Is the mind material or non-material?

[fast]

But that's not exactly what I said when I said; ''Obviously fictional characters don't have actual traits like a actual person, but unlike the fictional character itself, Superman, Pinocchio, etc, the traits that are portrayed are actual human traits that reside within every living human being''

I clearly said that fictional characters don't have actual traits!

I know. Believe it or not, I'm paying very close attention.

 

[Speakpigeon]

An imaginary person is a kind of person. The kind of person it is is specified by the term "imaginary".
We need to take language seriously rather than deny the evidence just because it suits our pet theories.
EB

I do take language seriously, and I do believe "imaginary" is a denial term, and I believe an imaginary person is not a kind of person.

It is not taking language seriously to dismiss "imaginary" as a denial term. Sure it can be used to deny that something is 'real', i.e. material, but it's only a non-compulsory implication. Denial may come, with the linguistic context.

and I believe an imaginary person is not a kind of person.

Sure you believe that but you haven't provided any argument.

I think your argument would have to be external to language, i.e. mostly we can line up examples of imaginary things and ask whether they are the real thing. In the end the answer we will give will depend and be based on our beliefs. It's not taking language seriously.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Imaginary people are products of our imagination, and products of our imagination are not people. People are real, and things that are not real are imaginary, yet there is no actual thing, not even a thing to which we can point to and say it's imaginary. Do people have an imagination? Sure, but there is no entity to instantiate the term to which we might try to use to refer to that which is imaginary. And yes, it is a denial term. If you say of a purported something that it's imaginary, you are not saying 1) there is something and 2) the something is imaginary; instead, you're saying there is no such something at all.

in the context of the imagination imaginary people are people.

Excellent!
EB

 

[none]

do I get a cookie?

 

[Speakpigeon]

no true scotsman arguement. what makes a real person a real person?

Sorry, should have written "real life person". Not "real person".

A real life person is a thing that you, in principle, could meet in real life.

Why being sorry? The term "real person" is clear enough. It is opposed to "imaginary person".

Clearly, the term "person" is normally used to refer to a real person but that is normally made clear by the linguistic context or the context of speech (the situation). But in many contexts, the term "person" on its own will refer to an imaginary person, not a real one.

As to the no true scotsman thing, it's not the same thing. The term "real person" is not synonymous with "true person". "Real" here is in fact a misnomer since an imaginary person is just as real. Instead, it should be "material person", at least in the context of this argument where we are not going to consider the spiritual dimension of a person as people normally do when using the word "person". For example, "dead person" does not normally refer to a cadaver, a corpse etc. "Real person" ordinarily refers to a person which has a material body (whether or not it also has a spirit, a mind, a sould etc.)
EB

- - - Updated - - -

do I get a cookie?

Yeah, an imaginary one. I hope you have some imagination!
EB

 

[none]

here is some feces on the wall.
are imaginary persons legally obligated?
is it a crime if an imaginary person commits murder?

 

[Speakpigeon]

here is some feces on the wall.
are imaginary persons legally obligated?
is it a crime if an imaginary person commits murder?

Imaginary things are all subject to our imagination. There are not other constraints, or 'obligations' that we know of.

The situation is similar to that of the real world. We construe relations between real people, like legal obligations, yet these things don't stand the scrutiny of science. There is no 'real' (material) obligation or even constraints. These categories are all in our imagination. Sure, likely they correspond to material things, like, maybe, certain regularities of the material world, but they are themselves construct of our minds, ideas. And the criminal can walk away and the judge can let the criminal walk away. What obligation?
EB

 

[fast]

The lexical definition of the word "person" does not have a lexical meaning with a scope sufficient enough to include these non-existent entities (which isn't to say that a non-existent entity is a kind of entity, of course) that you refer to as imaginary people. Yes, we can disambiguate contexts by explaining what kind of things we are talking about when using ambiguous words; for instance I can qualify the word, "right" by contrasting moral rights with legal rights, and if you want to use the term 'imaginary person' and stipulate a meaning, that's fine, but lexical meanings are a function of how fluent speakers of a language collectively use a term, not to be confused with what people are trying to say, as what one may mean by any particular term has no bearing on it's actual meaning. Also, it would be highly advisable to dismiss this notion that imaginary people are somehow located amidst electrochemical brain activity. There is an unfortunate tendency for people to ascribe location to things that are without location, and it's particularly odd to ascribe location to things that clearly don't exist in any form or fashion.

