Speakpigeon said:
Well, who is to say their model is not rational?
As in the case of other things, we make assessments as to whether other people are being immoral, irrational in the means-to-ends sense, irrational in the epistemic sense, on the basis of the information available to us. Ideologies (whether religious or not) are a usual case of irrationality. But to give you more direct examples, supporters of Moon Landing conspiracy theories (MLC), or Young Earth Creationism (YEC), or frankly Jesus divinity, etc., are usually being irrational, and in a specific case, one can make that assessment by reading what they write, talking to them, etc.
Speakpigeon said:
What's not rational about trusting your senses and your logic?
What do you mean by "your logic"?
Regardless, I did not claim that. I claimed that, sometimes, their model of the world is not epistemically rational.
Speakpigeon said:
Who or what are you going to trust if not your senses and your logic?
For example, consider the case of faith, in which a person makes a deliberate attempt to believe P, even if they at that point do not (say, because they used to believe P, but they have seen evidence on the basis of which their own faculties have reduced the probability they assign to P) . That is in fact an attempt to pervert the assessments yielded intuitively by their epistemic sense. It is epistemically irrational (though it might be means-to-ends rational in some cases).
Or consider the following case case: a person may insist that YEC is true and condemn "evolutionists", without taking a look at the evidence carefully, perhaps because he is too angry when he sees that some people are denying what he values so much that he loses his temper. Instead, he could make a choice to cool off, read the arguments and evidence put forth by philosophers, biologists, etc., and then let his epistemic sense yield a verdict
after having taken a look at the arguments and evidence, and while in a calm state of mind. Now, maybe his epistemic sense would malfunction and he would remain a YEC. But maybe not. Maybe his faculty would get it right.
Generally, while we do not choose what to believe (though people with faith try and maybe succeed in some cases, which is irrational from an epistemic point of view, even if it might be means-to-ends rational), we often (rationally) choose whether to take a look at arguments, evidence put forth by other people, etc., which would affect our beliefs of course.
Speakpigeon said:
Is it not enough that we should be able to agree among a group of people that we believe things are so and so without pretending that we know they are so and so.
Enough for what?
But of course, we do know things. I know that YEC is false (for example) and that MLC is false.
Speakpigeon said:
An assessment is a voluntary move of the mind. You don't need to make any assessment to believe the red flower is red. You take your senses on trust, without even thinking about it.
No, an assessment is usually an involuntary move of the mind. And I do make an assessment that the headphones are red. But we clearly disagree about the meaning of "assessment".
Speakpigeon said:
However, you may want to think about it and then you may decide whether those red flowers are really red.
No, that is not how it works. I may decide to think about it, consider different arguments (which I come up with, or which other people put forth), etc. That is a free choice to think about it. Now, when I'm thinking about it, some of the mental processes are not choices (like the intuitive epistemic assessments of the cases I deliberately consider), whereas others are (like when I choose to consider a case). However, in the end, there is no decision on my part as to whether to believe those headphones are really red. Rather, it's also a belief I find myself having, only after having (this part deliberately) considered more information, including arguments, etc.
Speakpigeon said:
That's something people actually do, including me.
I do not attempt to decide (though I often choose to think about the matters). I do think some people attempt to decide, and decide what to believe. It's epistemically irrational, though.
In short: choosing to ponder something, to think about a matter, to read arguments or come up with them, etc., is generally epistemically rational, and involves free choices. But after doing the thinking, one finds oneself in a state of mind that is not one's choice (i.e., one either believes or does not; one assigns a certain probability ("probable", "very probable"), etc.), if one is being epistemically rational. Alternatively, if one attempts to deliberately choose what to believe, that is a perversion of proper thought processes, and which is one of the things the word "faith" (in one of its meanings) refers to (which is not to say that that is one of the meanings of the word "faith"; let us not confuse meaning with reference).
Speakpigeon said:
I certainly don't believe any flower is actually red.
But they are (well, many of them anyway).
Speakpigeon said:
Descartes denied that he knew he had a body.
He was mistaken.
Speakpigeon said:
It has to be an assessment, though, at least for most people most of the time. Thinking the red flower is in fact not red requires a judgement, as assessment, a thinking.
It requires an error. But that aside, requiring deliberate thinking does not entail the actual assessment is deliberate. What one chooses is to think about the matter. What one does not choose is what, after thinking, one's belief happens to be - well, unless one has faith, and succeeds in perverting one's proper thought processes.
Speakpigeon said:
And then this ability we have to think against the compelling nature of our many wants is precisely what gives us our sense of free will. But you think otherwise if you want.
No, I do not think otherwise
if I want. I think otherwise, period. I choose to think about the matter if I want to (and I do), but what I find myself believing after doing the thinking is not my choice. It happens. I do not have faith.
Speakpigeon said:
What's not epistemically proper about thinking the red flower is not really red? And not a flower at all?
What would be epistemically improper would be to choose to believe it is not red, or no flower at all (then again, it would also be epistemically improper to choose to believe it is red: it is epistemically improper to
choose to believe). Now, if you choose to ponder the matter, that is rational. If, after pondering the matter, you find yourself believing (not by choice, but it happens to you as a result of the thinking, which you did freely choose to engage in) that it is not red or not a flower, I would say that your thinking got stray at some point, but I do not know what exactly was irrational in your thought processes, or whether you just got the wrong information. Maybe it was a faith-like event, a deliberate choice to believe. Maybe it was something else. Maybe your senses just failed. Maybe you made a rational assessment on the basis of wrong information ( less probable, but it happens).
Given my experience with people who make the same sort of mistake you are making, I think the most likely cause is an error about semantics, and more precisely, about the ontological commitments of the terms "red" and "flower" (an error which, in turn, would have other causes, which I do not know). But maybe in your case, it's something else. I have insufficient information about you to know.
Speakpigeon said:
It seems the only rational belief to have if you assume science is our best model of the world.
That is not true. Science is our best model of the world. The headphones on my desk are red. And so are many flowers.