Laws of Nature

[fast]

It is possible that things are so hard to explain because language is alive. All concepts in physical understanding like light and gravity, as well as cognitive and communicative things like language... alive. They're alive and they do their thing to confuse consciousness (another living thing) into believing the things that appear to transpire are actually transpiring. The main purpose of all living things could be convincing other living things that reality is occurring, yet some living things aren't aware of it.

Regarding language as alive is a bit too metaphorical for my taste, but I feel ya.

As to concepts, I'd argue that light and gravity are not concepts. Concepts and what concepts are concepts of are often (make that, very often) confused. To illustrate, let me start with a basic example. Consider two very different things: 1) a statue of a cat and 2) an actual living breathing cat. If I put both in a room and ask you to point to the first thing, I bet you would have no trouble, but never think (not even for a moment) that the thing to which you pointed to is a type of cat--it's a type of statue. The thing you pointed to is not a cat at all. Cats are animals. Statues are not animals. Pretty simple huh, but the simplicity can be maintained when talking about concepts if one makes an effort to regard things for what they actually are and not confuse concepts with what concepts are concepts of. To illustrate, let's add a third thing to the room.

In this room, we have 1) a statue of a cat, 2) a cat, and 3) a five foot two inch blonde who loves cats. She has a mental concept of what a cat is. Let's suppose the cat leaves the room. The concept (that mental concept) did not leave the room, so let's not confuse a) someone's' mental concept of a cat and b) a cat. The former is a mental phenomenon--something derivative of brain activity. The latter is an animal.

Light and gravity are not mental phenomenon. Yes, one may very well have a mental concept of what light is, but light (like the cat) is something that exists despite the development of our mental concepts.

 

[another1]

I understand that actually. Applying the reasoning you laid out doesn't change how I perceive reality though. I think all things construed are concepts because everything is an imagined conceptualization. All things thought are things which are concepts, which are things as well, regardless of how particularized they may be. I'm a concept. I'm the concept of a person, and the concept of me being a person, is a concept. The concept of my being a person being a concept, too, is a concept. I think that Ideas, the idea of ideas, and the things the ideas are, are concepts. I think that because in my model of reality everything is imagined. That makes things seem vague and childishly simple, but I think that is what they are. I don't see any difference in anything at all. If blonde women sitting on statues while petting a cat was a cosplay fad, the fad would be a thing; the cat would be a thing; the woman would be a thing; the statue would be a thing, and the things would all be concepts. The concepts would all be things, too. I can't make any distinction while holding on to the concept that life is completely imagined. They're all concepts with varying animation techniques that make them appear in varying ways to my minds processor. I do see that describing things can be done more efficiently using certain thinking and language techniques but at the base of reality there seems to be no difference in anything at all. Not an argument here, just personal observations.

 

[fast]

I understand that actually. Applying the reasoning you laid out doesn't change how I perceive reality though. I think all things construed are concepts because everything is an imagined conceptualization. All things thought are things which are concepts, which are things as well, regardless of how particularized they may be. I'm a concept. I'm the concept of a person, and the concept of me being a person, is a concept. The concept of my being a person being a concept, too, is a concept. I think that Ideas, the idea of ideas, and the things the ideas are, are concepts. I think that because in my model of reality everything is imagined. That makes things seem vague and childishly simple, but I think that is what they are. I don't see any difference in anything at all. If blonde women sitting on statues while petting a cat was a cosplay fad, the fad would be a thing; the cat would be a thing; the woman would be a thing; the statue would be a thing, and the things would all be concepts. The concepts would all be things, too. I can't make any distinction while holding on to the concept that life is completely imagined. They're all concepts with varying animation techniques that make them appear in varying ways to my minds processor. I do see that describing things can be done more efficiently using certain thinking and language techniques but at the base of reality there seems to be no difference in anything at all. Not an argument here, just personal observations.

Some say that we cannot sense that which is real directly. They say we can only directly sense what they dub as our percepts. In essence, there is a barrier of sorts, between our electrochemical processes of the brain and the physical events of the outside world. What we are privy to is limited to (so one might say) the inner percepts that develop, keeping us from directly sensing the events responsible for the percepts. I'm sure I could speak on this in greater depth, but I don't want to divert attention quite that far from the thread's intended purpose. Interesting stuff though.

