Immortal But Damned to Hell on Earth

[ksen]

http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/05/immortal-but-damned-to-hell-on-earth/394160/

Imagine a supercomputer so advanced that it could hold the contents of a human brain. The Google engineer Ray Kurzweil famously believes that this will be possible by 2045. Organized technologists are seeking to transfer human personalities to non-biological carriers, “extending life, including to the point of immortality.” My gut says that they’ll never get there. But say I’m wrong. Were it possible, would you upload the contents of your brain to a computer before death, extending your conscious moments on this earth indefinitely? Or would you die as your ancestors did, passing into nothingness or an unknown beyond human comprehension?

But would uploading the contents of your brain to a computer actually transfer your consciousness?

I find it hard to believe that it would.

Other people may think it's you but I think "you" would still be dead.

 

[Loren Pechtel]

http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/05/immortal-but-damned-to-hell-on-earth/394160/

Imagine a supercomputer so advanced that it could hold the contents of a human brain. The Google engineer Ray Kurzweil famously believes that this will be possible by 2045. Organized technologists are seeking to transfer human personalities to non-biological carriers, “extending life, including to the point of immortality.” My gut says that they’ll never get there. But say I’m wrong. Were it possible, would you upload the contents of your brain to a computer before death, extending your conscious moments on this earth indefinitely? Or would you die as your ancestors did, passing into nothingness or an unknown beyond human comprehension?

But would uploading the contents of your brain to a computer actually transfer your consciousness?

I find it hard to believe that it would.

Other people may think it's you but I think "you" would still be dead.

If the simulation is good enough I don't see how it could not transfer your consciousness.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

And what would be the downside of doing it? It's not like you need to kill your body to transfer your brain in there. It would be nice to have a backup copy.

 

[Malintent]

http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/05/immortal-but-damned-to-hell-on-earth/394160/



But would uploading the contents of your brain to a computer actually transfer your consciousness?

I find it hard to believe that it would.

Other people may think it's you but I think "you" would still be dead.

If the simulation is good enough I don't see how it could not transfer your consciousness.

you mean COPY. That would not "transfer" consciousness... it might copy enough information for consciousness to assert itself.. .but that would then be two of you, each arguing that they themselves are the real you.

I'm thinking Star Trek transporter technology... The science fiction of it is that you are transferred by way of matter to energy, back to matter. The science fact of it is that it is a murder machine. It vaporizes you and then builds a copy of you that does not know the difference.. so the copy of you that is created by the transporter says, "it works!".. but you are actually dead and that is your clone.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

I'm thinking Star Trek transporter technology... The science fiction of it is that you are transferred by way of matter to energy, back to matter. The science fact of it is that it is a murder machine. It vaporizes you and then builds a copy of you that does not know the difference.. so the copy of you that is created by the transporter says, "it works!".. but you are actually dead and that is your clone.

And what's the difference between that and you being alive and not having a clone?

 

[Kharakov]

If the simulation is good enough I don't see how it could not transfer your consciousness.

In other words, the simulated consciousness would act as if it felt, but it might or might not actually feel anything. So... how do you know if it does?

 

[PyramidHead]

I'm thinking Star Trek transporter technology... The science fiction of it is that you are transferred by way of matter to energy, back to matter. The science fact of it is that it is a murder machine. It vaporizes you and then builds a copy of you that does not know the difference.. so the copy of you that is created by the transporter says, "it works!".. but you are actually dead and that is your clone.

And what's the difference between that and you being alive and not having a clone?

The difference from the perspective of the person entering the transporter should be obvious. His existence, experience, and consciousness will permanently cease and he will die. To him, his final moments will be the sensation of being dissembled one particle at a time. Being alive and not having a clone, his consciousness would not permanently cease, and he would not experience those final moments.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

And what's the difference between that and you being alive and not having a clone?

The difference from the perspective of the person entering the transporter should be obvious. His existence, experience, and consciousness will permanently cease and he will die. To him, his final moments will be the sensation of being dissembled one particle at a time. Being alive and not having a clone, his consciousness would not permanently cease, and he would not experience those final moments.

I'm missing the relevance. He loses all of those particles over the course of the year anyways and his consciousness gets tranferred over to new particles. I don't see why having it happen all at once would be somehow important.

 

[PyramidHead]

The difference from the perspective of the person entering the transporter should be obvious. His existence, experience, and consciousness will permanently cease and he will die. To him, his final moments will be the sensation of being dissembled one particle at a time. Being alive and not having a clone, his consciousness would not permanently cease, and he would not experience those final moments.

