Is R real?

[Speakpigeon]

What we mean by "physical world" isn't just any world out there. It's a specific kind of world.

So apply systematic doubt. What do you think we mean by "physical world" that you think excludes some of the "just any world out there" worlds? What possible world would qualify as non-physical?

I don't need to offer any particular scenario because anything is conceivable as long as it is logical.

Well, how do you expect to argue that some allegedly conceivable non-physical "just any world out there" world is logical if you won't describe it?

I can't exclude for example solipsism, the possibility that there would be nothing else but my conscious mind.

There you go. There's a particular scenario. So why do you think that isn't a physical world containing you? If solipsism is correct, you are the physical universe. Physics is the study of your conscious mind.

Or that there are different minds but only minds.

Cool, there's another particular scenario. In that possible world, physics is the study of minds.

That's not what people mean when using the words "mind" and "physical". See here, although you shouldn't need a dictionary:

Mind
1. The faculty of a human or other animal by which it thinks, perceives, feels, remembers, or desires: studying the relation between the brain and the mind.

3. Of or relating to material things: a wall that formed a physical barrier; the physical environment.
4. Of or relating to matter and energy or the sciences dealing with them, especially physics.

That me mean different things is clear to all of us. You're just wasting my time.

Anybody learning that his mind is all that exists wouldn't go on to reflect that his mind was the physical world after all. He would just think, well, the physical world just doesn't exist.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

OK. I claim knowledge. So is what I just did true?

Assuming you believe that P and claim knowledge that P, you need to know that Q. Q says that your belief that P is somehow justified. Then you would need to know that P is true. That's where it gets funny. If P happens to be true, you know it's true, and this just because you then have a "justified true belief" and this is deemed to constitute knowledge. But if P is false, then you don't know that P is true and this just because you don't have a justified true belief in this case. The funny thing is that in both cases your belief is the same and your justification is the same whether P is true or not. So, this theory of knowledge requires that the truth of P somehow necessarily aligns with whether your justification for believing P is somehow good enough. However, how do you know that your justification is good enough? Ah, that's the difficult bit because this now requires more knowledge, knowledge that Q, i.e. knowledge that your justification is good enough. So whether you know that P depends on whether you know that Q. Whether you know that Q will in turn inevitably depend on whether you know that R and so on.

I have yet to be explained to me how this could work.

Compare with pain. You know you're pain when you're in pain. You know it's true you're in pain not because of some justification. You just know it. You don't even have to know the word "pain". You don't even have to be human. You don't even have to know you know you're in pain. That's the only kind of knowledge I'm aware that I have.
EB

I posted your whole post. All I want to do is challenge your example. It is not true that we know pain when we are in pain. We know this is true because people in pain often deny they are in pain even though they show symptoms of one in pain yet they actually continue to function as if they were not in pain, The problem is that one of the signals one is in pain is the denial of being in pain.

With a flawed example like that one would wind oup arguing whether we knew we had pain at all which is not the objective of the example you provided.

Continue.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I posted your whole post. All I want to do is challenge your example. It is not true that we know pain when we are in pain. We know this is true because people in pain often deny they are in pain

If you know something, you don't ask FDI whether you know it.

My example stands and I can only let people proceed to decide for themselves. This judgement is not at all as suggests your post here whether somebody else may or may not know pain, but whether they themselves know pain when they are in pain.

My argument is from the first person perspective.

So, I guess you just don't understand arguments from a first person perspective. You have spent your entire career as a scientist having no notion of the first person perspective. Oh, whoa.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

Your point if one can call it that is moot. One observes what one says and does. When what one says is not what one is doing tests should be done by one on whether there are reasons for that situation being so.

Now if you choose to only accept what one says or accept what you say you will find that you are often seen to be in error. Ultimately one comes to reconcile what one says with what one does if one survives.

Your first person claim is incomplete or science is wrong in presuming what one knows changes with experience as a consequence of learning.

If you now declare you know this and you behave as that, if you were a chick, your parents and kin would peck you to death or you would quickly change your behavior to correspond with what others know.

I agree one should never ask FDI. One is responsible for knowing what one claims to know. However you say you you shouldn't ask FDI. I have no idea what that means. I can only conclude it's probably due to a failure in observation.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Your point if one can call it that is moot.

No, it isn't. That you think it's moot doesn't make it so. Basic logic, Joe. And who should care about your opinion but you? My point is that each of us when they are in pain will judge for himself whether they know pain. So, why should anybody care as to what is your opinion? Let people judge for themselves. What is your problem with that? You think you know better than they will?! There is no scientific theory that explains the quality of pain in terms of the physical universe.

One observes what one says and does. When what one says is not what one is doing tests should be done by one on whether there are reasons for that situation being so.

This applies only to objective facts. We all go by that standard, including me and I'm perfectly happy with that. It is just profoundly idiotic to assume that what goes for objective facts necessarily goes for subjective facts. They is zero evidence to believe that because all evidence is ultimately subjective. There is no scientific theory that explains the quality of pain in terms of the physical universe.

