FORGIVENESS

[ruby sparks]

Now you can tell me that illness is different from morality, etc., and you still fail to see that the analogy is apt because the same argument that you are using against morality, if it worked, it would work against illness/health as well.

No. In the case of illness there are facts (and properties) that are independent of attitudes. In the case of morality, that is an unresolved issue. So whatever way you are using illness as a comparison, it could be inapt and the same arguments in favour or against could not necessarily be used validly for both. Gustatory taste or beauty would be better because they seem to be on a par with morality in that they are things which are 'merely' sensed or mentally held to be the case (with caveats for the things that have been suggested as bases for morality).

I am not even sure what you mean when you say 'the argument I am using against morality' in the first place.

If that were true, not only illness realism fails, but everything. Science and everything else relies on common sense human intuitions, like the intuition that we can generally (i.e., in nearly all cases) trust our senses, our memories, generally our faculties, and of course our epistemic intuition that allows us to make epistemic probabilistic assessments, and so on. There is no way around it. When people reject some common sense intuition on the basis of new evidence, they are actually rejecting it on the basis of new evidence and a stronger commonsense intuition (of course, in many cases, they just reject common sense moral intuitions because they are confused by RIP).

What we are investigating here is not clearly something about the outside world (eg illness). It is about psychological/internal/brain beliefs. In that domain especially, what we think things are is an unreliable guide to what is objectively the case and has been shown to be, over and over. Here is a suggested 'Top 20' of some of the inherent flaws involved in both human intuitions and reasoning:

1. Illusions of agency and free will (including attributing these to entities which don't have them).
2. Illusions of self.
3. False beliefs and superstitious thinking generally (eg conspiracy theories, gambler's fallacy, curses, luck, etc)
4. Teleology (the pervasive idea that things happen for a purpose).
5. Pattern-finding (when there is no pattern).
6. Anthropomorphism (the projecting of human attributes incorrectly).
7. Causality (we over-read this).
8. Various illusions of perception (vision, hearing etc).
9. Time (our brains muck about with this).
10. Over-estimating the role of consciousness (underestimating the role of what are the bulk of our mental processes, the non-conscious ones).
11. Over-confidence bias.
12. Self-serving bias.
13. Herd mentality.
14. Loss aversion.
15. Framing bias.
16. Narrative fallacy.
17. Anchoring bias.
18. Confirmation bias.
19. Hindsight bias.
20. Correlation bias.

And in at least some cases, no amount of reasoning can dislodge the false beliefs. Others are merely 'sticky' (tend to persist).

I might even suggest that if we are wrong about 1 and 2 above, then we are likely fundamentally wrong about morality from the very start.

There are also false beliefs about the way the physical world operates which for most humans are intuitively wrong. Most people not trained in Newtonian physics will think that a ball dropped by a man walking along will fall vertically down. And as for quantum physics, most people, even some trained physicists, have significant trouble getting their heads intuitively around the idea that things can be everywhere at once and that the appearance that they are in one particular location is merely probabilistic.

It is one thing to say that our unreliable brain allows us to navigate the world successfully most of the time, in an ad hoc way, and another thing to say that it gets things factually right, and this is especially true of 'mental' (internal) things such as beliefs. These have often been shown to be incorrect. The takeaway lesson is 'be sceptical about the true nature of your mental beliefs' (even if they have not yet been demonstrated to be wrong).

I did not even include religion, or 'spirituality' in general (the sense that there is some 'higher or other reality' or a supernatural realm or that there are souls, or for that matter auras or healing crystals) though I easily could have beefed up my list with things like that. They are very common false beliefs and quite 'sticky'.

Just on the topic of religion specifically though. I don't agree that just because it's an ideology it necessarily disqualifies moral judgements, especially if we realise that the moral rules of religion do not actually come from the god believed to be the source of them. In an important way, the moral content of religion consists of the morality of the writers and as such is a factual record of what they held to be moral and immoral. Men merely invented god to serve as an arbiter (a 'wise ruler') for the beliefs they already had about morality, whatever those were at the time of writing.

As such the false belief that there is a god deciding moral issues is only a skew in a limited way. And in any case, people, either individually or within the vast multitude of different religious subsets, generally pick and choose which bits to accept or reject and always have done.

1. There is a fact of the matter as to whether a moral assessment (e.g., whether Ted Bundy was a bad person) is true (this should be understood with some tolerance for vagueness, e.g., there is a fact of the matter as to whether an animal is a lion - but there might be some vagueness, as mentioned earlier).

2. There are moral properties, e.g., some humans sometimes behave immorally, some humans sometimes behave in a morally praiseworthy manner.
​

I am not sure what you mean by 'properties' but in any case, the more interesting first question here is whether all moral judgements are moral facts. I understand that some moral realists only claim that there are some. Are you one of them?

And I think you should move away from 'easy' examples, such as killing for fun, or at the other extreme, shoe-wearing customs. Get your hands dirty with the trickier ones in between. Although if you are only claiming that some moral judgements (eg killing for fun) are moral facts, then you don't need to.

Now, how would the fact that we ascertain morality by means of a human intuition make a dent on realism so defined? What does the fact that we use a human intuition - just as in the illness case, or the redness case, etc. - have any relevance at all?

There is more to illness than our intuitions about it. For that reason I have no idea why you carry on using the comparison with illness.

Regarding colour, I can't get past the claim that if we are not talking about colour in the everyday sense then we are not talking about colour, which is obviously questionable.

