Eliminating Qualia

[ruby sparks]

Dennett, following Wittgenstein, is quite clear that we never communicate anything with a phenomenal character, only our judgements about that phenomenal character. If we could directly communicate the phenomenal character of things, then there would be no problem of other minds.

What Dennett is up to here, and which he finishes off in Consciousness Explained, is demonstrating over and over again that how things seem to us is a dreadful guide to how they are. Ultimately, his final argument will be that all we have is our judgements about phenomenal character....

That is all fine, imo.

.... and that there simply isn't any determinate content below those judgements.

What does this bit mean?

I have to say that at this point, we don't appear to be at a case for qualia not existing, no matter how private or unreliable they are.

I'd plump for real yet beyond language. I'm ok with ineffable, for instance.

 

[ruby sparks]

Also, I'd have to say that picking holes in the reliability of qualia doesn't even necessarily mean that they are unreliable. It just means they aren't perfect. I imagine one could also say that they are on the whole pretty reliable, or else shared interactions with other people would be a lot more confused than they are.

Take pain for example. If I stub my toe it hurts, pretty reliably. Also, if someone else stubs their toe, most people can (apparently) feel a shadow/mirror/empathy version of that pain. I chose pain because unlike inverting a colour spectrum, suggesting that someone else may be experiencing something different to me is not so easy, because we'd have to invert affects as well. It's not going to hurt that much if the sky is green or blue. Now, some few people might enjoy pain and consider it a pleasure, but they would seem to be an exception.

I could go further and suggest that empathy is as near as dammit the non-linguistic communicating of qualia, albeit it may be unreliable.

 

[Subsymbolic]

Dennett, following Wittgenstein, is quite clear that we never communicate anything with a phenomenal character, only our judgements about that phenomenal character. If we could directly communicate the phenomenal character of things, then there would be no problem of other minds.

What Dennett is up to here, and which he finishes off in Consciousness Explained, is demonstrating over and over again that how things seem to us is a dreadful guide to how they are. Ultimately, his final argument will be that all we have is our judgements about phenomenal character....

That is all fine, imo.

.... and that there simply isn't any determinate content below those judgements.

What does this bit mean?

I have to say that at this point, we don't appear to be at a case for qualia not existing, no matter how private or unreliable they are.

I'd plump for real yet beyond language. I'm ok with ineffable, for instance.

That's certainly my feeling here. Dennett's put together a bloody good argument, with a lot that is right. However, I don't think he escapes the charge of linguistic behaviourism.

Of course, you don't have to do it my way, you can follow Chalmers and go down the panpsychic route...

 

[untermensche]

What could it possibly mean to say that it's possible to experience something that doesn't exist?

A ghost, I suppose.

Or a fictional character. What does it mean to say that Jessica Rabbit had red hair?

That doesn't eliminate the mental experience of course.

This is a dodge.

Pure and simple.

If there is experience that means one thing experienced something else.

It will always mean that.

That is the starting point when looking at experience.

If that is dodged you are looking at something that is not "experience".

The "mind" is that part of the human that experiences. It experiences the visual presentation. It experiences thoughts. It experiences color and qualities of things.

To deny this is just to deny reality and sink away into some twisted delusion.

You won't find the deniers of the mind explain their position plainly. It is always some twisted collection of jargon that only has meaning to the faithful.

 

[Subsymbolic]

Also, I'd have to say that picking holes in the reliability of qualia doesn't necessarily mean that they are unreliable. It just means they aren't perfect. I imagine one could say that they are on the whole pretty reliable, or else interactions with other people would be a lot more confused than they are.

Take pain for example. If I stub my toe it hurts, pretty reliably. Also, if someone else stubs their toe, most people can (apparently) feel a shadow/mirror/empathy version of that pain. I chose pain because unlike inverting a colour spectrum, suggesting that someone else may be experiencing something different to me is not so easy.

I think it's more the idea that there are a lot of people who are wholly convinced of stuff we can see is wrong. The idea being that Dennett can hold out the possibility that what we hold as being self evidently true is undermined by this in the same way.

Actually I think Watson summed up Dennett's position rather well with a quick FIFY:

The behaviorist advances the view that what the psychologists have hitherto called thought is in short nothing but talking to ourselves.

Dennett advances the view that what the philosophers have hitherto called qualia is in short nothing but talking to ourselves.

 

[Subsymbolic]

What could it possibly mean to say that it's possible to experience something that doesn't exist?

A ghost, I suppose.

Or a fictional character. What does it mean to say that Jessica Rabbit had red hair?

That doesn't eliminate the mental experience of course.

This is a dodge.

Pure and simple.

If there is experience that means one thing experienced something else.

It will always mean that.

That is the starting point when looking at experience.

If that is dodged you are looking at something that is not "experience".

Yep. Dennett says that what you experienced was the judgement that you experienced something and that asking for more than that is asking for something that demonstrably isn't there. You experience it in the public production and there is no inner show. This is the challenge you have to adress.

And, unlike any of your subjective chest beating, it's entirely objective and scientifically verifiable - as Dennett points out in great detail while developing heterophenomenology.

