Peter Turchin predicted recent US Unrest

[lpetrich]

Lawyers per 1,000 people was typically between 1.0 and 1.5 from 1850 to 1970, but it has recently increased to nearly 4.

Mass incarceration. For the male population (nearly all inmates), from 2 per 1000 in 1971 to 9 per 1000 in 1995, though it close to leveled off after that.

Fraction of 25-29-year-olds living with parents or grandparents: from 32% in 1940 to 12% in 1970 to 33% in 2012.

Median age at first marriage was M 26 F 22 in 1890, M 24 F 22 in 1940, M 22 F 20 in 1955, M 23 F 21 in 1975, and recently M 30 F 28 in 2019.

The divorce rate was roughly 5% of all marriages over 1950 - 1970, but increased rapidly afterwards, leveling off at different rates for different age groups.

For 18-34 yrs, it leveled off at 12% in 1980, for 35-44 yrs, it leveled off at 18% in 1990, and for 45-54 yrs, it leveled off at 27% in 2010. For 55+ yrs, it increased more slowly, also reaching 27% in 2010.

In the medical profession, administrators grow in numbers much more rapidly than doctors. Over 1970 - 2009, doctors grew about 300%, while administrators reached 500% in 1990, 2200% in 1995, and 3200% in 2009.

Such administrative bloat also afflicts universities, and it is a form of elite overproduction.

 

[Loren Pechtel]

Lawyers per 1,000 people was typically between 1.0 and 1.5 from 1850 to 1970, but it has recently increased to nearly 4.

Yup, and definitely a problem.

Mass incarceration. For the male population (nearly all inmates), from 2 per 1000 in 1971 to 9 per 1000 in 1995, though it close to leveled off after that.

Drug war in action. Take the drug war out and shoot it. Preferably also shoot all the top drug warriors.

Fraction of 25-29-year-olds living with parents or grandparents: from 32% in 1940 to 12% in 1970 to 33% in 2012.

Median age at first marriage was M 26 F 22 in 1890, M 24 F 22 in 1940, M 22 F 20 in 1955, M 23 F 21 in 1975, and recently M 30 F 28 in 2019.

Note that these are related things--people were more likely to be married young and thus almost certainly not living with their parents. Young marriages have high failure rates, the later age of marriage these days is a good thing, but it also means there are more single adults who could live with their parents.

The divorce rate was roughly 5% of all marriages over 1950 - 1970, but increased rapidly afterwards, leveling off at different rates for different age groups.

Not a bad thing, though--the failure of marriage rate isn't the same thing as the divorce rate. In the past there were a lot more failed marriages that didn't lead to divorce. I believe that was a negative for society.

In the medical profession, administrators grow in numbers much more rapidly than doctors. Over 1970 - 2009, doctors grew about 300%, while administrators reached 500% in 1990, 2200% in 1995, and 3200% in 2009.

What are they defining as "administrators"?

 

[jab]

Imposed on that were three big spikes of "instability events", in 1870, 1920, and 1970, to within 5 years each. There was none in 1820, however. This fits the two-generation cycles in other societies, and it implies that another spike is on the way around this year.

Here's the problem I have with this sort of predictions based on historical analysis.

So much is changing so fast that I don't see how it can be accounted for. Take the internet as an example. In 1970 it was at most a science fiction concept. By 2000, it was a force. By 2010, it became the dominant media. And not just in the western 1st world. Nothing can compare with the globalizing power of instant, real time, information. And in the unregulated media market, disinformation has been weaponized in a way that tyrants of old could only dream about.

And that's just one. Recognition of climate change is another.

I just don't think that such prognostication is particularly relevant, even if someone guesses right. I don't see how anybody can control for all the important variables.
Tom

I agree. Also, the 1920s weren't the really dreadful decade, it was the 1930s.

 

[lpetrich]

For 1920, Peter Turchin had in mind events like the 1919-1920 Red Scare and the ca. 1921 Blair Mountain Mine War.

 

[lpetrich]

We're on the verge of breakdown: a data scientist's take on Trump and Biden | US politics | The Guardian

Peter Turchin is not the first entomologist to cross over to human behaviour: during a lecture in 1975, famed biologist E O Wilson had a pitcher of water tipped on him for extrapolating the study of ant social structures to our own.

