ruby sparks
Contributor
He may only have been using his everyday logic.
It does not assume. It assesses. The thing is this. No matter how many counterexamples I can come up with, you can always say it is not so. But perhaps a contrastive scenario will be even more obvious.The AntiChris said:This assumes as true the very thing that's in question.
No, we can also use our moral sense instead of religion/ideology/philosophy (RIP for short) and tell that Ahmed's actions were immoral. Obviously.The AntiChris said:The only thing we can say with certainty is that both you and I (external to Ahmed's universe) consider Ahmed's actions immoral (and probably insane) and that the entire population of Ahmed's universe think he did no wrong.
Logically entailing? Well, it follows from the fact that his actions were immoral. But of course, one needs to use a (normally functioning) human moral sense to see that. If you use RIP instead, then you are using the wrong tool. However, for that matter, no matter how much empirical evidence I bring a YEC (Young Earth Creationist) can point out that none of that entails common descent, say the fossils, etc. may have been planted by God to test us, or by demons to confuse us, or whatever.The AntiChris said:Nothing in your scenario can be taken as logically entailing that Ahmed's behaviour was impermissible independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions.
The AntiChris said:Anyway, congratulations on coming up with a totally unrealistic and convoluted scenario which challenged my intuitions!
You are very confused. But on the issue of forgiveness, I will not forgive you for this, unless you show significant change in your behavior. You have an obligation not to attack me like that.ruby sparks said:I guess you can at least hope that whoever reads it arbitrarily limits their enquiries to colloquial everyday language, mere intuitions, folk-psychology, 'how things subjectively seem', incomplete analyses and inadequate definitions and so on. Try a theology forum maybe. Stay away from science and proper, thorough philosophy. Neither are your strong suit.
I've no idea what that means other than that you assess (assume) it to be true.It does not assume. It assesses.The AntiChris said:This assumes as true the very thing that's in question.
Thanks for taking the trouble but I'm afraid I have no idea what exactly you think you're demonstrating with these tortuous scenarios.But perhaps a contrastive scenario will be even more obvious.
This makes no sense.Logically entailing? Well, it follows from the fact that his actions were immoral. But of course, one needs to use a (normally functioning) human moral sense to see that.The AntiChris said:Nothing in your scenario can be taken as logically entailing that Ahmed's behaviour was impermissible independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions.
You made a claim that "This" assumes, implying I assume. But I do not. I assess, using my moral sense of course. Assessing is not the same as assuming. I invite readers to use their respective moral senses (not religion/ideology/philosophy) to assess by themselves whether it is true.The AntiChris said:I've no idea what that means other than that you assess (assume) it to be true.
That there are possible scenarios in which agent A does X, everyone in the universe believes that X was okay, yet X was immoral.The AntiChris said:Thanks for taking the trouble but I'm afraid I have no idea what exactly you think you're demonstrating with these tortuous scenarios.
What I am saying is that it follows from the fact that Ahmed's behaviour was impermissible + the fact that everyone in the universe believed otherwise, no one had negative feelings towards it, etc., that the impermissibility was independent of those feelings, beliefs, etc., going by the very test you propose (namely, that everyone in the universe thought it was fine).The AntiChris said:This makes no sense.
You appear to be saying that the reason Ahmed's behaviour was impermissible, independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions., is because it follows from the fact that Ahmed's actions were immoral (impermissible).
No, they may well be using RIP (religion/ideology/philosophy) instead of their moral sense, or they may disagree about some relevant nonmoral facts.The AntiChris said:Is it your view that anyone who is sceptical about attitude-independent moral properties has an abnormally functioning moral sense?
You're thoroughly confused.What I am saying is that it follows from the fact that Ahmed's behaviour was impermissible + the fact that everyone in the universe believed otherwise, no one had negative feelings towards it, etc., that the impermissibility was independent of those feelings, beliefs, etc., going by the very test you propose (namely, that everyone in the universe thought it was fine).
You're thoroughly confused.What I am saying is that it follows from the fact that Ahmed's behaviour was impermissible + the fact that everyone in the universe believed otherwise, no one had negative feelings towards it, etc., that the impermissibility was independent of those feelings, beliefs, etc., going by the very test you propose (namely, that everyone in the universe thought it was fine).
You've convinced yourself that you've established that Ahmed's behaviour is impermissible, independent of anyone's opinion. You haven't.
All you've done is establish that in the opinion of you and I Ahmed's behaviour is impermissible.
