DBT
Contributor
It shouldn't be hard to grasp. We've been through this years ago.
Basically, your argument from semantics fails as an argument for free will because it does not account for underlying non chosen causality.
The Punch and Judy Puppet show.
The Puppets (or marionettes) are manipulated by a Puppeteer hidden behind the screen working the strings that bring his Puppets into action.
Judy, being annoyed by Punch's insensitive comments has a habit of hitting punch over the head with a stick, which she does quite often: Judy is free to hit Punch. Punch, apparently tired of getting constantly hit, grabs Judy and ties her up: Judy is no longer free to hit Punch.
Punch, apparently feeling sorry for Judy's plight, free's Judy from her ropes, whereupon Judy is freed and able to renew her attack on Punch with even greater vigour.
As the word ''free'' is commonly used, within the context of this little deterministic world of the Puppeteer and his stage play, the puppets may be said to freely perform actions upon stage. The Puppeter being the determinant and motor function of their actions.
Now apply this principle to the world at large, where the 'Puppeteer' is Determinism - ''when, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.''
Again, without the possibility to choose otherwise in any given instance in time, where lies freedom of will?
That's a very log-winded way of saying that will, like everything else in the universe (determinism assumed), is subject to causal necessity (i.e. no possibility of realizable options). This is not in dispute.
You ask "If freedom does not require the possibility of realizable options, that the world procedes along a determined, singular, course of events, why call it freedom?". In asking this you are raising a semantic question.
In response I pointed out that the use of the terms 'free' and 'freedom', overwhelmingly apply to entities which are all subject to causal necessity (determinism assumed).
So...
I'm asking you why you appear to insist that human will is a special case to which the terms 'free' and 'freedom' cannot be applied (I was hoping for a clear and concise logical argument).
It shouldn't be hard to grasp.
Again, if the given definition of free will entails the ability to have chosen otherwise in any given instance in time, but determinism does not allow alternative decisions or actions any given instance in time, this eliminates 'the ability to choose otherwise,' which, by definition is the very essence of free will.
Consequently, free will is an illusion borne of insufficient information - the subject is not aware of antecedents, or the underlying activity that determined his decision - and any reference to free will is just a matter of casual social communication: how people use words. Semantics.
Basically, if you can't access or regulate quantum activity or what your cells are doing while they are forming your experience of the world and self, thoughts, decisions, you have no regulative control of your underlying condition, hence no ability to have done otherwise in any given instance in time, therefore the given definition of free will - an ability to have chosen otherwise in any given instance in time - fails.
I hope that distinction is understood.