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I just . . . wow, this one of the best letters I've ever read.

I don't believe it has been established that simply being a member of the Missouri Bar is sufficient to force the Governor to take this case. I have said previously in this thread, however, that if it is the case that the Missouri Bar has this provision, then the Governor may be obliged to take the case.

Even if he were a Public Defender, there are reasons he could legally use to not take the case. Those reasons do not include "the defendant is gay". They very likely do include "I am the sitting Governor of the State of Missouri, and the duties of that office preclude me from acting as a Public Defender".

From what Bomb posted upthread just the fact of being governor wouldn't be enough by itself to relieve him of this obligation.

Perhaps you can point out that post. I checked through the thread, but did not find anything from Bomb that seems to fit the above statement.

http://talkfreethought.org/showthre...I-ve-ever-read&p=319613&viewfull=1#post319613

The case law in question refers to appointment by a judge, just like the information provided by Don2 earlier. Michael Barrett is not a judge, but rather the Director of the MSPD. I doubt that the referenced case applies to the OP, unless Barrett obtains a court order from a judge.
 
I don't believe it has been established that simply being a member of the Missouri Bar is sufficient to force the Governor to take this case. I have said previously in this thread, however, that if it is the case that the Missouri Bar has this provision, then the Governor may be obliged to take the case.

Even if he were a Public Defender, there are reasons he could legally use to not take the case. Those reasons do not include "the defendant is gay". They very likely do include "I am the sitting Governor of the State of Missouri, and the duties of that office preclude me from acting as a Public Defender".

From what Bomb posted upthread just the fact of being governor wouldn't be enough by itself to relieve him of this obligation.

Perhaps you can point out that post. I checked through the thread, but did not find anything from Bomb that seems to fit the above statement.

http://talkfreethought.org/showthre...I-ve-ever-read&p=319613&viewfull=1#post319613

The case law in question refers to appointment by a judge, just like the information provided by Don2 earlier. Michael Barrett is not a judge, but rather the Director of the MSPD. I doubt that the referenced case applies to the OP, unless Barrett obtains a court order from a judge.

I guess we'll see what the judge he was ordered to appear before says when he doesn't show up.

In the meantime it'll look really good for the governor to refuse to help an indigent person get a defense in court.
 
I don't believe it has been established that simply being a member of the Missouri Bar is sufficient to force the Governor to take this case. I have said previously in this thread, however, that if it is the case that the Missouri Bar has this provision, then the Governor may be obliged to take the case.

Even if he were a Public Defender, there are reasons he could legally use to not take the case. Those reasons do not include "the defendant is gay". They very likely do include "I am the sitting Governor of the State of Missouri, and the duties of that office preclude me from acting as a Public Defender".

From what Bomb posted upthread just the fact of being governor wouldn't be enough by itself to relieve him of this obligation.

Perhaps you can point out that post. I checked through the thread, but did not find anything from Bomb that seems to fit the above statement.

http://talkfreethought.org/showthre...I-ve-ever-read&p=319613&viewfull=1#post319613

The case law in question refers to appointment by a judge, ........

The case law does refer to judges, but case law is often made after new statutes have been adopted. So just because there is no case law does not mean the statute does not apply...or will be fleshed out....or that a court will say this is kind of ambiguous...more laws need to be made for this piece...

...just like the information provided by Don2 earlier....

...it actually says "tribunal" not "judge" that while is a person or committee making some judgment, still shows your original point to be invalid, i.e. that laws and regulations would not allow appointing a lawyer to a case because of forced "servitude." What point are you now making though since your original point was not correct?
 
I really don't see how this can be rationally compared to forced servitude. First, it is a co edition for state recognition of special licensure. Being a licensed attorney in a state is to accept a contract, from a lawyerly perspective; this means that in addition to the special rights granted by the licensure, there are additional responsibilities. One is that entering into this contract means that you are eligible to be drafted into public service as a lawyer for public defense. It is not very different than the similar expectation that someone report for jury duty.
 
I don't believe it has been established that simply being a member of the Missouri Bar is sufficient to force the Governor to take this case. I have said previously in this thread, however, that if it is the case that the Missouri Bar has this provision, then the Governor may be obliged to take the case.

