non-existence of objective morality

[Bronzeage]

If you have accurately portrayed Angra's views, I have to agree with her.

There is no reason anyone should need to provide a definition for something they propose does not exist. Much the same, why would something which does not exist be a factor in a person's argument, or an incentive to behave in a particular way?

There is a world of difference between hell and punishment/enforcement, whether one believe hell exists, or not. The real problem with hell, as a threaten punishment, is there's nothing beyond it. Once a person accepts the are going to hell, what incentive is there to behave morally, if hell is the reason one does behave.

Every prison has a smaller prison inside, where people who can't abide by the rules, are put. Threat of this small prison is enough to keep most prisoners in line, but small prison is always full of those who didn't care.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

If you have accurately portrayed Angra's views, I have to agree with her.

I'm a man, but no, that does not even remotely accurately portrays my views.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Angra Mainyu all but declared theoretical objective morality an illusion.

1. I did that many years ago. I was mistaken. I realized that also long ago.
2. You almost certaintly had no idea I ever did that.
3. I never suggested anything remotely like that in this thread.
4. You have not addressed any of my arguments, which show some of your contentions to be false.

When folks relentlessly disagree with my criteria for objective/transcendent moral law but don't propose an alternative method of distinguishing same, I suspect they don't have anything better.

But that's not really the issue. I showed that your criteria did not work. I even argued it probably wasn't even compatible with your own usage, but I couldn't go on because you did not address my questions. But let me try again. Perhaps, if you address the point, we can go somewhere. You actually made an epistemic claim. You said:

One of the epistemic criteria for and objectively real/true moral law must surely be that it is enforceable. If I can violate a (supposed) moral law with zero consequences - because there's no punishment - then what other alternative way do we have of differentiating subjective opinion from objective moral law?

While I do not need to have a better criteria in order to show that yours is not good, I do have a better criteria: we use our sense of right and wrong, and reason (of course, we can also assess whether moral claims are objective). Preemptively, the fact that there is disagreement does not imply that the criteria in question is not good, but moreover, I have shown your criteria not to succeed. So has Bomb#20. But let us consider the following scenario:

Consider, for example, Aztec society before, say, 1400. How could Aztecs have epistemic access to moral knowledge? How could they make proper moral assessments? Surely, they did not have access to the Bible, so that's out of the question. They did not believe in God, either, nor did they seem to even had a concept of God (i.e., omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect). Do you think they had no epistemic access to moral truth? Do you think that God will punish them (or is punishing them) for their wrongdoings, even though they had no means whatsoever of realizing that their actions were immoral, due to the lack of epistemic access to moral truth?

Angra Mainyu said hell (punishment/enforcement) didn't matter because it wasn't real.

I did not say that hell did not matter. I said it was not real. Hell is not real, but belief in Hell is, and it has real consequences, so belief in Hell matters. But it also matters whether there is Hell, of course - fortunately, there is not.

Angra Mainyu said omniscient law makers had no greater rational insight than anyone else.

I did not say that. Whether they have greater rational insight than someone else depends on the hypothetical omniscient entity and the hypothetical someone else. For example, (hypothetically) there might be an irrational omniscient lawmaker and a rational omniscient less powerful being too weak to make laws and impose its will. But regardless, let us say that you add rationality to omniscience, or even perfect rationality, or define "omniscience" in a way that includes perfect rationality, or something along those lines. It remains the case that an omniscient perfectly rational lawmaker will act depending on its goals, and pass positive laws that may or may not be just, depending on what it wants to do. For example, imagine a being that is omniscient, perfectly rational, and above all enjoys watching other beings torture each other, either by command or for fun, and who does not care about wrong or right. I would not be surprised if such a law passed unjust laws.

Now you might think it's irrational to enjoy watching torture, so at that point, I would ask you how much you're packing in "rational": goals too? Preferences?

Angra Mainyu said God's laws were just her opinions.

