Is it just?

[The AntiChris]

What an odd response.

You seem to have seized on my saying "based upon personal judgements" in post #15. I accept I was sloppy - I should have said "personal value judgements" '(I think have everywhere else). You appear to have used this (personal judgements) as my 'inference rule' to provide obvious counterexamples to 'my' rule. This seems a little uncharitable.

The real question here is how do we distinguish claims based on personal values from those which are verifiable without reference to personal values.

You ask:

So, are you able to present any evidence, linguistic or otherwise, as to whether "reason, justice, and fairness" entail reference to a person's subjective values?

I can only offer the observation of how these terms are used in general and the apparent total absence of any objective standard by which to adjudicate between conflicting claims in these areas.

In the event that space aliens exist, then yes, that's in principle objectively verifiable; it's merely technically infeasible at mankind's present level of progress. But you say "all of the above". By all means, enlighten me. Postulating any technological advancement you please, what imaginable observation would let us know one way or the other whether the universe is infinitely large, or whether there was a "first cause", or whether the laws of physics are ultimately deterministic or random?

I have absolutely no idea.

However, whether or not any of these pertain is true regardless of any human sentiments. And this was my point.

If you want more details on my views on that point, I laid them out in last year's "non-existence of objective morality" thread.

https://talkfreethought.org/showthr...ctive-morality&p=554997&viewfull=1#post554997

https://talkfreethought.org/showthr...ctive-morality&p=561213&viewfull=1#post561213

Thanks for that. I'm still not clear on your distinction (assuming you do make one) between subjective and objective claims. Could you give an example of what you consider to be a subjective claim?

 

[The AntiChris]

Bomb#20

A brief addendum to my previous post.

and the apparent total absence of any objective standard by which to adjudicate between conflicting claims in these areas.

I want to make it clear I'm not presenting "absence of any objective standard by which to adjudicate between conflicting claims" as my 'inference rule' for determining whether a claim is subjective or not. It's just that in those areas where subjectivity/objectivity is in contention, such as those we're discussing on this thread, this (apparent total absence...) does seem to me to be strong supporting evidence against objectivity.

 

[Speakpigeon]

It is true that it is either true of false that the law just?

Yes, or rather, it is after you identify the law you're talking about. Some laws are just, some not. Some legal systems are (overall) mostly just, others aren't. And so on.

Good.

That's why a definition is necessary. Without a definition, there's no reference.
The dictionary definitions above provide an objective basis, a reference, for deciding if something is just or unjust.

No, they are not necessary to assess whether the law is just. Otherwise, how would people in societies without writing go about assessing whether their rules (not written, but customary) or the rules of other groups they were in contact with, were just? And how would dictionaries go about changing that? Dictionaries only provide an approximation to the actual meaning, which is defined by usage (and in the case "just", I'd say the concept it denotes stays across societies modulo translation).

Bloody Hell, I said that a definition was necessary, not that a dictionary definition was necessary.

Still, you do have a point. What matters is not any actual definition but whether people have a notion of what is just.

It doesn't even need to be a shared notion. Each man his own notion of what is just and he should be able to decide for himself whether the law is just.

And anyway, how would you go about deciding we all have the same notion of what is just without a proper definition?

I suspect we have a notion of what is just even before we get to have any rule at all. Isn't there a feeling of that? Do you not know whether a flower is red? You think you need to know the word "red" before you could possibly know a flower is red?

Sigh! And still no justification by professional logicians that the definition of validity used in "classical" mathematical logic would be the correct one?

You think people need to know the mathematical definition of validity to decide whether an inference is valid or not?
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

First, there is nothing remotely objective about "honorable", which means nothing other than "worthy of being honored". Worthy according to what? According to whatever arbitrary subjective feelings each person has that make them want to honor something.

Second, other definintions of "Just", such as the one I gave in my first post and what comes up when you google it explicitly reference moral values, as in "based on or behaving according to what is morally right and fair." Since all morality is nothing but subjective preferences, "just" only has meaning based on subjective preference.

