No, the definition of determinism is the same for both sides.

The distinction lies between compatibility and incompatibility of 'free will'

I argue that the term is redundant. It doesn't represent cognition, decision making, the drivers of human behaviour, the nature and function of neural networks, inputs or outputs....that compatibilism rests upon a carefully selected and worded definition.

That's all.

I argue that it does not, and is not.

I posed a simple question to you:

Is it possible for a human being to use game theory to make better choices?
Reword terms of you need to.

Compatibilism relies on a carefully selected and worded definition for the same reason that math relies on a carefully selected and worded definition of "set" and "identity" and "transitive".

Carefully worded and selected definitions when discussing topics on a level wherein mechanical function of ideas is possible was the entire point.

I repeat: Is it possible for a human being to use game theory to make better choices?

The correct answer is 'yes'. But a mistake is being made. 'Better' is a qualitative word, a subjective expression. I take the liberty here providing an example of providing a mostly subjective analysis of choice and decision in design.

Subjective And Objective Design Choices​

Subjective And Objective Design Choices - Vanseo Design

How can a series of objective design decisions lead to something subjective?

vanseodesign.com

makes what I've been trying to make clear obvious. Humans are subjective beings living in an objective world. All operationalists try to make this point, but, being subjective beings they mostly fail. Most spectacularly, Psychologists, behaviorists, in particular, failed miserably.

So me saying what you write is subjectively expressed or view is true, but not because you can't see the light. The field which you love is filled with subjective statements, even in definitions. That you defend your view is proof of your and my subjectivity. Even the founder of Operationalism acknowledges what he expresses is never completely objective. He failed, admits his condition as true, because he has justified it because he's a physicist.

I don't ask that every word be operationally defined. I ask that you admit what you write is a mostly subjective view.

You associating your view by linking Math with your list of essential words is a strong signal you are aware what you write is a subjective statement supporting mostly subjective terms of their objectivity.

 

[The AntiChris]

2. Free will has no mechanism for existence in either a determined or undetermined world. Cause and effect eliminated choice and lack of cause and effect negates motive.

This is true only for libertarian (contra-causal) free will. It is not true for compatibilist free will as discussed in this forum.

 

[DBT]

2. Free will has no mechanism for existence in either a determined or undetermined world. Cause and effect eliminated choice and lack of cause and effect negates motive.

This is true only for libertarian (contra-causal) free will. It is not true for compatibilist free will as discussed in this forum.

Compatibilism is based on flawed premises. If the premises are flawed, the conclusion is rendered unsound. unimpeded actions based on necessitated processes/will does not equate to free will.

 

[DBT]

Whenever you say "determined is not free", what you really mean is "determined will is not free". This is misleading. You do realise the two claims aren't synonymous don't you?

It's not misleading. You just seem unwilling to contemplate the implications of determinism.

You either aren't reading what I'm saying or you don't understand what I'm saying.

Either way, you're not responding to what I've written.

I'd say the same about your posts. You miss the point each and every time. Your objections have nothing to do with what I say.

 

[DBT]

I just wonder if this thread and the thread on compatibilsm could be merged, to avoid confusion, because both threads at this point are mainly discussing compatibilism. The only difference is that this thread has the added subject, not too often touched upon, of indeterminism. I think the compatiblist discussion kind of moved over here after the other thread was locked for awhile due to trolling.

There are only a few participants, and as the free will issue is repetitive it's pointless repeating the same things in multiple threads.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

2. Free will has no mechanism for existence in either a determined or undetermined world. Cause and effect eliminated choice and lack of cause and effect negates motive.

This is true only for libertarian (contra-causal) free will. It is not true for compatibilist free will as discussed in this forum.

Compatibilism is based on flawed premises. If the premises are flawed, the conclusion is rendered unsound. unimpeded actions based on necessitated processes/will does not equate to free will.

The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.

The proof is this:
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Which premise is flawed and what is the flaw?