Now if you choose to only accept what one says or accept what you say you will find that you are often seen to be in error. Ultimately one comes to reconcile what one says with what one does if one survives.

You're describing yourself here and again this only applies to objective facts. There is no scientific theory that explains the quality of pain in terms of the physical universe.

Your first person claim is incomplete or science is wrong in presuming what one knows changes with experience as a consequence of learning.

Clearly, you don't understand what you're talking about. The meaning of knowledge is that you can't know that p on Friday and then know that not p on Saturday. The only way to reconcile the meaning of knowledge with our experience of the physical world and science, is that we don't know the physical world and we don't know whether our science of the day is correct.

If you now declare you know this and you behave as that, if you were a chick, your parents and kin would peck you to death or you would quickly change your behavior to correspond with what others know.

Try to phrase your argument using only subjective terms. It won't work. "Declaring" and "behaving" are objective behaviours. I don't claim I would know if I were a chick since being a chick is an objective fact.

What is also an objective fact is that you are terminally unable to understand what I am talking about. Your opinions on what I explain are abysmally pathetic. You don't understand what is the first person perspective and you keep arguing as if we could interpret the facts of first person perspective in terms of objective facts.

There is no scientific theory that explains the quality of pain in terms of the physical universe. This also is a fact but you choose to ignore this fact, which should be worrying when one claims to be a scientist.

One is responsible for knowing what one claims to know.

It's not a matter of responsibility. It's a matter of what the facts are from a first person perspective and there is no scientific theory that explains the quality of pain in terms of the physical universe. .

I'm confident you won't understand any of what I say here. I've seen many people throughout my life like you. No amount of rationality can get at their obduracy. Your posts, going back possibly at least nine years I think, have never provided any evidence that you may be an intelligent guy. If you are, then you deliberately choose to act a complete idiot. I admit I don't know which is which and I'm not even confident you would know the answer to that.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

Your failures to comprehend anything is apparent right from the start. You presume one knows when one is in pain. One doesn't. My point is that there are those who don't feel pain who exhibit behavior as if they are in pain and are then tested and diagnosed with conditions where pain is an obvious aspect of their behavior.

As for gathering reports of one's knowing pain I've not read such BS as yours in a long time. We commonly use such as rating scales to elicit one's feelings about their levels of pain in doctor visits. The medical industry has co-opted the Cooper-Harper scale developed for workload for such reporting from patients.I spent much of my career recruiting subjective data from professionals, developing tools for such tasks and then applying them to objective data.

So when it comes to stupid your chatter ranks right up there with that of other notable impression and "I heard" champions. In the shitter.

If there is p and one knows p then there is a congruence with knowing and the real world, else there is no knowing by one of the nature of the real world. Try that.

Thanks for the detailed analysis of your failure to understand simple analysis in favor of defending pet biases.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Your failures to comprehend anything is apparent right from the start.

Don't be so ridiculous.

You presume one knows when one is in pain.

Sorry, but if you don't know you're in pain then you're not in pain.

One doesn't. My point is that there are those who don't feel pain who exhibit behavior as if they are in pain and are then tested and diagnosed with conditions where pain is an obvious aspect of their behavior.

That's a very interesting story. Basically, it means we have some people here with a split mind. One part knows pain because it experiences pain and this will be reflected in the behaviour of the person because this part of the mind happens to control said behaviour. The other part of the mind doesn't experience pain so doesn't know about it and so says he doesn't feel pain.
So, the part which is in pain knows pain. The part which doesn't know pain is not in pain. Just like I said.
See? Who understands? Obviously me, not you.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

I give you  Gate control theory

Common treatment for pain in right little toe is to step on left big toe./rat tat bumpf

Also one can use a tickle me Elmo approach to mask or eliminate sensation of pain.

There are many other demonstrations, but, I waste my time.

Two thousand year old rationality has no place in modernity.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I give you  Gate control theory

Common treatment for pain in right little toe is to step on left big toe./rat tat bumpf

Also one can use a tickle me Elmo approach to mask or eliminate sensation of pain.

There are many other demonstrations, but, I waste my time.

Two thousand year old rationality has no place in modernity.

Are you autistic? It's funny how you don't bother to articulate any argument. You don't quote people. You splash irrelevant claims that always turn out to be... irrelevant.

Go figure.

So, please explain yourself. How what you are talking about here has anything to do with whether we know pain when we experience pain?

Please, don't make me repeat my previous post.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

if pain is real let's call it p if I know pain Then I know p, If there is no p and I know p then I don't know pain because pain is real.

Now if I don't know pain but pain is real and I have pain then p is real but I don't know p. Apply gate theory to that one. OK.

Answer is I am equipped to know p if there is p, but sometimes things interfere with my ability to know p because a gate that normally allows me to experience pain been closed for some reason Observation tells you that I have should say I know p but I don't know p.