 

[ruby sparks]

No, if a person were going to kill me, and they had no justification, I would believe that that is morally wrong. If a dog were going to kill me, I would not believe the dog is doing anything morally wrong. I would just fight back. Now, if I am a boxer, and the other boxer is going to hurt me in accordance to the rules, I would not think his actions are immoral. I would think it's bad for me, for sure. I would take evasive action when I can, but that's not even related to morality. A shark makes no moral judgments whatsoever (that is a monkey thing, not a fishy thing), but takes evasive action when attacked.

Don't you see the difference? Some animals (prominently humans) make moral judgments. That's a specific sort of judgment. The sort of thing you make and is linked to feelings of guilt, or punitive sentiments for immoral behavior, things like that. The vast majority of animals act out of self-preservation. But they make no moral judgments. And a superintelligent AI or an alien from another planet might not make them, either (or they might, depending on the sort of mind they have).



But that's not a moral rule!

You misunderstand. The 'rules' offered are not necessarily moral rules of themselves (there may be a way to argue this but imo it would be more of a stretch). They are offered as being the underlying basis for morality. As such, one answer to the question 'what is something that is deemed to be right?' is 'my/our continued existence'.

They are all explainable by recourse to blind, non-teleological or 'truth-tracking' evolution and do not require the existence of independent, realist moral facts.

That's not it. There are things that are being tracked. If that were not the case, then moral judgments would just go in any direction. A system of rules would not be a stable strategy if individuals cannot track the rules.

Well in a way yes, the things that are being tracked are practical, pragmatic consequences. What I meant was there are no independent moral truths or properties (of themselves) being tracked. Well there may be, but it's not established.

No, I do not agree with that at all. But thank you, because you give an example of why the studies can go wrong. People simply do not understand what is being asked (and I did not choose polygamy because I wanted a more clear-cut case of a local rule that is immoral not to follow in ordinary cases; the matter is more debatable for polygamy

So you chose an easy one. I offered a list and I think it would have been better if you had chosen something from that, such as polygamy, or one of the other 'rules' that appear to be non-objective and often deemed as such.

Here is an extremely common statement of moral non-objectivity:

"One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter".

I think the nub of this is whether you are only claiming that there are facts about some moral issues, or all moral issues. If the former, then we have no disagreement about the existence of moral 'facts'. And if you accept the statements offered as to the basis for morality, then we have no issue about independence (from human attitudes) either.

No, I should not, because it is false and I know it is false, and does not support my position beyond the idea that they are independent of human attitudes. For that matter, someone may posit Divine Command Theory and that too makes moral properties independent from human attitudes. I would not endorse it a bit. It's false, and I know it is false.

Good for you. At some stage then, maybe you will come up with just one scenario to show it. Though oddly, you don't need to. You could do monkeys.

I can even suggest another. Pain = bad.

No, that is not it. If you are saying that in the moral sense, then actually, that depends on whose pain it is. The pain of the person being punished as they deserve is not a bad thing. It's good.

You either misunderstand or you are not casting the net wide enough. It is non-controversial to say that the items offered are the basis for morality.

Although this could arguably be subsumed into (1) as a negative, "the absence of pain is something that would promote one’s survival and so is a reason in favor of it".

That's not a moral reason - and no, the absense of pain may or may not be good for survival. Indeed, when something is not properly functioning, pain let us know. In general, pain has an important survival function, and it is dangerous not to be able to feel it.

Again the claim is that such things at least form the basis for morality. As in, for example, "what is deemed moral is my survival". The moral philosopher who drafted the list I cited seems to think this is uncontroversially the case and I and others I have discussed this with would seem to agree with her. Why do you disagree?

But that is not remotely the relevant sense of independence.

What exactly do you mean by the 'relevant' sense of independence?

 

[ruby sparks]

https://study.com/academy/lesson/retributive-justice-vs-restorative-justice.html

But that's going back to the OP topic!

Though on that, I would say that there is no objective moral fact of the matter as to whether it is right to forgive a wrong or to punish it instead. Not in all cases.

 

[ruby sparks]

I can even suggest another. Pain = bad.

No, that is not it. If you are saying that in the moral sense, then actually, that depends on whose pain it is.

Yes, it does. I explained that I meant it as per the 'existence = good' rule, in that it is my existence, my pain (or in other cases, 'ours' if say, it's my daughter's existence or pain, or to a lesser extent 'those like me' or my tribe or whatever).

The pain of the person being punished as they deserve is not a bad thing. It's good.

This is also going right back to the OP topic.

That's your moral judgement as a retributivist (which is arguably your ideology under some definitions*). I would not say it was objectively true in all cases (eg not in cases of deemed-to-be non-objective moral judgements, and possibly some deemed-to-be objective ones, I have not thought through enough possible scenarios). And when I say that, I obviously mean that you may disagree. Each of us may have an opinion on it that is the result of many factors and influences. Our moral frameworks may differ in some ways as a result.



*"Definition of ideology

1a: a manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture
1b: the integrated assertions, theories and aims that constitute a sociopolitical program
1c: a systematic body of concepts especially about human life or culture
2: visionary theorizing"

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ideology

 

[ruby sparks]

....There is a fact of the matter as to whether a moral assessment (e.g., whether Ted Bundy was a bad person) is true.....

This seems to imply that you claim there is an objective fact of the matter about the truth or untruth of all moral assessments, not just Assessments about Ted Bundy.

Can you clarify?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

No. In the case of illness there are facts (and properties) that are independent of attitudes. In the case of morality, that is an unresolved issue.

No, you misunderstand the argument again. I realize that you will keep replying in the same manner - because you have for many, many pages already -, so I will try something else. Before I address the rest of your arguments, I will focus just on this one. If I can get you to understand the argument, then I will address the next. Else, I will think about whether to continue this exchange. Of course, you claim that in the case of illness there are facts and properties that are independent of attitudes, but in the case of morality, that is an unresolved issue. Let us step back a little. Do you agree that the following is a fact independent of attitude?