It’s a reaction that Turchin, an expert-on-pine-beetles-turned-data-scientist and modeller, has yet to experience. But his studies at the University of Connecticut into how human societies evolve have lately gained wider currency; in particular, an analysis that interprets worsening social unrest in the 2020s as an intra-elite battle for wealth and status.

...
Explicitly, then, Turchin explains current political warfare as a battle between an overpopulation of elites to some degree exacerbated by a decline in general living standards or immiseration, and financially overextended governments. Initially, Turchin applied the theory to pre-industrial societies, but a decade ago he travelled forward in time, predicting unrest – Ages of Discord – that would intensify in 2020 and endure until reversed.

...
Turchin’s analysis, of course, is readily applied to Donald Trump who, spurned by mainstream elites, appealed to a radical faction of the elite and to the disaffected masses to forward his political ambition. A similar case could be made for leading Brexiteers.

...
In the professor’s reading, the incoming administration, notwithstanding the diversity of its appointments, is representative of mainstream elite power. “Think of 2020 as the return of the established elite and separation of dissidents. What’s important is that the incoming administration recognises the root problem.”

...
“I think he’s got a point, because a significant component of the reasonably far left are highly educated but with blocked opportunities,” says Mark Mizruchi, author of The Fracturing of the American Corporate Elite. “Where you have disjunctures is where you get political extremism. If Turchin is right, you’re going to get a lot more highly educated people facing limited career prospects. Most of those will turn left rather than right.”

 

[lpetrich]

I find that a rather interesting interpretation of Trump's candidacy. But I find it much like the Fascist movements of the early 20th cy. Many of them initially had strong anti-capitalist tendencies, but they tended to sell out to big business when they got into power.

I also note something that PT does not seem to have discussed in much detail. The fracturing of the two major political parties. For the Republican Party, it was the rise of the Tea Party a decade ago, culminating in Trumpism. For the Democrats, it is the rise of a progressive movement that runs its candidates as Democrats, notably AOC. Her recruiter, Brand New Congress, wanted to act like a European-style political party, but instead decided to run its candidates inside the two major parties without creating another one. Though BNC itself was not very successful at first, with AOC its only win, several other progressive candidates have won in recent years, and the Congressional Progressive Caucus has recently adopted rules that point to a greater willingness of such Congressmembers to play Tea-Party-style hardball politics.

 

[RVonse]

Peter Turchin is not the only one predicting these cycles, billionaire Ray Dalio is another. Good times cause men to become weaker (less productive), which then leads to economic hardship, which then leads to making men stronger, which then leads to economic good times again. Rinse and repeat. And the economy being the study of human behavior over several generations.

 

[lpetrich]

Does Ray Dalio explain his theories any further?

There is another such cycle of history that medieval Arab historian Ibn Khaldun noted.

It is a result of conflicts between nomadic people and settled people.

Nomadic people don't live very comfortable lives, and they have to fight off rivals. Thus, their military skill becomes great. Some nomads then then conquer nearby settled people. But after they do so, they settle down, they become fat and lazy, and they become vulnerable to some more nomads.


How Much Longer Can This Era Of Political Gridlock Last? | FiveThirtyEight
Argues that this era is much like the first Gilded Age, though with some differences.

A similarity was the nearly even division between parties and the frequent changing of hands of the Presidency and the two houses of Congress.

 Party divisions of United States Congresses - I checked, and that is pretty much correct.

There are some differences, however.

hat said, there are key ways in which that period is different than today. First, the partisan loyalties on display were largely holdovers from the Civil War, i.e., the South voted solidly Democratic once the Reconstruction period ended, and the North (excluding New York, New Jersey and Connecticut) voted solidly Republican.

Additionally, the two parties didn’t actually stand for all that much — a stark contrast from today’s politics, where the major parties have distinct policies on a host of national issues. Rather, the substance of national partisan conflict largely had to do with competing tariff policy visions and how best to exploit political spoils and patronage.

Is the US due for another political realignment?

