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How come under capitalism . . .


http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/miron-nationalaffairs-1-5-11.pdf

In looking at the drawbacks of anti-poverty programs, it is important to consider both the direct costs and the less tangible, but still potentially serious, indirect costs. One of the chief direct costs is the way anti-poverty spending alters incentives: Such programs reduce the reasons for potential recipients of income transfers to work and save; the availability of aid — and particularly of aid that is available only as long as one remains below a certain level of income — can discourage people from striving to rise above that income level.

Didn't think so.

I accept your apology.


And that's what I asked for originally that you laughed at. There are several government programs that discourage work because they will face declining income as they start working. If you get $X not to work or $x to work, what percentage of people will take that same money to not work?
 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/miron-nationalaffairs-1-5-11.pdf

In looking at the drawbacks of anti-poverty programs, it is important to consider both the direct costs and the less tangible, but still potentially serious, indirect costs. One of the chief direct costs is the way anti-poverty spending alters incentives: Such programs reduce the reasons for potential recipients of income transfers to work and save; the availability of aid — and particularly of aid that is available only as long as one remains below a certain level of income — can discourage people from striving to rise above that income level.

Didn't think so.

I accept your apology.


And that's what I asked for originally that you laughed at. There are several government programs that discourage work because they will face declining income as they start working. If you get $X not to work or $x to work, what percentage of people will take that same money to not work?
Depends on the work and if I incur additional costs by going to work. For example, childcare and commuting costs.
 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/miron-nationalaffairs-1-5-11.pdf

In looking at the drawbacks of anti-poverty programs, it is important to consider both the direct costs and the less tangible, but still potentially serious, indirect costs. One of the chief direct costs is the way anti-poverty spending alters incentives: Such programs reduce the reasons for potential recipients of income transfers to work and save; the availability of aid — and particularly of aid that is available only as long as one remains below a certain level of income — can discourage people from striving to rise above that income level.

Didn't think so.

I accept your apology.


And that's what I asked for originally that you laughed at. There are several government programs that discourage work because they will face declining income as they start working. If you get $X not to work or $x to work, what percentage of people will take that same money to not work?
Depends on the work and if I incur additional costs by going to work. For example, childcare and commuting costs.


Agree. That's why I asked about the percentage of people who will, didn't say 100%.
 
And that's what I asked for originally that you laughed at. There are several government programs that discourage work because they will face declining income as they start working. If you get $X not to work or $x to work, what percentage of people will take that same money to not work?
Depends on the work and if I incur additional costs by going to work. For example, childcare and commuting costs.


Agree. That's why I asked about the percentage of people who will, didn't say 100%.

And we can see how complicated this is.
 
Didn't think so.

I accept your apology.
For what? For assuming you would respond to a challenge in exactly the way you already responded to exactly the same challenge? Or for successfully cattle-prodding you into doing what you would have already done back in post #12 without needing to be cattle-prodded, if you'd had any serious interest in a substantive discussion, and weren't just preaching to your choir and telling yourself strawmen about your enemies in order to keep convincing yourself of what a superior life-form you are?


http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/miron-nationalaffairs-1-5-11.pdf

In looking at the drawbacks of anti-poverty programs, it is important to consider both the direct costs and the less tangible, but still potentially serious, indirect costs. One of the chief direct costs is the way anti-poverty spending alters incentives: Such programs reduce the reasons for potential recipients of income transfers to work and save; the availability of aid — and particularly of aid that is available only as long as one remains below a certain level of income — can discourage people from striving to rise above that income level.
Thank you. Now let's compare that with your caricature of it.

the typical conservative will argue that the poors require disincentives, which usually means less money in their pockets, to encourage them to work harder and the rich require incentives, which usually means more money in their pockets, to encourage them to work harder?
So you misrepresented Miron. (Or whoever it is you meant by "the typical conservative" that you're offering Miron as a stand-in for.) You painted him as having a double standard for the rich and the poor, as proposing to get people to be productive by reward if they're rich and by punishment if they're poor.

But he said nothing of the sort. He's saying if we want poor people to be productive we have to make it worth their while, which means we need to pay them more if they're productive than we pay them if they're unproductive. He says the poor require an incentive -- exactly what you say conservatives say about the rich. So going by what you've produced so far, "the typical conservative" is applying the same standard to rich and poor.