150 years ago, most white people in the US thought that it was honorable, just, and fair, for the law to prohibit women and non-whites from voting. Many Trump supporters today still believe that. Nothing objective has changed, yet the law did because the subjective preferences of a majority of voters changed.

Pain is explicitly defined as an unpleasant feeling. Now, surely, THAT must be subjective. If anything is...

And then do you not think it's either true or false you're in pain?

But then if our assessment of justice is subjective and not objective, why not a definition of "just" as a feeling?

"Moral" is defined as a judgement... And a judgement as "the formation of an opinion after consideration or deliberation". So, that has to be subjective, surely!!! Well, at least in your own judgement, yes?

Maybe you think what is subjective is not objective and what is objective is not subjective? Any evidence? I mean, any objective evidence? Or may be just your subjective evidence will do?

So, apparently, you can tell with deadly black-and-while accuracy that moral values are all subjective and not at all objective and that whether the Sun moves in the sky is definitely not subjective and entirely objective? I have been told that 500 years ago most people in Europe thought the Sun turned around the Earth. Including white educated people. Some Trump supporters I'm sure still believe that. Nothing objective has changed, yet the science did because because... the subjective preferences of a majority of scientists changed?

I wonder if feeling certain about things is not a little bit subjective as well.
EB

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Bloody Hell, I said that a definition was necessary, not that a dictionary definition was necessary. In fact, you said:

Actually, that is a minor point. You said a definition was necessary, but the sort of definition you described was not necessary, and for the reasons I gave.

It's only a matter of definition. We only need to have a proper definition.

We have the definition of the metre. It's either true or false that the speed of light is 299 792 458 m/s, even before we measure it. And indeed, independently of any actual measure.

Once we have an appropriate definition of justice, then it is either true or false that the law is just.

The key here is "appropriate" definition. By requiring that the definition (whether in a dictionary or not) be "appropriate", you imply that there is a shared concept that the definition (wherever it is written, or not written and stated orally) must match - in order to be appropriate in the first place.

Well, the point is that what we need is a concept, not a definition. Definitions can be helpful, but aren't necessary. With or without dictionaries. As a matter of fact, historically, most people did not have any appropriated definitions of "justice" (or synonyms in different languages), in the sense of "definition" used in this context (i.e., they did not have a definition matching the concept, as used colloquially). But they did have the concept of justice.

Still, you do have a point. What matters is not any actual definition but whether people have a notion of what is just.

Yes, you got this right.

It doesn't even need to be a shared notion. Each man his own notion of what is just and he should be able to decide for himself whether the law is just.

However, in that case, in addition to the specific law, in order for "the law is just" to be true or false, the person uttering it (or by whose notions it is assessed) it would have to be specified.

And anyway, how would you go about deciding we all have the same notion of what is just without a proper definition?

It's an interesting question and it would require a lot of discussion, but surely, in order for a definition to be proper, there needs to be a shared notion that the definition matches (if it fails to match it, it would not be proper), so the idea of a proper definition assumes a shared notion (clearly, you are not talking about a definition that is proper for one person).

Moreover, the same issue I raised before holds here too: in the past, where people did not have a definition matching the concept (and in the present, for most people), they still properly reckoned that there was a shared concept. So, it's not the case that one needs a proper definition for that.

I suspect we have a notion of what is just even before we get to have any rule at all. Isn't there a feeling of that? Do you not know whether a flower is red? You think you need to know the word "red" before you could possibly know a flower is red?

Maybe we are using "rules" differently. But I think the notion of what is just requires rules. But they do not have to be written or spoken. They might just be moral rules, or local, customary rules.
Other than that, I agree. You do not need to know the word "red", or the word "just" to know some things are red, or just.

Sigh! And still no justification by professional logicians that the definition of validity used in "classical" mathematical logic would be the correct one?

