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Downward Causation: Useful or Misguided Idea?

How do you not have both?

Them being two separate things is not a necessity because they could be two aspects of the same thing. Anomalous monism, in other words. It's a perfectly respectable and popular thesis, apparently. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry concludes that it "has earned a central place on the rather short list of important positions on the relation between mental and physical events and properties".

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anomalous-monism/#Con

Btw, I think you had at least 3 things. The brain, thoughts, and a 'me' to experience them.

Two aspects of the same thing are two things.

You have not escaped the need for there to be both that which can experience and that which can be experienced.

The brain creates them both. It is not a third element.

I refer you to Russell’s 1905 paper, On Denoting.
 
So far, it's only autonomous monism and chakras on the table. Oh and some long-dead god-botherer of the garlic-and-frogs-legs-eating variety who won the "Mr Worthless Bag of Wind Award" for 1645 for mistakenly thinking the pineal gland had superpowers, but who can't be identified in the thread because it means using magic words and name dropping.

Correspondance avec Élisabeth -- Descartes à Élisabeth - Egmond, 15 septembre 1645
https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Corr...artes_à_Élisabeth_-_Egmond,_15_septembre_1645

La seconde chose, qu'il faut connaître, est la nature de notre âme, en tant qu'elle subsiste sans le corps, et est beaucoup plus noble que lui, et capable de jouir d'une infinité de contentements qui ne se trouvent point en cette vie : car cela nous empêche de craindre la mort, et détache tellement notre affection des choses du monde, que nous ne regardons qu'avec mépris tout ce qui est au pouvoir de la fortune.

My translation:
Correspondence between René Descartes and Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, 1645

Descartes writes on 15.ix.1645:

The second thing, that we have to understand, is the nature of our soul. The soul as something that exists without the body, is far nobler than the body, and is capable of appreciating countless satisfactions that aren’t to be found in this life: Because this is what prevents us from fearing death, and moves our heart so far from the things of this world, that we regard with contempt all that wealth can do

1645...

So, he certainly didn't have the benefit as we do of the massive scientific revolution that followed (he knew of Galileo's work but came to early for Newton's). What he contributed to it would be very difficult to ascertain, but it seems to me he had a major contribution in that effectively the whole of Europe discussed his 'meditations'.

And the fact is, it seems to me at least, that the Cogito will always beat everything else we will come to think we know.

And, of course, as you suggest, we don't have any good theory for subjective experience. And I would say, not even the beginning of a clue.
EB

Note - More here: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1643.pdf
Copyright © Jonathan Bennett 2017.
 
DNA is a source of information, nobody is saying otherwise....but not in regard to what is happening around us in terms of our immediate environment.

That being the point of sensory input and its necessity.

I do not deny that there are multiple sources of information, signals from organs, limbs, memory, etc, but none of this negates the necessity of sensory input as a means of interacting with our surroundings.

You are underestimating just how rich the stage setting is. Have you ever considered how edge detection (one of the most basic tasks of vision) is actually achieved? More to the point, have you actually considered how informationally rich DNA is?

You are making assumptions about my estimation of 'just how rich the stage setting is' on the basis that I have not focused on DNA or the actual electrochemical process, ion flow, transmitters, receptors, glial cells, etc.

I have never denied or questioned the complexity of the brain, its DNA, architecture or anything else, I am simply focusing on the role and necessity of sensory input as a means of interacting with environment.....as was the article that I quoted earlier.

None of which denies or negates the complexity of the structure/architecture/DNA/electrochemical activity of a brain.
 
so I guess we should know at this point that our ontologies are purely matters of convenience. :)

More a matter of point of view than "convenience".

We can't always choose. I can very well doubt there are quarks and what not every morning when brushing my teeth, but I can't deny my qualia, certainly not when I have them.

So, I guess I'll have to wait till I'm very dead to see how it goes.
EB
 
Two aspects of the same thing are two things.

You have not escaped the need for there to be both that which can experience and that which can be experienced.

