Laws of Nature

[fromderinside]

Folks,

Language might express 'laws' but I can't see how it has diddly squat to do with our observations of patterns in nature. Or maybe "Look there's a pattern! Oh no, it's changed to another pattern."

Alex.

Its communicating the laws that seems to be at issue. Communication is an important aspect of a scientist's study of patterns. Fortunately we've developed math as a means to that end. When communicating science that doesn't have a math and when philosophers try to discuss what scientists do also makes language a problem.

One might say a scientist has a problem trying to make it clear she has abstracted the mechanics and dynamics of a pattern so others may reproduce the conditions either verifying or falsifying her results.

 

[untermensche]

Folks,

Language might express 'laws' but I can't see how it has diddly squat to do with our observations of patterns in nature. Or maybe "Look there's a pattern! Oh no, it's changed to another pattern."

Alex.

So if I had a cannon and wanted to hit something with it I would have trouble because the patterns are always changing?

 

[fast]

We were talking about the question of whether terms do or do not refer, not whether the idiotic expression "referring term" is legit.

It's not an idiotic expression. Moving on: As to the question, yes, they do refer. Not all of them. Some of them. The term, "cat", for example, and of course, does refer, and what it refers to is the class of all cats. A word's reference (if it has one, and many do) is distinct from it's meaning, but in cases where a word refers, it's reference is tied to its meaning. Oftentimes, people utterly confuse reference with meaning and I find myself pointing out the distinction, but I haven't spotted that mistake from you, but then again, we've barely glossed over the topic. Seeing as how you are persistent in your mistake, let me ask you this: do you think a word has a meaning independent of your use of it? Do you even think words have meaning? Denote meaning? Please, because if you get these questions wrong, the more complicated issue of the question (as you put it) is going to need to be circumvented, as the overarching issue of what the term, "laws of nature" refers to can be broached with careful hands avoiding the cumbersome underlying issues of what terms can and can't do. For instance, if you believe words don't refer, I can ask do you believe you can refer with words. Interestingly enough, on that very point, you have said that people believe they can, but are you suggesting they are mistaken in their belief? If we try to bypass these points of conflict, we might make some headway.

 

[untermensche]

The term, "cat", for example, and of course, does refer, and what it refers to is the class of all cats.

That may be a common belief but it is a disputed belief.

Some say words refer to mental constructions, not actual objects in the world.

We have a mental construction of "cat" based on the experience of cats and this mental construct can grow and change over time.

But this is a minority opinion in linguistics today.

 

[fast]

The term, "cat", for example, and of course, does refer, and what it refers to is the class of all cats.

That may be a common belief but it is a disputed belief.

Some say words refer to mental constructions, not actual objects in the world.

We have a mental construction of "cat" based on the experience of cats and this mental construct can grow and change over time.

But this is a minority opinion in linguistics today.

There is the silly argument that we cannot truly know about the world around us because we are only privy to our perceptions of the world around us, leaving any differences between our perceptions and what our perceptions are perceptions of as the basis for distorted knowledge. This percept (or mental construction), however, should be held in the same vein as we do when making the distinctions between (oh say) a dog and the idea of a dog. Kill the dog and the idea remains. Thinking the word, "dog" refers to a mental construction is as silly as thinking "the idea of a dog" doesn't.

 

[untermensche]

That may be a common belief but it is a disputed belief.

Some say words refer to mental constructions, not actual objects in the world.

We have a mental construction of "cat" based on the experience of cats and this mental construct can grow and change over time.

But this is a minority opinion in linguistics today.

There is the silly argument that we cannot truly know about the world around us because we are only privy to our perceptions of the world around us, leaving any differences between our perceptions and what our perceptions are perceptions of as the basis for distorted knowledge. This percept (or mental construction), however, should be held in the same vein as we do when making the distinctions between (oh say) a dog and the idea of a dog. Kill the dog and the idea remains. Thinking the word, "dog" refers to a mental construction is as silly as thinking "the idea of a dog" doesn't.

