The implication of what he says is vastly different from what he means.
How would you guess what he means other than from want he says? All you can say is that he is stretching the scope of particular words so that what he says becomes ambiguous, seeming to imply all sorts of things. But we don't know tat he doesn't mean those things, which is why people poke the inflated meaning to see if something stands out firm and clear. I don't see how we could go any different about it.
In his case, I think it's an error to base our interpretations of what he means based on what he says. He reminds me of Jim, a poster from a few years back. It takes strength of focus to unravel what is meant by what is said. Clearly, there are no rules that govern nature, as if to say there is an awareness by nature that abides by non-human rules derivative of nature. Even he would agree to that if not for the detachment from what is meant by what is said.
The key to fully grasping the truth of my declarations is in seeing the agreement that would ensue with neutrality of term usage. In simpler terms, he has a language of his own that (and for whatever reason) denies the implications we readily see that is implicit with the terms we use. To him, (for example) saying that nature abides by rules in no way, shape, or form conveys what we take for granted that such a statement makes, and strangely enough, it's not very much unlike how many people talk when discussing things like evolution, for instance. The gateway for further meaninful discussion isn't in showing the error of his ways through lexical understanding but rather lexical avoidance. We must find neautral ground with word-choice, as a meeting of the minds is otherwise an impasse of what might seem to some a quibbling on the meaning of words.
We certainly don't need to get hysterical about his use of the word "rules". What seems clear, though, is that he thinks that the existence of actual regularities in nature necessitate the existence of something else, prior to these regularities. Something that would explain these regularities. Something even that would cause these regularities. So the point is, what is the justification for his view? He doesn't say, apparently because he thinks it's obvious. He seems to be unable to conceive that nature is, or even merely appear, regular, all on its own. Let's ignore the case where it would just appear to be regular and assume it really is. So his point is that, in this case, something else, "rules", "a priori plan" or whatever, explains or causes the regularities to exist. As far as we know, it may well be the case that there is this something else, this "cause of regularities". We just don't know because what we observe are the regularities themselves, not their inferred conceivable cause. We also understand why we may be tempted to infer such a cause of regularities. Looking at a watch we infer a watchmaker. Looking at a trail we infer some animal we might be able to hunt and eat. So, survival explains our tendencies to see causes everywhere. But these are natural causes, i.e. causes that preceed their effects in time. There's no denying that it's useful to think in those terms, to unravel the criss-crossing of regularities and try to get our predictions right. But in the case of the causes of natural regularities, the causes themselves would have to be somehow outside nature and therefore outside time and space, so these would be a different kind of causes. So this is stretching our natural inclination to see causes everywhere well beyond its natural usefulness. It's essentially a metaphysical point. We will never know (presumably) and we certainly do not know now, either way, so to adopt a stance of certainty as he does would require justification, which is what we are missing here. We have no justification for the view that regularities necessitate something else, rules, a priori plan, whatever. And we also do not have anything like an explanation of how it would work, how these "rules", being outside nature, could nonetheless force nature to come to feature specific regularities. Or maybe we have to infer the existence of yet something else to explain this. Basically, inferring these causes of regularities would require that we also infer a new dimension where this explanatory mechanism would operate. Then nature as we think of it now would just be a part of a larger reality. I'm not sure why there would be a need then to stop there and not require yet another dimension with meta-rules or something, and repeat ad infinitum, which would be a very cumbersome explanation. Or turn to God of course, who is supposed to be self-explaining. But if we can conceive of something, God, as self-explaining, why not cut the middle man and accept that nature could be self-explaining to. Something has to be, obviously. So, is there any good reason that nature couldn't be self-explaining (I wouldn't say self-caused here)?
EB