The brain creates them both. It is not a third element.

I refer you to Russell’s 1905 paper, On Denoting.

Once again all you can do is drop a name. It has no relevance here. We're not talking about language use. We're talking about an understanding of a single concept.

I refer you to my post.

This dichotomy is inescapable.

If there is no thing that can experience there is no "experience".

If there are not the things that can be experienced there is no "experience".

Both are needed. Both will always be needed if you want to talk about experience.

Experience is always one thing experiencing another thing.

The subjective is not wiped away with the flick of the hand. The ocean is not swallowed whole.

This is not debatable.

Thus we see no counter arguments anywhere. Just a bunch of nonsense saying that two aspects are not two things.
 
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The brain creates them both.

That's still three.

I agree it is three things.

But experience is only two things.

The consciousness is not experiencing the brain.

It is experiencing things created by the brain.

There is an interaction between the consciousness and the brain but it is invisible.

When we use the consciousness to tell the brain to move the arm that is another interaction. And that interaction is experienced but the brain is not experienced.
 
But experience is only two things.

Really? I thought the 3 things were (according to your theory) brain, experience and something to have the experience. Now you're saying the middle one of the 3 is 2 things? Or do you mean that the third one, the 'something to have the experience' is itself an experience? If so, I might not disagree.

The alternative theory of course is that it's the brain that experiences your 'other two' (temporarily assuming they are two separate things, which I don't tend to agree with). I know you don't accept that, but it is nonetheless the prevailing, most respected and best supported theory nowadays, among almost all the relevant experts.
 
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But experience is only two things.

Really? I thought the 3 things were (according to your theory) brain, experience and something to have the experience. Now you're saying the middle one of the 3 is 2 things? Or do you mean that the third one, the 'something to have the experience' is itself an experience? If so, I might not disagree.

The alternative theory of course is that it's the brain that experiences your 'other two' (temporarily assuming they are two separate things, which I don't tend to agree with). I know you don't accept that, but it is nonetheless the prevailing, most respected and best supported theory nowadays, among almost all the relevant experts.

Do you experience your brain?

Or do you experience the things the brain creates for you to experience?

The brain is what allows experience to take place but it is not experienced.

The experience is between the consciousness and what it can be conscious of, what it can experience.
 
Do you experience your brain?

Or do you experience the things the brain creates for you to experience?

The brain is what allows experience to take place but it is not experienced.

I didn't suggest I experienced my brain. I suggested it the other way around, that my brain may be the thing that is having the experiences.
 
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Do you experience your brain?

Or do you experience the things the brain creates for you to experience?

The brain is what allows experience to take place but it is not experienced.

I didn't suggest I experienced my brain. I suggested it the other way around, that my brain may be the thing that is having the experiences.

That would be a brain experiencing something. Two things. A brain and what it experiences.

But the mind, the consciousness, also experiences things.

And that would be the mind and what it experiences.

Always two things.

Something capable of having experiences.

And the experiences.
 
That would be a brain experiencing something. Two things. A brain and what it experiences.

Yes.

Or, they (the physical and the mental) could be two aspects of the same thing (anomalous monism).

But the mind, the consciousness, also experiences things.

I only have your word for that, and unfortunately, it's contrary to most current models that I know of, which have the brain experiencing both thoughts and self, they both being seen as closely related 'mental phenomena' (ie essentially the same type of thing). I don't think I've heard of a model (before now) where one mental phenomenon experiences another mental phenomenon.

What, in that model, is the brain (thing 1) experiencing while the mind (thing 2) is experiencing thoughts (thing 3)?

And that would be the mind and what it experiences.

It would be, if the mind and thoughts are two separate things, one of which experiences the other, instead of the brain having varied experiences of essentially the same type of thing (most often at the same time).
 
Yes.

Or, they (the physical and the mental) could be two aspects of the same thing (anomalous monism).

I am not talking about the mental vs the physical. I am not talking about any alleged mind/body dualism.

