Jokes about prison rape on men? Not a fan.

[Angra Mainyu]

If I've left something out there, it's either because I agree, or because I need to think about it a bit more. I admit I'm struggling with the issues around 'objectivity', and you've made some very good, interesting and challenging points, but at this time I'm still a bit inclined to stick with 'mind-independent' for now. Saying something like "moral judgement about X qualifies as an objective moral fact because all normal, adult members of a species think it so" still feels like too big a hurdle, especially if the thing itself, X, is, in the end, non-moral by what I might call fully objective standards. And we can't say those sort of things about schizophrenia. We surely can't say either "the existence of schizophrenia qualifies as an objective physical fact because all normal, adult members of a species think it so" or "schizophrenia is, in the end, non-physical, by fully objective standards".

But who would say that "moral judgement about X qualifies as an objective moral fact because all normal, adult members of a species think it so"?
Rather, the idea would be that that provides evidence, not that it is objective because of that.

But aside from that, since you sticl with 'mind-independent' for now, your paragraph translates as follows:

If I've left something out there, it's either because I agree, or because I need to think about it a bit more. I admit I'm struggling with the issues around 'objectivity', and you've made some very good, interesting and challenging points, but at this time I'm still a bit inclined to stick with 'mind-independent' for now. Saying something like "moral judgement about X qualifies as a mind-independent moral fact because all normal, adult members of a species think it so" still feels like too big a hurdle, especially if the thing itself, X, is, in the end, non-moral by what I might call fully mind-independent standards. And we can't say those sort of things about schizophrenia. We surely can't say either "the existence of schizophrenia qualifies as a mind-independent physical fact because all normal, adult members of a species think it so" or "schizophrenia is, in the end, non-physical, by fully mind-independent standards".
​

That seems difficult to understand, but in any event, we surely can say that 'schizophrenia is mind-dependent' or - equivalently if 'objective'='mind-independent', then 'schizophrenia is not objective', because surely there is no schizophrenia without minds. For that matter, we can say that anger is mind-dependent, so it's not objective. But of course, in the usual sense of the words, there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether a person has schizophrenia or is angry, so the 'objective'='mind-independent' does not match the usual meaning of the words.

Even if you don't care about the usual meaning of the words for some reason, there is still a fact of the matter as to whether a person has schizophrenia, or is angry. Then why would there not be a fact of the matter as to whether a person is a bad person? After all, being non-objective in this particular sense of 'objective' is not relevant to the question of whether there is a fact of the matter.

 

[ruby sparks]

.....there is still a fact of the matter as to whether a person has schizophrenia, or is angry. Then why would there not be a fact of the matter as to whether a person is a bad person? After all, being non-objective in this particular sense of 'objective' is not relevant to the question of whether there is a fact of the matter.

Schizophrenia requires a mind (is mind-dependent in that sense) for its objective existence, yes. The corresponding fact about morality is that moral judgements objectively exist (this is also true, it seems, of all value judgements). Or to put it another way, let's say it is an objective fact that there is morality in the same way that it is an objective fact that there is schizophrenia.

But that does not seem to get us to being warranted to say that a particular moral value judgement is objectively right or wrong. Nor does it get us to whether retribution is the objectively right or wrong response. In other words, the objective existence of something in the mind does not necessarily mean that the subsequent claims made on its behalf are also objective facts.

 

[The AntiChris]

we surely can say that 'schizophrenia is mind-dependent' or - equivalently if 'objective'='mind-independent', then 'schizophrenia is not objective', because surely there is no schizophrenia without minds.

I find it difficult to believe that you really don't understand the sense in which 'mind independent' is used in the context of discussions about moral realism (i.e. independent of how we as individuals happen to think or feel).

 

[Angra Mainyu]

.....there is still a fact of the matter as to whether a person has schizophrenia, or is angry. Then why would there not be a fact of the matter as to whether a person is a bad person? After all, being non-objective in this particular sense of 'objective' is not relevant to the question of whether there is a fact of the matter.