This is a consistent problem with reporting sense data in humans so often we should experience something but we don't because either something else is interfering with our ability to feel pain, color, sound, touch, position taste, smell, etc. This situation arises when one stimulus either blocks another or is prioritized over another in most living things including us.

since you didn't read the wiki link first paragraph, reads as follows

The gate control theory of pain asserts that non-painful input closes the nerve "gates" to painful input, which prevents pain sensation from traveling to the central nervous system. Therefore, stimulation by non-noxious input is able to suppress pain.

First proposed in 1965 by Ronald Melzack and Patrick Wall, the theory offers a physiological explanation for the previously observed effect of psychology on pain perception. Combining early concepts derived from the specificity theory and the peripheral pattern theory, the gate control theory is considered to be one of the most influential theories of pain. This theory provided a neural basis which reconciled the specificity and pattern theories -- and ultimately revolutionized pain research

I'm not pretending to b e unresponsive. i am responding with a counter to the idea of possessing capability is the same as delivering it to the aware person. Exceptions to that little nugget abound and kill the idea that subjective knowing is personal and private just because most all of us have the capability to experience whatever thing we often don't experience when it would be normally appropriate to do so.

So, no Speakpigeon you can't justify your claim that you know something just because you are a human who has the right equipment to do so. You can't generalize for yourself, for others or for humanity or any and all other species basically because living things are complex and capable of responding to situations other than just those on which you choose to focus.

BTW, just in case you thought you set a trap I never claimed one normally can't experience pain. I am saying that such claims are fruitless because exceptions are so monstrously present in and through every aspect of our experience. Reporting sense is no refuge for subjective knowing.

 

[Speakpigeon]

your claim that you know something

You can't generalize for yourself, for others or for humanity

These two items selected from the irrelevant verbiage show you absolutely don't get it.

I'm not claiming to know anything.

I'm not generalising my case to other people.

I am making an argument.

I can say I know pain when I am in pain and other people can decide for themselves whether they know pain when they are in pain. No amount of scientific data will change that.

You also haven't replied to my interpretation of your little story:

YYou presume one knows when one is in pain. One doesn't. My point is that there are those who don't feel pain who exhibit behavior as if they are in pain and are then tested and diagnosed with conditions where pain is an obvious aspect of their behavior.

So, again, that's a very interesting story. Basically, it means we have some people here with a split mind. One part knows pain because it experiences pain and this will be reflected in the behaviour of the person because this part of the mind happens to control said behaviour. The other part of the mind doesn't experience pain so doesn't know about it and so says he doesn't feel pain.
So, the part which is in pain knows pain. The part which doesn't know pain is not in pain. Just like I said.
EB

 

[fast]

Sorry, truths are just the statements of facts by someone who knows the facts.

I’d like to respond (and with good cheer).

First, i’d like to clarify a dividing distinction. The statement versus what the statement is about. We all make the distinction. If you, I, or anyone else make a statement, then the statement is a statement and not what the statement is about; likewise, what the statement is about is what the statement is about and not the statement itself.

Second, i’d like to highlight a helpful pointer by referring to statements as something being leftward. I’ll regard statements as being in the left hand or to the left. What statements are about (on the other hand, ha ha) will be regarded as being rightward—or belonging to the right or in the right hand.

Third, an illustration. Consider the statement “the cat is on the mat.” That is a statement, and as such, it’s something i’ll regard as belonging to the left. Notice that it’s mind-dependent. Where there is no mind, there is no statement. Or at least, where there is a statement, there was a mind—I say that for extreme examples of statements that somehow (maybe signage?) that outlives it’s creator. Either way, the point here is simply to distinguish the statement from what you call facts.

The fact (FACT, I say) that the cat is on the mat is an example of not the statement but rather what the statement is about. If you (yourself) were to articulate what I’ve written regarding the divide between A) statements and B) what statements are about), you might say instead: statements versus facts. So, while statements are on the left, what the statements are about and facts are rightward.

Of course, there’s a lot of playing around we could do, and though it’s not my intention to go into detail, I feel an acknowledgment should suffice. For instance, I can make a statement where what the statement is about is a statement. That’s fine and can potentially bring some confusion for those not paying attention to the all important divide, but it’s that divide I want to focus on.

You clearly place truths to the left, and that’s fine, I do too! If I make a statement and there’s a matching (or corresponding fact), then I’ve spoken a truth. The problem is that “truth” is ambiguous (has more than a single meaning), and it just so happens (and it’s here you begin to disagree with me) that the term has acceptable usage on both sides of the divide.

The implication is that while it is sometimes mind dependent and residing to the left, it’s a drifter and gets around. It can indeed hold up on the right and essentially be substituted as a fact-a mind independent fact. And to make matters even crazier, we are sometimes called upon to speak the facts—and even statements themselves will be regarded as facts, not just because making a truthful statement is a fact in and of itself but because “fact” too has become apart of the sea of ambiguity.