F1: Ted Bundy killed several people for fun.
​

If the answer is 'yes' (else, let me know, and a very different argument will ensue), let us consider the following fact:

F2: Marie Curie got cataracts as a result of many years of exposure to high levels of radiation.
​

Now consider the following two facts (if you think one of those is not a fact or are not sure whether it is a fact but believe the other is, what's the difference?):

F3: Ted Bundy behaved immorally when he killed people for fun.
​

F4: Marie Curie's became ill as a result of many years of exposure to high levels of radiation.
​

Which of those facts F1-F4 are attitude-independent in your assessment, and why or why not?

 

[ruby sparks]

No. In the case of illness there are facts (and properties) that are independent of attitudes. In the case of morality, that is an unresolved issue.

No, you misunderstand the argument again. I realize that you will keep replying in the same manner - because you have for many, many pages already -, so I will try something else. Before I address the rest of your arguments, I will focus just on this one. If I can get you to understand the argument, then I will address the next. Else, I will think about whether to continue this exchange. Of course, you claim that in the case of illness there are facts and properties that are independent of attitudes, but in the case of morality, that is an unresolved issue. Let us step back a little. Do you agree that the following is a fact independent of attitude?

F1: Ted Bundy killed several people for fun.
​

If the answer is 'yes' (else, let me know, and a very different argument will ensue), let us consider the following fact:

F2: Marie Curie got cataracts as a result of many years of exposure to high levels of radiation.
​

Now consider the following two facts (if you think one of those is not a fact or are not sure whether it is a fact but believe the other is, what's the difference?):

F3: Ted Bundy behaved immorally when he killed people for fun.
​

F4: Marie Curie's became ill as a result of many years of exposure to high levels of radiation.
​

Which of those facts F1-F4 are attitude-independent in your assessment, and why or why not?

F1, F2 & F4 (assuming they are accurate) are attitude-independent. F3 depends on the having of a moral attitude.
(Brief answer omitting possible caveats and elaborations for simplicity).

After you have digested that, and before replying, consider these two sets of four statements also:

F1': Sam Smith was a polygamist.
F2': Marie Curie got cataracts as a result of many years of exposure to high levels of radiation.
F3': Sam Smith behaved immorally when he practiced polygamy.
F4': Marie Curie became ill as a result of many years of exposure to high levels of radiation.

and

F1": Jim Armstrong thinks capital punishment for the unprovoked murder of an innocent stranger is good.
F2": Marie Curie got cataracts as a result of many years of exposure to high levels of radiation.
F3": Jim Armstrong is morally right in thinking capital punishment for the unprovoked murder of an innocent stranger is good.
F4": Marie Curie became ill as a result of many years of exposure to high levels of radiation.

If you could also answer briefly in the first instance as to which if any are in your view attitude independent and which aren't, that would be good. There is no need to explain your reasons at his point. Attitude-independent or not is fine.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

F1, F2 & F4 (assuming they are accurate) are attitude-independent. F3 depends on the having of a moral attitude.
(Brief answer omitting possible caveats and elaborations for simplicity).

Okay, so why? What is the difference in that regard between F3 and F4?
In other words, why is it that whether Ted Bundy behaved immorally depend on having a certain attitude, but whether Marie Curie became ill not? I'm not talking about her getting cataracts, of course, but about whether her condition - i.e., cataracts - is an illness? In other words, why would the property of being immoral of Bundy's killing people for fun be attitude-dependent, but the property of being an illness of Curie's cataracts is not?

After you have digested that, and before replying, consider these two sets of four statements also:

F1': Sam Smith was a polygamist.
F2': Marie Curie got cataracts as a result of many years of exposure to high levels of radiation.
F3': Sam Smith behaved immorally when he practiced polygamy.
F4': Marie Curie became ill as a result of many years of exposure to high levels of radiation.

and

F1": Jim Armstrong thinks capital punishment for the unprovoked murder of an innocent stranger is good.
F2": Marie Curie got cataracts as a result of many years of exposure to high levels of radiation.
F3": Jim Armstrong is morally right in thinking capital punishment for the unprovoked murder of an innocent stranger is good.
F4": Marie Curie became ill as a result of many years of exposure to high levels of radiation.


If you could also answer briefly in the first instance as to which if any are in your view attitude independent and which aren't, that would be good. There is no need to explain your reasons at his point. Attitude-independent or not is fine.

I would like to, but I do not know what 'attitude independent' means. I tried to understand what you meant by it, but by your reply, it does not appear to be a coherent notion. I can, however, tell you whether there is a fact of the matter, which is the relevant sort of independence in the sense I am talking about (as I explained here, though that can be expanded upon).

So, let us see:


F1'-> Did you mean Joseph Smith, the founder of Mormonism? If you do, then there is a fact of the matter. If you do not, then there is a fact of the matter as long as you are talking about an actual person Sam Smith (if not, then we can assume for the sake of the argument that you are, so there is a fact of the matter).
F2', F4'=F4" -> There is a fact of the matter.
F3' -> Same answer as F1'.

F1"-> There is a fac of the matter (assuming of course that you are talking about a real Jim Armstrong, but as always with hypothetical questions, we can just pretend you are if you aren't, so the answer is that there is a fact of the matter).
F3" -> Seems ambiguous. Does it mean 'Jim Armstrong is correct in thinking capital punishment for the unprovoked murder of an innocent stranger is good.', or 'Jim Armstrong is not behaving immorally for thinking capital punishment for the unprovoked murder of an innocent stranger is good?', or something else? At any rate, those options or any other one I can think of are also cases in which there is a fact of the matter, assuming that Jim Armstrong is an actual person you are talking about.