I'm missing the relevance. He loses all of those particles over the course of the year anyways and his consciousness gets tranferred over to new particles. I don't see why having it happen all at once would be somehow important.

You don't? Honestly?

Well, most organs and tissues in the body need to have a majority of their constituent parts around in order to function. Being atomized is not something most people's bodies would be able to withstand. Or do you also wonder why people near the epicenter of nuclear explosions aren't salvageable, by making exact duplicates of whatever state they were in before being blown to bits? People who are reduced to particles always die. Whether or not we decide to later (a millisecond, an hour, or a decade) make an exact replica of their particulate arrangement just before dying doesn't change the simple fact that nobody survives being reduced to a fine powder. If we made such a replica while someone were still alive, would you say there was only one person, or two?

 

[Keith&Co.]

Or do you also wonder why people near the epicenter of nuclear explosions aren't salvageable, by making exact duplicates of whatever state they were in before being blown to bits?

Aren't they? If we had the technology to capture their state before the blast and the technology to create the same matter in the same state, and they come of the reconstruction pad acting normal (or, normal for someone who just survived seeing a nuclear blast approach them) why wouldn't we conclude that they were salvageable?

If we made such a replica while someone were still alive, would you say there was only one person, or two?

But the matter stream of the transporter is moving the original material to the new location, in the exact pattern captured at the time of the transport, not assembling a replica.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

I'm missing the relevance. He loses all of those particles over the course of the year anyways and his consciousness gets tranferred over to new particles. I don't see why having it happen all at once would be somehow important.

You don't? Honestly?

Well, most organs and tissues in the body need to have a majority of their constituent parts around in order to function. Being atomized is not something most people's bodies would be able to withstand. Or do you also wonder why people near the epicenter of nuclear explosions aren't salvageable, by making exact duplicates of whatever state they were in before being blown to bits? People who are reduced to particles always die. Whether or not we decide to later (a millisecond, an hour, or a decade) make an exact replica of their particulate arrangement just before dying doesn't change the simple fact that nobody survives being reduced to a fine powder.

So what? You blink and then you're back. I don't see why dying or not dying during that blink would be somehow important either way if you're back after the blink.

If we made such a replica while someone were still alive, would you say there was only one person, or two?

There would be two. Neither of them would be somehow more the original person than the other, though.

 

[PyramidHead]

Aren't they? If we had the technology to capture their state before the blast and the technology to create the same matter in the same state, and they come of the reconstruction pad acting normal (or, normal for someone who just survived seeing a nuclear blast approach them) why wouldn't we conclude that they were salvageable?

They would be salvageable to society, but they would not be the same person, any more than a 1:1 duplicate would be the same person if it were made while the original person was still alive. I am of course assuming that substrate continuity is a prerequisite for continuity of consciousness, but I think that's a safer assumption than assuming that new information, created by intentionally arranging particles in a similar configuration to existing information, is sufficient to preserve the continuity of consciousness.

If we made such a replica while someone were still alive, would you say there was only one person, or two?

But the matter stream of the transporter is moving the original material to the new location, in the exact pattern captured at the time of the transport, not assembling a replica.

A distinction without a difference. As Tom said, it doesn't need to be the same particles since particles get swapped out over time anyway. So, in effect, a transporter first does something we have no reason to doubt kills any organism yet discovered--namely, dismantling all of the interdependent complexity of its body to the level of the strong and weak forces that govern individual nuclei--and either simultaneously, directly after, or sometime later, it uses the same particles to make a perfect copy of the organism that was just destroyed. Since particles don't "know" if they came from a stone or a desk or a man, that detail on the other side of the equation doesn't change the reality of what's probably happening.

 

[PyramidHead]

You don't? Honestly?

Well, most organs and tissues in the body need to have a majority of their constituent parts around in order to function. Being atomized is not something most people's bodies would be able to withstand. Or do you also wonder why people near the epicenter of nuclear explosions aren't salvageable, by making exact duplicates of whatever state they were in before being blown to bits? People who are reduced to particles always die. Whether or not we decide to later (a millisecond, an hour, or a decade) make an exact replica of their particulate arrangement just before dying doesn't change the simple fact that nobody survives being reduced to a fine powder.

So what? You blink and then you're back. I don't see why dying or not dying during that blink would be somehow important either way if you're back after the blink.

