lpetrich
Contributor
First, Cliodynamics is back in action.
Peter Turchin and his colleagues have found two kinds of cycle in large-scale human societies: a 2-generation cycle of bursts of social violence, and a couple-centuries-long cycle of growth and decay. Might it be present in more recent societies? Nations in recent centuries have gotten more and more intertwined, though the United States has continued to relatively autonomous, almost to the point of being almost absurdly provincial. However, he's found a wealth of data on the US, and lo and behold, he has found similar cycles for the US also.
Dynamics of political instability in the United States, 1780–2010 reported on in Human cycles: History as science : Nature News & Comment:
PT sorted his data on violent incidents out into
PT's data collection starts at the American Revolutionary War, and his fathers-and-sons cycle is rather apparent, with big spikes around 1870, 1920, and 1970. There's no spike in 1820, the Era of Good Feelings, however. But the American Revolutionary War fits that cycle's timing, as does the Boston Revolt of 1689. Thus, PT speculates that the US will suffer some major strife around 2020.
Comparing these spikes with Arthur Schlesinger's liberal-conservative cycle reveals that the 1870, 1920, and 1970 spikes occurred near the end of various liberal periods. However, PT's proposed 2020 spike will not be at the end of a liberal period but near the beginning of one, or even in the conservative one we are in now, Gilded Age II. Like PT, AS speculates about generational shifts, with generations reacting against the previous ones.
PT also identifies a long-term cycle, but his data are only enough to identify about 1.5 complete ones. But it is still interesting what correlations he finds.
The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being | Social Evolution Forum noting Peter Turchin – The history of inequality He collected several sorts of statistics, detrended them, and then normalized them to look for cycles. Normalized: mean = 0, stdev = 1.
1800: 0.4
1824: 0.8 - Era of Good Feelings
1904: -1.4 - Gilded Age bottoming out
1960: 1.3 - Eisenhower/Kennedy era
2000: -0.3
Evidence of a downward trend:
The Strange Disappearance of Cooperation in America | Social Evolution Forum
The Strange Disappearance of Cooperation in America II | Social Evolution Forum
The End of Prosperity: Why Did Real Wages Stop Growing in the 1970s? | Social Evolution Forum
Cutting through the Thicket of Economic Forces (Why Real Wages Stopped Growing II) | Social Evolution Forum
A Proxy for Non-Market Forces (Why Real Wages Stopped Growing III) | Social Evolution Forum
Putting It All Together (Why Real Wages Stopped Growing IV) | Social Evolution Forum
More on Labor Supply (Why Real Wages Stopped Growing V) | Social Evolution Forum
The Road to Disunion | Social Evolution Forum
PT:
Back in the 1950's and 1960's, however, US political elites were remarkably unified, with Democrats and Republicans often getting along very well. Much like in the Era of Good Feelings in the 1820's. PT speculates that it was fear of revolution that made US elites decide to tolerate labor unions and to buy off their underlings with good pay and good job security. But more recently, as Communism has faded, the elites have decided to keep more for themselves and give less to their underlings, often making up the difference with expanded consumer credit.
So the US will be having a rough ride in the coming years.
Peter Turchin and his colleagues have found two kinds of cycle in large-scale human societies: a 2-generation cycle of bursts of social violence, and a couple-centuries-long cycle of growth and decay. Might it be present in more recent societies? Nations in recent centuries have gotten more and more intertwined, though the United States has continued to relatively autonomous, almost to the point of being almost absurdly provincial. However, he's found a wealth of data on the US, and lo and behold, he has found similar cycles for the US also.
Dynamics of political instability in the United States, 1780–2010 reported on in Human cycles: History as science : Nature News & Comment:
More: Article reprint, Appendices, DataSometimes, history really does seem to repeat itself. After the US Civil War, for example, a wave of urban violence fuelled by ethnic and class resentment swept across the country, peaking in about 1870. Internal strife spiked again in around 1920, when race riots, workers' strikes and a surge of anti-Communist feeling led many people to think that revolution was imminent. And in around 1970, unrest crested once more, with violent student demonstrations, political assassinations, riots and terrorism (see 'Cycles of violence').
To Peter Turchin, who studies population dynamics at the University of Connecticut in Storrs, the appearance of three peaks of political instability at roughly 50-year intervals is not a coincidence. For the past 15 years, Turchin has been taking the mathematical techniques that once allowed him to track predator–prey cycles in forest ecosystems, and applying them to human history. He has analysed historical records on economic activity, demographic trends and outbursts of violence in the United States, and has come to the conclusion that a new wave of internal strife is already on its way. The peak should occur in about 2020, he says, and will probably be at least as high as the one in around 1970. “I hope it won't be as bad as 1870,” he adds.