That said, although I appreciate your ability to keep them separate (what you call a statement vs what you call a fact), my disagreement is based not on an unacceptance of your stance you hold but a denial on the stance held by others when the usage is apart of our language.

PART TWO:
That darned addendum! Why in the world did you have to add, “who knows the facts?”

If I have no clue where the cat is and I say “the cat is not in the tree,” it’s the fact that cat is not in the tree but instead on the mat (not my knowledge or lack thereof) that makes my statement correspond with the current state of affairs.

 

[fromderinside]

<snip>

I am making an argument.

OK. Read my stuff as saying your argument is flawed. p/no-p problems.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Sorry, truths are just the statements of facts by someone who knows the facts.

I’d like to respond (and with good cheer).

First, i’d like to clarify a dividing distinction. The statement versus what the statement is about. We all make the distinction. If you, I, or anyone else make a statement, then the statement is a statement and not what the statement is about; likewise, what the statement is about is what the statement is about and not the statement itself.

So far, so good.

Second, i’d like to highlight a helpful pointer by referring to statements as something being leftward. I’ll regard statements as being in the left hand or to the left. What statements are about (on the other hand, ha ha) will be regarded as being rightward—or belonging to the right or in the right hand.

You yourself explain which this isn't helpful at all and even very confusing. A statement becomes a fact as soon as it is made and nothing is a statement unless something like a system both cognitive, linguistic and semantic makes it a statement. So, your "pointer" ends up having statements both on the left and on the right, which makes it not helpful.

And this is for example what happens when we claim that a statement is true. A claim is always a statement. So you can make statement B to claim that statement A is true. This is often used for emphasis for example when I say (B) "It is true that I know pain whenever I am in pain". Statement A, "I know pain whenever I am in pain", is true or false independently of statement B, but statement B is true only if statement A is true.

So, a statement is always a fact and it is always about another fact in that it affirms its reality (not its truth, its reality). So, at least, making a statement is one way to make a fact happens.

And of course, we make statements about imaginary facts all the time. As I see it, but it seems to be the default view among rational people at least, a statement is always a statement about an imaginary fact, which we call the purported fact. The purported fact is what we want to say is real and we claim it to be real through a statement.

Now some people recently, in the last 120 years, have invented a new notion, perfectly logical but entirely metaphysical. The reference of the statement. The reference of a statement is something like a metaphysically real fact. I'm not going into that because it's a muddle since nobody knows metaphysical facts if there is any. As I see it, but few rational people see it that way, we can do with only the notion of statement and the notion of fact. We've done well for hundred a civilised years without the notion of reference.

Isn't that clear enough?

Third, an illustration. Consider the statement “the cat is on the mat.” That is a statement, and as such, it’s something i’ll regard as belonging to the left. Notice that it’s mind-dependent. Where there is no mind, there is no statement. Or at least, where there is a statement, there was a mind—I say that for extreme examples of statements that somehow (maybe signage?) that outlives it’s creator. Either way, the point here is simply to distinguish the statement from what you call facts.

Well, you can't. A statement is also a fact. You say so yourself.

The fact (FACT, I say) that the cat is on the mat is an example of not the statement but rather what the statement is about. If you (yourself) were to articulate what I’ve written regarding the divide between A) statements and B) what statements are about), you might say instead: statements versus facts.

No. And I didn't say that. I was talking about truths, not statements. I was saying a truth is a statement of fact. I could have been more explicit saying a statement is a fact so that a truth, being a statement, is also a fact, but that wasn't my point.

So, while statements are on the left, what the statements are about and facts are rightward.

And you'd have statement also on the right, so both on the left and on the right. No exactly helpful.

The world is paved with good intentions, as we say in French when a good intention turns out to have rather bad consequences, as is often the case.

Of course, there’s a lot of playing around we could do, and though it’s not my intention to go into detail, I feel an acknowledgment should suffice. For instance, I can make a statement where what the statement is about is a statement. That’s fine and can potentially bring some confusion for those not paying attention to the all important divide, but it’s that divide I want to focus on.

There's a divide. There are facts that are statement and they are about other facts and there are facts which are not statements. What's difficult about that?

You clearly place truths to the left, and that’s fine, I do too!

Not quite since I don't use your "leftward" convention.

If I make a statement and there’s a matching (or corresponding fact), then I’ve spoken a truth. The problem is that “truth” is ambiguous (has more than a single meaning), and it just so happens (and it’s here you begin to disagree with me) that the term has acceptable usage on both sides of the divide.