I did not say that. I did imply that an omniscient, perfectly rational being need not be God, of course, under the understanding that God is - by definition - omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. But that does not address my arguments.

 

[Lion IRC]

How about folks just state for the record whether or not they think objective true moral laws exist independently of fads and opinions. I tried to use the rabbit season / duck season analogy and whether or not we have reason to think there is such a thing as a hunting season - a hunting licence, enforceable penalties for hunting out of season, an all-seeing Law Maker who wisely decides that feral rabbits are in plague proportions and so the end justifies the means etc etc

But if you don't think there even IS such a thing as an objectively true, definitive "hunting season" - let alone a justifiably moral hunting season, which is enforced by the Higher Power that arbitrates such things, then just say so.

 

[Lion IRC]

While I do not need to have a better criteria in order to show that yours is not good, I do have a better criteria: we use our sense of right and wrong, and reason...

Great! Let's all persuade Hitler to use his sense of right and wrong.
Problem solved.

 

[Lion IRC]

Consider, for example, Aztec society before, say, 1400. How could Aztecs have epistemic access to moral knowledge? How could they make proper moral assessments? Surely, they did not have access to the Bible,

Noah didn't have access to the bible.
Job didn't have access to the bible.
Abraham didn't have access to the bible.

I could go on but...you get the idea. (I hope)

 

[Angra Mainyu]

How about folks just state for the record whether or not they think objective true moral laws exist independently of fads and opinions. I tried to use the rabbit season / duck season analogy and whether or not we have reason to think there is such a thing as a hunting season - a hunting licence, enforceable penalties for hunting out of season, an all-seeing Law Maker who wisely decides that feral rabbits are in plague proportions and so the end justifies the means etc etc

But if you don't think there even IS such a thing as an objectively true, definitive "hunting season" - let alone a justifiably moral hunting season, which is enforced by the Higher Power that arbitrates such things, then just say so.

I don't know what you mean by "objectively true moral laws". But there are true moral claims, beliefs, statements, etc., and moral statements are objective. So, to go with Bomb#20's example, there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether it's always immoral for a person to torture another person for fun, and the fact of the matter is that it is so.

 

[Lion IRC]

"...there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether it's always immoral for a person to torture another person for fun, and the fact of the matter is that it is so."

Circular reasoning is no use because it is circular.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Consider, for example, Aztec society before, say, 1400. How could Aztecs have epistemic access to moral knowledge? How could they make proper moral assessments? Surely, they did not have access to the Bible,

Noah didn't have access to the bible.
Job didn't have access to the bible.
Abraham didn't have access to the bible.

I could go on but...you get the idea. (I hope)

I don't, I'm afraid. Could you please address my questions in a clear manner:
1. Do you believe that people who live in Aztec society before 1400 had epistemic access to moral truths?
2. How were they supposed to tell what their moral obligations were?

Moreover, you said:

One of the epistemic criteria for and objectively real/true moral law must surely be that it is enforceable. If I can violate a (supposed) moral law with zero consequences - because there's no punishment - then what other alternative way do we have of differentiating subjective opinion from objective moral law?

So, let's say that Acamapichtli lived in Tenochtitlan in 1350.
What do you think would have been a rational way of assessing moral claims, ascertaining what moral obligations he had, and so on?
I already told you what I think. It would have been rational on his part to use his own sense of right and wrong, and reason. Moreover, that would have given him epistemic access to moral truths, at least in most cases, though of course, the method was fallible.
But you say that one of the epistemic criteria is that the moral law must be enforceable, and you go on to imply that there is no other alternative for distinguishing between true and false moral claims. Yet, how could Acampichtli possibly have done that? If you're serious about discussing the matter, please explain. I offer to explain my own views.

- - - Updated - - -

"...there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether it's always immoral for a person to torture another person for fun, and the fact of the matter is that it is so."

Circular reasoning is no use because it is circular.