So, in short, fact of the matter for all. If that is not what you mean by 'attitude-independent' (it's how I would be inclined to understand that expression if I'm not given further clarification), I would need more information, but at any rate, it would be irrelevant to realism as I define it (which is a definition that - with some further details perhaps - would probably be endorsed by some but not all philosophers, I'm not sure what percentage).

 

[ruby sparks]

...why would the property of being immoral of Bundy's killing people for fun be attitude-dependent, but the property of being an illness of Curie's cataracts is not?

Because, as I already said, and have said many times before, and I don't think I can say it more plainly, the former does seem to require someone to have an attitude about it whereas the latter doesn't. That is why.

I would like to, but I do not know what 'attitude independent' means. I tried to understand what you meant by it, but by your reply, it does not appear to be a coherent notion.

Attitude-independence is surely not that hard to understand. It simply means independent of attitudes.

Independent of: not determined by, required by or relying on.
Attitudes: feelings towards or mental states about something.

I can, however, tell you whether there is a fact of the matter, which is the relevant sort of independence in the sense I am talking about ...

Succinctly and in a nutshell (please, if you can) what do you mean by 'relevant sense' of (presumably attitude-)independence? I asked you this at least once before. Most recently just before you asked me if I thought something was attitude-independent or not instead of answering me. If I was previously clear on what you meant before asking you again recently, I wouldn't have asked. Start with, "relevant attitude-independence, as I see it, is when.....[insert basic answer]."

Did you mean Joseph Smith, the founder of Mormonism?

Odd question. No, I did not mean Joseph Smith. That is why I typed the words 'Sam Smith'.

... there is a fact of the matter as long as you are talking about an actual person Sam Smith ...

Odd question. Was there an actual Jack person who went into outer space in your scenarios?

F3" -> Seems ambiguous. Does it mean 'Jim Armstrong is correct in thinking capital punishment for the unprovoked murder of an innocent stranger is good.', or 'Jim Armstrong is not behaving immorally for thinking capital punishment for the unprovoked murder of an innocent stranger is good?', or something else?

"Jim Armstrong is morally right in thinking capital punishment for the unprovoked murder of an innocent stranger is good" surely means what it clearly says. How you think it's ambiguous is mysterious.

At any rate, those options or any other one I can think of are also cases in which there is a fact of the matter, assuming that Jim Armstrong is an actual person you are talking about.

I'm not sure why he has to be an actual person for you to consider it. See above about spaceman Jack.

If that is not what you mean by 'attitude-independent' (it's how I would be inclined to understand that expression if I'm not given further clarification), I would need more information...

Would you really. Well, I hope I clarified above. If not, just ask again.

So, in short, fact of the matter for all.

Ok, so the upshot is that you seem to claim that there is an attitude-independent, objective moral fact of the matter as to whether polygamy is immoral and whether capital punishment is good.

I honestly can't see how you got to that, perhaps especially in the latter case. I guess we just think about morality differently you and I.

 

[ruby sparks]

In other words, why is it that whether Ted Bundy behaved immorally depend on having a certain attitude, but whether Marie Curie became ill not?

Alternative answer: I am not sure I fully know why some things are apparently attitude-dependent and others apparently aren't. You might as well ask why there even are such things as opinions, emotions or attitudes at all. For our purposes here, we don't necessarily need to fully know why such things exist. We can stop at the claims 'there are or aren't such things'. The question of whether Ted Bundy behaved immorally does seem to be dependent on attitudes, as does whether polygamy is immoral and/or capital punishment is good.

With the caveat that some general, human-independent rules (that are at least feasibly the root of morality, and a significant part of an explanation for it, to the extent that they are one candidate plausible answer, where they apply, to the general question, "what things are deemed morally right" and by extension, "what is it that morality is"*) have already been suggested.

Ted Bundy is, as I have said before, an especially easy one for you because there is at least what we might call a species-wide, agreed moral 'fact' about his behaviour. For that reason, I would prefer if you dealt with more difficult examples, such as polygamy and capital punishment, for example.




* Namely: "It is the application of these rules (with associated attitudes about them in species with the capacity to experience attitudes)."

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Because, as I already said, and have said many times before, and I don't think I can say it more plainly, the former does seem to require someone to have an attitude about it whereas the latter doesn't. That is why.

It seems like that to you, but it's not what it seems to me, or to most other people. Is your assessment based on intuition only, or can you provide any reason? If you already did, could you provide the link to the relevant post and/or a recap?

Alternative answer: I am not sure I fully know why some things are apparently attitude-dependent and others apparently aren't.

Okay, so how about this one?
Why does it appear to you that whether Ted Bundy behaved immorally depends on having a certain attitude, but whether Marie Curie became ill does not?
Are you relying exclusively on intuition to make that assessment, or do you have, in addition to intuition, some reasoning you can offer?

The question of whether Ted Bundy behaved immorally does seem to be dependent on attitudes, as does whether polygamy is immoral and/or capital punishment is good.

Why does it seem like that to you? It surely does not seem like that to me. As for poligamy and/or capital punishment, it depends on the situation, but it does not depend on the attitude of the person making the assessment of course. That seems intuitively clear to me, and I would say, generally to humans when they are not confused about what the question is. But leaving aside whether that is a general human assessment, I would like to ask why it seems like that to you?

Succinctly and in a nutshell (please, if you can) what do you mean by 'relevant sense' of (presumably attitude-)independence?

