non-existence of objective morality

[Angra Mainyu]

Do you realize that there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether Ivanov broke UK law, that his actions were illegal, etc., regardless of whether there is a means of punishment.

Sure. He did something illegal in one country but not illegal in another. He would be punished if caught in England yet not punished if he stays in Russia. How does that support the idea of objective moral values? If England sent assassins to Germany to kill Hitler I wouldn't think they would be hanged for murder upon their return to London.

The point of the example is not to give an argument in support of "objective moral values" (whatever that might mean). Rather, the point of the example is to show that positive laws (like UK law) can be objective even if there is no possibility of enforcement. More precisely, statements about UK law are objective statements, and some are true, some false, regardless of whether there is enforcement, punishment, or any chance of any of them. Now, you claim that this is not so of morality, and that without enforcement/punishment, there would be no objective morality (or moral values, or whatever). But why would that be so. It seems obviously false, you have given no good reason to even suspect that that is so, and even in the case of positive law, it is not true - i.e., lack of enforcement, punishment for law-breakers, etc., does not affect objectivity at all (obviously!), so why would it in the case of moral laws?
By the way, Bomb#20 already made more thorough and decisive counterpoints (e.g., https://talkfreethought.org/showthr...ctive-morality&p=562367&viewfull=1#post562367).

*Sigh* this is getting monotonous. Ontology - some people DO think it's possible that objective moral values exist irrespective of (terrestrial) subjective opinions/enforcement/zeitgeist. I think they exist too.

I don't know what "objective moral values" even mean, but I do believe moral statements (e.g., "raping people for fun is immoral", "you have a moral obligation to pay your taxes", etc.) are generally objective, in the sense that there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether they are true or false, and some of the statements attributing immorality, moral obligations, etc., are true.

Now. Cue epistemology. How would we know/recognise them when we see them? How would we tell the difference between OMV and random opinion?

I already gave an answer to that, at least in regards to moral truths ("objective moral values" I don't know, since I don't know what those are): by means of our moral sense, and reason.

Now, I also explained thoroughly why the presence of enforcement or punishment by humans does not play a significant role at all in ascertaining how to recognize that some behavior is immoral or not, and surely enforcement by superhuman entities (which has never happened) plays no role whatsoever.

Take, for example, Acamapichtli the Aztec. What he can observe is that those who engage in ritualistic human sacrifices are never punished. Moreover, he does not even have the concept of God, and so, of punishment by God. How could he figure out that those who engage in ritualistic human sacrifice are behaving immorally, by your account?

By the account I'm giving, the answer is: by his own moral sense, and reason.

Did you not look at the Bugs/Daffy wabbit season image? It's an analogy for this exact point. Daffy says it's OK for a Russian spy to assasinate enemies of the State. Bugs says it's OK for English spies to assasinate enemies of the State.

No, that's not at all analogous in any relevant sense, and that's not what they say. Again, the fact that Russian law is different from UK law is not the point I was making. The point was that there was no problem for objectivity.

...Unless objective moral truths really do exist and there is a means of showing that Daffy is wrong. If there's no Higher Umpire, if there's no inescapable enforceability and if there's no imprimatur of omniscient wisdom to justify the moral law, then both Bugs and Daffy are justified in sticking with their subjective claims.

That's not at all the case. If Bugs is talking about Russian law and Daffy is talking about UK law, they're still making objective, sometimes true claims, etc., but they are talking past each other. On the other hand, if they're talking about the same law, that's that. There is an objective fact of the matter as to who's right, etc. Maybe both are right, but they're talking about different things, because they mean different things with the words they use. Similarly, and regarding of enforcers, as long as Daffy and Bugs mean the same by the moral terms they use (including as "different meaning" something about the speaker, or about different third parties, etc. ), what you have is a disagreement, not a case of miscommunication. And as long as there is an objective fact of the matter as to who's right, also that's it - but whether there is an objective fact of the matter depends on the meaning of the words, not on enforcers of any kind (well, as long as they're precise enough to be used in the context in which they're being used, so there is some influence of external factors in rare cases, but generally not of enforcers, and there is no good reason to think they play a role in this case - quite the opposite).