Definition of Consciousness: 2nd Poll

[Speakpigeon]

Here is the second round of the poll on consciousness, with fewer options to choose from but also a new one, as well as one comprehensively reworded.
EB

 

[Subsymbolic]

I'll go with the definition I gave in the other thread:

Self consciousness requires the unification of two varieties of consciousness: being something that it is like something to be and being able to conceive of yourself as yourself. The former is a necessary condition for the latter, but both are necessary for self consciousness - which is what most people mean by consciousness.

But I'm still not keen of soundbites. Consciousness is difficult and trying to do difficult things quickly generally doesn't get you what you want.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Yes?
But the thread is not about self-consciousness.
EB

 

[Subsymbolic]

Isn't it?

While I'm content that mental events can occur without self consciousness, I'm not sure how they could be experienced as such. There is a problem with how cognition, conation and affect are bound into a user illusion. Personally I don't think consciousness counts for much without being part of a robust self consciousness. Sure, pain would hurt, for example, but it wouldn't hurt the bat. The pain would occur within the bat as a matter of biology, but that just means that the bat's biology has pain supervening upon it. Yes, it would hurt, but it wouldn't hurt the bat, because there isn't a mental bat to hurt, only a physical one. Nociception, even as a mental event, pain, doesn't require a self. If you can explain how a bat would be able to make the mental leap from there being a pain, to the pain being its pain then I don't have a definition of consciousness. I'd be delighted if you can make this case.

However, the reason I was so careful setting up self consciousness using the drone example was precisely to make it clear how much of a metaphysical leap of binding it is to achieve self consciousness. That's Bp2 not BP1 - and I'm one of those who sees Strawson's Individuals as setting out the bottom line here. However, as you seem to like Dennett, I guess that we could approach it through his position on mental events in the latter half of Consciousness Explained.

Alternatively, if this just isn't the discussion you are after, then I'm happy to save this for another day.

I guess the point I'm making is that both are necessary, but not sufficient, for the other.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Isn't it?

While I'm content that mental events can occur without self consciousness, I'm not sure how they could be experienced as such. There is a problem with how cognition, conation and affect are bound into a user illusion. Personally I don't think consciousness counts for much without being part of a robust self consciousness. Sure, pain would hurt, for example, but it wouldn't hurt the bat. The pain would occur within the bat as a matter of biology, but that just means that the bat's biology has pain supervening upon it. Yes, it would hurt, but it wouldn't hurt the bat, because there isn't a mental bat to hurt, only a physical one. Nociception, even as a mental event, pain, doesn't require a self. If you can explain how a bat would be able to make the mental leap from there being a pain, to the pain being its pain then I don't have a definition of consciousness. I'd be delighted if you can make this case.

It would hurt the bat. The bat would have no notion that it is the bat but it would still feel the pain. If a bat is conscious then surely the pain it feels will hurt the bat. Self-consciousness is irrelevant here.

Self-consciousness, as I see it, requires that the subject has a representation of itself within its own consciousness, as part of its overall representation of the world. Self-consciousness is probably best thought of as a biographical record of the subject. So the representation of the subject is useful, but not for experiencing pain. Pain hurts but it can only hurt the subject, not the representation of the subject, and the subject will hurt even if it does not keep any kind of biographical record.

However, the reason I was so careful setting up self consciousness using the drone example was precisely to make it clear how much of a metaphysical leap of binding it is to achieve self consciousness. That's Bp2 not BP1 - and I'm one of those who sees Strawson's Individuals as setting out the bottom line here. However, as you seem to like Dennett, I guess that we could approach it through his position on mental events in the latter half of Consciousness Explained.

Alternatively, if this just isn't the discussion you are after, then I'm happy to save this for another day.

No, I didn't like Dennett. All I can remember from Consciousness Explained is that Dennett tried to explain away consciousness. The cardinal sin in my book.

I guess the point I'm making is that both are necessary, but not sufficient, for the other.

I don't see why self-consciousness would be necessary to consciousness.

We usually have self-consciousness and we don't normally experience consciousness without self-consciousness but it can still happen, on occasions.
EB

 

[Subsymbolic]

It would hurt the bat. The bat would have no notion that it is the bat but it would still feel the pain.