I'm just trying to match whatever you are saying. In a previous reply, I explained 3 different senses in which something could be said to be 'attitude-dependent', but let me be clear, the discussion of attitude-independence did not begin with me (i.e., I did not bring this up). And in any event, what I think is the relevant sort of independence is the independence from the attitudes, beliefs, etc., of the person making the moral assessment, so that realism is true, where realism is defined as I already defined it:

There are different definitions of moral realism. I would go with a simple one - which would be accepted by some but not all philosophers:

1. There is a fact of the matter as to whether a moral assessment (e.g., whether Ted Bundy was a bad person) is true (this should be understood with some tolerance for vagueness, e.g., there is a fact of the matter as to whether an animal is a lion - but there might be some vagueness, as mentioned earlier).

2. There are moral properties, e.g., some humans sometimes behave immorally, some humans sometimes behave in a morally praiseworthy manner.
​

"Jim Armstrong is morally right in thinking capital punishment for the unprovoked murder of an innocent stranger is good" surely means what it clearly says. How you think it's ambiguous is mysterious.

I have never encountered the expression "is morally right in thinking" before. I googled it, and found no matches. It sounds odd to me. I have explained at least two potential interpretations, namely: 'Jim Armstrong is correct in thinking capital punishment for the unprovoked murder of an innocent stranger is good.', and 'Jim Armstrong is not behaving immorally for thinking capital punishment for the unprovoked murder of an innocent stranger is good?'

Could you please formulate it in an alternative manner?

Odd question. Was there an actual Jack person who went into outer space in your scenarios?

No, of course, an it's not an odd question. I did say "(assuming of course that you are talking about a real Jim Armstrong, but as always with hypothetical questions, we can just pretend you are if you aren't, so the answer is that there is a fact of the matter)", but it's a question to avoid a number of potential objections to my reply. In particular, in my scenarios, I do say 'imagine this scenario', or things like that, but you did not, and this might lead to an objection like 'But what if there is no Sam Smith?', etc.

I'm not sure why he has to be an actual person for you to consider it. See above about spaceman Jack.

He does not have to be, as I explained in the post you are replying to. But if he is not, we need to assume he is, and avoid tricky replies like 'Well, what if he does not exist? Is there a fact of the matter as to whether the present king of France is a morally bad person?', and so on, which I'm trying to preclude.

Ok, so the upshot is that you seem to claim that there is an attitude-independent, objective moral fact of the matter as to whether polygamy is immoral and whether capital punishment is good.

No, not at all!

Imagine that you had ask me to consider the following statement:

F5: Ted Bundy behaved immorally when he killed Karen Sparks.

I would have replied that there is a fact of the matter. Suppose you had them told me that I seem to claim there is an attitude-independent, objective moral fact of the matter as to whether killing is immoral. Well, not at all. There is an objective fact of the matter as to whether Ted Bundy behaved immorally when he killed Karen Sparks. He did. But that does not entail that all actions in which a person kill another are immoral. It depends on the case. Of course, there is also a fact of the matter as to whether the following statement is true:

F6: Every human who kills another behaves immorally in doing so.

The fact of the matter is that F6 is false. But sometimes, it is immoral.


So, let me put it this way. Imagine that in some, specific scenario, a person (say, Alice) is a lawmaker and votes in favor of imposing the death penalty. Then, there is a fact of the matter as to whether that particular action of Alice was morally wrong, or not morally wrong. And if it was not morally wrong, there is a fact of the matter as to whether her action was morally obligatory, or morally permissible but not morally obligatory. And if it was morally permissible but not morally obligatory, there is a fact of the matter as to whether it was morally praiseworthy.
That aside, the fact of the matter is that voting in favor of the death penalty is not necessarily (i.e., as of metaphysical necessity, in all metaphysically possible scenarios) morally wrong, and not necessarily morally permissible. Sometimes it is morally wrong, and sometimes it is not.

Let me further clarify: what I am saying is that the morality of an specific action X performed by a specific agent A depends only on properties of the mind of A (such as A's intent, some but not all of A's beliefs and/or probabilistic assessments, and a few others), but it does not depend at all on properties of the mind of the agent assessing whether A's performing X was morally wrong, morally permissible, etc. (in the case A makes an assessment of A's own doing X, then whether it was morally wrong depends on some A's mental properties in A's capacity of being the agent performing X, not in A's capacity of being the agent assessing whether it is immoral of A to X).

I honestly can't see how you got to that, perhaps especially in the latter case. I guess we just think about morality differently you and I.

I do it intuitively, and crucially case by case, as is how our moral sense works.

 

[ruby sparks]

Why does it appear to you that whether Ted Bundy behaved immorally depends on having a certain attitude, but whether Marie Curie became ill does not?
Are you relying exclusively on intuition to make that assessment, or do you have, in addition to intuition, some reasoning you can offer?

Here's a reason, and we can stop doing Ted Bundy, because you, who are strenuously claiming there is such a thing as an attitude-independent moral judgement, simply haven't yet been able to show it by coming up with even a single example, hypothetical or otherwise, throughout the entire discussion, involving a moral judgement about anything at all, Ted Bundy killings or whatever, that does not involve an attitude. As such, you have not yet even come close to successfully challenging the claim that moral judgements depend on attitudes.

If I, on the other hand, were to claim that moral judgements depend on attitudes, I would have no trouble finding support for that from virtually countless examples. You, so far, have nothing but your own bald assertion.

Especially since you are for some odd reason rejecting the examples of independent rules offered about what are plausibly the roots of morality and thus answer the question 'what is morality?' (Answer = 'the application of these rules'). One might wonder if you're really interested in exploring what morality is at all.