You need to understand that this does not establish the fact that Ahmed's behaviour is impermissible independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions.
The problem with your argument is that you equivocate between two different senses of morally "impermissible".The AntiChris,
Let me explain this in other words, before your next reply saying I'm very confused or something along those lines:
How should one go about assessing whether the behavior of Ahmed or Jack was immoral?
The proper way is to ponder about the intentions, beliefs, predicted consequences, etc., and use our moral sense. If you believe otherwise, then what method do you propose? In that case, by the way, I would argue that you are rejecting human morality, and so I would ask about the reasons.
Now, I claim that by that proper method, Jack in S13-S14 behaved immorally when he intended to kill everyone in the colony for fun, and so did Ahmed in S12 when he intended to do that because they were infidels. If you want to debate whether this method yields these result, then alright, let me know and we can debate that. If, on the other hand, you reject the method in the first place, please let me know so that I argue that you are rejecting human morality.
So, why is it that their behavior is impermissible independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions?
Well, that is by a combination of the proper method to figure out whether Jack or Ahmed behaved immorally in the aforementioned situations (in particular S14 in the case of Jack), and your own test for independence: his behavior is impermissible (as properly assessed) even though everyone in the universe (at that time, that was the perpetrator himself) thought it was okay (and, in the case of Ahmed, even praiseworthy).
I want to make it clear I wasn't proposing a test. I was simply raising an unintuitive consequence of your views.your own test for independence
No, I do not equivocate. I always use 'impermissible' in the sense of 'morally impermissible', in the usual sense of the words in English. However, if you used the word 'impermissible' in a non-standard manner, then I misunderstood your post because I did not know you were using it so, but I did not equivocate.The AntiChris said:The problem with your argument is that you equivocate between two different senses of morally "impermissible".
Your theory that there are two different meanings of the word 'impermissible' is mistaken. There aren't two different meanings of 'impermissible' in English. Consider the following two statements:The AntiChris said:In the first sense we agree that Ahmed's behaviour was impermissible. In agreeing with you I'm assenting only that in my opinion Ahmed's behaviour was impermissible.
The fact that you agreed only is used as further evidence. But it is not required. And it is not why I reckon it is independent of anyone's beliefs, etc. (heretoforth, 'independent' for short). Let me try to clarify further, as there clearly is a misunderstanding.The AntiChris said:Having established this 'agreement' you now take it as fact that Ahmed's behaviour now has the attitude-independent property of impermissibility. This assumption is demonstrated when you defend the notion that Ahmed's behaviour is "impermissible independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions". This is unwarranted. The only conclusion we can draw from your various scenarios is that both you and I consider Ahmed's action impermissible whilst the entire population of Ahmed's universe disagree.
The AntiChris said:You've taken one particular interpretation of what I said which avoids the uncomfortable logical conclusion of your view. I'll be explicit.
Given Angra Mainyu's view that an action is moral/immoral independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions, it follows that in principle it is possible that a behaviour could be immoral even if everyone in the universe thought it was fine (not immoral).
Is this a problem for you, or does it conform with your intuitions?
The AntiChris said:I want to make it clear I wasn't proposing a test. I was simply raising an unintuitive consequence of your views.
This is a strange misrepresentation of what I said.Your theory that there are two different meanings of the word 'impermissible' is mistaken.
Ok. At this point I'm expecting you to explain how your scenarios lead to the conclusion that Ahmed's behaviour is attitude-independent impermissible .The fact that you agreed only is used as further evidence. But it is not required. And it is not why I reckon it is independent of anyone's beliefs, etc. (heretoforth, 'independent' for short). Let me try to clarify further, as there clearly is a misunderstanding.The AntiChris said:Having established this 'agreement' you now take it as fact that Ahmed's behaviour now has the attitude-independent property of impermissibility. This assumption is demonstrated when you defend the notion that Ahmed's behaviour is "impermissible independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions". This is unwarranted. The only conclusion we can draw from your various scenarios is that both you and I consider Ahmed's action impermissible whilst the entire population of Ahmed's universe disagree.
I reckon that moral properties are independent because it is intuitively clear. That is what my moral sense says. And it is generally what the human moral sense says. I can do that by using my moral sense as a guide....
No. It's unfalsifiable. I say that it would be profoundly counterintuitive.Let us then consider the following thesis:
You claim that if T1 is false, then independence is false.
T1: It is possible that a behaviour could be immoral even if everyone in the universe thought it was fine (not immoral).