What would feel the pain?

If a bat is conscious then surely the pain it feels will hurt the bat.

As you say, the bat would have no notion that it was the bat. So where is the bat that is feeling the pain? Or to put it another way, what does the singular experience of pain bind with to make it 'the bat's pain rather than just a pain?

Self-consciousness is irrelevant here.

We disagree, it appears.

Self-consciousness, as I see it, requires that the subject has a representation of itself within its own consciousness, as part of its overall representation of the world. Self-consciousness is probably best thought of as a biographical record of the subject. So the representation of the subject is useful, but not for experiencing pain. Pain hurts but it can only hurt the subject, not the representation of the subject, and the subject will hurt even if it does not keep any kind of biographical record.

If it doesn't keep any kind of biographical record, how exactly is it aware it is a subject and how does in bind the pain that occurs with the subject that it isn't keeping a record of?

No, I didn't like Dennett. All I can remember from Consciousness Explained is that Dennett tried to explain away consciousness. The cardinal sin in my book.

I agree that Dennett is a linguistic behaviourist. However, that doesn't mean that you can just ignore his work. Personally I think he's got the language side of consciousness nailed down. His only mistake is to not allow that there is another side.

I guess the point I'm making is that both are necessary, but not sufficient, for the other.

I don't see why self-consciousness would be necessary to consciousness.

I gathered.

It's not necessary for discrete conscious events. However Nagel didn't call the book 'The View from Nowhere' for no reason. The fact is that a discrete conscious event is like a cog spinning without being connected to anything. To have conscious experience requires a lot more stage setting/

We usually have self-consciousness and we don't normally experience consciousness without self-consciousness but it can still happen, on occasions.

Really? Can you give an example of how we have that experience which explains how we can have an experience without the we bit?

 

[Speakpigeon]

It would hurt the bat. The bat would have no notion that it is the bat but it would still feel the pain.

What would feel the pain?

As you say, the bat would have no notion that it was the bat. So where is the bat that is feeling the pain? Or to put it another way, what does the singular experience of pain bind with to make it 'the bat's pain rather than just a pain?

But it's what being conscious is supposed to feel like. Consciousness is enough on its own to let you experience pain. The fact that you don't know who you are isn't going to change the fact that you feel pain.

So it's the bat feeling the pain even if it doesn't know it is a bat.

Self-consciousness, as I see it, requires that the subject has a representation of itself within its own consciousness, as part of its overall representation of the world. Self-consciousness is probably best thought of as a biographical record of the subject. So the representation of the subject is useful, but not for experiencing pain. Pain hurts but it can only hurt the subject, not the representation of the subject, and the subject will hurt even if it does not keep any kind of biographical record.

If it doesn't keep any kind of biographical record, how exactly is it aware it is a subject and how does in bind the pain that occurs with the subject that it isn't keeping a record of?

It's not aware of being a bat but it is conscious and it feels the pain.

The fact is that a discrete conscious event is like a cog spinning without being connected to anything. To have conscious experience requires a lot more stage setting

Conscious experience may be limited and indeed reduced to a bare minimum.

The bat feels the pain even if it has no notion of being a bat. That's what subjective experience does.

Really? Can you give an example of how we have that experience which explains how we can have an experience without the we bit?

I've already told this story once on this forum about experiencing 'bare' consciousness. I once woke up in the middle of the night with a bad case of back pain. I had to get up to go to the loo but once there, I fainted because of the back pain and lay there for a while crumpled on the floor. Yet, after the event, I was able to recall how I had felt immediately after fainting. So, while passed out, I couldn't remember anything at all about myself, who I was, or my life. I was just 'in the present' and nothing seemed to happen. My consciousness was very, very limited. In particular, I had no notion of my own identity, of who I was. And I could no longer feel any pain. I couldn't feel anything physical. I wasn't aware of the light, either. I only recall being slightly apprehensive all the while. But I have no idea how long it lasted, although possibly only for a few seconds.

So, broadly, I take this to be an instance of being conscious without any hint of self-consciousness. It's true I didn't feel any pain even though my back was still hurting when I woke up, but the point is that I was conscious nonetheless, if only minimally, and no trace of self-consciousness.
EB

 

[DBT]

Looks like a fair bit of overlap. I voted option two but could have voted option three, or both. Both being reasonably representative of my position.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Looks like a fair bit of overlap. I voted option two but could have voted option three, or both. Both being reasonably representative of my position.