Certainly, one can cast about for issues that could conceivably split one or both of the two major parties and cause a massive political realignment. Economics is arguably once again such an issue, given that the Republican Party’s voters are internally split over economic issues, with many of the more populist voters in the party rejecting the party’s established pro-business, pro-free trade agenda in favor of something more redistributionist. But the sticking point here seems to be that whatever latent class solidarity might exist among voters across parties, issues of race and racial identity have become so core to partisan affiliation that any potential cross-party coalition along lines of class seems unlikely.

For that reason, author Lee Drutman doesn't think that a political realignment is very likely any time soon.

 

[lpetrich]

The Republican and Democratic Parties Are Heading for Collapse - "U.S. political parties have reshuffled every few decades, and 2020 may be the year they do it again. "

Yet here’s some potentially good news in a year without much of it: The United States has been through moments of political and economic crisis before, and out of each crisis emerged a much-needed transformation of the country’s politics and economy. There’s reason to expect the 2020s to be a decade of major political evolution, as well. And none too soon: The United States is overdue for both an overhaul of its party system and a major renewal of its ever evolving democracy.

Author Lee Drutman wrote this piece also, and he notes five previous party systems and the sixth, present one.

These eras roughly covered 1796-1820, 1832-1856, 1868-1892, 1896-1928, 1932-1968, and 1980 until now. The transitions between each system were generally led from the top down, through rifts and realignments in elite coalitions and ideologies, typically catalyzed by societal crises. The first five party systems lasted, by this count, 24, 24, 24, 32, and 36 years—a certain regularity, with the length expanding as people lived longer. By this pattern, the current party system should probably be collapsing about now.

Overlaid on this pattern of party system and collapse are four major periods of bottom-up democratic transformation in the United States. These are the Revolutionary War (from monarchy to self-governance), the 1830s (major expansion of the franchise to nonpropertied white males), the Progressive Era (major expansions of participatory democracy and expansion of the franchise to women), and the 1960s (voting rights and enfranchisement of Black people, plus some governance reforms). Again, there’s a regular pattern, with some kind of transformation coming about every 60 years or so. Here, too, the United States is due for a wave of bottom-up democratic transformation.

He neglected the Civil War and the Great Depression, both big events in their own right. I'll put together a combined chronology:

• Revolution and Constitution: 1776 - 1796
• 1st PS: 1796 - 1820
• Expansion of the vote to nonpropertied white males
• 2nd PS: 1832 - 1856
• Strife over slavery, the fall of the Whig Party, the Civil War, the abolition of slavery, Reconstruction
• 3rd PS: 1868 - 1892
• Rise of the Populists and the Progressives
• 4th PS: 1896 - 1928
• The Great Depression and the New Deal
• 5th PS: 1932 - 1968
• Sixties Era, beginning of Gilded Age II
• 6th PS: 1980 - present

 

[lpetrich]

I'll interleave the party-system times with the Schlesinger phases. The second number is the number of years before the next landmark event.

• 1776 12 Lib Revolution & Constitution - CrdPss
• 1788 8 Con Hamilton Era
• 1796 4 PS 1 begin
• 1800 12 Lib Jefferson Era
• 1812 8 Con Era of Good Feelings
• 1820 9 PS 1 end
• 1829 3 Lib Jackson Era - SkowRgm - CrdPss
• 1832 9 PS 2 begin
• 1841 15 Con Slaveowner Domination
• 1856 5 PS 2 end
• 1861 7 Lib Civil War & Reconstruction - RacUph
• 1868 2 PS 3 begin
• 1869 23 Con The Gilded Age
• 1892 4 PS 3 end
• 1896 5 PS 4 begin
• 1901 18 Lib Progressive Era - SkowRgm? - CrdPss
• 1919 9 Con Roaring Twenties
• 1928 3 PS 4 end
• 1931 1 Lib New Deal Era - SkowRgm
• 1932 15 PS 5 begin
• 1947 15 Con Eisenhower Era
• 1962 6 Lib Sixties Era - CrdPss - RacUph
• 1968 10 PS 5 end
• 1978 2 Con Gilded Age II - SkowRgm
• 1980 - PS 6 begin

Party systems are ended by sociopolitical upheavals: Jacksonian populism, strife over slavery, the Progressive Era, the New Deal Era, and the Sixties Era. All of them are in Schlesinger liberal eras, as was the time before any political parties (Revolution & Constitution). The only Schlesinger liberal era missing such a big upheaval is the Jefferson Era.