No. To do so you'd have to show that attitude-independence is true. All you can do is show that if attitude-independence is true then T1 is not necessarily counterintuitive.Further, you suggest that T1 is 'uncomfortable', as in counterintuitive, improbable, weird, or whatever, just bad.
So, my goal is to show that T1 is clearly true.
No. I 'm not sure why you thought this. I don't even understand what it means.Let us get back to the following issue. I took it - as I understood the context - that you were agreeing to the following indepedence test:
IT1: Suppose agent A immorally does X. Suppose everyone in the universe believes A's doing X was morally permissible. Then, the impermissibility of A's doing X is independent.
Of course not. It's ambiguous. Here's your test again with 'immorally' 'replaced with 'impermissibly':I would like to ask, then: would you agree with the test? In other words, do you think that that is a sufficient condition for independence?
IT1: Suppose agent A impermissibly does X. Suppose everyone in the universe believes A's doing X was morally permissible. Then, the impermissibility of A's doing X is independent.
It is neither strange nor a misrepresentation. You claimed that I was equivocating on 'impermissible'. As I explained, it is false. Moreover, you made a claim about the meaning of 'impermissible' (namely, about their being two meanings) which is false, for the reasons I have been explaining.The AntiChris said:This is a strange misrepresentation of what I said.
There are infinitely many possible meanings of every word. However, in English, the word 'impermissible' in a moral context does not take those two meanings. It takes one. And the meaning is given by usage. It's 'one of those behaviors' (while describing some impermissible behaviors), but 'not one of those' (when describing permissible ones). And if you want to put it in terms of properties, then the claim 'X is impermissible' just is the claim that X has the property of being impermissible.The AntiChris said:I'm saying there are two (at least) possible meanings of the claim "X is impermissible":
1. X has the attitude-independent property of impermissibility - This is the moral realist version.
2. X is, in the opinion of the speaker, impermissible - The moral anti-realist version.
The AntiChris said:There is no non-question-begging correct version.
Equivocation occurs when you fail, either intentionally or unintentionally, to make this distinction clear.
But they work for that purpose as well. In fact, I repurposed them to show attitude-independence under what I thought was your test, and they worked. I will defend the test later, and use it. But originally, you are correct, the goal was not to show independence, as I do not need to show that (it's the default position)...but then again, why not go for it? I will argue for it later.The AntiChris said:Ok. It's clear that your scenarios were never intended to demonstrate attitude-independence, you simply wanted to challenge my intuitions. You expand on this here:
The AntiChris said:No. It's unfalsifiable. I say that it would be profoundly counterintuitive.Angra Mainyu said:Let us then consider the following thesis:
You claim that if T1 is false, then independence is false.
T1: It is possible that a behaviour could be immoral even if everyone in the universe thought it was fine (not immoral).
_____________________________
You've taken one particular interpretation of what I said which avoids the uncomfortable logical conclusion of your view. I'll be explicit.
Given Angra Mainyu's view that an action is moral/immoral independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions, it follows that in principle it is possible that a behaviour could be immoral even if everyone in the universe thought it was fine (not immoral).
Is this a problem for you, or does it conform with your intuitions?
To do what? If I say my goal is to show that T1 is clearly true, then that is my goal. I'm not following your objection here, but in any case, I do not have to show that indepedence is true, as it is he ordinary, default and rational position to trust our faculties; I gave more details above. Still, I will make an unnecessary case for independence below, but first I have other things to reply to.The AntiChris said:No. To do so you'd have to show that attitude-independence is true. All you can do is show that if attitude-independence is true then T1 is not necessarily counterintuitive.Angra Mainyu said:Further, you suggest that T1 is 'uncomfortable', as in counterintuitive, improbable, weird, or whatever, just bad.
So, my goal is to show that T1 is clearly true.
The AntiChris said:Of course, your painfully constructed scenarios do show that T1 is not necessarily uncomfortable/unintuitive in all situations. But they do not challenge the notion that T1 is profoundly unintuitive in realistic situations.
You did say that independence logically entails that it is possible that a behaviour could be immoral even if everyone in the universe thought it was fine (not immoral). All I'm saying is that the converse implication holds as well, leaving aside theism and things like that. In other words, that a behaviour could be immoral even if everyone in the universe thought it was fine (not immoral), entails that the property of immorality is attitude-independent (not in all but at least in some cases). Do you agree with that?The AntiChris said:No. I 'm not sure why you thought this. I don't even understand what it means.