I did not engage in any circular reasoning. In fact, in that post of mine, I did not even posted any reasoning. I answered your question about what I believe, because you asked me. Could you please address my points?

 

[Lion IRC]

I don't know what you mean by "objectively true moral laws"

I have posted my explanation/opinion heaps of times.
You cannot possibly accuse me of not explaining what criteria constitute objective moral law.

1. They carry the imprimatur of an unbiased law maker/umpire. (God isn't biased against ducks or rabbits)
2. They are laws given by an all knowing law maker who can legitimately claim to know that the end justifies the means.
3. They are both enforceable AND inevitably enforced. A law which isn't enforced or enforced selectively can hardly be called a Law - let alone a fair/moral law.

 

[Bomb#20]

How about folks just state for the record whether or not they think objective true moral laws exist independently of fads and opinions.

Been there, done that. Quite a few of us in the thread have been pretty clear on this point. Angra Mainyu, fast, you and I think so. Tom Sawyer, Juma and Bronzeage think not. BH, Underseer and PyramidHead aren't sure what to think.

fast: It's wrong to steal your neighbor's lawnmower and pawn it for the purpose of buying porn with those ill-gotten gains no matter who in your household thinks otherwise.

me: It's wrong for people to rape other people for fun.

AM: it's a fact that the monstrous creator of hell is evil - assessing the character in the story, of course.

While I do not need to have a better criteria in order to show that yours is not good, I do have a better criteria: we use our sense of right and wrong, and reason...

Great! Let's all persuade Hitler to use his sense of right and wrong.
Problem solved.

Been there, done that. It took shooting six million German soldiers, but in the end we persuaded Hitler to do the right thing and shoot one more. Problem solved.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

I have posted my explanation/opinion heaps of times.
You cannot possibly accuse me of not explaining what criteria constitute objective moral law.

1. They carry the imprimatur of an unbiased law maker/umpire. (God isn't biased against ducks or rabbits)
2. They are laws given by an all knowing law maker who can legitimately claim to know that the end justifies the means.
3. They are both enforceable AND inevitably enforced. A law which isn't enforced or enforced selectively can hardly be called a Law - let alone a fair/moral law.

I did not accuse you. I said I did not know what you meant. But I asked what you meant by it, not what criteria you think is required. Regardless, of course I do not believe that what you describe above exists. I do believe that there generally is an objective fact of the matter as to whether actions are immoral or not, whether we have a moral obligation or not, and that we do have moral obligations, etc. Could you please address my questions?

Let's start at least by addressing something, like your epistemic claim and my reply to it. In particular, and to be crystal clear, could you please address the following scenario:

So, let's say that Acamapichtli lived in Tenochtitlan in 1350.
What do you think would have been a rational way of assessing moral claims, ascertaining what moral obligations he had, and so on?
I already told you what I think. It would have been rational on his part to use his own sense of right and wrong, and reason. Moreover, that would have given him epistemic access to moral truths, at least in most cases, though of course, the method was fallible.
But you say that one of the epistemic criteria is that the moral law must be enforceable, and you go on to imply that there is no other alternative for distinguishing between true and false moral claims. Yet, how could Acampichtli possibly have done that? If you're serious about discussing the matter, please explain. I offer to explain my own views.​

 

[Lion IRC]

Consider, for example, Aztec society before, say, 1400. How could Aztecs have epistemic access to moral knowledge? How could they make proper moral assessments? Surely, they did not have access to the Bible,

Noah didn't have access to the bible.
Job didn't have access to the bible.
Abraham didn't have access to the bible.

I could go on but...you get the idea. (I hope)

I don't, I'm afraid. Could you please address my questions in a clear manner:
1. Do you believe that people who live in Aztec society before 1400 had epistemic access to moral truths?
2. How were they supposed to tell what their moral obligations were

1. Yes. The same way Noah, Abraham, Job did.
2. The same way we do. By logical inference and or special revelation. Aztecs could have the exact same discussion we are right here. They could debate and arrive at a theoretically sound epistemic basis for objective morality.