 

[ruby sparks]

...I don't think he escapes the charge of linguistic behaviourism.

Yes. I hadn't thought of that term, but that puts it well, I think.

Of course, you don't have to do it my way, you can follow Chalmers and go down the panpsychic route...

I think I'm mostly with you, and as for Chalmers, I'd have to google. I'd guess that panpsychism isn't the only possible next station along from naturalistic dualism.

I do agree that a heck of a lot of this is linked to the persistent notion, which I don't think we can blame Descartes for since he was only formalising something which most people probably thought for thousands of years, that the mental is a different and separate thing from the physical. I agree that it could be a false dichotomy, a bit like saying that the head side and the tail side of a coin are separate.

 

[Speakpigeon]

..... so I would rather assume that Dennett's point is entirely pragmatic.

Or possibly dogmatic.

Possibly. Old age and all that.

And dogmatic can also be seen as a sub-genre of pragmatic.

I mean, it would seem a bit unwarranted to dismiss something just because it's unreliable or vague.

By pragmatic, I mean you accept qualia exist but claim they don't because you think they have no practical role in relation to what you do in your line of business and admitting they exist would be to step into a debate about their possible role, a debate without an end in sight and you don't want to lose money on this.

One could dismiss it (in pragmatic terms) if it were a non-causal byproduct or epiphenomenon, but I don't know how you'd go about demonstrating that.

I wouldn't mind if it meant admitting to their existence.

I also think serious thinking should stay clear of the notion of epiphenomenon.

One could start by saying that useless byproducts can exist, but that wouldn't get us very far regarding whether qualia were an example. One could also say that just because it feels like they play a role, they may not, but again that wouldn't get us very far unless we could show that they played no role.

The other possibility is that they do play a role but it's not a helpful one, in the sense that it hinders our survival fitness.

Like, qualia are so damn beautiful you'd stop paying attention to the fact that they represent the real world?

Personally, I assume it is as if they had no causal power, like epiphenomena although not actually epiphenomena themselves.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

I also think serious thinking should stay clear of the notion of epiphenomenon.

Possibly, but then there is still the possibility that qualia are a byproduct which is a hindrance.

Take the fur (or is it hair) coat on a polar bear. The weight of the coat might be described as a (hindering) byproduct of it being insulating.

 

[ruby sparks]

The "mind" is that part of the human that experiences.

You never explained to me how you know that it could not be the brain that is experiencing, and I doubt if you will now.

 

[Subsymbolic]

The "mind" is that part of the human that experiences.

You never explained to me how you know that it could not be the brain that is experiencing, and I doubt if you will now.

If he does, it better be an objective explanation or he'd be the worst sort of hypocrite...

 

[Speakpigeon]

I imagine one could also say that they are on the whole pretty reliable, or else shared interactions with other people would be a lot more confused than they are.

I can see how the conventional materialist interpretation, i.e. one without qualia, can explain everything we do. So, in effect, without qualia, everything would go as expected in a fully materialist perspective, and you wouldn't have of course to explain the qualia themselves. Such a perfect world.

But such explaining may not be possible. Maybe qualia have causal powers. I have no idea but my view is that qualia is so foreign to our conception of the physical world that we will have to be radical and think out of the box to somehow put qualia and matter back together in a unique conceptual frame, if at all possible.

Radical may conceivably mean to give up on causality, materiality, or even rationality.
EB

 

[Subsymbolic]

I imagine one could also say that they are on the whole pretty reliable, or else shared interactions with other people would be a lot more confused than they are.

I can see how the conventional materialist interpretation, i.e. one without qualia, can explain everything we do. So, in effect, without qualia, everything would go as expected in a fully materialist perspective, and you wouldn't have of course to explain the qualia themselves. Such a perfect world.

But such explaining may not be possible. Maybe qualia have causal powers. I have no idea but my view is that qualia is so foreign to our conception of the physical world that we will have to be radical and think out of the box to somehow put qualia and matter back together in a unique conceptual frame, if at all possible.

Radical may conceivably mean to give up on causality, materiality, or even rationality.
EB

Rationality is impossible anyway, so you can relax!

 

[Speakpigeon]

I also think serious thinking should stay clear of the notion of epiphenomenon.

Possibly, but then there is still the possibility that qualia are a byproduct which is a hindrance.

Take the fur (or is it hair) coat on a polar bear. The weight of the coat might be described as a (hindering) byproduct of it being insulating.

Ah, yes, I'd say the concept of "byproduct" is perfectly respectable and rational and helpful. And, yes, byproducts may have some inevitable properties that will be unhelpful in some environments.

Maybe the only one bad property of qualia is that we get to waste our time talking about them!

Other people are just judiciously concentrating on earning more money and reproducing themselves.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Rationality is impossible anyway, so you can relax!

Admit to it and have a nervous breakdown.

If that was true, we could not get to any rational conclusion about it.

Anyway, if by any chance that was a serious point you would start a thread.

See? Problem solved!
EB

 

[untermensche]

This is a dodge.

Pure and simple.

If there is experience that means one thing experienced something else.

It will always mean that.

That is the starting point when looking at experience.

If that is dodged you are looking at something that is not "experience".