 

[another1]

Wish I knew how to make a point more scientific and smart sounding. I should hire you to be my translator sometime.
Anyhow, language is a living, breathing, decision making and mid f**king entity in my opinion. It transforms and it is more than meets the eys, the monster we're sketching out. It always ends up with confusion and more words. Our pets may be spying on us. Forgot to mention that aspect of the theory. When are we publishing? Jk, thank you for being kind and interesting.

 

[fast]

Wish I knew how to make a point more scientific and smart sounding. I should hire you to be my translator sometime.
Anyhow, language is a living, breathing, decision making and mid f**king entity in my opinion. It transforms and it is more than meets the eys, the monster we're sketching out. It always ends up with confusion and more words. Our pets may be spying on us. Forgot to mention that aspect of the theory. When are we publishing? Jk, thank you for being kind and interesting.

Even if (if, I say) language is breathing (as you say), I'm not so sure you hold an opinion that language is breathing--not because you don't (perhaps) hold the belief that language is breathing but rather because such a matter comes across to me as being a matter of fact --a factual matter. The tagging qualifier that it's in your opinion doesn't therefore make it an opinion. For example, if I say: "7+3=22," then the truth of the matter is matter of fact; hence, it's a proposition that is either true or not, so to tag on the "in my opinion" seems to confuse matters of fact with matters of opinion; the confusion would manifest should I say, "7+3=22 in my opinion." A belief it might be (be it one that is true or one that is false), but be it an opinion, it does not seem to me.

 

[fast]

Our pets may be spying on us.

That is false. It is not true that our pets may be spying on us. It is true, however, that our pets might be spying on us. If you're at work, it might be the case that your house is on fire, but it's not therefore true that your house may be on fire. If you have some actual reason to think your neighbors house is on fire, then you're justified in making the claim that his house may be on fire, but in the face of mere possibility, no justification exists for making the claim.

To put it another way, yes, it's possible that our pets might be spying on us, so it's perfectly legitimate to make the claim that our pets might be spying on us, but escalating the claim from might to may (or mere possibility to an actual probability exceeding mere possibility) is not justified with no other actual reason for thinking so.

"May" does express possibility, but it's often reserved for at least some minimal level of plausibility. Mere possibility lacks reason to act. Yes, my car might have been stolen in the last few minutes, but I'm not worried, for the mere logical possibility does nothing to get me up to check.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Words don't mean or refer. Instead, we use them to mean.

I can most certainly appreciate where you're coming from with that. I once came close to thinking that myself. What talented creatures they must be (those words) I used to self-sarcastically ponder, but once I accepted that it's acceptably apart of the range of language to couch our discussions as if words have power, it's easier to accept that it is not therefore false (since it is indeed apart of language) to consider true that (oh say) words have definitions, meaning, reference, etc--they do because we (in essence) say they do--it's the function we bestow upon them.

To illustrate, consider the proposition, "words denote meaning." It's neutral. It's not to imbue them with skill, and it's not to personify them as engaging in action. It's not as if they are 'doing' something. To counter argue that words don't denote meaning but instead we denote meaning with words is to presume personification. That's not what's going on when we say that words refer. It's not to imply that words are actually doing something, as if they are making conscious decisions to act. It's apart of language to couch words as having power.

I broadly agree with this as far as everyday use is concerned. I myself say on occasions that this or that word means something or other. Yet, as soon as you use language to address philosophical issues, it becomes problematic to follow non-philosophical usage. We would have the problem of prior assumptions and possible contradiction in terms as soon as the issue of the relation between words and meaning becomes central to the topic discussed.

For example, somebody might want to say that the expression "the laws of nature" refers to the laws of nature.
EB

 

[fast]

I broadly agree with this

thank you

For example, somebody might want to say that the expression "the laws of nature" refers to the laws of nature.
EB

Well, yeah, it does, or if you prefer, we refer to the laws of nature with the term, "laws of nature." Or even more specifically, the fluent users of our language collectively refer to the laws of nature (even when individuals don't reference accordingly) when using the term, "laws of nature."

What I find interesting is there seems to be seemingly legitimate sources that misuse the term and refer not to the laws of nature (those regularities) but instead to our explanation (explanations of those regularities.)

This is where argument seems to be the useful tool to counterargue against those using such sources to show that I'm incorrect.

 

[fromderinside]

This is where argument seems to be the useful tool to counterargue against those using such sources to show that I'm incorrect.

Perhaps we should reduce the scope of our view and look at one's, Speakpigeon's, laws of nature.