Schizophrenia requires a mind (is mind-dependent in that sense) for its objective existence, yes. The corresponding fact about morality is that moral judgements objectively exist (this is also true, it seems, of all value judgements). Or to put it another way, let's say it is an objective fact that there is morality in the same way that it is an objective fact that there is schizophrenia.

But that does not seem to get us to being warranted to say that a particular moral value judgement is objectively right or wrong. Nor does it get us to whether retribution is the objectively right or wrong response. In other words, the objective existence of something in the mind does not necessarily mean that the subsequent claims made on its behalf are also objective facts.

But the objection was with the definition of 'objective' as 'mind-independent'. For example, you say

Schizophrenia requires a mind (is mind-dependent in that sense) for its objective existence, yes.

, going by the definition of 'objective=mind-independent', that sentence means

Schizophrenia requires a mind (is mind-dependent in that sense) for its mind-independent existence, yes.
​

but that does not work (because if it requires a mind, how would it be mind-independent? ).

And this one:

But that does not seem to get us to being warranted to say that a particular moral value judgement is objectively right or wrong.

would be

But that does not seem to get us to being warranted to say that a particular moral value judgement is mind-independently right or wrong​

That has the problem as above, and also the problem of what it would mean to be "mind-independently" right or wrong. And here again:

In other words, the objective existence of something in the mind does not necessarily mean that the subsequent claims made on its behalf are also objective facts.

That translates as

In other words, the mind-independent existence of something in the mind does not necessarily mean that the subsequent claims made on its behalf are also mind-indenpendent facts.
​

But "the mind-independent existence of something in the mind" is not understandable. I would suggest ditching the definition of 'objective' as 'mind-independent', or else explain what you mean by "mind-independent".

 

[Angra Mainyu]

we surely can say that 'schizophrenia is mind-dependent' or - equivalently if 'objective'='mind-independent', then 'schizophrenia is not objective', because surely there is no schizophrenia without minds.

I find it difficult to believe that you really don't understand the sense in which 'mind independent' is used in the context of discussions about moral realism (i.e. independent of how we as individuals happen to think or feel).

Well, in my experience, the use of 'mind-independent' in the context of discussions about moral realism is not at all settled; different authors seem to mean different things, miscommunication is frequent, and so on.

However, in this thread, ruby sparks offered the following definition, which one could use to understand his posts:

Literally the first dictionary definition google threw up for me for ‘objective’ was “not dependent on the mind for existence; actual". This is what I generally mean by ‘objective’ (and also ‘independent’). YMMV.

Since 'actual' and 'not dependent on the mind for existence' are very different things, I asked for clarification in another thread.

https://talkfreethought.org/showthr...purely-for-fun&p=828177&viewfull=1#post828177

With those caveats in place, the first thing we can say is that it is not, as far as we know, objectively or independently morally wrong, using the definition of either as meaning 'not dependent on the mind for existence; actual'.

Those are two very different things, so which definition is it?
I mean, you say 'not dependent on the mind for existence; actual', but 'not dependent on the mind for existence' and 'actual' are very different concepts. For example, psychosis, psychopathy, love, hatred, anger, are all very much actual, but all of them depend on a mind for their existence - as all mental states, properties, etc.

Ok I would run with 'not dependent on the mind for existence'.

So, the sense in which 'mind independent' is used in the context of this particular discussion is that of something that does not depend on the mind for its existence. And then schizophrenia is not objective. Maybe ruby sparks meant to say something else, so he could change the definition. No problem, but I'm going with the definitions as they are right now, in this context.

 

[The AntiChris]

we surely can say that 'schizophrenia is mind-dependent' or - equivalently if 'objective'='mind-independent', then 'schizophrenia is not objective', because surely there is no schizophrenia without minds.