That's coming a bit late. I suggested in due course that the authors of the options 1, 2 and 3 could try to work out a common formulation.
EB

 

[Subsymbolic]

Consciousness is enough on its own to let you experience pain.

Seriously, just read this bit alone again. Now, where are you getting the you from?

In your story, my problem is simple. You are telling a story about states that you are very clearly claiming as your own. You say it yourself:

I had no notion of my own identity, of who I was. And I could no longer feel any pain. I couldn't feel anything physical. I wasn't aware of the light...

So my question is quite simply, if you had no idea of your own identity, why are you so sure that you had the experience. The fact is that you have bound those experiences together in narrative and entirely claimed them as your own. This is something that happened to you, not something that merely happened.

To put it in Nagel's terms, you are taking the experience and imagining of a mature adult with all the machinery in place and imagining that this allows you to feel like a creature without those things in place. One point of Nagel's book is that you can't do that.

More to the point, this sort of introspective account in extremis is precisely the sort of thing that I'm sure you know doesn't stand up to scrutiny. I have heard very similar stories as justification of life after death, angels and so on. Can't you see the problem with saying anything that adds up to 'I had no notion of my own identity'?

 

[ruby sparks]

I personally am taking it that self-consciousness is a more sophisticated version of consciousness and that there's a spectrum starting....somewhere basic...and going up to robust self. To analogise, it's akin to saying that the ability to focus is a more sophisticated feature of vision, but that there is a less sophisticated experience below that. Pain seems another relevant example. Are we to say that to feel pain, an entity has to be having having a sense of self to go along with that?

And to my mind, the spectrum doesn't just operate on evolutionary timescales, or between species, or during the life of any one species, or between members of that species. It seems to vary on all of those. Even I myself (or if you like the mature/developed system that calls itself me most of the time) can experience quite an extensive range of experiences on the spectrum on a day-to-day, moment-to-moment basis.

 

[Subsymbolic]

I personally am taking it that self-consciousness is a more sophisticated version of consciousness and that there's a spectrum starting....somewhere basic...and going up to robust self. To analogise, it's akin to saying that the ability to focus is a more sophisticated feature of vision, but that there is a less sophisticated experience below that. Pain seems another relevant example. Are we to say that to feel pain, an entity has to be having having a sense of self to go along with that?

And to my mind, the spectrum doesn't just operate on evolutionary timescales, or between species, or during the life of any one species, or between members of that species. It seems to vary on all of those. Even I myself (or if you like the mature/developed system that calls itself me most of the time) can experience quite an extensive range of experiences on the spectrum on a day-to-day, moment-to-moment basis.

Sure, now try to imagine a system that isn’t you. That doesn’t have an I to have these experiences. It has biology and that biology feels like something sometimes but that’s it for the system’s mental life. How do those mental events become unified and under what unifying principle? Sure there are putative solutions to BP1, but that doesn’t solve this issue.

 

[untermensche]

There is not this thing called "consciousness".

There are only individual consciousnesses and no two are the same thing.

If all we look at are similarities we are not defining. We are abstracting.

If we try to reduce it to some primitive essence, like arousal, we are not defining. We are abstracting and subtracting.

Many humans use their individual and unique consciousnesses to create and plan.

To plan means to see ahead, to forcefully look ahead, not to respond to stimuli.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Consciousness is enough on its own to let you experience pain.

Seriously, just read this bit alone again. Now, where are you getting the you from?

In your story, my problem is simple. You are telling a story about states that you are very clearly claiming as your own. You say it yourself:

I had no notion of my own identity, of who I was. And I could no longer feel any pain. I couldn't feel anything physical. I wasn't aware of the light...

So my question is quite simply, if you had no idea of your own identity, why are you so sure that you had the experience. The fact is that you have bound those experiences together in narrative and entirely claimed them as your own. This is something that happened to you, not something that merely happened.