 

[fast]

This is where argument seems to be the useful tool to counterargue against those using such sources to show that I'm incorrect.

Perhaps we should reduce the scope of our view and look at one's, Speakpigeon's, laws of nature.

Post 13. He and I agree. We use the term to refer to the regularities.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Perhaps we should reduce the scope of our view and look at one's, Speakpigeon's, laws of nature.

Post 13. He and I agree. We use the term to refer to the regularities.

Oh my God, I never say that! I use the term "regularities" to refer to regularities in nature.

I try not to touch the expression "laws of nature", because as, I said in the post you are referring to, "I decided long ago that the expression was confused".

And I don't see why using the expression "laws of nature" to refer to regularities in nature would be less of a confusion. The expression "laws of nature" is hopeless because we tend to hopelessly understand it on the model of the laws in society, which are not regularities but descriptions, i.e. actual descriptive things, meant to prescribe regularities in society (somewhat hopelessly too). Essentially, our minds can't stop themselves from building a metaphysical object, which we call "laws of nature", which would somehow prescribe the regularities in nature.

At best, laws of nature are understood as our descriptions of regularities in nature. So, even in this case, "laws of nature" are not understood as referring to natural regularities but to certain ideas we have about them or to our formal expression of those ideas. It's much better but still does nothing to stop most people from understanding the expression in their own twisted ways. Switching to the term "regularities" to refer to regularities is the only sensible way forward.
EB

 

[fast]

That being said, I believe that most articulate people use the expression "laws of nature" to refer not to explanations but to what may be the causes of the regularities we observe.

Then what I am supposed to make of this sentence [of yours that I have quoted]? The naturally occurring regularities is not a function of human intervention. It's my contention that the laws of nature predate humanities arrival.

Just to hazard a wild guess out of the blue, you don't think humans' ability to engage in abstract thinking is a necessary condition for the pre-human existence of abstract (or higher levels) categorical groupings do you? A variation of clusterings with various human dependent identification of such does not therefore necessitate human existence or identification for such various clusterings to exist.

If you think (confusing as it might be) that the term refers (or your comparable version) to neither the regularities or the explanations, then which hand does this creature belong? If it comes down to abstraction, is it one of human dependence or human independence?

 

[another1]

you've lost me. I believe that what you're saying isn't a lie crafted to confuse me but I'm hopelessly lost. I compensate by believing something is intentionally misleading me, but not you of course. Something makes his a = b to me, and is c to you. In the end it spells bs in my reality. Please continue because it is like a milky hit of crack. I'll just nod.

 

[Speakpigeon]

That being said, I believe that most articulate people use the expression "laws of nature" to refer not to explanations but to what may be the causes of the regularities we observe.

Then what I am supposed to make of this sentence [of yours that I have quoted]?

I'm perfectly happy with this sentence and I don't see whereabout you see a problem.

Most articulate people use the expression "laws of nature" to refer to the causes of regularities and that's why I try not to use the expression. I'm happy with many scientists using the expression "laws of nature" to refer to their explanations of regularities but you never know if that's what they really do.

I guess it goes on to show that while usage is important, it's also what people individually choose to do which matters.

The naturally occurring regularities is not a function of human intervention.

I certainly believe there are naturally occurring regularities, irregularities that occur independently of our mental représentations.

It's my contention that the laws of nature predate humanities arrival.

If you call "laws of nature" the things you know then I doubt very much that they could predate humanity. If you're talking in the abstract, about things you don't actually know, then I broadly believe they predate us.

Just to hazard a wild guess out of the blue, you don't think humans' ability to engage in abstract thinking is a necessary condition for the pre-human existence of abstract (or higher levels) categorical groupings do you?

I would reverse the perspective. We are unable to construe a world abstracted of any human representation. So, I'm agnostic on this.

This idea that reality is somehow structured in a way maybe different but fundamentally similar to our representations of the world cannot possibly be tested. Human beings in the past have seen certain abstract structures in the fabric of reality that were subsequently falsified.

If that can help.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

What has been falsiified has, when later considered from a broader perspective permitted by more available information, been seen to consistent with what is now established belief about causes of observed regularities and those presumed to underlay them as basis for current theory. Angels on pin heads was probably first actually posited in the late 16th or mid 17th century.

