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Free Will And Free Choice

It shouldn't be hard to grasp. We've been through this years ago.

Basically, your argument from semantics fails as an argument for free will because it does not account for underlying non chosen causality.

The Punch and Judy Puppet show.

The Puppets (or marionettes) are manipulated by a Puppeteer hidden behind the screen working the strings that bring his Puppets into action.

Judy, being annoyed by Punch's insensitive comments has a habit of hitting punch over the head with a stick, which she does quite often: Judy is free to hit Punch. Punch, apparently tired of getting constantly hit, grabs Judy and ties her up: Judy is no longer free to hit Punch.

Punch, apparently feeling sorry for Judy's plight, free's Judy from her ropes, whereupon Judy is freed and able to renew her attack on Punch with even greater vigour.


As the word ''free'' is commonly used, within the context of this little deterministic world of the Puppeteer and his stage play, the puppets may be said to freely perform actions upon stage. The Puppeter being the determinant and motor function of their actions.

Now apply this principle to the world at large, where the 'Puppeteer' is Determinism - ''when, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.''

Again, without the possibility to choose otherwise in any given instance in time, where lies freedom of will?

That's a very log-winded way of saying that will, like everything else in the universe (determinism assumed), is subject to causal necessity (i.e. no possibility of realizable options). This is not in dispute.

You ask "If freedom does not require the possibility of realizable options, that the world procedes along a determined, singular, course of events, why call it freedom?". In asking this you are raising a semantic question.

In response I pointed out that the use of the terms 'free' and 'freedom', overwhelmingly apply to entities which are all subject to causal necessity (determinism assumed).

So...

I'm asking you why you appear to insist that human will is a special case to which the terms 'free' and 'freedom' cannot be applied (I was hoping for a clear and concise logical argument).

It shouldn't be hard to grasp.

Again, if the given definition of free will entails the ability to have chosen otherwise in any given instance in time, but determinism does not allow alternative decisions or actions any given instance in time, this eliminates 'the ability to choose otherwise,' which, by definition is the very essence of free will.

Consequently, free will is an illusion borne of insufficient information - the subject is not aware of antecedents, or the underlying activity that determined his decision - and any reference to free will is just a matter of casual social communication: how people use words. Semantics.

Basically, if you can't access or regulate quantum activity or what your cells are doing while they are forming your experience of the world and self, thoughts, decisions, you have no regulative control of your underlying condition, hence no ability to have done otherwise in any given instance in time, therefore the given definition of free will - an ability to have chosen otherwise in any given instance in time - fails.

I hope that distinction is understood.
 
if the given definition of free will entails the ability to have chosen otherwise in any given instance in time,

Sure, no such freedom exists.

But you asked:

2- If freedom does not require the possibility of realizable options, that the world procedes along a determined, singular, course of events, why call it freedom?

Here you implicitly acknowledge alternative conceptions of 'free will' (ones that do not require "the possibility of realizable options".

I'm trying to understand why you think these alternatives are not examples of a different kind of freedom.
 
he's just trying to wedge what people want to discuss into a world where the topic is Moot.

From the perspective of the one whose world is some several seconds in the past. Time t = 0 means I'm here and the world has passed me by. So why can't I make up my own views in this impossible place?
 
if the given definition of free will entails the ability to have chosen otherwise in any given instance in time,

Sure, no such freedom exists.

But you asked:

2- If freedom does not require the possibility of realizable options, that the world procedes along a determined, singular, course of events, why call it freedom?

Here you implicitly acknowledge alternative conceptions of 'free will' (ones that do not require "the possibility of realizable options".

I'm trying to understand why you think these alternatives are not examples of a different kind of freedom.


I'm saying that free will - the ability to have chosen otherwise in any given instance in time - is impossible within a determined or causal system. That compatibalism is a failed argument.

''That what you call freedom as a matter of common usage of words/semantics is more a ability determined by the system; the moon freely orbits the earth the earth freely orbits the sun, etc....there are no impediments, nor are there actual alternatives.


If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution taken once and for all. So would a Being, endowed with higher insight and more perfect intelligence, watching man and his doings, smile about man's illusion that he was acting according to his own free will.'' - Albert Einstein
 
I'm saying that free will - the ability to have chosen otherwise in any given instance in time - is impossible within a determined or causal system. That compatibalism is a failed argument.

This only logically follows if you believe that compatibilism (in all its forms) argues that we do have the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances.

Is this what you believe?
 
I'm saying that free will - the ability to have chosen otherwise in any given instance in time - is impossible within a determined or causal system. That compatibalism is a failed argument.

This only logically follows if you believe that compatibilism (in all its forms) argues that we do have the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances.

Is this what you believe?

I'm saying that compatibilism is incoherent, a failed argument.

Without the actual ability to have chosen otherwise in any given instance in time, there is no freedom of choice.

Your choice is determined by the information conditions that determine your 'selection' in in any given instance in time, so any reference to freedom of will is empty rhetoric.