Moreover, you said:

One of the epistemic criteria for and objectively real/true moral law must surely be that it is enforceable. If I can violate a (supposed) moral law with zero consequences - because there's no punishment - then what other alternative way do we have of differentiating subjective opinion from objective moral law?

So, let's say that Acamapichtli lived in Tenochtitlan in 1350.
What do you think would have been a rational way of assessing moral claims, ascertaining what moral obligations he had, and so on?
I already told you what I think. It would have been rational on his part to use his own sense of right and wrong,

Using ones own 'sense' of right and wrong doesn't work when you're arguing over which hunting season it is.

But you say that one of the epistemic criteria is that the moral law must be enforceable,

What is our Aztec friend to make of a law that isn't enforced? Or an opinion that can't be enforced?
The presence or absence of enforcement is not an irrelevant consideration.
When presented with an 'ought' proposition or a Thou Shalt moral imperative surely the most obvious questions are why should I? Or what if I don't? Or who says I have to?

and you go on to imply that there is no other alternative for distinguishing between true and false moral claims.

I have explicitly stated the multiple criteria that (I believe) are reasonable for objectively distinguishing moral law from personal preference.

"...there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether it's always immoral for a person to torture another person for fun, and the fact of the matter is that it is so."

Circular reasoning is no use because it is circular.

I did not engage in any circular reasoning. In fact, in that post of mine, I did not even posted any reasoning.

I agree circular reasoning isn't reasoning.

 

[Wiploc]

How about folks just state for the record whether or not they think objective true moral laws exist independently of fads and opinions. I tried to use the rabbit season / duck season analogy and whether or not we have reason to think there is such a thing as a hunting season - a hunting licence, enforceable penalties for hunting out of season, an all-seeing Law Maker who wisely decides that feral rabbits are in plague proportions and so the end justifies the means etc etc

But if you don't think there even IS such a thing as an objectively true, definitive "hunting season" - let alone a justifiably moral hunting season, which is enforced by the Higher Power that arbitrates such things, then just say so.

Do moral laws exist? Depends on what you mean by "laws." If you are one of those who thinks laws require lawmakers, then, no, I don't think moral laws exist.

As to objectivity, that's so often used as a weasel word, as a locus of equivocation, that I don't bother to have an opinion about it in the abstract.

In your case, since you define it as requiring gods, and since I don't believe in gods, I don't believe in objectivity. But that answer is specific to you. Most people don't define it that way. If they define it in ways which make objectivity exist, then I'm happy to believe in it.

 

[Lion IRC]

Sure.
If you don't think a law-giver exists and you think "objective" is a weasel word and enforceability is overrated, then you're free to coast along and selectively define your moral preferences as you wish. ("I'm happy to believe in it." as you say.)

"It depends" is a very post-modern way of thinking.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

1. Yes. The same way Noah, Abraham, Job did.
2. The same way we do. By logical inference and or special revelation. Aztecs could have the exact same discussion we are right here. They could debate and arrive at a theoretically sound epistemic basis for objective morality.

1. Okay.
2. Here's my follow-up:

2. a. How did the Aztecs access special revelation? They had no Bible (not that the Bible is revealed, but leaving that aside), and no connection to it. In fact, there was not even a claim that there was special revelation from God. Moreover, they did not even have the concept of God (i.e., omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect) in the first place. How would you suggest Acamapichtli go about finding special revelation?

2. b. Even in societies in which there are claims of special revelation, how do you propose we assess whether the claims are true?
For example, if someone claims the Hadith contains commands from God, how are humans supposed to ascertain that that is not so?
For the purpose of this example, we may assume the person assessing the claim is Omar, a man who lives in rural Afghanistan in 1920, and has never had any contact with any Christians or Christian writings.

Using ones own 'sense' of right and wrong doesn't work when you're arguing over which hunting season it is.