I already provided justification in another thread. Given the way you treated me in that thread, and given also that you were not persuaded, I realized it was pointless to talk to you about that, since:

1. I will not be able to persuade you.
2. I will be mistreated by you.

So, nothing good would come out of it. For that reason, I pass on that thread.

(Links in case a reader wants to assess for themselves who is right, who treated whom improperly, or whatever they want to assess:

https://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?17781-4-very-easy-arguments-Are-they-valid
https://talkfreethought.org/showthr...-validity-of-an-argument-on-Joe-being-a-squid )

You think people need to know the mathematical definition of validity to decide whether an inference is valid or not?

I already explained in more than enough detail in two previous threads. I will not discuss validity with you, for the aforementioned reasons. I hope readers take a look at the other threads, in addition to your latest. If not, well such is life.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Still, you do have a point. What matters is not any actual definition but whether people have a notion of what is just.
It doesn't even need to be a shared notion. Each man his own notion of what is just and he should be able to decide for himself whether the law is just.
And anyway, how would you go about deciding we all have the same notion of what is just without a proper definition?

It's an interesting question and it would require a lot of discussion, but surely, in order for a definition to be proper, there needs to be a shared notion that the definition matches (if it fails to match it, it would not be proper), so the idea of a proper definition assumes a shared notion (clearly, you are not talking about a definition that is proper for one person).

Moreover, the same issue I raised before holds here too: in the past, where people did not have a definition matching the concept (and in the present, for most people), they still properly reckoned that there was a shared concept. So, it's not the case that one needs a proper definition for that.

Yes, no one really needs a proper definition. But all our judgements are based on prior assumptions. These assumptions are the notion we have of the things that we think are involved in the situation we assess.

So, if not a proper definition, then a proper notion is what we need.

And by proper notion, I don't mean a notion necessarily shared. It's enough that the body that's doing the assessing has its own notion, irrespective of whether it is shared. It will be a proper notion if it allows for a rational assessment.

Basically, that's free will in action. Our actions that we decide are motivated, justified or explained, by the proper notions we have, by our rational model of the world.

If shared, then we can coordinate our actions with other people. If not, well, so be it, but we're not going to stop doing things until our notions are shared and the other guys are ready for it.
EB

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Yes, no one really needs a proper definition. But all our judgements are based on prior assumptions. These assumptions are the notion we have of the things that we think are involved in the situation we assess.

So, if not a proper definition, then a proper notion is what we need.


And by proper notion, I don't mean a notion necessarily shared. It's enough that the body that's doing the assessing has its own notion, irrespective of whether it is shared. It will be a proper notion if it allows for a rational assessment.

In order to make an assessment, yes. But if it is not shared, then people will be talking past each other if they think it is shared.

Basically, that's free will in action. Our actions that we decide are motivated, justified or explained, by the proper notions we have, by our rational model of the world.

What do you mean?

I would say that:

First, people make sometimes free choices based on a non-rational part of their model of the world.

Second, our notions (and our assessments) do not require free actions. To go with your color example, I do not make a free choice to believe that the headphones on my desk are red. I look at them, and believe they are. But no choice was involved. I just believe it. I'm not being irrational. But I'm not making choices, either. And a similar case can be made for other notions. While it might be possible to make a choice to believe something and actually do so (in some cases and/or for some people), that is not required (nor, I would say, epistemically proper, but that's another matter).

 

[Speakpigeon]

In order to make an assessment, yes. But if it is not shared, then people will be talking past each other if they think it is shared.

Sure, and that's what we see all the time. Not so much because we don't share concepts but because we have so many of them there's bound to be some discrepancies.

Basically, that's free will in action. Our actions that we decide are motivated, justified or explained, by the proper notions we have, by our rational model of the world.

What do you mean?

I would say that:

First, people make sometimes free choices based on a non-rational part of their model of the world.