Even if he were a Public Defender, there are reasons he could legally use to not take the case. Those reasons do not include "the defendant is gay". They very likely do include "I am the sitting Governor of the State of Missouri, and the duties of that office preclude me from acting as a Public Defender".

From what Bomb posted upthread just the fact of being governor wouldn't be enough by itself to relieve him of this obligation.

Perhaps you can point out that post. I checked through the thread, but did not find anything from Bomb that seems to fit the above statement.

http://talkfreethought.org/showthre...I-ve-ever-read&p=319613&viewfull=1#post319613

The case law in question refers to appointment by a judge, ........

The case law does refer to judges, but case law is often made after new statutes have been adopted. So just because there is no case law does not mean the statute does not apply...or will be fleshed out....or that a court will say this is kind of ambiguous...more laws need to be made for this piece...

That may very well be, but it doesn't change the fact that no case law has been documented in this thread that relates directly to this situation. This may very well be the case that sets that precedent, though.

...just like the information provided by Don2 earlier....

...it actually says "tribunal" not "judge" that while is a person or committee making some judgment, still shows your original point to be invalid, i.e. that laws and regulations would not allow appointing a lawyer to a case because of forced "servitude." What point are you now making though since your original point was not correct?

A tribunal usually refers to a panel of judges, but I suppose that in the cited statute they are referring to a different kind of tribunal. Do you have any further information that shows what they meant by tribunal there? Regardless, one man does not a tribunal make.
 
I really don't see how this can be rationally compared to forced servitude. First, it is a co edition for state recognition of special licensure. Being a licensed attorney in a state is to accept a contract, from a lawyerly perspective; this means that in addition to the special rights granted by the licensure, there are additional responsibilities. One is that entering into this contract means that you are eligible to be drafted into public service as a lawyer for public defense. It is not very different than the similar expectation that someone report for jury duty.

It seems to apply in the eyes of the law. In the case law that Bomb presented upthread, you will find the following:

In this and any similar case, the respondent circuit judge should provide relator when requested with an evidentiary hearing as to the propriety of his appointment, taking into consideration his right to earn a livelihood for himself and his family and to be free from involuntary servitude.
 
Delegating something to someone simply means passing on authority or responsibility to do that thing to them. It does not mean the person has to accept that authority/responsibility. As has been noted, the word "compel" would be used if the person were legally bound to accept the authority/responsibility, and that would be tantamount to involuntary servitude in this situation.

The only way I see that Nixon would be required to do this is if the State BAR has a provision that compels their attornies to accept such delegation. I doubt, however, that such a provision exists.

The verb "delegate" is nearly always used in contexts where the delegatee is being compelled to take responsibility for a task by someone with the authority to compel them.
Nearly all dictionary definitions of the verb form refer to this authority.

Therefore, you are wrong that the absence of the word "compel" indicates that no compulsion was intended by the statute. Rather, if no compulsion was intended, the word "delegate" would not have been used because it typically entails authority to compel unless the delegatee chooses to leave the organization in which he/she agrees to be so compelled, which in this case in the State Bar Association. They would have used the word "request" if no compulsion was implied.

As for "involuntary servitude" it in no way applies since Nixon is choosing to be a member of the State Bar and can choose to leave it and thus no be compelled. It is not much different than an employee who can be compelled to show up to work as a condition of employment, except in this case the condition is choosing to be a member of the State Bar and receive the benefits that entails. Given that military conscription with no way to refuse has been found constitutional, conscripting voluntary members of a State Bar Association in an emergency situation would have little constitutional problems.
 
The clear and legally undisputed fact of the matter is that the legal definition of "delegate" does not mean "compel". In other words, the delegated private counsel must willingly accept the delegation. This is common knowledge within the legal community, absent a shred of dissent.

this is a publicity stunt... a damn good one.

The correct response from the Governor would be along the lines of, "I am honored by the confidence and support of our States public defenders office, demonstrated by this delegation. Unfortunately, my primary responsibilities to the citizens of MO must take precedence, and as such, I must respectively decline this prestigious delegation. "

and then maybe add..