As I said repeatedly, the method that I suggested is to use one sense of right and wrong and reason. It should be clear that whether it's duck or rabbit season (or neither, etc.) is a matter of positive law. The way to resolve the issue is take a look at the laws passed by whoever runs the place.

What is our Aztec friend to make of a law that isn't enforced? Or an opinion that can't be enforced?

Well, for example, using his own sense of right and wrong and reason, Acamapichtli has a way of realizing that sacrificing people to the gods is immoral.

The presence or absence of enforcement is not an irrelevant consideration.

Well, given that humans tend to punish wrongdoings in general, the absence of enforcement by humans is not an irrelevant consideration, but it is by no means a decisive one. Now, if, say, Orniut is an alien scientist from a species that evolved from squid-like things and she's studying humans, enforcement - as well as moral claims made by humans -, perhaps is one of her best guides to moral truth (of course, not to squid-like-moral truths!). But we're not aliens from other planets.

When presented with an 'ought' proposition or a Thou Shalt moral imperative surely the most obvious questions are why should I? Or what if I don't? Or who says I have to?

If that "should" is a moral "should", then that's equivalent to asking why the behavior is immoral. Well, the behavior of raping people for fun is immoral because of, say, it makes people suffer people for fun, it is an infrigement on their freedom over their bodies, etc. That's why you should not rape people for fun. Still, this is my speculation about what makes the behavior immoral. It's not as strong as the immediate assessment (via my own sense of right and wrong) that it is immoral.
As for the behavior of sacrificing people to the gods, also that clearly hurts people for no good reason, first because there is no good reason to believe in the gods and those who kill people over that are being epistemically irrational, second because there is no good reason that worse things will happen if it's not done, and third because it's not done as a necessary evil but a means of preventing something worse (which might justify it depending on what is to be prevented), but is done while not being considered an evil at all. There may well be other reasons why it's wrong, but those seem to be some - still, that's secondary: I don't need to know why it's wrong (though I can speculate) to know it is.

As to who says you have to, well that depends. In the case of Acamapichtli, no one says that he has to refrain from sacrificing people to the gods. In fact, perhaps some people claim he should do it (depending on his position in Aztec society). But regardless, it is immoral on his part, and he has tools to figure that out (else, he's hopeless to find moral truth; at any rate, he has no access to any revelation. I'm curious: how do you think he can access special revelation?).

I have explicitly stated the multiple criteria that (I believe) are reasonable for objectively distinguishing moral law from personal preference.

But actually said:

One of the epistemic criteria for and objectively real/true moral law must surely be that it is enforceable. If I can violate a (supposed) moral law with zero consequences - because there's no punishment - then what other alternative way do we have of differentiating subjective opinion from objective moral law?

The "what other alternative way do we have of differentiating subjective opinion from objective moral law?" part clearly indicates you think there is no room for another alternative, in absence of enforcement.


Moreover, you later said:

3. They are both enforceable AND inevitably enforced. A law which isn't enforced or enforced selectively can hardly be called a Law - let alone a fair/moral law.

While I suspect you conflated epistemic and ontological issues, at least it is clear that you're saying that without enforcement, people has no means of recognizing a moral law.

I agree circular reasoning isn't reasoning.

Why not a civil conversation?
Again, in that post of mine, I was reporting my beliefs, not engaging in argumentation.

 

[Bomb#20]

But there is corruption and injustice in the human race here on Earth. So are you implying Earth doesn't belong to God? Or are you implying man was not created by God?

Well yes... you'd be right as the theology goes - as its written : This is Satans world now and man was still created by God.

The usual theistic defense from reproaches against God for His cruelty to man is the claim that Man is to God as pot is to potter -- that God the Creator owns the creation and has every right to slay whichever men He pleases, every right to order Saul to commit genocide against the Amalekites, every right to create malaria and create mosquitoes to infect men with it, every right to abort a third of us in the womb even though He judges that life begins at conception, and so forth. But if this is Satan's world now then the potter no longer owns the pot. How then do you figure God's crimes against mankind can be justified?

