Sorry, fast, but that article doesn't tell me anything about the nature of things non physical, thoughts, feelings, mind or anything else immaterial or non physical. Nor does the artice demonstrate that mind is in fact non physical.
The article is based on a set of undefined assumptions:
1 - That non physical things are not only possible, but exist.
2 - that something produced by physical process (a brain producing thoughts, etc), may be 'non physical. An assumption that is not based on evidence.
3 - that conscious thoughts, feelings and emotions (mind), must be non physical.
The proposition of non physical mind is stated, but not described or proven.
To say of something that it exists is to say of something that it has properties. For instance, the number three exists, and we know this because the number three has properties. An example of a property that the number three has is that it is odd. That's one of it properties that instantiates the numeral three which in turn refers to the number three.
In contrast, unicorns do not exist, for unicorns do not have properties. Unicorn statues exist, and a property they have is the depiction of an equine with a horn, but there are no worldly horn born equines to observe in nature to instantiate the term "unicorn" leaving the term still with a meaning but without a referent.
If there were unicorns, they would have properties we could identify in nature because they would be the kinds of things that could be observed in nature, but the properties of things like the number three do not therefore not exist simply because we cannot observe them in nature, and that is because they are not the kind of things that exist in nature. We shouldn't deny existence simply because there are no instances of them in nature...we should deny them when they have no properties. Both the mind and the number three are things that exist, and they both have properties, but because neither are composed of physical matter, we shouldn't expect to identify them in the same manner as we would something else that would be composed of physical matter had they existed.
The propensity for some to deny existence based on the absence of physical matter is not a mistake when the proposed object should be composed of physical matter if it exists, but when regarding abstract objects, we shouldn't be too quick to deny their existence when they don't manifest themselves in ways only physical objects would if they existed.
Does this clear anything up for you?