 

[none]

The lexical definition of the word "person" does not have a lexical meaning with a scope sufficient enough to include these non-existent entities (which isn't to say that a non-existent entity is a kind of entity, of course) that you refer to as imaginary people. Yes, we can disambiguate contexts by explaining what kind of things we are talking about when using ambiguous words; for instance I can qualify the word, "right" by contrasting moral rights with legal rights, and if you want to use the term 'imaginary person' and stipulate a meaning, that's fine, but lexical meanings are a function of how fluent speakers of a language collectively use a term, not to be confused with what people are trying to say, as what one may mean by any particular term has no bearing on it's actual meaning. Also, it would be highly advisable to dismiss this notion that imaginary people are somehow located amidst electrochemical brain activity. There is an unfortunate tendency for people to ascribe location to things that are without location, and it's particularly odd to ascribe location to things that clearly don't exist in any form or fashion.

so there is no foundation for what you say here if imaginary people don't exist in any context...

 

[fast]

The lexical definition of the word "person" does not have a lexical meaning with a scope sufficient enough to include these non-existent entities (which isn't to say that a non-existent entity is a kind of entity, of course) that you refer to as imaginary people. Yes, we can disambiguate contexts by explaining what kind of things we are talking about when using ambiguous words; for instance I can qualify the word, "right" by contrasting moral rights with legal rights, and if you want to use the term 'imaginary person' and stipulate a meaning, that's fine, but lexical meanings are a function of how fluent speakers of a language collectively use a term, not to be confused with what people are trying to say, as what one may mean by any particular term has no bearing on it's actual meaning. Also, it would be highly advisable to dismiss this notion that imaginary people are somehow located amidst electrochemical brain activity. There is an unfortunate tendency for people to ascribe location to things that are without location, and it's particularly odd to ascribe location to things that clearly don't exist in any form or fashion.

so there is no foundation for what you say here if imaginary people don't exist in any context...

When we say Sally has an imaginary friend, we ought not think there is indeed a friend but that is merely imaginary, as there is no friend, but there is something she has, as context suggests (an imagination), so just because we're denying the existence of a friend, we ought not therefore hold the belief because of language structure that there is somehow a friend roaming within the brain of the child. The child may even ascribe characteristics to this so-called imaginary friend, but never do they therefore stand good as properties. Imaginary properties are not properties at all.

 

[Speakpigeon]

The lexical definition of the word "person" does not have a lexical meaning with a scope sufficient enough to include these non-existent entities

person
n.
9. A character or role, such as in a play; a guise:

ORLANDO - I take some joy to say you are, because I
would be talking of her.
ROSALIND - Well, in her person, I say — I will not have you.

Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act 4, Scene 1

EB

 

[fast]

person
n.
9. A character or role, such as in a play; a guise:

ORLANDO - I take some joy to say you are, because I
would be talking of her.
ROSALIND - Well, in her person, I say — I will not have you.

Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act 4, Scene 1

EB

Good answer.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Also, it would be highly advisable to dismiss this notion that imaginary people are somehow located amidst electrochemical brain activity.

I would be interested if you could quote the wretched soul who committed such a crime. Just curious.

There is an unfortunate tendency for people to ascribe location to things that are without location, and it's particularly odd to ascribe location to things that clearly don't exist in any form or fashion.

That's assuming you know these things don't have a location or don't exist. I think you don't know that. You unfortunately ascribe knowledge to yourself where there is no evidence that you have that particular knowledge.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

When we say Sally has an imaginary friend, we ought not think there is indeed a friend but that is merely imaginary, as there is no friend,

You are again short on argument. Why do we ought not to?

An imaginary friend is a friend of a sort.

Are you going to scold quantum physicists for talking about wave superposition? Why, waves can be seen at sea and no one ever saw waves of the kind theorised by quantum physicists!

we ought not therefore hold the belief because of language structure that there is somehow a friend roaming within the brain of the child.

Who suggested that? Just curious...
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

The lexical definition of the word "person" does not have a lexical meaning with a scope sufficient enough to include these non-existent entities <snip>
, but lexical meanings are a function of how fluent speakers of a language collectively use a term <snip>

So is it the case that any use of a word that does not comply with how fluent speakers collectively use it is wrong?
EB

 

[4321lynx]

The lexical definition of the word "person" does not have a lexical meaning with a scope sufficient enough to include these non-existent entities (which isn't to say that a non-existent entity is a kind of entity, of course) that you refer to as imaginary people. Yes, we can disambiguate contexts by explaining what kind of things we are talking about when using ambiguous words; for instance I can qualify the word, "right" by contrasting moral rights with legal rights, and if you want to use the term 'imaginary person' and stipulate a meaning, that's fine, but lexical meanings are a function of how fluent speakers of a language collectively use a term, not to be confused with what people are trying to say, as what one may mean by any particular term has no bearing on it's actual meaning. Also, it would be highly advisable to dismiss this notion that imaginary people are somehow located amidst electrochemical brain activity. There is an unfortunate tendency for people to ascribe location to things that are without location, and it's particularly odd to ascribe location to things that clearly don't exist in any form or fashion.

so there is no foundation for what you say here if imaginary people don't exist in any context...