Are you proposing that nobody who actually "wants" to exist and "belong" in the Christian Heaven by His ways is corrupt or unjust? We have had two thousand years of appalling history proving that that is not the case.

Of course not. We've had appalling history but there are people who have had everything by unjust means, loving the life they've had or live,why give that up for being merely humble? Not until they suddenly for some reason believe there is a God after all.

Are you proposing that all the people who've butchered in the name of Christ, from Richard the Lionheart, who went to the Holy Land to save Jerusalem from the Muslims and murdered 2700 prisoners of war just because he didn't know what else to do with them, to Torquemada, who massively expanded the Spanish Inquisition and murdered some 1500 suspected dissidents in an attempt to wipe out heresy, didn't really believe in God?!?

 

[Wiploc]

Sure.
If you don't think a law-giver exists and you think "objective" is a weasel word and enforceability is overrated, then you're free to coast along and selectively define your moral preferences as you wish. ("I'm happy to believe in it." as you say.)

"It depends" is a very post-modern way of thinking.

"Objective" is a weasel word because people often use it in conflicting ways. They surreptitiously two-step back and forth between different meanings. That's an objective fact.

So whether I think morality is objective depends on what the person I'm talking to means by "objective." That's not post modernism; it's pedantry; I likes my facts correct.

I don't think enforceability is overrated. I just don't think it has to do with morality. Rape is wrong regardless of whether you can get away with it. I'm a moral realist, not a post modernist.

 

[Lion IRC]

1. Okay.
2. Here's my follow-up:

2. a. How did the Aztecs access special revelation? They had no Bible (not that the Bible is revealed, but leaving that aside), and no connection to it.

How many times do I have to say this?
You don't need a bible. Noah didn't have a bible. Job didn't. Abraham didnt.

In fact, there was not even a claim that there was special revelation from God.

The bible certainly does include such claims.

Moreover, they did not even have the concept of God (i.e., omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect) in the first place. How would you suggest Acamapichtli go about finding special revelation?

They might not even have to search. God can reveal stuff unilaterally.

2. b. Even in societies in which there are claims of special revelation, how do you propose we assess whether the claims are true?
For example, if someone claims the Hadith contains commands from God, how are humans supposed to ascertain that that is not so?

The same way we always have. Test it against other claims and if it is incongruous then we can be more skeptical than if it harmonises with other claims.

For the purpose of this example, we may assume the person assessing the claim is Omar, a man who lives in rural Afghanistan in 1920, and has never had any contact with any Christians or Christian writings.

You do realise Judeo-Christianity is a/the forerunner of Islam. Muslims revere Jesus more than Moses

As I said repeatedly, the method that I suggested is to use one sense of right and wrong and reason. It should be clear that whether it's duck or rabbit season (or neither, etc.) is a matter of positive law. The way to resolve the issue is take a look at the laws passed by whoever runs the place.

Now we are getting somewhere. You concede that a common, objective epistemology would be to appeal to the Umpire.

What is our Aztec friend to make of a law that isn't enforced? Or an opinion that can't be enforced?

Well, for example, using his own sense of right and wrong and reason, Acamapichtli has a way of realizing that sacrificing people to the gods is immoral.

Sure, but then Apamachupichu meets someone who says if they don't make sacrifices then millions will die of starvation and begins to think that the moral good is to save lives thru sacrifice. And you're back to opinion-based morality.

The presence or absence of enforcement is not an irrelevant consideration.

Well, given that humans tend to punish wrongdoings in general, the absence of enforcement by humans is not an irrelevant consideration, but it is by no means a decisive one.

I never said that alone was necessary or sufficient.
But you agree it is one way to differentiate subjective opinion from objective reality?