 

[lpetrich]

The United States’ current party system cohered around 1980, with the Republican Party uniting a coalition of market libertarians, evangelical values voters, and foreign-policy hawks. Democrats comprised a coalition of cosmopolitan liberals, lower-income people of color, and backers of a laundry list of social causes. For both parties, “neoliberalism” became the dominant economic ideology, a fuzzy term that defined markets and privatization as the primary tools of both domestic public policy and international relations. With a relative consensus around neoliberalism, cultural and racial issues became the dominant cleavage in the system along with an increasingly polarized urban-rural “density divide.”

Looks like all my adult life has been in Gilded Age II and the 6th Party System. Bill Clinton sort of promised to end it, but he wimped out. Barack Obama also sort of promised to end it, but he also wimped out.

That party system seemed on its last legs as early as four years ago. At the time, the 2016 presidential election appeared to augur the coming of a new party system, with newly elected President Donald Trump as the vanguard of a now economically populist Republican Party. Yet whereas candidate Trump may have signaled as much with his pledged commitments to the social welfare state and domestic manufacturing, as president Trump lacked both the policy infrastructure and the internal party consensus to carry it through. Instead, his presidency has been defined by a remarkable maintenance of the existing Republican coalition. Thanks to his own flexibility, his lack of policy knowledge, his astounding cult of personality, and his singular ability to blame “radical Democrats,” Trump has held together a party so beset by internal disagreement that it publicly stands for pretty much nothing—only against the fevered threat of a violent Marxist revolution by a racially militant Democratic Party. Democrats have been able to a cobble together a policy platform ahead of this year’s election, but even they have elided their divisions by shifting focus to the existential risk of a second Trump term—an obvious strategy given both Trump’s clear failures and the lack of internal policy unity.

Author Lee Drutman doesn't think that we are going to have a realignment anytime soon.

But then, in the past, the outlines of a realignment often did not seem very clear for some years.

 

[lpetrich]

Opinion | A Political Era Is Reborn - The New York Times

“The First Post-Reagan Presidency,” by Michelle Goldberg (column, Jan. 31), cites the work of a Yale political scientist, Stephen Skowronek, in which he says he has calculated that every 40 to 60 years there is a fresh transformative presidency in America.

My grandfather Arthur Schlesinger Sr. and my father, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., conceived of a similar theory proposing that cycles of American history alternate between public purpose and private interest, every 30 years or so. Like Professor Skowronek, they did not see their theory “as a skeleton key to history,” but, like Mr. Skowronek, really as a way of understanding how U.S. history evolves.

Both concepts suggest that we are now entering a new progressive era.

Stephen Schlesinger
New York
The writer is a fellow at the Century Foundation.

Nice to see a shout-out for the Schlesinger cycles.

Opinion | The First Post-Reagan Presidency - The New York Times

When Joe Biden became the Democratic nominee, it seemed that the coming of a new era had been delayed. Reconstructive leaders, in Skowronek’s formulation, repudiate the doctrines of an establishment that no longer has answers for the existential challenges the country faces. Biden, Skowronek told me, is “a guy who’s made his way up through establishment Democratic politics.” Nothing about him seemed trailblazing.

Yet as Biden’s administration begins, there are signs that a new politics is coalescing. When, in his inauguration speech, Biden touted “unity,” he framed it as a national rejection of the dark forces unleashed by his discredited predecessor, not stale Gang of Eight bipartisanship. He takes power at a time when what was once conventional wisdom about deficits, inflation and the proper size of government has fallen apart. That means Biden, who has been in national office since before Reagan’s presidency, has the potential to be our first truly post-Reagan president.

"What has changed is not just the politics but the economic consensus." - like willingness to pass a stimulus bill that is twice the size of what the Obama Administration supported, and doing so with much less worry about running up big deficits.