Succinctly and in a nutshell (please, if you can) what do you mean by 'relevant sense' of (presumably attitude-)independence?

I'm just trying to match whatever you are saying.

And I asked you a straight question. I have now asked you several times to succinctly confirm what you mean when you talk about the 'relevant' sense of attitude-independence and you have obfuscated every time so far. Please stop referring me to lengthy posts which do not seem to make it succinct and clear what you mean. So far, even after re-reading all the posts you refer back to, I can see nothing to distinguish what you mean by saying something does not depend on attitudes and what I mean, which you say is incoherent.

Please can you just tell me, directly and succinctly, what you mean by what you have called the relevant sense of attitude-independence.

Eg. 'The relevant, as opposed to the non-relevant sense, is when...[insert straight answer or illustrative example].'

So, let me put it this way. Imagine that in some, specific scenario, a person (say, Alice) is a lawmaker and votes in favor of imposing the death penalty. Then, there is a fact of the matter as to whether that particular action of Alice was morally wrong, or not morally wrong.

Ok, so please show me how that would involve an attitude-independent, objective moral fact and not, say, merely an opinion, even if very strongly or widely held. I don't think you can, even if you choose your conveniently easy example of Ted Bundy.

Although as I have said, your repeated reliance on Ted Bundy-type situations is arguably somewhat questionable, not only for being rare and unusual (and therefore of limited value) but also because in that case it could merely involve nothing more than general, species-wide attitudinal agreement (and you have not yet shown even a single counter-example to that). Although to be fair, I am not sure if there is species-wide agreement that the death penalty is good, even for killers such as Ted Bundy. There are definitely some who disagree, and there may even be those who are ambivalent about it, including me. But in any case it would certainly be more useful if you moved away from the relative 'safety' of Ted Bundy or killing for fun, and onto other cases which have been suggested, including by me.

I do it intuitively....

Which of course does not show that it's a fact. Many people intuitively disagree with you about the death penalty and about polygamy and on many other things. That does not mean that you are incorrect, but it does mean that you can't show that you are correct, or even that there is an independent, objective moral fact involved in either of those, and many other issues. So far, you have gotten nowhere at all with showing that claim to be correct, or with challenging the counter-claim.

 

[ruby sparks]

Let me be clear. In my considered assessment (and that of moral relativists in general, I am inclined to think) there is no independent, objective moral fact of the matter either way as to either whether the death penalty is ever good, or right or deserved, or not, even in the case of Ted Bundy.

(With the caveat about the general, species-independent rules that are offered as plausible candidates for being the roots of morality).

And that's an unusually extreme example with a very high degree of instinctive, emotional weight attached, especially in the even more extreme case where, say, Ted Bundy had raped and murdered my beloved daughter. In which case I myself might easily and intuitively want him to die as retribution, but I, or anyone in my situation, even if everyone in that situation felt the same, may not be being particularly objective about it. And if everyone in that situation agreed it would only show species-wide agreement, which we could call a type of moral 'fact' (for humans), but not one that is independent of human attitudes, because it seems to rely on humans having attitudes about it.

Perhaps Angra means to say that some moral judgements are human-species-wide and in that sense are arguably independent of individual (human) attitudes. I wouldn't have a problem with that. I agreed way back in the discussions that there may be some species-wide moral 'facts'. In some cases the independent rules they operate under have been suggested.

More to the point, we should not just be doing Ted Bundy or killing for fun or only things for which there is human-species-wide agreement. It would be easier to say that there are not necessarily any independent, objective moral facts about many other 'lesser' cases, whether they are about the death penalty for other wrongdoings or not about the death penalty at all, or even whether they are legally proscribed or not.

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The obvious overarching answer here is that moral realism in some form may be true, for at least some things, and there are arguments in favour of it and against it, and the same could be said about alternatives. It is an unresolved issue. It seems to me that it is probably not one or the other and that depending on what moral issue and what individual case we are dealing with, there will be degrees of realism and degrees of non-realism. A bit of a fudge answer, I know, but sometimes the truth about certain things is very complicated and variegated, perhaps especially the psychology and behaviour of humans.

That a sense of morality has evolved and that evolution has shaped our sense of morality to at least a significant degree is surely uncontroversial. Even then, we can't say that disproves moral realism, because evolution could have been tracking (at least some) moral facts. Personally, I am inclined not to think this is the case, but it has to be admitted that it is possible. Nevertheless, an appreciation of the ways in which evolution may have shaped our sense of morality would still be an informative and useful contribution to the topic.

One more general thought. The suggestion (sometimes made) that moral non-realism would mean that society would cease to function well and that it would be 'open season' on all sorts of horrible behaviours is imo probably bunkum. It was said about losing a belief in the realism of god, it is said about losing a belief in the realism of free will and it could be said about losing a belief in the realism of the self. It might even be said about many other realisms or absolutes, about purpose or meaning or order, and such things. Sometimes we just worry about the losing of our familiar and everyday beliefs, including the ones that are our comfort blankets, that's all.



Once again:

Show

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Here's a reason, and we can stop doing Ted Bundy, because you, who are strenuously claiming there is such a thing as an attitude-independent moral judgement, simply haven't yet been able to show it by coming up with even a single example, hypothetical or otherwise, throughout the entire discussion, involving a moral judgement about anything at all, Ted Bundy killings or whatever, that does not involve an attitude.