This is a position specific to human language, not to human perception.

We know the dog by our perception of it, but obviously what a "dog" is according to our perception is many different things. To say they are all the same thing requires conceptions like "species".

 

[fromderinside]

Folks,

Language might express 'laws' but I can't see how it has diddly squat to do with our observations of patterns in nature. Or maybe "Look there's a pattern! Oh no, it's changed to another pattern."

Alex.

So if I had a cannon and wanted to hit something with it I would have trouble because the patterns are always changing?

No because

One might say a scientist has a problem trying to make it clear she has abstracted the mechanics and dynamics of a pattern so others may reproduce the conditions either verifying or falsifying her results.

 

[fromderinside]

There is the silly argument that we cannot truly know about the world around us because we are only privy to our perceptions of the world around us, leaving any differences between our perceptions and what our perceptions are perceptions of as the basis for distorted knowledge. This percept (or mental construction), however, should be held in the same vein as we do when making the distinctions between (oh say) a dog and the idea of a dog. Kill the dog and the idea remains. Thinking the word, "dog" refers to a mental construction is as silly as thinking "the idea of a dog" doesn't.

This is a position specific to human language, not to human perception.

We know the dog by our perception of it, but obviously what a "dog" is according to our perception is many different things. To say they are all the same thing requires conceptions like "species".

We infer the dog through our perception of the object dog because it matches our memory tagged dog which refers to collected perceptions cataloged as 'dog' from which our present attending finds one that matches one nearly the one we are recently currently perceiving. Of course we have intervened with abstractions memory, attending, tag, and perception to produce the preceding sentence as our attempt to 'explain' processes, another abstraction, which we believe humans use to get the recognizing, another intervening abstraction, done. What is really taking place involves complicated chemical, physical. operations taking place in the brain. Communicating involves using whichever of the above forms of abstraction leads to communicating understandable code transmitted between individuals (bunch more abstractions which are also involved in the processing and brain activity (still more abstractions)).

 

[untermensche]

This is a position specific to human language, not to human perception.

We know the dog by our perception of it, but obviously what a "dog" is according to our perception is many different things. To say they are all the same thing requires conceptions like "species".

We infer the dog through our perception of the object dog because it matches our memory tagged dog

We attach a human label to a perception. That is a word.

Not a label attached to some object in the world.

 

[fromderinside]

We infer the dog through our perception of the object dog because it matches our memory tagged dog

We attach a human label to a perception. That is a word.Not a label attached to some object in the world.

Depends on the way one uses the term. If one stimulates the language cortex at a point where one gets a 'dog' utterance, one also gets subcategories such as name, species, physical and social characterizations uttered with continued stimulation. Seems the brain is using categorical processes here. Dog is an uttered word and it is a label under which parts of the abstraction 'dog' are also accessible in the brain.

 

[untermensche]

We attach a human label to a perception. That is a word.Not a label attached to some object in the world.

Depends on the way one uses the term. If one stimulates the language cortex at a point where one gets a 'dog' utterance, one also gets subcategories such as name, species, physical and social characterizations uttered with continued stimulation. Seems the brain is using categorical processes here. Dog is an uttered word and it is a label under which parts of the abstraction 'dog' are also accessible in the brain.

This just reinforces the notion that words do not refer to objects in the world.

A person can stimulate a point and get a dog utterance without any outside help.

And with that dog utterance a whole lot of close connections to that utterance are stimulated as well in the mind.

 

[fromderinside]

Depends on the way one uses the term. If one stimulates the language cortex at a point where one gets a 'dog' utterance, one also gets subcategories such as name, species, physical and social characterizations uttered with continued stimulation. Seems the brain is using categorical processes here. Dog is an uttered word and it is a label under which parts of the abstraction 'dog' are also accessible in the brain.

This just reinforces the notion that words do not refer to objects in the world.