Maybe it wouldn't be important to an outside observer, but from the perspective of someone entering the machine, don't you think they might want to see their loved ones again? Their loved ones would of course be fine, since their exact copy would come home that evening, but the original person would be dead forever.

If we made such a replica while someone were still alive, would you say there was only one person, or two?

There would be two. Neither of them would be somehow more the original person than the other, though.

It's unimportant who gets to claim they were the 'prime'. They both have the same interest in continuing to live. Killing one of them would be depriving him of his future life. I'm just extending that same reasoning to killing one of them before making the duplicate; why is the timing of creating the duplicate the difference between killing someone and not killing someone, if in all respects the original person is treated the same way in both scenarios (namely, disintegrated)?

 

[Keith&Co.]

So if you were transporter-ed in your sleep what change would you notice that would tell you you're dead?

 

[PyramidHead]

So if you were transporter-ed in your sleep what change would you notice that would tell you you're dead?

You wouldn't notice, anymore than someone slowly administered an overdose of morphine in their sleep (or instantly killed by a fragmentation grenade in their sleep) would notice being dead. Being dead isn't something that people notice anyway, but that doesn't stop us from not wanting to be dead.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

So what? You blink and then you're back. I don't see why dying or not dying during that blink would be somehow important either way if you're back after the blink.

Maybe it wouldn't be important to an outside observer, but from the perspective of someone entering the machine, don't you think they might want to see their loved ones again? Their loved ones would of course be fine, since their exact copy would come home that evening, but the original person would be dead forever.

This implies that there's some sort of difference between the original person and the new person. What is that difference?

As far as I can see, if he dies during that blink or lives through the blink, he still sees his loved ones immediately afterwards.

 

[PyramidHead]

Maybe it wouldn't be important to an outside observer, but from the perspective of someone entering the machine, don't you think they might want to see their loved ones again? Their loved ones would of course be fine, since their exact copy would come home that evening, but the original person would be dead forever.

This implies that there's some sort of difference between the original person and the new person. What is that difference?

As far as I can see, if he dies during that blink or lives through the blink, he still sees his loved ones immediately afterwards.

We agree. But as far as he sees, the person who dies during the blink does not see his loved ones (or anyone, anything) ever again.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

This implies that there's some sort of difference between the original person and the new person. What is that difference?

As far as I can see, if he dies during that blink or lives through the blink, he still sees his loved ones immediately afterwards.

We agree. But as far as he sees, the person who dies during the blink does not see his loved ones (or anyone, anything) ever again.

But he does. Nothing is "lost" during the transport, so the guy who dies and comes back is still exactly the same guy as he was before. The new person isn't a different person from the original person.

Are you arguing from some kind of dualistic perspective or something? If all that we are is the end result of our physical processes, then why would an interruption of those processes make them somehow different from if they weren't interrupted?

 

[PyramidHead]

I am making an unstated presumption that may have something to do with our disagreement: I believe that it is like something to be one person and not another person, even if that other person is your double. There is the experience of being fed the sensory input of one brain/nervous system, situating one at a vantage point at the level of one's eyeballs. This first-person perspective (which I am calling consciousness) is vulnerable to changes in the sensory apparatus, especially swift and destructive changes. Whether or not another consciousness exists, residing in the sensory apparatus of a manufactured being whose components were intentionally arranged to mimic the locus of the original consciousness, seems to me an entirely separate event, so I don't see the mechanism of how it effects what's going on from the first-person perspective of the guy entering the transporter.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

I am making an unstated presumption that may have something to do with our disagreement: I believe that it is like something to be one person and not another person, even if that other person is your double. There is the experience of being fed the sensory input of one brain/nervous system, situating one at a vantage point at the level of one's eyeballs. This first-person perspective (which I am calling consciousness) is vulnerable to changes in the sensory apparatus, especially swift and destructive changes. Whether or not another consciousness exists, residing in the sensory apparatus of a manufactured being whose components were intentionally arranged to mimic the locus of the original consciousness, seems to me an entirely separate event, so I don't see the mechanism of how it effects what's going on from the first-person perspective of the guy entering the transporter.

Well, I guess that you could say that from his perspective, he dies and then comes back to life. The consciousness in the "manufactured being" is the same consciousness as was in the original being. A transportation machine is a murder/resurrection machine. If you get killed and resurrected, you're still the same you that you were before you died.

Also, there's no problem in getting resurrected in a new body while your old body is still alive. Both are you and there is no "prime".