PT sorted his data on violent incidents out into
- Political
- Labor or Economic
- Racially motivated
- Vigilante
- Riots: group vs. group
- Lynchings: group vs. individual (or small group)
- Terrorism: individual (or small group) vs. group
PT's data collection starts at the American Revolutionary War, and his fathers-and-sons cycle is rather apparent, with big spikes around 1870, 1920, and 1970. There's no spike in 1820, the Era of Good Feelings, however. But the American Revolutionary War fits that cycle's timing, as does the Boston Revolt of 1689. Thus, PT speculates that the US will suffer some major strife around 2020.
Comparing these spikes with Arthur Schlesinger's liberal-conservative cycle reveals that the 1870, 1920, and 1970 spikes occurred near the end of various liberal periods. However, PT's proposed 2020 spike will not be at the end of a liberal period but near the beginning of one, or even in the conservative one we are in now, Gilded Age II. Like PT, AS speculates about generational shifts, with generations reacting against the previous ones.
PT also identifies a long-term cycle, but his data are only enough to identify about 1.5 complete ones. But it is still interesting what correlations he finds.
The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being | Social Evolution Forum noting Peter Turchin – The history of inequality He collected several sorts of statistics, detrended them, and then normalized them to look for cycles. Normalized: mean = 0, stdev = 1.
What | Proxy | Direction |
Labor oversupply | Proportion of population born outside the USA | - |
Price of labor | Wage in relation to GDP per capita | + |
Biological well-being/Health | Average stature and life expectancy | + |
Social optimism | Age at first marriage (both sexes) | - |
Wealth inequality | Largest fortune in relation to the median wage | - |
Intra-elite competition/conflict | Political polarization in the Congress | - |
Sociopolitical instability | Fatalities per 5 years per 1 million population | - |
1800: 0.4
1824: 0.8 - Era of Good Feelings
1904: -1.4 - Gilded Age bottoming out
1960: 1.3 - Eisenhower/Kennedy era
2000: -0.3
Evidence of a downward trend:
The Strange Disappearance of Cooperation in America | Social Evolution Forum
The Strange Disappearance of Cooperation in America II | Social Evolution Forum
The End of Prosperity: Why Did Real Wages Stop Growing in the 1970s? | Social Evolution Forum
Cutting through the Thicket of Economic Forces (Why Real Wages Stopped Growing II) | Social Evolution Forum
A Proxy for Non-Market Forces (Why Real Wages Stopped Growing III) | Social Evolution Forum
Putting It All Together (Why Real Wages Stopped Growing IV) | Social Evolution Forum
More on Labor Supply (Why Real Wages Stopped Growing V) | Social Evolution Forum
The Road to Disunion | Social Evolution Forum
PT:
Major strife, like In Washington budget war, hype and hyperbole seize the floor | Reuters. Tea Party Senator Ted Cruz compared Republicans who don't agree with him to appeasers of Nazi Germany. John McCain resented that remark, but then again, he had called Ted Cruz and his friends "wacko birds". Sen. Harry Reid called the "Tea Party anarchists" the "weird caucus", and Sen. Mike Lee called the Democrats the "political ruling class" and "crony capitalists" who support "socialized medicine".But as I read the today’s news, I am struck by how many parallels there are between the 2010s and the 1850s, especially on the political front.
Before 1850 the United States had a stable political landscape dominated by two main parties: the Democrats and the Whigs. During the 1850s this “Second Party System” collapsed.
The Democrats split along the Southern/Northern divide, while the Whig party simply disintegrated. In his 1976 book, The Impending Crisis, 1848–1861, the historian David Potter describes a stunning array of parties and factions with which the voters were presented in 1854. These included: Democrats, Whigs, Free Soilers, Republicans, People’s party men, Anti-Nebraskaites, Fusionists, Know-Nothings, Know-Somethings, Main Lawites, Temperance men, Rum Democrats, Silver Gray Whigs, Hindoos, Hard Shell Democrats, Soft Shells, Half Shells, and Adopted Citizens.
PT commented that TH does not know how right he is.It's "high noon," cautioned Democratic Senator Tom Harkin, "as dangerous as the breakup of the Union before the Civil War."
Back in the 1950's and 1960's, however, US political elites were remarkably unified, with Democrats and Republicans often getting along very well. Much like in the Era of Good Feelings in the 1820's. PT speculates that it was fear of revolution that made US elites decide to tolerate labor unions and to buy off their underlings with good pay and good job security. But more recently, as Communism has faded, the elites have decided to keep more for themselves and give less to their underlings, often making up the difference with expanded consumer credit.
So the US will be having a rough ride in the coming years.