I find it difficult to believe that you really don't understand the sense in which 'mind independent' is used in the context of discussions about moral realism (i.e. independent of how we as individuals happen to think or feel).

Well, in my experience, the use of 'mind-independent' in the context of discussions about moral realism is not at all settled; different authors seem to mean different things, miscommunication is frequent, and so on.

But why assume that your interlocutor may be using a sense of 'mind independence' that leads you to suggest that ruby sparks doesn't care about the usual meaning of words ("Even if you don't care about the usual meaning of the words for some reason, there is still a fact of the matter as to whether a person has schizophrenia,". This seems uncharitable and just a petty attempt to belittle your opponent's argument.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Well, in my experience, the use of 'mind-independent' in the context of discussions about moral realism is not at all settled; different authors seem to mean different things, miscommunication is frequent, and so on.

But why assume that your interlocutor may be using a sense of 'mind independence' that leads you to suggest that ruby sparks doesn't care about the usual meaning of words ("Even if you don't care about the usual meaning of the words for some reason, there is still a fact of the matter as to whether a person has schizophrenia,". This seems uncharitable and just a petty attempt to belittle your opponent's argument.

Oh, no, my assessment that he doesn't care about the usual meaning of the words is not based on the definition of 'objective' at all. Rather, in our exchanges in several threads, he has many times strongly criticized (to be mild) my arguments and myself on the basis that I try to stick to the usual meaning of the words. When I say "Even if you don't care about the usual meaning of the words for some reason", I'm simply taking his position into account.

 

[ruby sparks]

But "the mind-independent existence of something in the mind" is not understandable.

Bear in, er, mind, that we are not just doing mere physical existence here (such as for a human brain cortex, which either exists or not as a functioning, dependent part of the human mind, independently of the judgement of any human mind or minds as to whether or not it exists). We are not questioning whether moral judgements actually exist. The question here is whether or not they are objectively true. In other words, the relevant existence claims we are concerned about are those for objective truths, in this case regarding moral rightness or wrongness.

 

[ruby sparks]

But why assume that your interlocutor may be using a sense of 'mind independence' that leads you to suggest that ruby sparks doesn't care about the usual meaning of words ("Even if you don't care about the usual meaning of the words for some reason, there is still a fact of the matter as to whether a person has schizophrenia,". This seems uncharitable and just a petty attempt to belittle your opponent's argument.

Oh, no, my assessment that he doesn't care about the usual meaning of the words is not based on the definition of 'objective' at all. Rather, in our exchanges in several threads, he has many times strongly criticized (to be mild) my arguments and myself on the basis that I try to stick to the usual meaning of the words. When I say "Even if you don't care about the usual meaning of the words for some reason", I'm simply taking his position into account.

Well, it is not actually correct that I do not care about the usual meanings of words (or everyday language). I'm sure I often use words that way myself, and indeed find it useful to take such things into account, and I don't criticise you just for referring to them or using them. I criticise you because you seem to me to rely too heavily on them at times, as being a reliable basis for obtaining objective facts.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

But "the mind-independent existence of something in the mind" is not understandable.

Bear in, er, mind, that we are not just doing mere physical existence here (such as for a human brain cortex, which either exists or not as a functioning, dependent part of the human mind, independently of the judgement of any human mind or minds as to whether or not it exists). We are not questioning whether moral judgements actually exist. The question here is whether or not they are objectively true. In other words, the relevant existence claim we are concerned about is that of objective truths, in this case regarding moral rightness or wrongness.

Yes, I keep that in mind. See my objections.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

But why assume that your interlocutor may be using a sense of 'mind independence' that leads you to suggest that ruby sparks doesn't care about the usual meaning of words ("Even if you don't care about the usual meaning of the words for some reason, there is still a fact of the matter as to whether a person has schizophrenia,". This seems uncharitable and just a petty attempt to belittle your opponent's argument.