I didn't say it is unacceptable. It's a fact of language that the word "truth" is usually used in the way I use it, so I shouldn't need to specify how I use it to help all the big mouths around here to sort out what I mean.
Like here:

Truth
1.
a. Conformity to fact or actuality: Does this story have any truth?
b. Reality; actuality: In truth, he was not qualified for the job.
c. The reality of a situation: The truth is, she respects your work.
2.
a. A statement proven to be or accepted as true: truths about nature.
b. Such statements considered as a group: researchers in pursuit of truth.
3. Sincerity; integrity: the truth of his intentions.
4. Fidelity to an original or standard: the truth of the copy.

Some people here have shown themselves to be confused as to the meaning of the word "truth" by mixing the usual mean with this second meaning, which is, as signalled here, normally used by theologians and philosophers, and then essentially doing religious metaphysics.

5.
a. Theology & Philosophy That which is considered to be the ultimate ground of reality.

So, it's funny to see hardcore materialists unwittingly use religious verbiage.

So, it's perfectly acceptable verbiage but I don't use it myself since there is already a perfectly good word to talk about whatever is "the ultimate ground of reality", which is the word "reality". Basically, I take the use of the word "truth" in this sense, a way for the Bishops to suggest they can talk about something other people don't even understand.

The implication is that while it is sometimes mind dependent and residing to the left, it’s a drifter and gets around. It can indeed hold up on the right and essentially be substituted as a fact-a mind independent fact. And to make matters even crazier, we are sometimes called upon to speak the facts—and even statements themselves will be regarded as facts, not just because making a truthful statement is a fact in and of itself but because “fact” too has become apart of the sea of ambiguity.

There is nothing ambiguous about a statement being itself a fact. Statements are recorded by the justice system, the police, whatever. What's confusing about that?

That said, although I appreciate your ability to keep them separate (what you call a statement vs what you call a fact),

Except I don't. A statement is a fact.

my disagreement is based not on an unacceptance of your stance you hold but a denial on the stance held by others when the usage is apart of our language.

I'm not rejecting the use of "truth" to mean something metaphysical but people doing it here don't even understand where this use comes from. And switching to this use in the middle of the thread without signalling that's what you're doing certainly shows you are confused about the topic at hand and bring confusion to the debate, again unnecessarily since we already have the word "reality".

PART TWO:
That darned addendum! Why in the world did you have to add, “who knows the facts?”

If I have no clue where the cat is and I say “the cat is not in the tree,” it’s the fact that cat is not in the tree but instead on the mat (not my knowledge or lack thereof) that makes my statement correspond with the current state of affairs.

I can only make a true statement of fact if I know the fact, simply because the word "fact" means something you know.

Fact
1. Knowledge or information based on real occurrences: an account based on fact; a blur of fact and fancy.
2.
a. Something demonstrated to exist or known to have existed: Genetic engineering is now a fact. That Chaucer was a real person is an undisputed fact.
b. A real occurrence; an event: had to prove the facts of the case.
c. Something believed to be true or real: a document laced with mistaken facts.
3. A thing that has been done, especially a crime: an accessory before the fact.
4. Law A conclusion drawn by a judge or jury from the evidence in a case: a finding of fact.

So, you can't make a statement of fact if you don't know it.

Although, of course, you can be mistaken in your belief that you've made a statement of fact.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

<snip>

I am making an argument.

OK. Read my stuff as saying your argument is flawed. p/no-p problems.

Right, you go on "ignore".
EB

 

[fromderinside]

Deck mate!

 

[Bomb#20]

What the devil are you on about? I used the word "truth" because it's the word you and fromderinside used in the posts I was replying to. What, you feel I ought to have read your mind and realized you'd suddenly start having a problem with it?

Sorry, truths are just the statements of facts by someone who knows the facts. There aren't any truth free floating without somebody knowing them, as well as the relevant fact.

So the fact that mammals evolved from reptiles is a fact, not a truth as you said here.

truth noun
\ˈtrüth \
plural truths\ˈtrüt͟hz, ˈtrüths \
Definition of truth (Entry 1 of 2)
1a(1) : the body of real things, events, and facts : ACTUALITY

(2) : the state of being the case : FACT
...​

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/truth

If fromderinside meant to be making some distinction between a truth and a fact when he asked for example of an enduring truth, he can clarify this point for us. If he does not, I'll presume he was speaking normal English like any other American, and giving him a "fact" satisfied his request for a "truth".

I can't read your mind. If you're not careful with the way you express yourself, or maybe if you're not to clear about what you mean, this will be your problem, not mine.

Where, by "not careful with the way you express yourself", you mean, "not expressing yourself in accordance with EB's dictates about what foreigners speaking the foreign language that's their native tongue mean by the words they use"?

When a criminal court is deciding whether a killing was negligence or murder, and is therefore looking into the question of whether the defendant knew the gun was loaded when he shot the deceased, the court will consider a witness saying he saw the defendant load the gun shortly before pulling the trigger to be relevant testimony. The fact that the defendant cannot possibly have had 0% probability of error on this point, because at the time he couldn't have completely ruled out the hypothesis that some mysterious stranger snuck into the room, chloroformed him, and unloaded the gun while he was temporarily blacked out, will not be considered a substantive reason to dismiss the witness's testimony. If "know" meant what you say it means, then courts would have to disregard all evidence as to who knew what.