In the usual sense of the word 'impermissible' in English, in moral contexts (i.e., not 'legally impermissible'). If we use 'immoral' instead of 'impermissible', we avoid that ambiguity. See my comments on the charge of equivocation earlier in this post, but in more detail, in this post.The AntiChris said:The premise here is that X is impermissible. In what sense is it impermissible?(see my comments on equivocation at the beginning of this post)
No, you got that wrong.The AntiChris said:In other words your "test" is meaningless.
Illness is an attitude-independence property. Whether an agent is ill does not depend on she or what other agents happen to believe on the matter, their attitudes, and so on.
Second, as the human moral sense is the proper tool to make moral assessments, this shows independence.
You would need a ton of evidence to debunk the human moral sense, as it would not be rational to reject what one of our faculties says without specific counter evidence.
The term 'X is impermissible' does not mean 'X is, in the opinion of the speaker, impermissible'.
But you did claim that that if T1 is false, then independence if false.
Well, you trivially implied it, to be more precise.
To show "T1 is clearly true".To do what?The AntiChris said:No. To do so you'd have to show that attitude-independence is true. All you can do is show that if attitude-independence is true then T1 is not necessarily counterintuitive.Angra Mainyu said:So, my goal is to show that T1 is clearly true.
For T1 to be true you'd have to show that the behaviour in question had the attitude-independent property of immorality.T1: It is possible that a behaviour could be immoral even if everyone in the universe thought it was fine (not immoral).
a behaviour could be immoral even if everyone in the universe thought it was fine (not immoral), entails that the property of immorality is attitude-independent
This isn't helpful.In the usual sense of the word 'impermissible' in English, in moral contextsThe AntiChris said:The premise here is that X is impermissible. In what sense is it impermissible?(see my comments on equivocation at the beginning of this post)
No, this is not at all a fact. It is a fact that your claim is false.The AntiChris said:Yes it can. This isn't an opinion. It's a fact.Angra Mainyu said:The term 'X is impermissible' does not mean 'X is, in the opinion of the speaker, impermissible'.
It's what moral anti-realists mean when they say "X is impermissible".
That is a misrepresentation of my words. If you had quoted the next sentence, that would be obvious. What you are replying to is this:The AntiChris said:No I didn't. This is a fact.Angra Mainyu said:But you did claim that that if T1 is false, then independence if false.
So, even though you did not literally claim it, my claim is that you trivially implied it, so telling me that it is a fact that you did not literally claim it misrepresents my words.Angra Mainyu said:But you did claim that that if T1 is false, then independence if false. Well, you trivially implied it, to be more precise. In fact, you said the following:
No, this is false. Let us consider the matter again.The AntiChris said:No I didn't. This was your misinterpretation of what I said. I pointed out your mistake in post #69 (which you acknowledged).
The AntiChris said:You've taken one particular interpretation of what I said which avoids the uncomfortable logical conclusion of your view. I'll be explicit.
Given Angra Mainyu's view that an action is moral/immoral independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions, it follows that in principle it is possible that a behaviour could be immoral even if everyone in the universe thought it was fine (not immoral).
Is this a problem for you, or does it conform with your intuitions?
My claim is about what you said - and very clearly so -, not about what you intended to say. If you misspoke repeatedly, that is a difficulty. But the problem is not on my side.The AntiChris said:
On a general note I'd like point out that this isn't the first time you've insisted that you know better than I what I intended to say despite my protests (the last time you did this was some years ago). This is extremely frustrating and makes civil discourse difficult.
Actually, to show that T1 is true I need to construct a scenario in which a behavior is immoral, even if everyone in the universe in that scenario thinks it is not immoral. To show it is clearly true, I need to construct a scenario in which a behavior is clearly immoral, even if everyone in the universe in that scenario thinks it is not immoral. I have done so. The scenarios are S12 and S14.The AntiChris said:To show "T1 is clearly true".
No, the human moral sense does not say that a behavior is immoral depending on attitudes. It just says it is immoral. It's like the human sense of health/illness which says that someone - or something - is ill, not that it is ill depending on attitudes.The AntiChris said:For T1 to be true you'd have to show that the behaviour in question had the attitude-independent property of immorality.
Well, the expression was used by you first, but 'immoral' is not ambiguous, and any ambiguity in 'could be' is covered when the scenario is such that the behavior is immoral, since 'is immoral' surely implies 'could be immoral'. Still, I took your claim in the best possible manner, which was to use 'could be' in the sense of metaphysical possibility. But I see your beef was not with 'could be' but with 'immoral'. On that note.The AntiChris said:What do you mean by "could be immoral"?