This probably resulted as a confluence by those studying earlier medieval thinking who were aware of work by those using microscopes. This is an example returned to favor around mid 19th century as atomic theory which is now under attack by champions of field theory.

 

[fast]

I guess it goes on to show that while usage is important, it's also what people individually choose to do which matters.

Lexical meaning is unaffected by stipulative meaning (at least over the short-term).

What a few individual people might just so happen to mean by their individual usage of particular terms may or may not match what fluent users collectively use such words to mean. What it goes to show isn't that what individuals choose to do that matters. It's goes to show that individuals sometimes use terms incorrectly.

 

[fast]

What has been falsiified has, when later considered from a broader perspective permitted by more available information, been seen to consistent with what is now established belief about causes of observed regularities and those presumed to underlay them as basis for current theory. Angels on pin heads was probably first actually posited in the late 16th or mid 17th century.

This probably resulted as a confluence by those studying earlier medieval thinking who were aware of work by those using microscopes. This is an example returned to favor around mid 19th century as atomic theory which is now under attack by champions of field theory.

I'm not exploring the complicated task of uncovering the actual causes behind the reoccurring patterns observed in our physical world. When considering the similarities between hypothesis, theories, and laws, it's abundantly clear that they all belong in the right hand. That is, they are human made. As to a law, it's not discovered. It's invented. It's invented because of something we've discovered--something discovered in nature (or about our natural world). Scientists do have very specific definitions they use, and that's okay. Many fields stipulate definitions, and they are stipulative definitions specific to their respective fields. These laws (these human made, invented laws) are scientific laws.

This thread is about the term, "laws of nature." When a scientist says that the term is interchangeable with "scientific law," that's a sign that he is using the term in a stipulative manner. Okay, but this thread isn't about any stipulative use of the term. It's about the lexical use of the term.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I guess it goes on to show that while usage is important, it's also what people individually choose to do which matters.

Lexical meaning is unaffected by stipulative meaning (at least over the short-term).

What a few individual people might just so happen to mean by their individual usage of particular terms may or may not match what fluent users collectively use such words to mean. What it goes to show isn't that what individuals choose to do that matters. It's goes to show that individuals sometimes use terms incorrectly.

Language is used to communicate and it is used to think. Whatever you happen to mean personally matters more to your thinking than whatever others may mean.

Also, usage varies, in particular according to the community of speech concerned, the immediate groupe of people who are having a linguistic communication (a conversation), etc. It is not a matter of using terms incorrectly but of using them effectively for communication purposes and therefore for the communication task at hand. There's no use complaining that "water" isn't the proper word to refer to fire if those people who shout "Water!" to mean the building is on fire are successful in communicating that there is a fire to those people they need to communicate this information to.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

Lexical meaning is unaffected by stipulative meaning (at least over the short-term).

What a few individual people might just so happen to mean by their individual usage of particular terms may or may not match what fluent users collectively use such words to mean. What it goes to show isn't that what individuals choose to do that matters. It's goes to show that individuals sometimes use terms incorrectly.

Language is used to communicate and it is used to think. Whatever you happen to mean personally matters more to your thinking than whatever others may mean.

Also, usage varies, in particular according to the community of speech concerned, the immediate groupe of people who are having a linguistic communication (a conversation), etc. It is not a matter of using terms incorrectly but of using them effectively for communication purposes and therefore for the communication task at hand. There's no use complaining that "water" isn't the proper word to refer to fire if those people who shout "Water!" to mean the building is on fire are successful in communicating that there is a fire to those people they need to communicate this information to.
EB

See fast. Even Speakpigeon thinks you delineate too fine. I agree with you by the way. Its just that when it comes to laws of nature all the other forums for that discussion outside science have been debunked by scientists. That Ma Flippet defies the laws of nature is just not worth discussing.

Of course this is the "laws of nature" thread not the "communication" thread.

 

[fast]

That we can successfully communicate with improper word usage is no good reason to deny that improper word usage has been employed. Language is so dang misleading. Scientists can define their terms willy-nilly, like a mathematician labeling a variable, and that's okay, and when it catches on, that's okay too, but when it's lost in the quagmire that it's of a non-lexical variety, people make the mistake of thinking words mean what they been taught, probably not even taking notice of the ambiguity. The term, "laws of nature," and the term, 'laws of nature' are not one and the same. When someone says the term, "laws of nature" refers to a human made formula, they are mistaken even though the term, 'laws of nature' might very well do that very thing.