Ksen, I'm just trying to understand your position here. Why is intent needed in regards to this precise issue with the ACA? Is it because you believe the statute is ambiguous? Is it because you believe the plain language results in an undesirous outcome for those obtaining insurance through a federally established exchange? I'm just trying to understand your position here.
My position is that if the 9th Circuit's ruling wins out then it will cause painful suffering for millions of citizens whose only fault is to live in a state that didn't want to establish its own exchange. It's clear to me from reading the amicus brief, statements from others closely involved in crafting the bill and seeing the nonreaction of congress to the IRS interpretation of that rule that congress' intent was to have subsidies apply to state and federal established exchanges.
And it's clear that that idiot from Cato that's pursuing this doesn't care at all about the damage that might happen to millions of americans just because he wants to try and prove a point. It's ridiculous and is just another example of how dangerous true believers in libertarianism can be.
But that's, like, just my opinion man.
So, viewed soberly without hair-pulling, your position is that if the DC Circuit court ruling stands then for those states that turned down an Obamacare exchange it will return to the insurance market as it existed prior to January of 2014, and you don't like their choice to keep the prior system.
In addition you are convinced, due to your perception of relative Congressional calm over the IRS regulation, and the claim of 7 (of 533 Congresspersons) who are relentless hawkers of universal Obama care, and a single staffer, that Congress must have intended to extend credits and subsidies to the Federal Exchange(s).
As someone who might qualify, in your view, as one of the "disingenuous or complete idiots" I suggest that you note that just because a law has a policy outcome you loath does not mean the court's ruling legally was wrong - it may be morally wrong not to support Obamacare, in your view, but that is a different argument. And you might also note a recent post at Volokh by an "agnostic" on Halbig points out that part of the problem is that the supporters and critics are talking past one another using three forms of discourse.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/...4/07/24/different-ways-of-criticizing-halbig/
In the course of reading criticisms of the decision, I have noticed several different forms of legal argument, and I think it’s important to distinguish them, since they have different roles in different theories of statutory interpretation:
Mode 1: That’s not what the text says, at least if you read the whole text carefully.
Mode 2: That’s not what Congress actually intended.
Mode 3: That result is absurd — i.e., nobody who supported the statute could have intended that.
Obviously these are non-exhaustive and also overlapping, and one can advance two or all three of them at the same time. But it is still important to keep track of which modes are involved.
For example, Ilya’s previous post is a response to a mode 3 argument (cooperative federalism programs aren’t absurd). Abbe Gluck’s rejoinder is a mode 2 argument (this wasn’t intended to be a cooperative federalism program). I understand Neil Siegel to be making largely a mode 1 argument...
Specifically, without an appreciation of the primacy of the plainly written text (Mode 1) over seller's 'do-over' regrets, your claims will continue to confuse. If the plain text of the ACA law only authorizes credits and subsidies for individuals who purchase through State and Territorial 'American Heal Benefit Exchanges' (section 3011) then that's the law and it was, apparently, its intent. The plain meaning of a statute's language can only be rendered inoperative if it is due to glaring clerical/technical error (such as an error in transcription) OR if the result of the language is so absurd that it is impossible that Congress could have intended it.
Consider, from the opinion:
"The fact is that the legislative record provides little indication one way or the other of congressional intent, but the statutory text does. Section 36B plainly makes subsidies available only on Exchanges established by states. And in the absence of any contrary indications, that text is conclusive evidence of Congress’s intent. Cf. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“At best, the legislative history is cryptic, and this surely is not enough to overcome the plain meaning of the statute.”). To hold otherwise would be to say that enacted legislation, on its own, does not command our respect—an utterly untenable proposition. Accordingly, applying the statute’s plain meaning, we find that section 36B unambiguously forecloses the interpretation embodied in the IRS Rule and instead limits the availability of premium tax credits to state-established Exchanges."
In other words, absent an absurd result, if the text of the statute is clear, intent doesn't matter and the clear wording prevails. As a Justice Brandeis’ opinion once observed: “What the government asks is not a construction of a statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court, so that what was omitted, presumably by inadvertence, may be included within its scope."
From a legal standpoint, merely noting that the failure to extend a welfare benefit causes pain for some is NOT a legal argument. And as the result was not absurd, the court was correct in its finding.