By 'immoral' I meant the behavior is immoral, in the usual sense of the word 'immoral' in English, when making moral assessments. Now I did not mean that it was immoral according to the human moral sense, but one should not confuse meaning and reference. Indeed, I explained that it is reckoned as immoral by the human moral sense, and that provides conclusive reasons to think it's immoral, barring good evidence against it.The AntiChris said:If you mean the behaviour has the attitude-independent property of immorality, then your statement is circular. If you mean immoral according to "human moral sense" then it clearly isn't attitude-independent and your statement is false.
No, the test is not circular. I mean 'immoral' in the usual sense of the words. That the propery is attitude independent can be seen in different ways. The easier is to look at moral disagreements, as explained above. Humans take disagreement to be genuine, they debate, etc.., so the human moral sense - save for malfunction - says the property is attitude independent.The AntiChris said:This isn't helpful.
If you mean that X has the attitude-independent property of impermissibility then your test is circular. If you mean X is impermissible according to "human moral sense" then it clearly isn't attitude-independent and your test fails.
No, that misses the point of the analogy again. The point was to show the misguided reply that the scenarios were contrived.ruby sparks said:There are clearly non-attitudinal facts about illness that are externally independent. This does not necessarily seem to be the case regarding the morality of the actions in your scenario, or at least you have not shown it.
ruby sparks said:Also:
1. Your scenarios don't show attitude-independence because you are making a negative judgement, albeit from outsidethe scenario.
No, you got that wrong, because:ruby sparks said:2. The people inside the scenarios are merely mistaken about the facts, something which you elsewhere consider essential to making the correct and proper moral judgement.
No, it does not. I showed that the human moral sense does that. Try it using your own moral sense, rather than RIP.ruby sparks said:This is just circular and involves assuming the conclusion.
First, that is false for Jack. The mistake about others being alive does not color his judgment of his own action - i.e., this is not something relevant to his assessment. He is fully informed about the facts about the mental behavior of the person he judges (himself), he knows intent, beliefs, etc., which are the relevant ones to make moral assessments.ruby sparks said:It's also not even relevant to your scenarios, because the people in all the scenarios (unless I've missed one) are merely mistaken about the facts and therefore can't make a proper or correct assessment.
No, you do not understand. Obviously, if I want to show that everyone can be mistaken and the behavior is still immoral, again obviously they are not making a proper assessment. Something went wrong. But it is irrelevant what it was, as my target was attitude-independence considering actual attitudes, not ideal observers.ruby sparks said:If you're not even showing what you would call a proper or correct assessment, you're not really showing anything much at all about morality, even by your own standards.
No, we use them all the time, and that is the only way to even make rational assessments. Indeed, while human faculties are fallible, it is normal and rational to trust them unless presented with sufficient counter evidence. This should be obvious, but in any case, I have explained it repeatedly: The fact is that we trust our faculties all the time, e.g., we trust our eyes - both to see shapes and colors -, ears (so to speak), memories, and so on. If we did not do that, it would be impossible to make any rational assessments whatsoever. So, in order to move away from this normal and rational position with regard to one of our faculties (in the case under consideration, our human moral sense), one would need a lot of evidence indicating it is failing. No such evidence is forthcoming.ruby sparks said:Well, that's debatable, given how often modern science demonstrates that our subjective mental faculties are an unreliable guide to what's actually happening. At best they're normally reliably pragmatic for navigating the world, even if they involve many useful illusions about it, that's all.
False and unwarranted accusations, demonization of the opponent, etc. There is a word for that. Well, a few: Individual in fighting mode, not in learning mode, and probably RIP too.ruby sparks said:But in any case you are an evidence-denialist. Even if/when counter evidence were/is available, you would/do ignore it, and have tried to do so on other issues. So personally, I wouldn't put you in charge of deciding about that, because you have a tendency to hold on to your assumptions and beliefs no matter what the counter evidence. There's a word for that you know. Religion.
No, you got that wrong, because:ruby sparks said:2. The people inside the scenarios are merely mistaken about the facts, something which you elsewhere consider essential to making the correct and proper moral judgement.
a. Actually, in S14, the only person left in the universe is the serial killer who wants to murder other people for fun. He is mistaken about the fact that others are dead and he believes otherwise, but that is not the issue, as it does not make his assessment that his own behavior is not immoral any different. In other words, he is fully informed about the facts about the mental behavior of the person he judges (himself), he knows intent, beliefs, etc., which are the relevant ones to make moral assessments.