Well, who is to say their model is not rational? What's not rational about trusting your senses and your logic? Who or what are you going to trust if not your senses and your logic? Is it not enough that we should be able to agree among a group of people that we believe things are so and so without pretending that we know they are so and so. Which we don't. And then let people who believe differently fend for themselves. Often enough, the group will be wrong, apparently.

Second, our notions (and our assessments) do not require free actions. To go with your color example, I do not make a free choice to believe that the headphones on my desk are red. I look at them, and believe they are. But no choice was involved. I just believe it. I'm not being irrational. But I'm not making choices, either. And a similar case can be made for other notions.

An assessment is a voluntary move of the mind. You don't need to make any assessment to believe the red flower is red. You take your senses on trust, without even thinking about it.

However, you may want to think about it and then you may decide whether those red flowers are really red. That's something people actually do, including me. I certainly don't believe any flower is actually red. Descartes denied that he knew he had a body. I believe he had to think hard to get there.

It has to be an assessment, though, at least for most people most of the time. Thinking the red flower is in fact not red requires a judgement, as assessment, a thinking.

And then this ability we have to think against the compelling nature of our many wants is precisely what gives us our sense of free will. But you think otherwise if you want.

While it might be possible to make a choice to believe something and actually do so (in some cases and/or for some people), that is not required (nor, I would say, epistemically proper, but that's another matter).

What's not epistemically proper about thinking the red flower is not really red? And not a flower at all? It seems the only rational belief to have if you assume science is our best model of the world.
EB

 

[Bomb#20]

You seem to have seized on my saying "based upon personal judgements" in post #15. I accept I was sloppy - I should have said "personal value judgements" '(I think have everywhere else). You appear to have used this (personal judgements) as my 'inference rule' to provide obvious counterexamples to 'my' rule. This seems a little uncharitable.

For it to be uncharitable there would have to be an alternative reading that makes your reply more reasonable. I don't see one. "... based upon personal value judgements" isn't any better. Under that reading, the exchange goes like this:

Sp: There's no reference to a person's subjective values.
AC: They all reference value judgements. Value judgements are subjective. "reason, justice, and fairness" are all based on opinion. They're opinions (value judgements) about facts but they're still opinions.
Sp: You are asserting this without providing any justification.
AC: I've explained that your definition of "just" references value judgements (reason, justice, and fairness)...What more do you want in the way of justification?
B20: Are any of you able to present any evidence, linguistic or otherwise, as to whether "reason, justice, and fairness" entail reference to a person's subjective values?
AC: Apart from the observation that all claims about these appear to be based upon personal value judgements, what more do you require as evidence?​

Under that reading, you're just repeating yourself and begging the question. You're still John Cleesing him.

The real question here is how do we distinguish claims based on personal values from those which are verifiable without reference to personal values.

That's not the real question here; that's a false dilemma fallacy. There are more kinds of claims in the world than those based on personal values and those which are verifiable without reference to personal values. I just presented a bunch of them.

Postulating any technological advancement you please, what imaginable observation would let us know one way or the other whether the universe is infinitely large, or whether there was a "first cause", or whether the laws of physics are ultimately deterministic or random?

I have absolutely no idea.

I take it you thought this was an irrelevant digression from the metaethics discussion. It's actually a central element of my argument. People make claims about those topics all the time, and it's painfully obvious* that none of those claims are verifiable without reference to personal values -- none of them are verifiable, period. And yet they are not claims based on personal values. Claiming the universe is deterministic does not depend on valuing the universe being deterministic.

Therefore, when you find a means to "distinguish claims based on personal values from those which are verifiable without reference to personal values", what will you have? You'll have an inference rule, a rule you can use to make arguments of the form "Claim C is not verifiable without reference to personal values; therefore C is based on personal values". Those arguments will be fallacious. It is not correct logic to jump from the premise "X cannot be verified without Y" to the conclusions "X references Y" or "X is based upon Y".