Oh, no, my assessment that he doesn't care about the usual meaning of the words is not based on the definition of 'objective' at all. Rather, in our exchanges in several threads, he has many times strongly criticized (to be mild) my arguments and myself on the basis that I try to stick to the usual meaning of the words. When I say "Even if you don't care about the usual meaning of the words for some reason", I'm simply taking his position into account.

Well, it is not actually correct that I do not care about the usual meanings of words (or everyday language). I'm sure I often use words that way myself, and indeed find it useful to take such things into account, and I don't criticise you just for referring to them or using them. I criticise you because you seem to me to rely too heavily on them at times, as being a reliable basis for obtaining objective facts.

What I mean is that you do not care in this context - i.e., you do not think it's proper to stick to the ordinary meaning of words when assessing whether something is objective, or morally wrong, etc.

 

[The AntiChris]

Well, in my experience, the use of 'mind-independent' in the context of discussions about moral realism is not at all settled; different authors seem to mean different things, miscommunication is frequent, and so on.

But why assume that your interlocutor may be using a sense of 'mind independence' that leads you to suggest that ruby sparks doesn't care about the usual meaning of words ("Even if you don't care about the usual meaning of the words for some reason, there is still a fact of the matter as to whether a person has schizophrenia,". This seems uncharitable and just a petty attempt to belittle your opponent's argument.

Oh, no, my assessment that he doesn't care about the usual meaning of the words is not based on the definition of 'objective' at all. Rather, in our exchanges in several threads, he has many times strongly criticized (to be mild) my arguments and myself on the basis that I try to stick to the usual meaning of the words. When I say "Even if you don't care about the usual meaning of the words for some reason", I'm simply taking his position into account.

That doesn't seem to reflect what was implied by what you said in post #61.

Your "assessment that he doesn't care about the usual meaning of the words" directly followed your uncharitable suggestion that his definition of objective would mean that mental illness did not objectively exist.

In any event this is a standard attempted 'gotcha' employed by moral realists in response to the antirealist 'mind independent' claim for objectivity (when what is clearly and commonly intended is that objective moral moral facts should be independent of how we as individuals happen to think or feel).

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Your "assessment that he doesn't care about the usual meaning of the words" directly followed your uncharitable suggestion that his definition of objective would mean that mental illness did not objectively exist.

That was not an uncharitable suggestion. That was an implication. It does imply that. And the "Even if you don't care about the usual meaning of the words for some reason.." was indeed meant to prevent an objection like the many ones I got before, that using the ordinary meaning of the words was improper in one way or another.

In any event this is a standard attempted 'gotcha' employed by moral realists in response to the antirealist 'mind independent' claim for objectivity (when what is clearly and commonly intended is that objective moral moral facts should be independent of how we as individuals happen to think or feel).

No, it is not a standard 'gotcha'. Rather, it is an attempt to focus on a meaning of 'objective' that is sensible in this context, by pointing to the consequences of some of the definitions that are offered.

 

[The AntiChris]

In any event this is a standard attempted 'gotcha' employed by moral realists in response to the antirealist 'mind independent' claim for objectivity (when what is clearly and commonly intended is that objective moral moral facts should be independent of how we as individuals happen to think or feel).

No, it is not a standard 'gotcha'. Rather, it is an attempt to focus on a meaning of 'objective' that is sensible in this context, by pointing to the consequences of some of the definitions that are offered.

The charitable and reasonable approach would be to assume your interlocutor was using a sensible interpretation of 'mind independence' at the outset.

As you'll be aware 'mind independent' in discussions of moral philosophy is most commonly used to mean independent of how we as individuals happen to think or feel which does not lead to the absurd conclusion that mental illness is not real/objective.

 

[ruby sparks]

But "the mind-independent existence of something in the mind" is not understandable.