A person can stimulate a point and get a dog utterance without any outside help.

And with that dog utterance a whole lot of close connections to that utterance are stimulated as well in the mind.

Eh?

It is another person who is stimulating. That is outside help.

If the object's characteristics had not been encoded there would be no utterance, no expansion on the object, from the subject. There would be no word for the object itself.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Interesting. We are talking laws of nature aren't we? Such being the case wouldn't one assume we are talking about laws of nature, not about what Newton thought he was talking about? Even if we are talking about what Newton thought I'm quite sure Newton wasn't interested in laws of nature.

In fact he actually wrote "I do not feign (frame) hypotheses"

The whole quote:

I have not as yet been able to discover the reason for these properties of gravity from phenomena, and I do not feign hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction.

So why don't we just keep it our discussion about laws of nature by not bringing the sentiments of others into it. Obviously Newton was referring to model building (see bolded).

Sorry, I'm lost about your logic here.


You are saying "model building" but contrary to what you suggest there's no indication in your quote that's what he had exclusively in mind. Sure he had to start with a model but your quote doesn't show he didn't believe in the end it expressed a law of nature.

All he was saying there was that he didn't pretend to understand why gravity existed. In other words, he admitted not knowing of a law of nature that would have explained gravity (or caused gravity to exist). All he could offer was gravity itself and the law of gravitation as explaining the movements of planets. I don't see how it would be possible to conceive of this law of gravitation somehow as not a law of nature.e
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

We were talking about the question of whether terms do or do not refer, not whether the idiotic expression "referring term" is legit.

It's not an idiotic expression. Moving on: As to the question, yes, they do refer. Not all of them. Some of them. The term, "cat", for example, and of course, does refer, and what it refers to is the class of all cats.

We all use the word "cat" to refer to some cat but that we all do doesn't make it true that a cat is thus referred to ever.

A word's reference (if it has one, and many do) is distinct from it's meaning, but in cases where a word refers, it's reference is tied to its meaning.

This is so vague a statement that it could be true or false depending on how you interpret it. You may want to sharpen the language of it.

Oftentimes, people utterly confuse reference with meaning and I find myself pointing out the distinction, but I haven't spotted that mistake from you, but then again, we've barely glossed over the topic.

You are wrong here. The reality is that some people, mostly philosophers, since Frege I guess, see reference and meaning as distinct. Most people, mostly not philosophers, don't see it that way, i.e. what they mean by a word is what they are referring to when they use the word. I can't see how that would be necessary wrong.

In other word, you are assuming philosophers are correct, with Frege, yet you haven't shown how they would be correct.

Seeing as how you are persistent in your mistake, let me ask you this: do you think a word has a meaning independent of your use of it? Do you even think words have meaning?

Words don't have meaning. I think I already told you that very clearly. If you can't remember my position there's no point having this conversation.

Denote meaning? Please, because if you get these questions wrong, the more complicated issue of the question (as you put it) is going to need to be circumvented, as the overarching issue of what the term, "laws of nature" refers to can be broached with careful hands avoiding the cumbersome underlying issues of what terms can and can't do. For instance, if you believe words don't refer, I can ask do you believe you can refer with words. Interestingly enough, on that very point, you have said that people believe they can, but are you suggesting they are mistaken in their belief? If we try to bypass these points of conflict, we might make some headway.

That's a lot of words just to say we disagree. I know we do. I'm just saying you don't have any indication that your views on this point are correct. You are merely parroting what philosophers usually say on the subject and they don't have evidence either.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

That may be a common belief but it is a disputed belief.

Some say words refer to mental constructions, not actual objects in the world.

We have a mental construction of "cat" based on the experience of cats and this mental construct can grow and change over time.

But this is a minority opinion in linguistics today.

There is the silly argument that we cannot truly know about the world around us because we are only privy to our perceptions of the world around us, leaving any differences between our perceptions and what our perceptions are perceptions of as the basis for distorted knowledge.