I have come up with moral judgments like 'Ted Bundy was a morally bad person', or several others, in which whether the judgment is not true does not depend on any attitude of the person making the assessment. You do not realize that but that does not change the facts. However, here I was just asking why you think that moral judgments are dependent on attitudes, but judgments about health and illness are not. Now, you claim I have not been able to come up with a single judgment, etc., but that does not explain why you think I haven't been able to come up with a single such judgment. Of course, in reality I have, but that is again not the point here. My question is whether your assessment that the judgments I came up with are all attitude-dependent is entirely based on your intuitions, or you have a different reason?

If I, on the other hand, were to claim that moral judgements depend on attitudes, I would have no trouble finding support for that from virtually countless examples. You, so far, have nothing but your own bald assertion.

Do you mean health/illness judgments?
Well, of course you would have no trouble, just as I had no trouble coming up with similar examples for moral judgments. But that is not the point, either. If you were challenged by a health/illness antirealist of the variety that thinks such judgments are attitude-depending, he would just flatly deny that the examples you come up with work at all, just as you engage in the same flat denial for my examples of moral judgments. That is not at all the question. I'm asking whether in those examples (i.e., health/illness) you see something that makes them attitude-independent and that is not present in moral judgments, or else you only rely on your intuitions for the assessment?

And I asked you a straight question. I have now asked you several times to succinctly confirm what you mean when you talk about the 'relevant' sense of attitude-independence and you have obfuscated every time so far. Please stop referring me to lengthy posts which do not seem to make it succinct and clear what you mean. So far, even after re-reading all the posts you refer back to, I can see nothing to distinguish what you mean by saying something does not depend on attitudes and what I mean, which you say is incoherent.

I asked you many of those. Now I am focusing on just one. But you fail to give a straight answer, whereas my lengthy posts are precise answers.

Here is my question: when you assess that judgments of health/illness are independent of attitude, do you make that assessment on the basis of intuitions alone, or do you have another argument?
Please do not tell me that a reason is that I failed to come up with a single example, because you assess that the examples I came up with are not examples of attitude-independent judgments, so I want you to tell me whether that assessment of yours is entirely based on intuitions, or you have some other reason.

Please can you just tell me, directly and succinctly, what you mean by what you have called the relevant sense of attitude-independence.

I have been using the expression to try to match what you mean. As for the relevant sense, I already explained to you in the post you are replying to. I talked about the relevant sense of independence, not just attitude-independence. That would be an unncessary limitation, because it has to be independent of other stuff, like beliefs, etc.

Still, if you want me to again make clear what I think the relevant sense of independence is, it is as follows:

Let me further clarify: what I am saying is that the morality of an specific action X performed by a specific agent A depends only on properties of the mind of A (such as A's intent, some but not all of A's beliefs and/or probabilistic assessments, and a few others), but it does not depend at all on properties of the mind of the agent assessing whether A's performing X was morally wrong, morally permissible, etc. (in the case A makes an assessment of A's own doing X, then whether it was morally wrong depends on some A's mental properties in A's capacity of being the agent performing X, not in A's capacity of being the agent assessing whether it is immoral of A to X).

If you for some reason want to only talk about attitudes, then here it goes:

The relevant sense of attitude-independence is that the morality of an specific action X performed by a specific agent A depends only on properties of the mind of A (such as A's intent, some but not all of A's beliefs and/or probabilistic assessments, and a few others), but it does not depend at all on the attitude of the agent assessing whether A's performing X was morally wrong, morally permissible, etc. (if the two agents coincide, it does not depend at least in the agents' capacity as evaluator, not actor).

Ok, so please show me how that would involve an attitude-independent, objective moral fact and not, say, merely an opinion, even if very strongly or widely held. I don't think you can, even if you choose your conveniently easy example of Ted Bundy.

Again, that is intuitively clear. It's based on the way people use the words (and of course I disagree with the studies you brought up for the given reasons). I have defended intuiton-based assessments, and you reject them. I grant you I cannot persuade you. But I have explained my position in excruciating detail, and continue to do so. Could you please tell me know how do you make the assessment that

F4: Marie Curie's became ill as a result of many years of exposure to high levels of radiation.​

is an attitude-independent, objective illness fact? Given your claims about intuition, perhaps you have something other than intuitions to offer?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

The suggestion (sometimes made) that moral non-realism would mean that society would cease to function well and that it would be 'open season' on all sorts of horrible behaviours is imo probably bunkum.

I have not made that suggestion. I would say it's never happened, and would never happen realistically in a human society, because humans are humans, so even if their RIP says moral non-realism, nearly all (but not all) would slip unconsciously into realism. Regardless, if an odd society of philosophers were to exist and all were, say, moral error theorists and consistent about that, I do not think that the above would happen, so again not my claim.

 

[The AntiChris]

I have come up with moral judgments like 'Ted Bundy was a morally bad person', or several others, in which whether the judgment is not true does not depend on any attitude of the person making the assessment.

All you're doing is stating what you intuitively believe and attempting to present it as undeniable fact.

It's an article of faith.

 

[ruby sparks]

I'm asking whether in those examples (i.e., health/illness) you see something that makes them attitude-independent and that is not present in moral judgments....

Yes.

1. Living things (including Marie Curie) get diseases, and did so long before there were any brains to have mental states, either about diseases or about anything.
2. Living things (including Marie Curie) in some cases die of diseases.
3. Living things (including Marie Curie) die, either from disease, or decay, or damage or malfunction or whatever.
4. Illnesses, diseases, damage, malfunctions, decay etc, and indeed in the end, death, for living things in general (including Marie Curie) are therefore, by any reasonable standard, fully mental-state-independent phenomena with attitude-independent properties.

Does anyone have reasonable grounds to doubt or disagree with any of those statements? No, they don't. Are they relying on their intuitions? No, they aren't. That said I would love to hear you suggest that the fact of death, including that of Marie Curie, is merely based on intuitions. That would be amusing.