"I am, however, very surprised that our state's public defenders office was unable to locate a member of the bar with more relevant experience and qualifications to better serve the defendant in the case for which delegation was offered to me. I must wonder what other failures in efficiency and relevancy may be occurring in that office, and hereby am appointing an independent Auditor to perform a forensic accounting review to identify possible sources of fiscal mishandling, to help correct the issues stated in the delegation."

... back at ya, biatch!
 
Delegating something to someone simply means passing on authority or responsibility to do that thing to them. It does not mean the person has to accept that authority/responsibility. As has been noted, the word "compel" would be used if the person were legally bound to accept the authority/responsibility, and that would be tantamount to involuntary servitude in this situation.

The only way I see that Nixon would be required to do this is if the State BAR has a provision that compels their attornies to accept such delegation. I doubt, however, that such a provision exists.

The verb "delegate" is nearly always used in contexts where the delegatee is being compelled to take responsibility for a task by someone with the authority to compel them.
Nearly all dictionary definitions of the verb form refer to this authority.

We are talking about the legal definition here, which is what matters when it comes to the law. You will need to present a clear case for "delegate" being the same as "compel" in a legal sense to prove your point with regard to the OP.
 
I don't believe it has been established that simply being a member of the Missouri Bar is sufficient to force the Governor to take this case. I have said previously in this thread, however, that if it is the case that the Missouri Bar has this provision, then the Governor may be obliged to take the case.

Even if he were a Public Defender, there are reasons he could legally use to not take the case. Those reasons do not include "the defendant is gay". They very likely do include "I am the sitting Governor of the State of Missouri, and the duties of that office preclude me from acting as a Public Defender".

From what Bomb posted upthread just the fact of being governor wouldn't be enough by itself to relieve him of this obligation.

Perhaps you can point out that post. I checked through the thread, but did not find anything from Bomb that seems to fit the above statement.

http://talkfreethought.org/showthre...I-ve-ever-read&p=319613&viewfull=1#post319613

The case law in question refers to appointment by a judge, ........

The case law does refer to judges, but case law is often made after new statutes have been adopted. So just because there is no case law does not mean the statute does not apply...or will be fleshed out....or that a court will say this is kind of ambiguous...more laws need to be made for this piece...

That may very well be, but it doesn't change the fact that no case law has been documented in this thread that relates directly to this situation. This may very well be the case that sets that precedent, though.

We agree. Just to restate--I do think this is sufficiently ambiguous to warrant disambiguation by court or having the legislative body create additional clarifying subsections to existing laws.

...just like the information provided by Don2 earlier....

...it actually says "tribunal" not "judge" that while is a person or committee making some judgment, still shows your original point to be invalid, i.e. that laws and regulations would not allow appointing a lawyer to a case because of forced "servitude." What point are you now making though since your original point was not correct?

A tribunal usually refers to a panel of judges, but I suppose that in the cited statute they are referring to a different kind of tribunal. Do you have any further information that shows what they meant by tribunal there? Regardless, one man does not a tribunal make.

One man can be a tribunal. You should know that since you originally thought it referred to a single judge. However, remember that again this statute is not one that the director of public defenders has tried to actualize by delegating responsibility for defense of a person to a lawyer. So, the regulation/code of conduct can be enhanced if it were to be found that the word "delegate" does refer to the same kinds of things that a judge can do when appointing such lawyer.
 
I don't believe it has been established that simply being a member of the Missouri Bar is sufficient to force the Governor to take this case. I have said previously in this thread, however, that if it is the case that the Missouri Bar has this provision, then the Governor may be obliged to take the case.

Even if he were a Public Defender, there are reasons he could legally use to not take the case. Those reasons do not include "the defendant is gay". They very likely do include "I am the sitting Governor of the State of Missouri, and the duties of that office preclude me from acting as a Public Defender".

From what Bomb posted upthread just the fact of being governor wouldn't be enough by itself to relieve him of this obligation.

Perhaps you can point out that post. I checked through the thread, but did not find anything from Bomb that seems to fit the above statement.

http://talkfreethought.org/showthre...I-ve-ever-read&p=319613&viewfull=1#post319613

The case law in question refers to appointment by a judge, ........

The case law does refer to judges, but case law is often made after new statutes have been adopted. So just because there is no case law does not mean the statute does not apply...or will be fleshed out....or that a court will say this is kind of ambiguous...more laws need to be made for this piece...