Yep. Dennett says that what you experienced was the judgement that you experienced something and that asking for more than that is asking for something that demonstrably isn't there. You experience it in the public production and there is no inner show. This is the challenge you have to adress.

And, unlike any of your subjective chest beating, it's entirely objective and scientifically verifiable - as Dennett points out in great detail while developing heterophenomenology.

An experience is not a judgement. A judgement is something we make about experiences or ideas in memory. And besides only "minds" make judgements. To say a judgement is being made is to say some thing is making a judgement.

This idea is basically not knowing the difference between a real time experience and contemplation.

It is absurd and unsupported by anything you have ever said.

When you "see" a red bird you experience the sensation of seeing a red bird.

The "you" is the mind.

The "mind" is that which experiences. And that which can move the body and arrange ideas into a coherent order.

If a "science" is not looking for the "mind" it is on the wrong track.

 

[untermensche]

The "mind" is that part of the human that experiences.

You never explained to me how you know that it could not be the brain that is experiencing, and I doubt if you will now.

Bullshit!

I used color to do it but you simply made absurd claims and ran away.

If the brain is experiencing it can experience "red" without turning it into something else. Because the experience of "red" is a transformation. Something the brain creates whole using stimulation that has nothing to do with "red".

The transformation is wasted energy if the brain can experience. Because if a faithful transformation can take place the brain must already have ways to recognize the untransformed stimuli.

Biological entities don't waste energy for no reason at all.

The brain is creating "red" so something besides the brain, the mind, can experience it. The brain already knows what it is. That is how a faithful transformation is made.

The "sense of self", the self, will not be wiped away with the wave of a finger. To think you can do it with absolutely no coherent ideas is ridiculous folly.

 

[Subsymbolic]

This is a dodge.

Pure and simple.

If there is experience that means one thing experienced something else.

It will always mean that.

That is the starting point when looking at experience.

If that is dodged you are looking at something that is not "experience".

Yep. Dennett says that what you experienced was the judgement that you experienced something and that asking for more than that is asking for something that demonstrably isn't there. You experience it in the public production and there is no inner show. This is the challenge you have to adress.

And, unlike any of your subjective chest beating, it's entirely objective and scientifically verifiable - as Dennett points out in great detail while developing heterophenomenology.

An experience is not a judgement. A judgement is something we make about experiences or ideas in memory. And besides only "minds" make judgements. To say a judgement is being made is to say some thing is making a judgement.

I think it's lovely that you can define words and the meanings of them so well. now all you have to do is convince people outside of your head.

This idea is basically not knowing the difference between a real time experience and contemplation.

Or that I was explaining someone else's work, not my position. You didn't even notice.

It is absurd and unsupported by anything you have ever said.

Because I'm explaining Dennett's position not my own. I'm sorry that is so hard to grasp

When you "see" a red bird you experience the sensation of seeing a red bird.

YOu did read the target paper and see the problem with claiming that? You didn't, did you. YOu just carried on pimping your own niave misunderstandings of a complex and highly studied area.

The "you" is the mind.

How do you know? why can't it be God or each aspect belong to a different person? Or a hundred other possibilities you have never considered.

The "mind" is that which experiences.

You know, we've had people arguing about exactly what the mind is and does for millennia and you think you can just stick your dogmatic certainty in and assert in complete ignorance.

And that which can move the body and arrange ideas into a coherent order.

Because all of these are clearly achieved by one unitary thing.

If a "science" is not looking for the "mind" it is on the wrong track.

Do you have a scientific argument for that claim?

 

[untermensche]

You know, we've had people arguing about exactly what the mind is and does for millennia and you think you can just stick your dogmatic certainty in and assert in complete ignorance.

We have had people using their minds to create the world you see around you.

The mind is not so easily done away with.

And certainly not by the air you spew.

You explain absolutely nothing about your faith. There is not one argument in that whole waste of time you just wrote.

Like many religious adherents you just proclaim it.

From what I can see YOU have no position here. There really is nothing for me to argue against.

You simply drop names and then salivate to their greatness.

And from third rate story tellers with no biological training like Dennett that create more confusion than clarity no less.

 

[Subsymbolic]

You know, we've had people arguing about exactly what the mind is and does for millennia and you think you can just stick your dogmatic certainty in and assert in complete ignorance.

We have had people using their minds to create the world you see around you.

The mind is not so easily done away with.

And certainly not by the air you spew.

You explain absolutely nothing about your faith. There is not one argument in that whole waste of time you just wrote.

Like many religious adherents you just proclaim it.

From what I can see YOU have no position here. There really is nothing for me to argue against.

You simply drop names and then salivate to their greatness.

And from third rate story tellers with no biological training like Dennett that create more confusion than clarity no less.

The key thing here are the words 'from what I see' and yes, from what you see, I'm sure you are quite right. Thank God that you haven't sullied yourself with any formal training in this simple and easy to understand domain. You just have to look inside yourself and all the answers are there. However, one of us actually gets paid to teach this stuff and has over a decade of formal study in precisely this domain and a couple of decades of teaching experience around it.

So, how about you share your qualifications in this domain?