The only double standard here is your double standard. When we pay a rich person more to be productive than unproductive, you label that an incentive, and when we pay a poor person more to be productive than unproductive, you label that a disincentive. Why the difference? Evidently, because in your world-view the default state -- the zero-point on your scale -- is a point where the poor person is being paid enough to satisfy your tastes, by the rich person, whether the poor person produces anything or not. So if what the rich person pays the poor person is less than enough to satisfy you, even though the rich person gets nothing in exchange, you perceive a payment from the rich person to the poor person as the poor person being punished.

Beggar: One kopek? Last week you gave me two kopeks.
Butcher: I had a bad week.
Beggar: You had a bad week, so I should suffer?​

That's not a punishment.

Of course, if the poor person pays something to the rich person and gets nothing in exchange, you would not perceive that as the rich person being punished. Your perceptions of the two situations are asymmetrical, because you have a double standard, because you are a tribalist. The poor person is in your ingroup, the rich person is in your outgroup, and, like tribalists everywhere, you judge everything you see through the lenses of ingroup bias.

People who apply the same standard to a tribalist's ingroup and outgroup are automatically perceived as being partisans of the outgroup, biased against the ingroup. There is no neutral ground in a tribal worldview -- you're with us or you're against us. When a tribalist encounters a non-tribal viewpoint, he can't grok it. His only mental recourse is to choose an enemy tribe and convince himself that the non-tribal viewpoint is tribal, is partisan favoritism for his chosen enemy tribe.
 
I accept your apology.
Thank you.

You're welcome.

The only double standard here is your double standard. When we pay a rich person more to be productive than unproductive, you label that an incentive, and when we pay a poor person more to be productive than unproductive, you label that a disincentive. Why the difference?

Because there is a difference.

Your characterization of what we try to do to the poor as "pay a poor person more to be productive" is pretty bad.

Miron isn't arguing to pay the poor more. He's arguing to cut benefits so that now, by virtue of less money in the poor person's pocket via lower assistance payments, work, whose payrate hasn't changed, is now paying them "more." So it's an incentive achieved negatively, i.e. a disincentive.

When we incentivize the rich it is normally through some sort of tax reduction which results in more money in the rich person's pocket. That is a positive incentive.
 
In economies that can't provide enough decent jobs many have to be discouraged to not work.

Discouraging people from working is productive in these circumstances.
 
The problem is you are looking at two very different situations as if they are the same.

The basic choice for the poor is work or leech. The basic choice for the rich is work or leisure.

The "disincentives" are applied to leeching in order to make work a more attractive option. Personally I think a greatly expanded EITC would be a far better approach.

I'd hardly classify people willing and able to work but having no jobs available for them to take as "leechers".
Especially people kept out of work to maintain the value of money. Increasing unemployment is a well-known way of fighting inflation.
 
Miron isn't arguing to pay the poor more. He's arguing to cut benefits so that now, by virtue of less money in the poor person's pocket via lower assistance payments, work, whose payrate hasn't changed, is now paying them "more." So it's an incentive achieved negatively, i.e. a disincentive.

That is a complete mischaracterization of what the paper is proposing. He is proposing a negative income tax.

A negative income tax — an idea once advocated by Nobel prize-winning
economist Milton Friedman — would have two key components:
a minimum, guaranteed level of income, and a tax rate that is applied
to the total amount of income (if any) that a person earns.

He does not state anywhere what that guaranteed level of income should be. The idea that it must be a cut is a figment of your imagination.

- - - Updated - - -

I'd hardly classify people willing and able to work but having no jobs available for them to take as "leechers".
Especially people kept out of work to maintain the value of money. Increasing unemployment is a well-known way of fighting inflation.

How did that work out in the 70's?
 
That is a complete mischaracterization of what the paper is proposing. He is proposing a negative income tax.

A negative income tax — an idea once advocated by Nobel prize-winning
economist Milton Friedman — would have two key components:
a minimum, guaranteed level of income, and a tax rate that is applied
to the total amount of income (if any) that a person earns.

He does not state anywhere what that guaranteed level of income should be. The idea that it must be a cut is a figment of your imagination.

I'm sure all that conservative rhetoric about "breaking the cycle of government dependency" is also a figment of my imagination.

I'm also sure all of those attempts by conservatives to slash safety net spending and to cut capital gains and top income tax rates and doing away with inheritance taxes are figments of my imagination as well.
 
The problem is you are looking at two very different situations as if they are the same.

The basic choice for the poor is work or leech. The basic choice for the rich is work or leisure.