Basically;

Abstract
If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced:

1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated

2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers

3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powers

Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false.
 
I'm saying that free will - the ability to have chosen otherwise in any given instance in time - is impossible within a determined or causal system. That compatibalism is a failed argument.

This only logically follows if you believe that compatibilism (in all its forms) argues that we do have the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances.

Is this what you believe?

I'm saying that compatibilism is incoherent, a failed argument.

You quote my question then ignore it in your response.

I just can't get you to respond to what I actually say.

I tried.:shrug:
 
DBT answered. He doesn't accept your presumption(s) about compatibilism. Saying determinism soft is compatible with free will is incoherent. I don't subscribe to that notion either. Determinism is just that, that things after time t = 0 are anything but fixed is nonsense, incompatible with determinism.

sigh.
 
DBT answered.
He did?

Ok, maybe you can confirm that he, and you?, are of the view that all compatibilist conceptions of free will rely on the posited ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances (or in your parlance that "things after time t = 0" are not fixed)?
 
Ok, maybe you can confirm that he, and you?, are of the view that all compatibilist conceptions of free will rely on the posited ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances (or in your parlance that "things after time t = 0" are not fixed)?

Compatibilism does not apply to the determined world. There is no wiggle room for an alternative to determined. Things are determined so they can't be somewhat determined or other than determined. No room for compatibilism.

Was that a "yes" or "no"?:shrug:
 
I'm saying that compatibilism is incoherent, a failed argument.

You quote my question then ignore it in your response.

I just can't get you to respond to what I actually say.

I tried.:shrug:

Are you sure that you have understood the argument? I'd say that it not only does answer your questions, but eliminates compatibilism as an argument for free will.

Perhaps it may help if you gave your definition of free will and a description or an example of how the 'common use of words' actually establishes that we have free will.

In other words: what do you think free will is, and how does it work?
 
DBT answered.
He did?

Ok, maybe you can confirm that he, and you?, are of the view that all compatibilist conceptions of free will rely on the posited ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances (or in your parlance that "things after time t = 0" are not fixed)?

Word usage alone does not establish the reality of the thing in question.

God is love.
Love exists.
God is real.
 
DBT

Three times now you've avoided giving a straightforward response to my question.

Here's the question again: Are of the view that all compatibilist conceptions of free will rely on the posited ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances?

There's no catch. It's not a trick question. I just want to find out what your understanding is of compatibilism.
 
DBT

Three times now you've avoided giving a straightforward response to my question.

Here's the question again: Are of the view that all compatibilist conceptions of free will rely on the posited ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances?

There's no catch. It's not a trick question. I just want to find out what your understanding is of compatibilism.


I have said that compatibilism relies, as you said, on how words are used. The foundation of Compatibilism being purely a matter of Semantics.

Again;

God is love.
Love exists.
God is real.

Free will is the ability to make decisions.
People are able to make decisions.
People have free will.

Free will is the ability to select options based on sets of criteria.
Computers are able to select options from sets of criteria.
Computers have free will.

Semantic arguments without sound references (how decision-making actually works), being trivial and meaningless.
 
DBT

Three times now you've avoided giving a straightforward response to my question.

Here's the question again: Are of the view that all compatibilist conceptions of free will rely on the posited ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances?

There's no catch. It's not a trick question. I just want to find out what your understanding is of compatibilism.


I have said that compatibilism relies, as you said, on how words are used. The foundation of Compatibilism being purely a matter of Semantics.

Again;

God is love.
Love exists.
God is real.

Free will is the ability to make decisions.
People are able to make decisions.
People have free will.

Free will is the ability to select options based on sets of criteria.
Computers are able to select options from sets of criteria.
Computers have free will.

Semantic arguments without sound references (how decision-making actually works), being trivial and meaningless.
And yet another non-answer.

It's becoming quite apparent that neither you nor FDI understand compatibilism, despite it being the approach adopted by the majority of academic philosophers.
 
DBT

Three times now you've avoided giving a straightforward response to my question.

Here's the question again: Are of the view that all compatibilist conceptions of free will rely on the posited ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances?

There's no catch. It's not a trick question. I just want to find out what your understanding is of compatibilism.


I have said that compatibilism relies, as you said, on how words are used. The foundation of Compatibilism being purely a matter of Semantics.

Again;

God is love.
Love exists.
God is real.

Free will is the ability to make decisions.
People are able to make decisions.
People have free will.

Free will is the ability to select options based on sets of criteria.
Computers are able to select options from sets of criteria.
Computers have free will.

Semantic arguments without sound references (how decision-making actually works), being trivial and meaningless.
And yet another non-answer.

It's becoming quite apparent that neither you nor FDI understand compatibilism, despite it being the approach adopted by the majority of academic philosophers.

I'm inclined to say that it's you who doesn't understand the given replies.

Be that as it may, I have asked you to describe what you believe compatibilism to be, how it works and the argument or evidence that supports it...as yet, no response.

Your only comment is essentially 'that's how words are used' - which is far from adequate.
 
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