fast
Contributor
The JTB Analysis of knowledge is our best known Theory of knowledge, and my question presumes as much. In this thread, I'm avoiding Gettier examples. Also, be careful not to confuse knowledge with certainty. Any use by another of the phrase, "know that I know" will be interpreted as a confusion with certainty (Cartesian sense, not confidence) unless otherwise specified.
If I have a justified belief that P is true, then I know that P is true if P is true. Whether I know the truth condition is met is wholly irrelevant. For instance, I believe the cat is in the house. I have good justifiable reasons for believing the cat is in the house. If the cat is not in the house, I'm still justified in claiming that the cat is in the house. Being mistaken is a good defense for inaccurate claims of knowledge when one has a justified belief.
Now, I'm in the front yard and see the cat go in the house at 5:00, and never before has the cat left the house after going in around that time. There's never before been a way for the cat to get out after going in. I have a justified belief that the cat is in the house. Unbeknownst to me, my daughter opened the back door for the first time ever. Do I know that the cat is in the house? The answer is yes. We already know that I have a justified belief, so the only other condition that needs to be met is for the truth condition to be satisfied. I do not need to go inside and look. I'm perfectly justified in claiming that I know since my belief is justified, and being mistaken is excusable. It just so happens that the cat did't go out the back door. It just so happens that my justified belief is true; therefore, and barring Gettier counter examples that leave room for its possibility, I do in fact know that the cat is inside.
Now, my wife is inside and sees that the back door is open. She saw the cat enter, she sees the cat, and sees that the cat never left out either the front or back door. She too knows that her justified belief is true.
When I go in and learn that the back door is open, I realize that I might have been mistaken. Of course, I always knew I might be mistaken, but the possibility of mistake is irrelevant, for the truth condition of knowledge deals with actuality, not possibility. Whether P is actually true is what matters, not whether there's a possibility of mistake. There's always a possibility of mistake, and people are notorious for using that as an excuse to proclaim that I don't truly know what I believe I know, but to leave no room for the possibility of mistake is to confuse knowledge (actual true knowledge as we ordinarily use the term) with certainty (and I'm not speaking of confidence).
Anyone that understands the JTB Analysis of truth well shouldn't jump to disagree with me to this point.
Now, the purpose of this thread actually has more to do with qualifying or categorizing justification into discernible groups. As it stands, one is either justified or not, but from my example, both my wife and I were justified in our beliefs, yet the strength of her justification was stronger, but what terms do we use to differ between varying degrees of justification. I knew my belief was justified, but I also knew there was room for error, but we must be careful not to use that as a basis for insufficient justification for declaring I didn't know; moreover, it was possible that my cat and a stray cat went into the house and that she never saw my cat but instead a cat that looked the same--that gets into Gettier-mode. What I'm trying to do is fasten down the variants between minimal justification and strong justification. Are there categories already established that scholars with an analytical bent cling to in discussing such matters, or is "strong" and "weak" the only thing I have to work with?
If I have a justified belief that P is true, then I know that P is true if P is true. Whether I know the truth condition is met is wholly irrelevant. For instance, I believe the cat is in the house. I have good justifiable reasons for believing the cat is in the house. If the cat is not in the house, I'm still justified in claiming that the cat is in the house. Being mistaken is a good defense for inaccurate claims of knowledge when one has a justified belief.
Now, I'm in the front yard and see the cat go in the house at 5:00, and never before has the cat left the house after going in around that time. There's never before been a way for the cat to get out after going in. I have a justified belief that the cat is in the house. Unbeknownst to me, my daughter opened the back door for the first time ever. Do I know that the cat is in the house? The answer is yes. We already know that I have a justified belief, so the only other condition that needs to be met is for the truth condition to be satisfied. I do not need to go inside and look. I'm perfectly justified in claiming that I know since my belief is justified, and being mistaken is excusable. It just so happens that the cat did't go out the back door. It just so happens that my justified belief is true; therefore, and barring Gettier counter examples that leave room for its possibility, I do in fact know that the cat is inside.
Now, my wife is inside and sees that the back door is open. She saw the cat enter, she sees the cat, and sees that the cat never left out either the front or back door. She too knows that her justified belief is true.
When I go in and learn that the back door is open, I realize that I might have been mistaken. Of course, I always knew I might be mistaken, but the possibility of mistake is irrelevant, for the truth condition of knowledge deals with actuality, not possibility. Whether P is actually true is what matters, not whether there's a possibility of mistake. There's always a possibility of mistake, and people are notorious for using that as an excuse to proclaim that I don't truly know what I believe I know, but to leave no room for the possibility of mistake is to confuse knowledge (actual true knowledge as we ordinarily use the term) with certainty (and I'm not speaking of confidence).
Anyone that understands the JTB Analysis of truth well shouldn't jump to disagree with me to this point.
Now, the purpose of this thread actually has more to do with qualifying or categorizing justification into discernible groups. As it stands, one is either justified or not, but from my example, both my wife and I were justified in our beliefs, yet the strength of her justification was stronger, but what terms do we use to differ between varying degrees of justification. I knew my belief was justified, but I also knew there was room for error, but we must be careful not to use that as a basis for insufficient justification for declaring I didn't know; moreover, it was possible that my cat and a stray cat went into the house and that she never saw my cat but instead a cat that looked the same--that gets into Gettier-mode. What I'm trying to do is fasten down the variants between minimal justification and strong justification. Are there categories already established that scholars with an analytical bent cling to in discussing such matters, or is "strong" and "weak" the only thing I have to work with?