Do we really perceive anything?

[ontological_realist]

Then what is the difference between your "Brahman" and universe?

None. I consider 'physical energy' to be the Brahman mentioned in our books.

Thanks for a direct and to the point reply.

 

[Rilx]

We don't see light or taste apples; we experience action potentials, neurotransmissions etc. The light stops being light once it gets absorbed by our rod and cone cells in the retina. From there it becomes an electrical impulse/signal/action potential, and we still have not got the experience. Then it enters the brain where there are millions of neurotransmissions. And keep in mind that this still just simplifying the process.

You seem to think it kind of backwards? Our sensory organs detect electromagnetic waves and certain molecules, but - after a complex process - we experience light and taste.

As to the OP, our perceptions (experiences) create for us a meaningful projection of the world, ie our phenomenal world. If we perceived a "real" world, it would be nothing but chaos.

 

[ryan]

We don't see light or taste apples; we experience action potentials, neurotransmissions etc. The light stops being light once it gets absorbed by our rod and cone cells in the retina. From there it becomes an electrical impulse/signal/action potential, and we still have not got the experience. Then it enters the brain where there are millions of neurotransmissions. And keep in mind that this still just simplifying the process.

You seem to think it kind of backwards? Our sensory organs detect electromagnetic waves and certain molecules, but - after a complex process - we experience light and taste.

No, I do not have it backwards. You must have misunderstood me because I can't possibly see how my explanation of the sequence is wrong.

 

[Rilx]

We don't see light or taste apples; we experience action potentials, neurotransmissions etc. The light stops being light once it gets absorbed by our rod and cone cells in the retina. From there it becomes an electrical impulse/signal/action potential, and we still have not got the experience. Then it enters the brain where there are millions of neurotransmissions. And keep in mind that this still just simplifying the process.

You seem to think it kind of backwards? Our sensory organs detect electromagnetic waves and certain molecules, but - after a complex process - we experience light and taste.

No, I do not have it backwards. You must have misunderstood me because I can't possibly see how my explanation of the sequence is wrong.

Yes, it's possible that I've misunderstood you. We seem to use terms differently. Let me analyze the bolded sentence my way: IMO it's not light that enters our retina, just electromagnetic waves reflecting from objects. When our brains finally produces conscious percepts, we experience ("see") the objects reflecting light (as colours). So, in my epistemology, light (ie colours) exists only in our minds.

I think that this case reflects the practical convention to call the certain objective range of waves - visual spectrum - "light". But it becomes circular definition if we analyze the process of visual perception: we see light because light enters our eyes.

I'm not saying that the way you use "light" is wrong and my way is right.

 

[ryan]

We don't see light or taste apples; we experience action potentials, neurotransmissions etc. The light stops being light once it gets absorbed by our rod and cone cells in the retina. From there it becomes an electrical impulse/signal/action potential, and we still have not got the experience. Then it enters the brain where there are millions of neurotransmissions. And keep in mind that this still just simplifying the process.

You seem to think it kind of backwards? Our sensory organs detect electromagnetic waves and certain molecules, but - after a complex process - we experience light and taste.

No, I do not have it backwards. You must have misunderstood me because I can't possibly see how my explanation of the sequence is wrong.

When our brains finally produces conscious percepts, we experience ("see") the objects reflecting light (as colours). So, in my epistemology, light (ie colours) exists only in our minds.

I think that this case reflects the practical convention to call the certain objective range of waves - visual spectrum - "light". But it becomes circular definition if we analyze the process of visual perception: we see light because light enters our eyes.

Light enters the eyes. Light gets absorbed by rod and cone cells in the retina. This causes an action potential of the photoreceptor cells (rod and cone cells), and the signals get sent to the occipital lobes in the brain. There is no light beyond the retina in the visual system.

 

[Rilx]

Ryan, do you understand what I mean? There's no doubt that we understand the real process similarly.

 

[ryan]

Ryan, do you understand what I mean? There's no doubt that we understand the real process similarly.

Well just as long as you don't think that we experience/perceive light, I agree with you.

 

[Rilx]

OK, then how do you call the corresponding phenomenon we do perceive/experience?

 

[ryan]

OK, then how do you call the corresponding phenomenon we do perceive/experience?

We experience the effects of light; we experience how our body reacts to light.

 

[Perspicuo]

OK, then how do you call the corresponding phenomenon we do perceive/experience?

We experience the effects of light; we experience how our body reacts to light.

You have just described perception. The title of the thread is "Do we really perceive anything?". The answer is, thus, affirmative.

Light is photons, photons are energy packets, the potential of producing effects in amounts per quanta in substances they come into contact with (such as the cones and rods in our retina). We come into contact with photons and our physiologies react accordingly, proportionate (quantity) and differentially (quality, such as color or wavelength and form i.e. boundaries that form figures that correspond to actual objects in the world).

 

[ryan]

OK, then how do you call the corresponding phenomenon we do perceive/experience?

We experience the effects of light; we experience how our body reacts to light.

You have just described perception. The title of the thread is "Do we really perceive anything?". The answer is, thus, affirmative.

Read the rest of the OP. I think that Ipetrich meant "do we perceive anything directly".

 

[Perspicuo]

OK, then how do you call the corresponding phenomenon we do perceive/experience?

We experience the effects of light; we experience how our body reacts to light.

You have just described perception. The title of the thread is "Do we really perceive anything?". The answer is, thus, affirmative.

Read the rest of the OP. I think that Ipetrich meant "do we perceive anything directly".

Yes we do. Unless we're watching a TV monitor. Perception is defined by the structures involved in our visual system, and if the object is just in front of us, our perception is direct.