The "I" as I use it in my little story just stands for my thoughts at the moment I had them. I'm very comfortable with this use for I am in illustrious company in the person of Descartes. He did the same thing with the Cogito. In my example, I couldn't possibly have articulated any elaborate idea on the moment. But as I said, I was able to recall the episode afterward (and still am) and that's when I was able to elaborate a proper narrative. Obviously, the narrative using the "I" is made possible by my memory of the episode appearing to me to be straightforwardly my own, even if I had no proper self-consciousness during the episode itself. Again, what is crucial in this case is consciousness during the episode, if only minimal, and memorisation of the episode. In this sense, it's not different from any other ordinary moment in life.

To put it in Nagel's terms, you are taking the experience and imagining of a mature adult with all the machinery in place and imagining that this allows you to feel like a creature without those things in place. One point of Nagel's book is that you can't do that.

Actually, I didn't try to imagine anything. I just recalled my memory of the episode.

And, clearly, the 'machinery' of the mature adult was gone during the episode. And part of that was the clear recollection, after the event, that I had no self-consciousness at all during the episode. I wasn't even aware of being a human being in any way, let alone a mature adult! I had no memory left at all during the episode. There was just the moment and utter darkness, and nothing else except a slight anxiety. And all very apt given the circumstances.

More to the point, this sort of introspective account in extremis is precisely the sort of thing that I'm sure you know doesn't stand up to scrutiny. I have heard very similar stories as justification of life after death, angels and so on. Can't you see the problem with saying anything that adds up to 'I had no notion of my own identity'?

I really have no reason to doubt the accuracy of my memories. The episode looks very plausible to me. There's no extraordinary happenings. It doesn't look dubious in any way. If I had to doubt it, I would just as well doubt all my memories, including as to what I was doing just 5 minutes ago!

And it's also not essential to my view of consciousness and the distinction with self-consciousness.
EB

 

[Subsymbolic]

The "I" as I use it in my little story just stands for my thoughts at the moment I had them. I'm very comfortable with this use for I am in illustrious company in the person of Descartes. He did the same thing with the Cogito.

He certainly did. and this is a very useful diagnostic tool for you: was Descartes legitimate in claiming 'I think?' Think about it: he's doubting his memory, his very cognition and yet he allows himself a sense of self. what possible justification could he have. This is why I, and most of the philosophical community of the last century are quite clear that all he could say is 'there are thoughts'. Just as you are doing he allowed himself acces to resources he couldn't have. He should have disallowed himself on methodological grounds, you should on metaphysical ones.

In my example, I couldn't possibly have articulated any elaborate idea on the moment.

Do you not think that a self is an elaborate idea?

But as I said, I was able to recall the episode afterward (and still am) and that's when I was able to elaborate a proper narrative.

Obviously, the narrative using the "I" is made possible by my memory of the episode appearing to me to be straightforwardly my own, even if I had no proper self-consciousness during the episode itself. Again, what is crucial in this case is consciousness during the episode, if only minimal, and memorisation of the episode. In this sense, it's not different from any other ordinary moment in life.

To put it in Nagel's terms, you are taking the experience and imagining of a mature adult with all the machinery in place and imagining that this allows you to feel like a creature without those things in place. One point of Nagel's book is that you can't do that.

Actually, I didn't try to imagine anything. I just recalled my memory of the episode.

And, clearly, the 'machinery' of the mature adult was gone during the episode. And part of that was the clear recollection, after the event, that I had no self-consciousness at all during the episode. I wasn't even aware of being a human being in any way, let alone a mature adult! I had no memory left at all during the episode. There was just the moment and utter darkness, and nothing else except a slight anxiety. And all very apt given the circumstances.

More to the point, this sort of introspective account in extremis is precisely the sort of thing that I'm sure you know doesn't stand up to scrutiny. I have heard very similar stories as justification of life after death, angels and so on. Can't you see the problem with saying anything that adds up to 'I had no notion of my own identity'?

I really have no reason to doubt the accuracy of my memories. The episode looks very plausible to me. There's no extraordinary happenings. It doesn't look dubious in any way. If I had to doubt it, I would just as well doubt all my memories, including as to what I was doing just 5 minutes ago!