How is that a silly argument? You may want to believe it's wrong, like most philosophers do, but I have yet to see any convincing counterargument.

This percept (or mental construction), however, should be held in the same vein as we do when making the distinctions between (oh say) a dog and the idea of a dog. Kill the dog and the idea remains. Thinking the word, "dog" refers to a mental construction is as silly as thinking "the idea of a dog" doesn't.

Is that all you have to support your claim of the "silly argument"? Broadly, you reason from the majority view and you conclude the majority view is right. That's not the way to do it. Start from the minority view, if you understand it, and show it leads to some contradiction.
EB

 

[untermensche]

This just reinforces the notion that words do not refer to objects in the world.

A person can stimulate a point and get a dog utterance without any outside help.

And with that dog utterance a whole lot of close connections to that utterance are stimulated as well in the mind.

Eh?

It is another person who is stimulating. That is outside help.

If the object's characteristics had not been encoded there would be no utterance, no expansion on the object, from the subject. There would be no word for the object itself.

What I meant by a person stimulating a point to give a dog utterance is sometimes just referred to as a person saying the word "dog".

But in your mind something different happens when you say dog than when I say dog because we each have different conceptions and nearby or related conceptions.

 

[fromderinside]

Eh?

It is another person who is stimulating. That is outside help.

If the object's characteristics had not been encoded there would be no utterance, no expansion on the object, from the subject. There would be no word for the object itself.

What I meant by a person stimulating a point to give a dog utterance is sometimes just referred to as a person saying the word "dog".

But in your mind something different happens when you say dog than when I say dog because we each have different conceptions and nearby or related conceptions.

My statement covered that. What you encode and what I encode are different yet be both use the label 'dog' to recover appropriate experiences,

 

[untermensche]

What I meant by a person stimulating a point to give a dog utterance is sometimes just referred to as a person saying the word "dog".

But in your mind something different happens when you say dog than when I say dog because we each have different conceptions and nearby or related conceptions.

My statement covered that. What you encode and what I encode are different yet be both use the label 'dog' to recover appropriate experiences,

There doesn't seem to be disagreement.

Words refer to some nebulous and ever-changing conceptual "cloud" in the mind (brain), not to objects in the world.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Words refer to some nebulous and ever-changing conceptual "cloud" in the mind (brain), not to objects in the world.

Absolutely.

We use words to communicate about our ideas.

And I would say that it's pretty obvious unless the world be totally different from what most of us believe.

Which is still a possibility.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

We use words to communicate about our ideas.


EB

That's not very lawful is it. I mean ideas are 'creations of the mind' are they not? I have great difficulty reconciling order and organization with creativity implied in the creation of mind sentiment. That sentiment presumes origination with one, but, fails to explain how that one comes to be an originator. Ideas seem to be an invention of a self-centric rationalization giving meaning before the understanding there is a demonstrable physical explanation for why and how things behave in the world.

I take a more deterministic view on laws of nature. They are laws because they reflect order and organization in nature. Today we have before us measured and repeatable evidence for a theory of the physical world that both explains and provides rules for measurement of that world including the behavior of the human organism. This point of view becomes all the more meaningful as the result of recent insights demonstrating the superiority of, tendency toward dominance by, efficient organized systems in a thermodynamic world as rationale for the inevitability of such as life and self organizing systems as a law of organization.

Back to the nut. For me ideas are the result of plasticity and learning in biological beings expressed as propositions based on what has been experienced and the current circumstances in which one finds oneself. Forming such are due to development of associations from what is at hand to the nervous system, the basic principle of nervous system organizing, as my psychologist training informs me.

The discussion is begun. I have much to explain to counter those who hold the self evidence of mind against that of an orderly physical universe not created by some knowing thing in which a being exists that has capability to divine and communicate it's own design. However since the opposing position has little material evidence to bolster it beyond self evidence I am confident a material evidence based deterministic position will prevail.