The key is: define perception. And I'm using one that medics and behavior scientists have made and use.

 

[lpetrich]

I think that Ipetrich meant "do we perceive anything directly".

That's pretty much it. We don't *directly* perceive the objects that we think that we perceive.

 

[Perspicuo]

I think that Ipetrich meant "do we perceive anything directly".

That's pretty much it. We don't *directly* perceive the objects that we think that we perceive.

Not according the scientific view of perception. The only way of not "directly" perceiving is view playback (video, photographs). Perception--visual perception as an example par excellence- involves the anatomical structures of the visual system. If you think this is a complicated way to becoming aware of objects, well, let's recall we are living physiologies and everything we do, anything we are involved in, everything in our experience entail physiological subsystems.

The traditional philosophical way, used in the West for thousands of years, requires ignoring scientific discoveries, and pretending we are some sort of abstract Platonic entities that float around and happen to be imprisoned in corrupt bodies that get in the way of full knowledge. This is, without fear of exaggeration, reactionary.

Perception requires photons and living matter reactive to them. The only other possibility is merging with the object, somehow becoming fused with it. This has two big problems. First, it's science fiction. Second, that is not perception, but, well, fusion. And I can be fused with something and not percieve it. Such as having a prosthetic implant you do not see or feel. It's there but it is not perceived.

 

[ryan]

I think that Ipetrich meant "do we perceive anything directly".

That's pretty much it. We don't *directly* perceive the objects that we think that we perceive.

Not according the scientific view of perception. The only way of not "directly" perceiving is view playback (video, photographs). Perception--visual perception as an example par excellence- involves the anatomical structures of the visual system. If you think this is a complicated way to becoming aware of objects, well, let's recall we are living physiologies and everything we do, anything we are involved in, everything in our experience entail physiological subsystems.

The traditional philosophical way, used in the West for thousands of years, requires ignoring scientific discoveries, and pretending we are some sort of abstract Platonic entities that float around and happen to be imprisoned in corrupt bodies that get in the way of full knowledge. This is, without fear of exaggeration, reactionary.

Perception requires photons and living matter reactive to them. The only other possibility is merging with the object, somehow becoming fused with it. This has two big problems. First, it's science fiction. Second, that is not perception, but, well, fusion. And I can be fused with something and not percieve it. Such as having a prosthetic implant you do not see or feel. It's there but it is not perceived.

But this is in epistemology, not science. Please see, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-episprob/ .

 

[Perspicuo]

I think that Ipetrich meant "do we perceive anything directly".

That's pretty much it. We don't *directly* perceive the objects that we think that we perceive.

Not according the scientific view of perception. The only way of not "directly" perceiving is view playback (video, photographs). Perception--visual perception as an example par excellence- involves the anatomical structures of the visual system. If you think this is a complicated way to becoming aware of objects, well, let's recall we are living physiologies and everything we do, anything we are involved in, everything in our experience entail physiological subsystems.

The traditional philosophical way, used in the West for thousands of years, requires ignoring scientific discoveries, and pretending we are some sort of abstract Platonic entities that float around and happen to be imprisoned in corrupt bodies that get in the way of full knowledge. This is, without fear of exaggeration, reactionary.

Perception requires photons and living matter reactive to them. The only other possibility is merging with the object, somehow becoming fused with it. This has two big problems. First, it's science fiction. Second, that is not perception, but, well, fusion. And I can be fused with something and not percieve it. Such as having a prosthetic implant you do not see or feel. It's there but it is not perceived.

But this is in epistemology, not science. Please see, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-episprob/ .

Gee, I thought the way knowledge is acquired was pertinent to the study of the acquisition of knowledge!

 

[ontological_realist]

I think that Ipetrich meant "do we perceive anything directly".

That's pretty much it. We don't *directly* perceive the objects that we think that we perceive.

At least that is what idealist philosophers are saying. Does anybody here know what present day cognitive science says about it exactly?

 

[Juma]

I think that Ipetrich meant "do we perceive anything directly".

That's pretty much it. We don't *directly* perceive the objects that we think that we perceive.

At least that is what idealist philosophers are saying. Does anybody here know what present day cognitive science says about it exactly?

Why would that be a specifially idealistic view?
What you perceive have gone a lot of filtering before you are aware of it .

 

[Perspicuo]

I think that Ipetrich meant "do we perceive anything directly".

That's pretty much it. We don't *directly* perceive the objects that we think that we perceive.

At least that is what idealist philosophers are saying. Does anybody here know what present day cognitive science says about it exactly?

Why would that be a specifially idealistic view?
What you perceive have gone a lot of filtering before you are aware of it .

There is no filter in the way of perception. Perception is the way information gets to a brain and is processed as it gets to memory encoding. Information requires a channel. The channel (and any other subsystem of perception) is not in the way of direct perception--it is part of the perception itself. Without that or any other subsystem of perception there would be no perception.

If, on the other hand, what the question means to express is the desire to have full, unencumbered reception of every aspect of an object, well, that would require something other than perception, it would require some sort of absolute merging with the object. This is not possible, and let me tell you why. First let us ask ourselves who is the perceiver. The answer is, a limited, 3.3 lb organ designed (naturally selected) to process limited visual information, limited olfaction and audition, etc. What you get in a normal day observing a dog play with a ball, is pretty much the limit of what this organ can perceive. More than that is sci-fi or the febrile meanderings of an armchair philosopher or clueless prophet. We, in contrast, should and can know better, armed with the discoveries of empirical research.

 

[Valjean]

How would one disentangle epistemology from neurology? It strikes me as a pretty tight weave.