That may very well be, but it doesn't change the fact that no case law has been documented in this thread that relates directly to this situation. This may very well be the case that sets that precedent, though.

We agree. Just to restate--I do think this is sufficiently ambiguous to warrant disambiguation by court or having the legislative body create additional clarifying subsections to existing laws.

...just like the information provided by Don2 earlier....

...it actually says "tribunal" not "judge" that while is a person or committee making some judgment, still shows your original point to be invalid, i.e. that laws and regulations would not allow appointing a lawyer to a case because of forced "servitude." What point are you now making though since your original point was not correct?

A tribunal usually refers to a panel of judges, but I suppose that in the cited statute they are referring to a different kind of tribunal. Do you have any further information that shows what they meant by tribunal there? Regardless, one man does not a tribunal make.

One man can be a tribunal. You should know that since you originally thought it referred to a single judge. However, remember that again this statute is not one that the director of public defenders has tried to actualize by delegating responsibility for defense of a person to a lawyer. So, the regulation/code of conduct can be enhanced if it were to be found that the word "delegate" does refer to the same kinds of things that a judge can do when appointing such lawyer.

Yeah, I was being a bit overzealous with that last sentence, but I do think we agree for the most part at this point.
 
There will be no case heard that affirms the right to appoint does not mean the right to compel... no more so than a judge would waste anyone's time and the public's resources hearing a case where someone claimed they had a right to have a police officer assigned to their household as their personal butler and chef, because their motto is "to protect and serve". "serve" means to prepare and deliver food. They are public servants, and I have paid my taxes, damn it!
 
There will be no case heard that affirms the right to appoint does not mean the right to compel

That's not what we were talking about. There may very well be a case heard that determines whether Nixon is obligated to accept delegation as a public defender by the director of the MSPD, and whether previous case law regarding judges and tribunals making similar appointments is applicable in this case.
 
As has been noted, the word "compel" would be used if the person were legally bound to accept the authority/responsibility, and that would be tantamount to involuntary servitude in this situation.
Just out of curiosity, if a state were to legally bind a baker to bake a cake for a gay wedding, would you also regard that as tantamount to involuntary servitude?

If the baker was not otherwise working as a public baker of wedding cakes, then yes, it would be. For example, the state could not go into a random restaurant, pull out a random cake baker, and compel them to bake a cake for a gay wedding, which would be analogous to the situation being described in this thread.
:picardfacepalm:
I see, so whether legally binding someone to do what he doesn't want to do qualifies as "compelling him" and "involuntary servitude" doesn't depend on whether what he is being bound to do is compulsory and on whether the service he is to provide is involuntary. Do I have that right? What it depends on is whether people who think like you put the service being coerced from him in your same mental category with some other service the fellow provides willingly. Are you seriously under the impression that that's an intellectually defensible criterion for "compel" and "involuntary servitude"?

No, you don't have it right. Forget about baking cakes, it was stupid to bring that issue into this thread so that you could torture it into an analogy.
No, I evidently do have it right; and what was stupid was making the "that would be tantamount to involuntary servitude" argument even though you support compelling bakers to work events they don't volunteer to participate in. If Trausti wants to invoke the "involuntary servitude" clause, fine -- I haven't seen him post in favor of the government ordering people to bake cakes. But when you invoke it it's hypocrisy.

The Governor in this case is not holding himself out publicly as a Public Defender, therefore, there is no legal binding that he should defend any member of the public, much less this particular member of the public.
In the first place, that in no way follows, as a matter of established law. A lawyer doesn't need to "hold himself out" as anything in order to be legally bound in that way. Lawyers have been getting ordered to defend poor people pro bono at least since the 15th century. Anybody who's read "To Kill a Mockingbird" should be familiar with this concept -- Atticus Finch was ordered to defend the accused rapist.

In the second place, how someone "holds himself out" has no rational bearing on whether service is voluntary. When you decide what's voluntary based on how someone "holds himself out", you are not deciding based on whether he's volunteering. When a prostitute holds herself out as a purveyor of sex for money, and then she refuses to put out for some client who she decides at the last second is unacceptable, so he forces her, he's a rapist! And when he then throws money at her as he walks away, and thereby completes the arranged deal she agreed to, he's still a rapist! See how it works?