(* It's obvious to me at least; and you have no idea either how they could be verified.)

You ask:

So, are you able to present any evidence, linguistic or otherwise, as to whether "reason, justice, and fairness" entail reference to a person's subjective values?

I can only offer the observation of how these terms are used in general

That's not an observation; that's a claim of private knowledge. An observation would be a quotation of some people using those terms in a way that backs up the contention that the speakers are referring to a person's subjective values.

You and I debated this same issue a long time ago, when we were discussing rb's simplistic claim to the effect that "X is immoral" was equivalent to "I don't want X". At that time, I posted a counterexample proving his claim was wrong. Do you have some formulation more sophisticated than his -- any translation of reason, justice, and fairness claims into explicit subjective value claims -- that preserves the speakers' intention?

and the apparent total absence of any objective standard by which to adjudicate between conflicting claims in these areas.

Well, can you propose any objective standard by which to adjudicate between conflicting claims in the randomness, infinity, and first-cause areas?

An inability to objectively adjudicate claims does not logically qualify as evidence for subjective semantics. Thinking it does is a category mistake.

Thanks for that. I'm still not clear on your distinction (assuming you do make one) between subjective and objective claims. Could you give an example of what you consider to be a subjective claim?

Sure. "Chocolate ice cream is yummier than vanilla."

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Well, who is to say their model is not rational?

As in the case of other things, we make assessments as to whether other people are being immoral, irrational in the means-to-ends sense, irrational in the epistemic sense, on the basis of the information available to us. Ideologies (whether religious or not) are a usual case of irrationality. But to give you more direct examples, supporters of Moon Landing conspiracy theories (MLC), or Young Earth Creationism (YEC), or frankly Jesus divinity, etc., are usually being irrational, and in a specific case, one can make that assessment by reading what they write, talking to them, etc.

What's not rational about trusting your senses and your logic?

What do you mean by "your logic"?
Regardless, I did not claim that. I claimed that, sometimes, their model of the world is not epistemically rational.

Who or what are you going to trust if not your senses and your logic?

For example, consider the case of faith, in which a person makes a deliberate attempt to believe P, even if they at that point do not (say, because they used to believe P, but they have seen evidence on the basis of which their own faculties have reduced the probability they assign to P) . That is in fact an attempt to pervert the assessments yielded intuitively by their epistemic sense. It is epistemically irrational (though it might be means-to-ends rational in some cases).

Or consider the following case case: a person may insist that YEC is true and condemn "evolutionists", without taking a look at the evidence carefully, perhaps because he is too angry when he sees that some people are denying what he values so much that he loses his temper. Instead, he could make a choice to cool off, read the arguments and evidence put forth by philosophers, biologists, etc., and then let his epistemic sense yield a verdict after having taken a look at the arguments and evidence, and while in a calm state of mind. Now, maybe his epistemic sense would malfunction and he would remain a YEC. But maybe not. Maybe his faculty would get it right.

Generally, while we do not choose what to believe (though people with faith try and maybe succeed in some cases, which is irrational from an epistemic point of view, even if it might be means-to-ends rational), we often (rationally) choose whether to take a look at arguments, evidence put forth by other people, etc., which would affect our beliefs of course.

Is it not enough that we should be able to agree among a group of people that we believe things are so and so without pretending that we know they are so and so.

Enough for what?
But of course, we do know things. I know that YEC is false (for example) and that MLC is false.

An assessment is a voluntary move of the mind. You don't need to make any assessment to believe the red flower is red. You take your senses on trust, without even thinking about it.

No, an assessment is usually an involuntary move of the mind. And I do make an assessment that the headphones are red. But we clearly disagree about the meaning of "assessment".

However, you may want to think about it and then you may decide whether those red flowers are really red.