I am only talking about the necessary separation, the necessary dualism contained within the concept of "experiencing".

A separation of that which can experience from what it experiences. Two distinct things. This distinction must exist for there to be "experience".

Experience is always one thing experiencing something else. If there is not the something else there is not experience.

I only have your word for that

If you have never experienced a thought then all you have is my word.

When you experience a thought, there is you, your mind, and the thought. Two things.

And your mind does more than experience thoughts. It understands them if they are in language.

What, in that model, is the brain (thing 1) experiencing while the mind (thing 2) is experiencing thoughts (thing 3)?

I can only know what my mind experiences.

I have no idea if the brain experiences or what it experiences. It reacts to stimulation and needs stimulation to function properly.

It would be, if the mind and thoughts are two separate things

If you understand a thought there is the thought and the thing that understands it.
 
If you understand a thought there is the thought and the thing that understands it.

Yes, but that relies on the mind being a 'thing' which experiences thoughts (another 'thing'), in other words one mental thing experiencing another mental thing, and I agree that it does feel like that, sort of, but it could be that the only 'thing' which is doing any experiencing is my brain, experiencing both the others, if indeed they really are separate things, which I'm not sure they are.

If you have never experienced a thought then all you have is my word.

I'm not questioning that it feels like 'I' have thoughts, I'm questioning whether they actually are two separate things, one of which experiences the other. The generally accepted alternative for instance is that it is the brain having both flavours of mental experience, usually simultaneously.
 
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If you understand a thought there is the thought and the thing that understands it.

Yes, but that relies on the mind being a 'thing' which experiences thoughts (another 'thing'), in other words one mental thing experiencing another mental thing

The mind is not a "mental thing". It is some unknown phenomena. It is alive. It is a decision making tool with access to memory that has evolved. Like the leg or teeth it aids with survival.

The contents of the mind are "mental things".

I'm not questioning that it feels like 'I' have thoughts, I'm questioning whether they actually are two separate things

To have awareness of something you have to be separated from it.

To experience the tree the mind must be separated from the representation of it.

The mind experiences "mental things".
 
The mind is not a "mental thing". It is some unknown phenomena. It is alive. It is a decision making tool with access to memory that has evolved. Like the leg or teeth it aids with survival.

The contents of the mind are "mental things".

I'm not questioning that it feels like 'I' have thoughts, I'm questioning whether they actually are two separate things

To have awareness of something you have to be separated from it.

To experience the tree the mind must be separated from the representation of it.

The mind experiences "mental things".

If I responded again I'd just be repeating myself about the possibility that only the brain is actually experiencing anything mental. Your view that the mind is a separate 'thing' from thoughts and experiences them independently is contrary to any commonly accepted current models that I am aware of and as such, thanks for your interesting and different theory.
 
An active normally functioning brain forms and generates conscious experience. An normal/healthy active brain is the author of experience. A comatose brain is alive but not healthy, so does not form or generate experience.
 
The mind is not a "mental thing". It is some unknown phenomena. It is alive. It is a decision making tool with access to memory that has evolved. Like the leg or teeth it aids with survival.

The contents of the mind are "mental things".

I'm not questioning that it feels like 'I' have thoughts, I'm questioning whether they actually are two separate things

To have awareness of something you have to be separated from it.

To experience the tree the mind must be separated from the representation of it.

The mind experiences "mental things".

If I responded again I'd just be repeating myself about the possibility that only the brain is actually experiencing anything mental. Your view that the mind is a separate 'thing' from thoughts and experiences them independently is contrary to any commonly accepted current models that I am aware of and as such, thanks for your interesting and different theory.

Mental refers only to what a mind experiences.

If a brain experiences, which I doubt, it would be something else. Something the mind would not understand.
 
What would be fun is if someone started a thread on downward causation. :D

Nah. What would have caused downward causation to begin with?

Turtles? Turtles all the way up?

Yeah, when turtles rain. :D

Purple Rain - Prince.jpg
EB
 
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