In the third place, the baker is not, in point of fact, holding himself out publicly as a maker of a cake for the gay wedding of some client you define him as obligated to. You simply arbitrarily lump different actions into categories, according to some classification scheme chosen by you to please your own sensibilities; and you define "baking cakes for the public" to be one of your categories; and you define anyone who engages in certain subsets of the actions in that category to be "holding himself out publicly as a baker", regardless of whether he posted a unilateral contract saying "If you give me money I'll bake you a cake" or a sign saying "We reserve the right to refuse service to anyone." Your categorization of baking cakes for gay weddings as being an essential element of being a public baker has no more objective reality to it than King Henry VII's categorization of defending poor people as being an essential element of being a lawyer, and a hell of a lot less institutional history.

And in the fourth place, even if a baker made it abundantly clear that he wasn't holding himself out publicly as a maker of cakes for gay weddings, because the only reference to wedding cakes on his public face is his shop window, listing among his services, "Cakes for Christian Weddings", you wouldn't regard that as sufficient grounds for allowing him to refuse to bake for weddings he considers unchristian, would you?

Even if he were a Public Defender, there are reasons he could legally use to not take the case. Those reasons do not include "the defendant is gay".
I.e., you decide what's "involuntary servitude" based on the reason for not volunteering. That is irrational. You might as well claim when a man in a neolithic subsistence farming community is kidnapped in a slave raid by the neighboring tribe, and put to work farming their fields, that's not involuntary servitude, because he was already holding himself out publicly as an unpaid farmer, so it's ethnic discrimination for him to refuse to work the kidnappers' fields, and legitimate reasons do not include ethnic discrimination.

They very likely do include "I am the sitting Governor of the State of Missouri, and the duties of that office preclude me from acting as a Public Defender".
Not seeing how the duties of a governor preclude someone from acting as an appointed counsel. They don't seem to preclude a governor from acting as a golfer.
 
The case law in question refers to appointment by a judge, just like the information provided by Don2 earlier. Michael Barrett is not a judge, but rather the Director of the MSPD. I doubt that the referenced case applies to the OP, unless Barrett obtains a court order from a judge.

I guess we'll see what the judge he was ordered to appear before says when he doesn't show up.
With any luck the whole "Judges can; we don't know whether Barrett can." issue will be rendered moot, when she responds to Nixon's non-appearance by countersigning Barrett's appointment of him. I expect that's what Barrett is hoping for, rather than fight an unnecessary war over the limits of his authority.

In the meantime it'll look really good for the governor to refuse to help an indigent person get a defense in court.
Bingo. If the idiot had any political sense he'd make a grand public show of agreeing to take the case, call on all Missourians to follow his example and pull together during this time of budgetary difficulty, and then do a competent job of defending the guy.
 
Had an interesting situation in Kansas:

A judge appointed a lawyer to represent a defendant. The lawyer declined, saying that the money allotted for such work was less than he could afford to work for. It cost him more than that to keep his office running. The judge said he had to do it anyway. The issue wound up in the Kansas Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court said that lawyers can't be forced to work for that little money.

And it pointed out that the state didn't have any more money. In the the next fiscal year, the state could allocate more money, but it didn't have that money now, so it couldn't pay lawyers more now.

Now way out of that impasse, right?

But then the Supremes added the brilliant part: You can't force us lawyers to work for so little money, but we volunteer! For the rest of this fiscal year, court appointed attorneys will voluntarily work for unconscionably low pay. After that, the state will come up with more money.

And so that's how it happened.
 
But then the Supremes added the brilliant part: You can't force us lawyers to work for so little money, but we volunteer! For the rest of this fiscal year, court appointed attorneys will voluntarily work for unconscionably low pay. After that, the state will come up with more money.

And so that's how it happened.
Are you talking about Stephan v. Smith, 1987?
 
But then the Supremes added the brilliant part: You can't force us lawyers to work for so little money, but we volunteer! For the rest of this fiscal year, court appointed attorneys will voluntarily work for unconscionably low pay. After that, the state will come up with more money.

And so that's how it happened.
Are you talking about Stephan v. Smith, 1987?

That year sounds about right? Right decade anyway. I never read the case, just heard a reverent lecture about it.
 
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