You can see, I'm sure, the story, as you describe it, is not dissimilar to those told by people who have had near death experiences, 'night terror' alien encounters and so on. I'm surprised that you'd want to give a memory of something that occurred in the middle of the night while passed out from pain the same status as everyday mental states. More to the point, you really don't seem to be responding to the repeated pointing out of the paradoxical nature of the claims like:

'I had no notion of my own identity'?

Do you not see the problem? Who had no notion of whose identity?

And it's also not essential to my view of consciousness and the distinction with self-consciousness.

It's not essential to mine either. It's merely an observation of how it has to be. At the start of this, I said I'd be delighted if you could provide me with a counter argument. I really would be, because solving BP2 in a non conceptualised and subsymbolic (no relation) manner would be extremely handy.

 

[ruby sparks]

Sure, now try to imagine a system that isn’t you. That doesn’t have an I to have these experiences. It has biology and that biology feels like something sometimes but that’s it for the system’s mental life. How do those mental events become unified and under what unifying principle? Sure there are putative solutions to BP1, but that doesn’t solve this issue.

But however fascinating that is, I'm not trying to solve the issue of self-consciousness specifically in this discussion here. Unless I'm misunderstanding your question, because I'm not sure what BP1 stands for.

Be aware that when you send me a message, my sense of self will probably be reasonably robust when reading and answering it. Hence its tendency (my system's tendency) to throw in terms like 'I'.

 

[Subsymbolic]

But however fascinating that is, I'm not trying to solve the issue of self-consciousness specifically in this discussion here.

Sure. It's simply that I gave a definition of consciousness that was ruled out of court. I was merely pointing out why it wasn't. This apparently isn't going well. I'm surprised you are not all over it as it's rather similar to my point about global scepticism which I thought you'd accepted. Either way I'm not overly concerned. At this point, I think I may stop trying to argue this position and just argue Dennett's position on consciousness for fun, as it's endlessly defensible even if I don't agree with it.

Unless I'm misunderstanding your question, because I'm not sure what BP1 stands for.

It's about The Binding Problem, which is a rather major issue in the philosophy of consciousness that, for some reason, only came up in The Other Place during a discussion of the mechanisms of freewill and nobody took any notice. There are two, possibly three, discrete binding problems. which are often called called BP1, 2 (and, for readers of the Journal of Consciousness, 3). There's also a different binding problem in Linguistics. Wikipedia will see you all right, but whoever did the Dennett bit deserves a clip round the ear as Dennett really didn't mean his multiple drafts model to be taken literally, merely to be a metaphor for the semi indeterminate, and rather messy, nature of non conceptual content compared to the hard edged nature of conceptual content.

Be aware that when you send me a message, my sense of self will probably be reasonably robust when reading and answering it. Hence its tendency (my system's tendency) to throw in terms like 'I'.

Of course, do you look like a bat?

 

[ruby sparks]

Sure. It's simply that I gave a definition of consciousness that was ruled out of court. I was merely pointing out why it wasn't. This apparently isn't going well. I'm surprised you are not all over it as it's rather similar to my point about global scepticism which I thought you'd accepted. Either way I'm not overly concerned. At this point, I think I may stop trying to argue this position and just argue Dennett's position on consciousness for fun, as it's endlessly defensible even if I don't agree with it.



It's about The Binding Problem, which is a rather major issue in the philosophy of consciousness that, for some reason, only came up in The Other Place during a discussion of the mechanisms of freewill and nobody took any notice. There are two, possibly three, discrete binding problems. which are often called called BP1, 2 (and, for readers of the Journal of Consciousness, 3). There's also a different binding problem in Linguistics. Wikipedia will see you all right, but whoever did the Dennett bit deserves a clip round the ear as Dennett really didn't mean his multiple drafts model to be taken literally, merely to be a metaphor for the semi indeterminate, and rather messy, nature of non conceptual content compared to the hard edged nature of conceptual content.

Be aware that when you send me a message, my sense of self will probably be reasonably robust when reading and answering it. Hence its tendency (my system's tendency) to throw in terms like 'I'.

Of course, do you look like a bat?

Thanks. I skimmed the wiki page on The Binding Problem. That will be my new thing learned today.

Am I right in thinking though, that throughout, the research and thinking is assuming a more or less wide awake human brain (though I note that other ape brains got a brief mention)?