Now, if, say, Orniut is an alien scientist from a species that evolved from squid-like things and she's studying humans, enforcement - as well as moral claims made by humans -, perhaps is one of her best guides to moral truth (of course, not to squid-like-moral truths!). But we're not aliens from other planets.

Are we debating human morality or the Ten Commandments applicable to squids?

When presented with an 'ought' proposition or a Thou Shalt moral imperative surely the most obvious questions are why should I? Or what if I don't? Or who says I have to?

If that "should" is a moral "should", then...

Of course it's a moral 'should'.
What else are we discussing here???

I have explicitly stated the multiple criteria that (I believe) are reasonable for objectively distinguishing moral law from personal preference.

But actually said:

One of the epistemic criteria for and objectively real/true moral law must surely be that it is enforceable. If I can violate a (supposed) moral law with zero consequences - because there's no punishment - then what other alternative way do we have of differentiating subjective opinion from objective moral law?

The "what other alternative way do we have of differentiating subjective opinion from objective moral law?" part clearly indicates you think there is no room for another alternative, in absence of enforcement.

Of course I think it's possible that people who think OMV's exist might have an alternative way to validate them.
Do you know how long I've been waiting for them to come up with something?

Moreover, you later said:

3. They are both enforceable AND inevitably enforced. A law which isn't enforced or enforced selectively can hardly be called a Law - let alone a fair/moral law.

While I suspect you conflated epistemic and ontological issues, at least it is clear that you're saying that without enforcement, people has no means of recognizing a moral law.

Show me objective moral values that don't rely on the equivalent of Bugs or Daffy making unenforceable brute claims which are indistinguishable from opinions.

I agree circular reasoning isn't reasoning.

Why not a civil conversation?

I apologise if I offended you with that opinion.

Again, in that post of mine, I was reporting my beliefs, not engaging in argumentation.

Then there was no need to try and justify it with a... I think this because
You were using the single belief to justify itself. Which is circular.

 

[Learner]

The usual theistic defense from reproaches against God for His cruelty to man is the claim that Man is to God as pot is to potter -- that God the Creator owns the creation and has every right to slay whichever men He pleases, every right to order Saul to commit genocide against the Amalekites, every right to create malaria and create mosquitoes to infect men with it, every right to abort a third of us in the womb even though He judges that life begins at conception, and so forth.

I used to think that about theists but I realised that the contexts where not quite right without a few more detatils (in my opinion of course ). By default anyway , a creator has the right to do what ever he pleases with his creation, however its not quite as you make it sound or by how you put it, which can be misleading to some, giving the impression (perhaps not intended); God enjoys doing the things you've portrayed above.

There are causes and consequences and as it shows in the bible ...God reacts only "after" particular events happen that goes against Gods ways or His chosen , but then the chosen also have consequences which were agreed upon in the covenants. The Amalekites were natural enemies at war with the Israelites and they were not helpless or harmless neither successful when backed by a pagan god or the belief.

But if this is Satan's world now then the potter no longer owns the pot. How then do you figure God's crimes against mankind can be justified?

Your question is shaped for a particular answer. Your interpretation doesn't seem correct to me but of course that debatable between us. My POV is that God does not interact directly as HE did back then (Satans world) and HE has no crimes.

Are you proposing that all the people who've butchered in the name of Christ, from Richard the Lionheart, who went to the Holy Land to save Jerusalem from the Muslims and murdered 2700 prisoners of war just because he didn't know what else to do with them, to Torquemada, who massively expanded the Spanish Inquisition and murdered some 1500 suspected dissidents in an attempt to wipe out heresy, didn't really believe in God?!?

Not at all, but you see those under the Christian guise did the opposite in the "name of God" so-called as compared to the earlier Christians before them ...who were conscientious objectors. The Romans wrote about them even those in the legion that refused to fight once they became Christian and were seriously punished ,even to the point of death. Obviously things steered of course from the origin.(at least how some theists see it to be fair)