Criminal courts don't pretend to know whether the suspect is guilty. They assess the overall plausibility of alternative scenarios. When they decide on the balance of probabilities that for example the suspect knew the gun was loaded, possibly on the evidence provided by a witness, they assert their belief that the suspect knew 100% the gun was loaded. The judge in effect, decides that the suspect was at the time of the murder in the same position as he is himself at the time of the trial as to whether the gun was loaded, i.e. that the gun was loaded is regarded by the judge as a fact. Knowledge 100%. The judge would say himself that it would be a fact that the gun had been loaded. The judge would think he himself knew that fact. The assertion is always that you know 100%. That's what knowledge means.

That is not an argument. That is nothing but a reassertion of your claim.

Nobody ever says, "I know this for a fact" for no reason. Nobody says, "I know this but maybe it's not true", or "there's a probability I'm wrong".

That's an argument. Thank you. But it's a weak inductive argument. The reason nobody says "I know this but maybe it's not true", or "there's a probability I'm wrong" is not because they're claiming the probability they're wrong is 0.0%. People don't make those hedges when they claim knowledge because they feel the probability they're wrong is so low it's not worth mentioning. Courts in the U.S. are explicit about this distinction -- the term of art used is "beyond reasonable doubt". They instruct juries that that's not the same thing as "beyond all possible doubt". People typically claim knowledge when they think their belief is beyond reasonable doubt.

So your weak inductive argument fails to outweigh the strong inductive argument I made. Testimony as to who knew what when would be inadmissible if "know" meant what you say.

Later, you may accept you were wrong and that's why you need to revise your story from "I know" to "I didn't know". The claim to knowledge would have been wrong but that doesn't make knowledge less than 100%. It just means people assert their knowledge as 100% and later may accept they were wrong about knowing. You couldn't be wrong about knowing if it was less than 100%. That's how belief works. If you say you believe something, it definitely means you accept you may, or even just about might, be wrong. And if proven wrong later, you don't have to change the story from "I believe" to "I didn't believe" like you have to do when admitting you were wrong about knowing.

That's an illogical deductive argument. When you find out you were wrong, the reason you have to change from "I knew" to "I didn't know", but you don't have to change from "I believe" to "I didn't believe", is not because you were wrong about the probability, but because there's a "true" condition on "know" and there's no "true" condition on "believe". Nobody is claiming knowledge is "justified belief". So yes, of course you could be wrong about knowing if it was less than 100%.

 

[Bomb#20]

It just happens that for a very long time we believed we knew the physical world. It's only recently, with science, that we have now more reasons to believe we now nothing about it.

Such as?

For example that we believe we are entirely biological organisms and that we can only interact with our environment through a perception system whose processes are entirely unconscious and therefore unknown to us except for the final representations we get within our mind of this environment. We know the representations, not what is represented. That's a fundamental fact about us. And whatever science we can do about our perception system cannot change this fact.
EB

Are you seriously under the impression that giving examples of things we can't know about the physical world qualifies as evidence we know nothing about it? That's illogical. You might as well try to prove man can never fly, because he has no wings, and try to prove it by presenting a list of wingless animals that can't fly.

This is getting painful to watch...

My example wasn't an example of "things we can't know about the physical world". It was an example of the evidence we have that we don't know things. It's an example of a good reason to believe we don't know and we can't know the physical world.

No, it's an example of a good reason to believe we don't know and we can't know some things about the physical world. Whether the representations our perception system builds for us are correct representations of what is represented is unknown to us, yes. But whether those perceptions are correct is just an example; it's not the sum total of what is available to be known about the world. There are other things available that your argument doesn't touch.

How the heck do you figure that the fundamental fact about us that we are entirely biological organisms and that we can only interact with our environment through a perception system whose processes are entirely unconscious qualifies as a reason that we can't know, for example, that the physical world contains processes that are unconscious to us? We don't need to know what's on the other end of our perception processes to know that much.

Or consider the example I gave you earlier. The physical world contains simulations. By systematic doubt, how do you figure we could be wrong about that? Either it contains the simulations we think we see from our perception system, or else the world is somehow simulating them.

So apply systematic doubt. What do you think we mean by "physical world" that you think excludes some of the "just any world out there" worlds? What possible world would qualify as non-physical?


Well, how do you expect to argue that some allegedly conceivable non-physical "just any world out there" world is logical if you won't describe it?

I can't exclude for example solipsism, the possibility that there would be nothing else but my conscious mind.

There you go. There's a particular scenario. So why do you think that isn't a physical world containing you? If solipsism is correct, you are the physical universe. Physics is the study of your conscious mind.

Or that there are different minds but only minds.

Cool, there's another particular scenario. In that possible world, physics is the study of minds.