The "disincentives" are applied to leeching in order to make work a more attractive option.
Why not use incentives for the poor to make work more attractive?
Personally I think a greatly expanded EITC would be a far better approach.

And an expanded EITC wouldn't make work more attractive?!?!?!
 
That is a complete mischaracterization of what the paper is proposing. He is proposing a negative income tax.



He does not state anywhere what that guaranteed level of income should be. The idea that it must be a cut is a figment of your imagination.

I'm sure all that conservative rhetoric about "breaking the cycle of government dependency" is also a figment of my imagination.

I'm also sure all of those attempts by conservatives to slash safety net spending and to cut capital gains and top income tax rates and doing away with inheritance taxes are figments of my imagination as well.

What does any of this have to do with Miron and your misreading of the paper?
 
The problem is you are looking at two very different situations as if they are the same.

The basic choice for the poor is work or leech. The basic choice for the rich is work or leisure.

The "disincentives" are applied to leeching in order to make work a more attractive option. Personally I think a greatly expanded EITC would be a far better approach.

I love the way you think that the rich are somehow not leeching if they choose to do fuck all with their worthless lives.

You fail to understand what's going on. The incentives aren't about getting them to work, it's about the amount of work they do.

You have some odd notion of a large group of idle rich. There aren't many of them.
 
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My own situation is a perfect example. I have enough free time to do a side job preparing tax returns and financial statements as a CPA during this tax season. I have an offer to work as a contractor for a local CPA part-time on select projects that I worked on in the prior year, offer good for a project by project basis (he gave me the option to pick which projects I would take on and which ones I didn't want to from a selection of about a dozen projects). Given that any compensation I receive as a contractor will be taxed at almost 55% (for self-employment and income taxes, and then again with state and local sales taxes on any purchases I make), given the amount of income I receive from my other business, you can bet I took this into account in deciding how many hours a week I would accept to work this tax season. I accepted to do more like 5-10 hours/week vs. an offer of up to ~20 hours/week. Had the after-tax compensation been higher (either from an offer to be compensated more per hour or if the taxes were lower), I would've been much more willing to take on additional projects and hours.

Exactly the sort of situation I had in mind.
 
My own situation is a perfect example. I have enough free time to do a side job preparing tax returns and financial statements as a CPA during this tax season. I have an offer to work as a contractor for a local CPA part-time on select projects that I worked on in the prior year, offer good for a project by project basis (he gave me the option to pick which projects I would take on and which ones I didn't want to from a selection of about a dozen projects). Given that any compensation I receive as a contractor will be taxed at almost 55% (for self-employment and income taxes, and then again with state and local sales taxes on any purchases I make), given the amount of income I receive from my other business, you can bet I took this into account in deciding how many hours a week I would accept to work this tax season. I accepted to do more like 5-10 hours/week vs. an offer of up to ~20 hours/week. Had the after-tax compensation been higher (either from an offer to be compensated more per hour or if the taxes were lower), I would've been much more willing to take on additional projects and hours.

What you seem to fail to realize is that the higher tax on you actually creates more jobs for other CPAs rather than just more revenue for you personally. Congrats on being a 'job creator' and you're welcome for the higher tax rate necessary to achieve this.

aa
 
My own situation is a perfect example. I have enough free time to do a side job preparing tax returns and financial statements as a CPA during this tax season. I have an offer to work as a contractor for a local CPA part-time on select projects that I worked on in the prior year, offer good for a project by project basis (he gave me the option to pick which projects I would take on and which ones I didn't want to from a selection of about a dozen projects). Given that any compensation I receive as a contractor will be taxed at almost 55% (for self-employment and income taxes, and then again with state and local sales taxes on any purchases I make), given the amount of income I receive from my other business, you can bet I took this into account in deciding how many hours a week I would accept to work this tax season. I accepted to do more like 5-10 hours/week vs. an offer of up to ~20 hours/week. Had the after-tax compensation been higher (either from an offer to be compensated more per hour or if the taxes were lower), I would've been much more willing to take on additional projects and hours.

What you seem to fail to realize is that the higher tax on you actually creates more jobs for other CPAs rather than just more revenue for you personally. Congrats on being a 'job creator' and you're welcome for the higher tax rate necessary to achieve this.

aa

Actually it does not. Not in this situation. The owner of this small, local CPA firm will have to spend more hours working during the tax season as he was trying to reduce his own workload. He has a few temp workers helping him during this tax season but these projects in particular were his most complicated and the people he has working for him are not well trained for these kind of projects, so he is planning to do them himself.
 
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