No, that is not how it works. I may decide to think about it, consider different arguments (which I come up with, or which other people put forth), etc. That is a free choice to think about it. Now, when I'm thinking about it, some of the mental processes are not choices (like the intuitive epistemic assessments of the cases I deliberately consider), whereas others are (like when I choose to consider a case). However, in the end, there is no decision on my part as to whether to believe those headphones are really red. Rather, it's also a belief I find myself having, only after having (this part deliberately) considered more information, including arguments, etc.

That's something people actually do, including me.

I do not attempt to decide (though I often choose to think about the matters). I do think some people attempt to decide, and decide what to believe. It's epistemically irrational, though.

In short: choosing to ponder something, to think about a matter, to read arguments or come up with them, etc., is generally epistemically rational, and involves free choices. But after doing the thinking, one finds oneself in a state of mind that is not one's choice (i.e., one either believes or does not; one assigns a certain probability ("probable", "very probable"), etc.), if one is being epistemically rational. Alternatively, if one attempts to deliberately choose what to believe, that is a perversion of proper thought processes, and which is one of the things the word "faith" (in one of its meanings) refers to (which is not to say that that is one of the meanings of the word "faith"; let us not confuse meaning with reference).

I certainly don't believe any flower is actually red.

But they are (well, many of them anyway).

Descartes denied that he knew he had a body.

He was mistaken.

It has to be an assessment, though, at least for most people most of the time. Thinking the red flower is in fact not red requires a judgement, as assessment, a thinking.

It requires an error. But that aside, requiring deliberate thinking does not entail the actual assessment is deliberate. What one chooses is to think about the matter. What one does not choose is what, after thinking, one's belief happens to be - well, unless one has faith, and succeeds in perverting one's proper thought processes.

And then this ability we have to think against the compelling nature of our many wants is precisely what gives us our sense of free will. But you think otherwise if you want.

No, I do not think otherwise if I want. I think otherwise, period. I choose to think about the matter if I want to (and I do), but what I find myself believing after doing the thinking is not my choice. It happens. I do not have faith.

What's not epistemically proper about thinking the red flower is not really red? And not a flower at all?

What would be epistemically improper would be to choose to believe it is not red, or no flower at all (then again, it would also be epistemically improper to choose to believe it is red: it is epistemically improper to choose to believe). Now, if you choose to ponder the matter, that is rational. If, after pondering the matter, you find yourself believing (not by choice, but it happens to you as a result of the thinking, which you did freely choose to engage in) that it is not red or not a flower, I would say that your thinking got stray at some point, but I do not know what exactly was irrational in your thought processes, or whether you just got the wrong information. Maybe it was a faith-like event, a deliberate choice to believe. Maybe it was something else. Maybe your senses just failed. Maybe you made a rational assessment on the basis of wrong information ( less probable, but it happens).

Given my experience with people who make the same sort of mistake you are making, I think the most likely cause is an error about semantics, and more precisely, about the ontological commitments of the terms "red" and "flower" (an error which, in turn, would have other causes, which I do not know). But maybe in your case, it's something else. I have insufficient information about you to know.

It seems the only rational belief to have if you assume science is our best model of the world.

That is not true. Science is our best model of the world. The headphones on my desk are red. And so are many flowers.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

I do not attempt to decide (though I often choose to think about the matters). I do think some people attempt to decide, and decide what to believe. It's epistemically irrational, though.

To be more precise, I do not think that in general, when people claim they have chosen to believe X, they have in fact chosen. At least in most cases I've been able to test (by asking them about the matter and/or reading what they say), they just found themselves believing X, and are mistaken in their belief that they have made a choice.

However, after considering the matter for a long time and looking at a lot of evidence, I think there probably are cases of people actually making a choice to believe (which is epistemically irrational) and succeeding, but it is far more common the case of people just accepting what they're told without choosing to think about the matter, and then failing to choose to reconsider their beliefs, or at least failing to make a sufficient effort to think about them with a cool head. That is, for example, how most children come to be Christians, Muslims, etc., and how most adults fail to reconsider those positions.