No, it does not. I showed that the human moral sense does that.ruby sparks said:This is just circular and involves assuming the conclusion.
But it is irrelevant what it was, as my target was attitude-independence considering actual attitudes....
.....not ideal observers.
Try it using your own moral sense..
Ok. So it's your claim that "X is impermissible" can never mean "impermissible in the opinion of the speaker (an absurd claim if you understand anything about meaning and language use).No, this is not at all a fact. It is a fact that your claim is false.
So some do. This directly contradicts your previous claim.even the vast majority of moral anti-realists do not believe that 'X is impermissible' means 'X is, in the opinion of the speaker, impermissible'.
No it's not. It's a direct quote.That is a misrepresentation of my words.The AntiChris said:No I didn't. This is a fact.Angra Mainyu said:But you did claim that that if T1 is false, then independence if false.
No It's not. Here's the exchange:Angra Mainyu said:But you did claim that that if T1 is false, then independence if false. Well, you trivially implied it, to be more precise.
No, this is false.The AntiChris said:No I didn't. This was your misinterpretation of what I said. I pointed out your mistake in post #69 (which you acknowledged).
Having apologised for your mistake, you continue to argue against something I never said nor intended to imply!The AntiChris said:I want to make it clear I wasn't proposing a test. I was simply raising an unintuitive consequence of your views.
Okay, so I misunderstood the context and you did not mean to agree with IT1, sorry about that.
The problem here is that if you're not assuming the very thing you're attempting to prove (that A's doing X is impermissible attitude-independent), how do you explain, in a non-question-begging way, how we can know that A's doing X was immoral in the first place?IT1: Suppose agent A immorally does X. Suppose everyone in the universe believes A's doing X was morally permissible. Then, the impermissibility of A's doing X is independent.
The AntiChris said:This is becoming quite bizarre. Your continued desperation to refute absolutely everything I say is not only tiresome, it stops us focussing on the central points of disagreement.
No. Any word has infinitely many possible meanings. For that matter, I might use 'impermissible' to mean 'cat'. But that is not my point, no. The point is what I carefully explained. Note that the "can" was your addition. Indeed, you said:The AntiChris said:Ok. So it's your claim that "X is impermissible" can never mean "impermissible in the opinion of the speaker (an absurd claim if you understand anything about meaning and language use).
Note that to my assertion that 'X is impermissible' does not mean 'X is, in the opinion of the speaker, impermissible (i.e., that is not one of the regular meanings in English) you replied "Yes it can". But I never said 'X is impermissible' cannot mean 'X is, in the opinion of the speaker, impermissible'. Obviously, one might redefine the words as one pleases. However, that is not what it means, in English.The AntiChris said:Yes it can. This isn't an opinion. It's a fact.Angra Mainyu said:The term 'X is impermissible' does not mean 'X is, in the opinion of the speaker, impermissible'.
It's what moral anti-realists mean when they say "X is impermissible".
First, you take part of my sentence out of context.The AntiChris said:So some do. This directly contradicts your previous claim.Angra Mainyu said:even the vast majority of moral anti-realists do not believe that 'X is impermissible' means 'X is, in the opinion of the speaker, impermissible'.
A direct quote that takes away the part that comes later and changes thus its meaning completely by means of a gross misinterpretation is a gross misrepresentation.The AntiChris said:No it's not. It's a direct quote.
Note how, in my second sentence, I say "you trivially implied it, to be more precise", which means I am not really saying that you literally claimed that if T1 is false, then independence if false, but rather, than you trivially implied it. Replying as you did telling me that my claim was false because you did not literally claimed that if T1 is false, then independence if false is a gross misrepresentation of my words, by means of quoting them out of context and assuming an bad misinterpretation - which was obviously a misinterpretation given my second sentence there.me said:But you did claim that that if T1 is false, then independence if false. Well, you trivially implied it, to be more precise.
That is not the relevant exchange.The AntiChris said:No It's not. Here's the exchange:
No, that is a false claim on your part, you continue to grossly misrepresent my words, even though I explained your mistake in painstaking detail.The AntiChris said:Having apologised for your mistake, you continue to argue against something I never said nor intended to imply!
Note that this claim is indeed completely different from the claim that you proposed a test so that if IT is true, then attitude-independence is true.me said:But you did claim that that if T1 is false, then independence if false. Well, you trivially implied it, to be more precise.
The AntiChris said:Having apologised for your mistake, you continue to argue against something I never said nor intended to imply!