As such, if that is the case, is there not a self already 'there' at the time of the experiments?

You might say to me, what is the point of discussing lesser more basic forms of consciousness in other types of entities because it'll all be speculation, but given that ever since someone posted a video about trees 'talking' here in the thread, I am feeling more inclined to go down-spectrum rather than up-spectrum, because I am curious about what 'bare' consciousness might be, or where it might start.

I'm wondering if there are any experiments done on pain in human subjects who are not fully conscious, for example? Apart from during surgical operations. How do anaesthetists judge if or when a patient might be starting to 'come up' enough to feel stuff? Ditto vets, some of whom may even have anaesthetised a bat, I suppose.

What about taking psychedelics? I read that this can 'dissolve a sense of self'.

 

[Speakpigeon]

The "I" as I use it in my little story just stands for my thoughts at the moment I had them. I'm very comfortable with this use for I am in illustrious company in the person of Descartes. He did the same thing with the Cogito.

He certainly did. and this is a very useful diagnostic tool for you: was Descartes legitimate in claiming 'I think?' Think about it: he's doubting his memory, his very cognition and yet he allows himself a sense of self. what possible justification could he have. This is why I, and most of the philosophical community of the last century are quite clear that all he could say is 'there are thoughts'. Just as you are doing he allowed himself acces to resources he couldn't have. He should have disallowed himself on methodological grounds, you should on metaphysical ones.

So I will disagree with most of the philosophical community. Who are these people again?

And I fail to see how I could possibly be wrong whenever I think that I think. There's no sense of self involved as the "I" here does not point at a self, as would normally be the case. Descartes saying "I think" is really his thought thinking "I think". You're at liberty to dismiss this as vacuous but, personally, I couldn't.

In my example, I couldn't possibly have articulated any elaborate idea on the moment.

Do you not think that a self is an elaborate idea?

And, as I already pointed out, I had no sense of self during the episode. The narrative where I use the "I" came after the event, from memory, once I had woken up. It is also similar to saying "I had a dream". Although the "I" in this case is normally taken to mean the person, it is still the case that the person is only able to attribute the dream to herself on the basis that people take the memories they can recall as being about themselves.

You can see, I'm sure, the story, as you describe it, is not dissimilar to those told by people who have had near death experiences, 'night terror' alien encounters and so on. I'm surprised that you'd want to give a memory of something that occurred in the middle of the night while passed out from pain the same status as everyday mental states.

I just reported my experience as I can recall it. And I happen to think there's no difficulty whatsoever.

More to the point, you really don't seem to be responding to the repeated pointing out of the paradoxical nature of the claims like:

'I had no notion of my own identity'?

Do you not see the problem? Who had no notion of whose identity?

I think I understood your point alright. And I believe I have replied.

At the time, having no notion of self, I could not have thought in terms of "I". However, once I had recovered, I was able to remember what had gone through my mind during the episode. And I usually take the memories I have to be mine. So, I can only see the thing having this minimal thinking process during the episode as being me, even if my memory of this process doesn't feature any self data.

I really don't see an issue here.
EB

 

[Subsymbolic]

There's a huge literature on dissociation and (for example) medical hypnosis. It's the one discipline with a new age flavour that I take seriously and which holds up well to me being me at it.

Personally, I'm not going to double guess what the literature says for the simple reason that I don't think there's that sort of consensus. It's a problem. There are some local solutions in neurobiology, but mostly it's a classic clusterfuck with overconfident neurobiologists confusing themselves by not getting absolutely clear as to precisely what the problem is, what the constraints are and what a good question looks like. The only thing there is consensus about is that it's a fairly insurmountable problem at multiple levels of description. It doesn't help that the current state of the art is increasingly sure that we have perception in the brain the wrong way around.

The binocular rivalry thing has been hanging around in the corner being a bit of a 'Brownian motion' style problem, which everyone knew about but largely ignored as it's too weird. It's now looking increasingly obvious that all it indicated was that perception is more about error correction than even the most Piagetian of theorists dared to contemplate. The implications of this for a GUT of binding look good, but it largely means that most bets are off the table right now. As usual, it's much easier to see what is definitely out than to imagine what next week's model might look like.