That's not what people mean when using the words "mind" and "physical". See here, although you shouldn't need a dictionary:

Mind
1. The faculty of a human or other animal by which it thinks, perceives, feels, remembers, or desires: studying the relation between the brain and the mind.

3. Of or relating to material things: a wall that formed a physical barrier; the physical environment.
4. Of or relating to matter and energy or the sciences dealing with them, especially physics.

That me mean different things is clear to all of us. You're just wasting my time.

You are at liberty to walk away and enjoy your solipsistic perception of victory any time it pleases you to live in the echo chamber of your own mind. But what you're saying makes no sense. The physical world includes all manner of stuff that isn't matter: light, force fields, spacetime, wave functions. And the fact that physics deals with energy is not a property of the concept of physics; it's a contingent fact of the particular sort of world we've discovered we live in. The idea of energy didn't even exist until Leibniz figured it out, in around 1675. So do you think that means that if there had been no such thing, then what Copernicus and Galileo and Newton had been doing wouldn't have been physics? Do you think all the physicists who told Leibniz his theory was wrong were committing a category error, and should have known he was right by contemplating the meaning of words?

Consider the alternate world of Conway's Life. There's no matter or energy in that world, just bits. It's a world of pure information. Do you think if conscious beings evolved there, they wouldn't be able to do research, invent a science of physics, and discover the laws of their universe, because there are no material things or energy there for them to discover?

The reason people think physics isn't the study of minds is because we live in a world where mind is not fundamental. It's an emergent property of matter, here. But in the alternate possible worlds you postulated, mind is fundamental. In that world, what argument would there be for physics to be anything other than the study of mind?

You might as well claim that "water" means "H₂O", and therefore infer that if Cavendish had found out the stuff contained sodium instead of hydrogen then that would have meant we'd been wrong all along about whether the sea is full of water.

Anybody learning that his mind is all that exists wouldn't go on to reflect that his mind was the physical world after all. He would just think, well, the physical world just doesn't exist.
EB

How could anyone conceivably learn that his mind is all that exists? A person reaching that conclusion would simply be choosing to rename the parts of reality he doesn't have conscious access to "me" instead of "other". That's not learning. That's labeling.

 

[Speakpigeon]

When a criminal court is deciding whether a killing was negligence or murder, and is therefore looking into the question of whether the defendant knew the gun was loaded when he shot the deceased, the court will consider a witness saying he saw the defendant load the gun shortly before pulling the trigger to be relevant testimony. The fact that the defendant cannot possibly have had 0% probability of error on this point, because at the time he couldn't have completely ruled out the hypothesis that some mysterious stranger snuck into the room, chloroformed him, and unloaded the gun while he was temporarily blacked out, will not be considered a substantive reason to dismiss the witness's testimony. If "know" meant what you say it means, then courts would have to disregard all evidence as to who knew what.

Criminal courts don't pretend to know whether the suspect is guilty. They assess the overall plausibility of alternative scenarios. When they decide on the balance of probabilities that for example the suspect knew the gun was loaded, possibly on the evidence provided by a witness, they assert their belief that the suspect knew 100% the gun was loaded. The judge in effect, decides that the suspect was at the time of the murder in the same position as he is himself at the time of the trial as to whether the gun was loaded, i.e. that the gun was loaded is regarded by the judge as a fact. Knowledge 100%. The judge would say himself that it would be a fact that the gun had been loaded. The judge would think he himself knew that fact. The assertion is always that you know 100%. That's what knowledge means.

That is not an argument. That is nothing but a reassertion of your claim.

Nobody ever says, "I know this for a fact" for no reason. Nobody says, "I know this but maybe it's not true", or "there's a probability I'm wrong".

That's an argument. Thank you. But it's a weak inductive argument. The reason nobody says "I know this but maybe it's not true", or "there's a probability I'm wrong" is not because they're claiming the probability they're wrong is 0.0%. People don't make those hedges when they claim knowledge because they feel the probability they're wrong is so low it's not worth mentioning.

This is patently contrary to what we do. We constantly edge our bets. I'm not quite sure, I'm sure this is so but, I believe he's guilty but I may be wrong. So, your interpretation doesn't make sense.

We can all say I believe this guy is guilty but maybe I'm wrong. Nobody can say meaningfully I know this guy is guilty but maybe I'm wrong.

Courts in the U.S. are explicit about this distinction -- the term of art used is "beyond reasonable doubt". They instruct juries that that's not the same thing as "beyond all possible doubt". People typically claim knowledge when they think their belief is beyond reasonable doubt.

No sane judge would instruct the juries that they should know beyond any reasonable doubt that the person on trial is guilty because that wouldn't make sense because knowledge is already absolute certainty. But it makes sense to talk of believing beyond all reasonable doubt. This is why juries are not required to know that the guy is guilty. They are required to believe it beyond any reasonable doubt.