Bear in, er, mind, that we are not just doing mere physical existence here (such as for a human brain cortex, which either exists or not as a functioning, dependent part of the human mind, independently of the judgement of any human mind or minds as to whether or not it exists). We are not questioning whether moral judgements actually exist. The question here is whether or not they are objectively true. In other words, the relevant existence claim we are concerned about is that of objective truths, in this case regarding moral rightness or wrongness.

Yes, I keep that in mind. See my objections.

I am not sure what you are referring to. I believe I already responded to your objections. The resolution seems to involve clarifying what is meant by 'mind-independent'*.

*ETA: or amending it perhaps. See below.

 

[ruby sparks]

.... 'mind independent' in discussions of moral philosophy is most commonly used to mean independent of how we as individuals happen to think or feel which does not lead to the absurd conclusion that mental illness is not real/objective.

I agree.

I wonder if, generally speaking in all of this, some lack of clarity arises from the word 'mind', possibly because of a persistent (intuitive) legacy of some form of dualism involving the brain and the mind as being separate (often involving supposed separate realms in fact, the physical and the non-physical)*.

Would it therefore be better to say, 'objective = thought-independent?' Would that usefully narrow down the sense in which the word is commonly used in moral philosophy? I am not sure it would, it is just a suggestion.

Perhaps 'objective = human judgement/attitude-independent'?

In any case, I think 'mind (or thought or human judgement/attitude)-independent existence = existence independent of how humans think or feel about it' (which is a shorter version of how you put it) seems pretty good.


* On which note, such beliefs (perhaps along with what I might call supernatural beliefs generally) seeming to be very common and intuitive, across human culture and history, I might cite them as yet another reason to be wary of relying on human intuitions as a basis for obtaining objective truths in general. As I see it, the idea that moral truths objectively exist merely because it might be a very common intuitive belief that they do, could be subject to similar potential problems.

 

[The AntiChris]

Would it therefore be better to say, 'objective = thought-independent?' Would that usefully narrow down the sense in which the word is commonly used in moral philosophy? I am not sure it would, it is just a suggestion.

I really don't think this is necessary. The terms 'mind independent' and 'mind independence' really are very common in the moral philosophy literature.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

The charitable and reasonable approach would be to assume your interlocutor was using a sensible interpretation of 'mind independence' at the outset.

The rational approach is to use the definition that one's interlocutor explicitly gives as evidence of how one's interlocutor defines the word. It is also rational to use the way they use the word, given the claims they make.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Would it therefore be better to say, 'objective = thought-independent?' Would that usefully narrow down the sense in which the word is commonly used in moral philosophy? I am not sure it would, it is just a suggestion.

I really don't think this is necessary. The terms 'mind independent' and 'mind independence' really are very common in the moral philosophy literature.

Take a look at the SEP entry on Moral Antirealism:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/

Of course, the notion of “mind-independence” is problematically indeterminate: Something may be mind-independent in one sense and mind-dependent in another. Cars, for example, are designed and constructed by creatures with minds, and yet in another sense cars are clearly concrete, non-subjective entities. Much careful disambiguation is needed before we know how to circumscribe non-objectivism, and different philosophers disambiguate differently. Many philosophers question whether the “non-objectivism clause” is a useful component of moral anti-realism at all. Many advocate views according to which moral properties are significantly mind-dependent but which they are loath to characterize as versions of moral anti-realism. There is a concern that including the non-objectivism clause threatens to make moral anti-realism trivially true, since there is little room for doubting that the moral status of actions usually (if not always) depends in some manner on mental phenomena such as the intentions with which the action was performed or the episodes or pleasure and pain that ensue from it. The issue will be discussed below, with no pretense made of settling the matter one way or the other.

It's a pretty contentious matter in philosophy.

 

[The AntiChris]

It's a pretty contentious matter in philosophy.

It really isn't (and even if it were, you'd still have no reason to assume the least charitable interpretation). Outside the rarefied heights of academic debate, the term 'mind independent' is commonly used to describe objective moral facts and is typically understood to mean independent of how we as individuals happen to think or feel.