I've never been convinced by Modern Logic's use of Truth Tables in the case of the implication. As I see it, the logicians' justification for using them in this case is not convincing at all, to say the least. And it's not just me. Many professional logicians take issue with the official dogma. It's also not new. One guy wrote a book on the subject in 1908 I think, broadly saying that the kind of formal logic proposed in Modern Logic didn't correspond to what humans do intuitively.
The earliest moanings I read about it were in Quine's
Mathematical Logic. It's not new, and it still trips students up, myself included back in 2004.
Whatever complaints you muster, you ultimately want something like the material conditional, whether or not it is the appropriate translation for the English "implies." The conditional, for starters, is that thing which gives you:
P ⊦ Q
therefore:
⊦ P → Q
This is either the deduction theorem, or implication introduction, and it's a big deal.
The truth table for implication is another matter. One basic requirement of implication is that it should be the "exponential" for the lattice of truth values. In the case of Boolean logic, where there are basically only two truth values, you're in this stupidly trivial world where you get the strange equivalence (p → q) ↔ (¬p ∨ q), which makes implication kind of pathetic. It has me suggesting to students that they should simply read classical implication "p → q" as nothing more than "either p is false or q is true."
But in intuitionistic logic, that translation won't fly, and implication feels a lot more "causal." You can start reading the implication arrow as saying that, from p, you can produce q, and I think there's something a lot more intuitive in that reading.
So, what do you think on this issue. Is formal logic an apt rendering of our logical intuitions? Is it perhaps even better? Or do you feel it is somehow flawed and if so why is it so difficult to put it right? Unless maybe you know of some system of formal logic which, unlike the official dogma is a perfect interpretation of the human sense of logic?
I don't think formal logic should strictly adhere to our intuitions, our psychology, or our language. All of modern mathematics starts at something intuitive and then abstracts towards some implied concept that can easily be a long distance from where you started. Logic is the same, IMO. What you end up with as the correct logic is probably not what you instantly thought of, and we shouldn't be trying to justify our informed end state based on how intuitive it is to the beginner.
Just compare how a modern mathematician understands basic geometry compared to a layperson.
Let's be specific: The implication (2 = 3) → (10/2 = 5) is true according to standard formal logic.
Do you agree? Do you disagree? And then why?
EB
I certainly want that implication to be true. It's saying that if you start from an impossible situation, then all bets are off, and you can end wherever you like. No-one will ever be running modus ponens on that implication anyway, because they'll never have evidence that 2 = 3 (unless you're an extreme pessimist, and I am: but then, I live dangerously.)
The first mathematician I've read who got close to this point is Hardy: in a proof by contradiction, you sacrifice the game. Everytime a mathematician entertains a falsehood,
all bets are off, and you can play whatever you want. All-bet-are-off (2 = 3) → (10/2 = 5). See the implication arrow as a transition between game states.
As for truth-tables, I'm a card-carrying constructivist, and we don't do truth-tables. If you're doing truth-tables, then you're really just doing arithmetic modulo 2, which is cool. That's much of computing, and not to be sniffed at.