When we say Sally has an imaginary friend, we ought not think there is indeed a friend but that is merely imaginary, as there is no friend, but there is something she has, as context suggests (an imagination), so just because we're denying the existence of a friend, we ought not therefore hold the belief because of language structure that there is somehow a friend roaming within the brain of the child. The child may even ascribe characteristics to this so-called imaginary friend, but never do they therefore stand good as properties. Imaginary properties are not properties at all.

So Sally has "an imagination".

Please explain how she came to have this imagination. In other words what is producing it?

1.Is it the electrochemical activity of Sally's brain?
2.Is it something else?
3.If so what is that "something else"?

Can your mind produce three short and clear answers to those three short and clear questions?

 

[fast]

The lexical definition of the word "person" does not have a lexical meaning with a scope sufficient enough to include these non-existent entities (which isn't to say that a non-existent entity is a kind of entity, of course) that you refer to as imaginary people. Yes, we can disambiguate contexts by explaining what kind of things we are talking about when using ambiguous words; for instance I can qualify the word, "right" by contrasting moral rights with legal rights, and if you want to use the term 'imaginary person' and stipulate a meaning, that's fine, but lexical meanings are a function of how fluent speakers of a language collectively use a term, not to be confused with what people are trying to say, as what one may mean by any particular term has no bearing on it's actual meaning. Also, it would be highly advisable to dismiss this notion that imaginary people are somehow located amidst electrochemical brain activity. There is an unfortunate tendency for people to ascribe location to things that are without location, and it's particularly odd to ascribe location to things that clearly don't exist in any form or fashion.

so there is no foundation for what you say here if imaginary people don't exist in any context...

When we say Sally has an imaginary friend, we ought not think there is indeed a friend but that is merely imaginary, as there is no friend, but there is something she has, as context suggests (an imagination), so just because we're denying the existence of a friend, we ought not therefore hold the belief because of language structure that there is somehow a friend roaming within the brain of the child. The child may even ascribe characteristics to this so-called imaginary friend, but never do they therefore stand good as properties. Imaginary properties are not properties at all.

So Sally has "an imagination".

Please explain how she came to have this imagination. In other words what is producing it?

1.Is it the electrochemical activity of Sally's brain?
2.Is it something else?
3.If so what is that "something else"?

Can your mind produce three short and clear answers to those three short and clear questions?

Number 1. By the way, I am answering your question, not my mind.

 

[fast]

The lexical definition of the word "person" does not have a lexical meaning with a scope sufficient enough to include these non-existent entities <snip>
, but lexical meanings are a function of how fluent speakers of a language collectively use a term <snip>

So is it the case that any use of a word that does not comply with how fluent speakers collectively use it is wrong?
EB

Not necessarily, but that is a good question. Any use of a word, as you qualify your question, doesn't necessarily entail a lexical usage, so a stipulative usage, for instance, wouldn't therefore be an incorrect use of a word simply because it doesn't accord with how a word is collectively used by fluent speakers of a language.

 

[fast]

An imaginary friend is a friend of a sort.

It has been said (although not by you) that anything can be a kind of thing, so if we're to use the word "kind" in such an extreme fashion, perhaps an imaginary person is a kind of person, as preposterous (or at least highly misleading) as I think such a claim is. Perhaps the term, "type" would be preferable for you?

People breath, or if that's too much to ask, then most people breath, but imaginary people don't breath, so imaginary people are not people. Oh wait, is your counterargument that they can take an imaginary breath? But wait, I said breath, that's different. Let me guess, an imaginary breath is a kind of breath. Not.

I'm being completely serious when I say that "imaginary" is a denial term. People do have an imagination, but there is nothing, absolutely nothing (no actual instantiatory material) to serve as a referent for any term meant to indicate the presence of something imaginary--hence, no properties, and oh my(!) please don't regard imaginary properties as something that exists, especially on the highly misguided notion that the physical processes that allow for imagination somehow, someway makes them identifiable.

 

[DBT]

By the way, I am answering your question, not my mind.

To be quite specific, it is an information processor called a ''brain'' that is gathering, storing and correlating information and answering questions through the medium of conscious response and self identity in the form of a poster who goes by the name of 'fast.'