Thanks for this case example by the way, it's really good.

Later, you may accept you were wrong and that's why you need to revise your story from "I know" to "I didn't know". The claim to knowledge would have been wrong but that doesn't make knowledge less than 100%. It just means people assert their knowledge as 100% and later may accept they were wrong about knowing. You couldn't be wrong about knowing if it was less than 100%. That's how belief works. If you say you believe something, it definitely means you accept you may, or even just about might, be wrong. And if proven wrong later, you don't have to change the story from "I believe" to "I didn't believe" like you have to do when admitting you were wrong about knowing.

That's an illogical deductive argument. When you find out you were wrong, the reason you have to change from "I knew" to "I didn't know", but you don't have to change from "I believe" to "I didn't believe", is not because you were wrong about the probability, but because there's a "true" condition on "know" and there's no "true" condition on "believe". Nobody is claiming knowledge is "justified belief". So yes, of course you could be wrong about knowing if it was less than 100%.

Sure, and the truth condition is exactly what I am talking about. We say we know that P when we don't see any possibility that P would fail to be true. We say we believe that P whenever we have in mind at least one possibility that P would be false. So, I can only say I believe my sister is in London if I can think of at least one possibility that she could still be in Paris. But I can only say I know I am in Paris if I can't think of any other possibility. And yet, maybe I'm wrong. And later, I will accept I didn't know that I was in Paris and this merely because then I will be able to think that it was possible at the time that I was somewhere else than Paris and this again merely because then I would believe that I was in fact in London (even though maybe it would be false that I was in London). So, our professed knowledge about the world is in fact knowledge of our own state of mind. We say we know there is a tree there just because we indeed know the percept of a tree because we experience it and can't see any possibility that there wouldn't be this percept we take to be a tree. When claiming knowledge, we talk about our own state of mind because that's all we know. It's like saying "it's cold" as if you could know it was really cold out there when in fact cold is only something in your mind you experience, the quale of cold. We talk about it as if cold was out there in the world, the world which we think exist out there when all we know is the idea we have in our mind of a world that would be out there.

That's also why I can say, when in pain, that I know I am in pain, and not, I believe I am in pain. But I can only say I believe he is in pain since I can think of several possibilities that he is not in pain even though he looks like it.

I hope this time it will be good enough for you. Thank you to acknowledge I was correct all along if it's not to painful a thing to do.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

So apply systematic doubt. What do you think we mean by "physical world" that you think excludes some of the "just any world out there" worlds? What possible world would qualify as non-physical?


Well, how do you expect to argue that some allegedly conceivable non-physical "just any world out there" world is logical if you won't describe it?

I can't exclude for example solipsism, the possibility that there would be nothing else but my conscious mind.

There you go. There's a particular scenario. So why do you think that isn't a physical world containing you? If solipsism is correct, you are the physical universe. Physics is the study of your conscious mind.

Or that there are different minds but only minds.

Cool, there's another particular scenario. In that possible world, physics is the study of minds.

That's not what people mean when using the words "mind" and "physical". See here, although you shouldn't need a dictionary:

Mind
1. The faculty of a human or other animal by which it thinks, perceives, feels, remembers, or desires: studying the relation between the brain and the mind.

3. Of or relating to material things: a wall that formed a physical barrier; the physical environment.
4. Of or relating to matter and energy or the sciences dealing with them, especially physics.

That me mean different things is clear to all of us. You're just wasting my time.

You are at liberty to walk away and enjoy your solipsistic perception of victory any time it pleases you to live in the echo chamber of your own mind. But what you're saying makes no sense. The physical world includes all manner of stuff that isn't matter: light, force fields, spacetime, wave functions. And the fact that physics deals with energy is not a property of the concept of physics; it's a contingent fact of the particular sort of world we've discovered we live in. The idea of energy didn't even exist until Leibniz figured it out, in around 1675. So do you think that means that if there had been no such thing, then what Copernicus and Galileo and Newton had been doing wouldn't have been physics? Do you think all the physicists who told Leibniz his theory was wrong were committing a category error, and should have known he was right by contemplating the meaning of words?

Sorry, you can't do that. I was giving dictionary definitions that apply today. That people before Leibnitz couldn't even think of the word "energy" as referring to something in the physical world is irrelevant.

We're on a public forum. I'm not a scientist and I'm not any kind of specialist or expert. I use words as per dictionary definitions, those of today that is. Anybody can understand what I say provided he has a reasonable proficiency in English. So, if you are going to use a different dictionary as reference, and you always have to have one, then we're not going to understand each other. and frankly there's no use have this conversation. So, the physical world is whatever most people understand to be the physical world based on their everyday real experience, not on some theoretical physics textbook. You can have a theory as to what are the true characteristics of this thing people call the physical world, but you need to remember it's your theory, possibly that of many scientists and experts, but not that of most people who nonetheless use the expression "physical world" and understand each other.
EB