The above sharply contrasts with human moral judgements, which always involve and are expressions of mental states about them, for example intuitions and attitudes.

(With the previous caveat about species-independent rules).

The relevant sense of attitude-independence is that the morality of an specific action X performed by a specific agent A depends only on properties of the mind of A (such as A's intent, some but not all of A's beliefs and/or probabilistic assessments, and a few others), but it does not depend at all on the attitude of the agent assessing whether A's performing X was morally wrong, morally permissible, etc. (if the two agents coincide, it does not depend at least in the agents' capacity as evaluator, not actor).

Thank you for clarifying your own particular usage.

However, it seems to be nothing more than a bald claim based on personal conviction and your dogmatic belief in moral realism and possibly related to your retributivist ideology.

Again, that is intuitively clear. It's based on the way people use the words (and of course I disagree with the studies you brought up for the given reasons). I have defended intuiton-based assessments, and you reject them. I grant you I cannot persuade you. But I have explained my position in excruciating detail, and continue to do so.

Just to give two brief examples and not go through a longer list again, most people intuitively feel they have a self which is centred between their ears and just behind their eyes, and many people intuitively think there are ghosts, spirits or suchlike. So much for the reliability of intuitions. You have built your arguments on soft sand.

I suggested that with the sorts of clearly questionable standards you are using, you might get more acceptance of them (the standards themselves at least) at a different forum. There are forums for those who have strong convictions about the healing power of crystals, for example. You could go to such a forum and swop claims that rely on human intuitions with the posters there. You could do it using everyday language.

is an attitude-independent, objective illness fact?

Yes, it is, by any reasonable standard. We have a very large body of scientific evidence for illness, damage, disease and death in all living things, including plants, and in some cases including fossil evidence from a time before there were humans to have mental states or attitudes about any of those or about anything at all.

Illnesses, diseases, damage, malfunctions, decay etc, and indeed in the end, death, for living things in general, are therefore, by any reasonable standard, fully mental-state-independent phenomena with attitude-independent properties, regardless of human brain states, intuitions or attitudes.

 

[ruby sparks]

I have come up with moral judgments like 'Ted Bundy was a morally bad person', or several others, in which whether the judgment is not true does not depend on any attitude of the person making the assessment.

All you're doing is stating what you intuitively believe and attempting to present it as undeniable fact.

It's an article of faith.

Very much so, it seems.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

I have come up with moral judgments like 'Ted Bundy was a morally bad person', or several others, in which whether the judgment is not true does not depend on any attitude of the person making the assessment.

All you're doing is stating what you intuitively believe and attempting to present it as undeniable fact.

It's an article of faith.

It is not remotely an article of faith, as it is not an article of faith that judgments like health/illness judgments or color judgments do not depend on any attitude of the person making the assessment. Relying on intuition is not an article of faith. But I already debated this with you earlier in the thread and won (yes, of course, you disagree. I invite interested readers to take a look).

 

[Angra Mainyu]

1. Living things (including Marie Curie) get diseases, and did so long before there were any brains to have mental states, either about diseases or about anything.
2. Living things (including Marie Curie) in some cases die of diseases.
3. Living things (including Marie Curie) die, either from disease, or decay, or damage or malfunction or whatever.
4. Illnesses, diseases, damage, malfunctions, decay etc, and indeed in the end, death, for living things in general (including Marie Curie) are therefore, by any reasonable standard, fully mental-state-independent phenomena with attitude-independent properties.

Living things interact with viruses or radiation (for example). That results in some changes in those living things, resulting in conditions that look to us as illnesses. But why do you think that the fact that those conditions are illnesses is independent of attitudes? Intuition?


For example, for billions of years, there was light of different wavelenghts, and objects that reflected light in different manners, etc. Some of those objects would have looked red to us under ordinary light conditions, others would have looked blue, others green, and so on. Yet, you claim that dinosaurs had no color, and in the time of the dinosaurs there was no color, etc.
Now, for hundreds of millions of years, there were animals whose cells were modified by viruses, or which had cancer, or a number of other condition which, to us, would look like illnesses. But you do say that those were in fact illnesses. You say that illnesses existed for a long time before humans, etc., but color did not. Why? Why are facts about whether some condition is or is not an illness, attitude-independent, but facts about whether some object is red, attitude-dependent?

Does anyone have reasonable grounds to doubt or disagree with any of those statements? No, they don't.

Well, the same applies to color, or morality. But of course, some philosophers have sophisticated arguments and doubts, or even deny that. If that counts as reasonable in the color case and/or the moral case, why not the illness case?

Are they relying on their intuitions? No, they aren't.

Certainly, they are relying on their intuition that conditions such as cancer, or some modifications caused by interactions with viruses, etc., are illnesses, or that some objects are red, or green, or blue, etc., and that some behaviors are immoral, and so on. Obviously, they rely on intuitions.

That said I would love to hear you suggest that the fact of death, including that of Marie Curie, is merely based on intuitions. That would be amusing.

I am of course pointing out that the assessment that some conditions (a minority of which tend to result in death) are illnesses, is based on intuition.

However, it seems to be nothing more than a bald claim based on personal conviction and your dogmatic belief in moral realism and possibly related to your retributivist ideology.

It is regrettable that you haven't realized this is not remotely so, despite the amount of argumentation. Maybe in the future you can take a look at the exchange more carefully and you'll realize you were mistaken, though in my experience, that almost never happen (i.e., people do not go back to read all threads, and they are in any case never persuaded that their RIP is false by means of argumentation).