lpetrich
Contributor
Wittgenstein’s ‘defense’ of religion by Mano Singham, linking to Atheists vs religious belief, with Wittgenstein on the stand | Aeon Essays, by Stephen Law
SL then discusses non-cognitivism, the theory that religious claims are not really claims. It includes expressivism, that religious claims are to express emotions or attitudes. That has plenty of problems, and another interpretation is
Seems to me a muddled mess.In Lectures, Wittgenstein said that, as a non-believer, he couldn’t contradict what the religious person believes:
Indeed, Wittgenstein is widely interpreted as supposing that, not only can non-believers not contradict what the religious believe, they can’t refute those beliefs either. But why not?If you ask me whether or not I believe in a Judgment Day, in the sense in which religious people have belief in it, I wouldn’t say: ‘No. I don’t believe there will be such a thing.’ It would seem to me utterly crazy to say this.
And then I give the explanation: ‘I don’t believe in …’, but then the religious person never believes what I describe.
I can’t say. I can’t contradict that person.
SL then discusses non-cognitivism, the theory that religious claims are not really claims. It includes expressivism, that religious claims are to express emotions or attitudes. That has plenty of problems, and another interpretation is
That has problems of its own.So, on this view, while (contrary to non-cognitivism) claims are made by religious folk who say God exists and Jesus rose from the dead, there are often further dimensions of meaning or significance that are lost on the atheist.
... What the philosophical critic of religious belief attempts, he suggests, is the ‘fruit-juicer method’: an attempt to extract from religious belief the clear liquid of certain claims that can be examined in isolation, discarding the pulpy mush of context.
Then,But then perhaps what the religious mean when they say God exists is similarly wholly metaphorical, with the result that the atheist critic entirely misunderstands what the religious person is committed to? Call this the strong juicer view.
I've never been able to understand that. "God" as something other than a discrete being would mean that "God" is another name for something else, as with pantheism.A third view attributed to Wittgenstein regarding religious language is what I dub the atheist minus view. On this, the religious person is committed, not to more than the atheist supposes, but to less.
... Theologians often stress that God is not a ‘thing’: God is not some sort of extra item in addition to the Universe and its contents.