OK, you didn't get my example, which means it was badly chosen.
No, I did. I found it merely academic, which doesn't particularly interest me.
Using the classic:
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
It's trivial to claim that Socrates is mortal.
Actually, it is not, as it is possible--however unlikely--that there could exist immortal beings. So, if one wished to determine (i.e., derive) that Socrates was in fact not an immortal being, then that syllogism would do the trick.
There's no need to derive such a claim
See above.
But that's not the point of the exercise.
This isn't a logic and language course and Speakpigeon isn't trying to come up with a syllogism he can use to teach Modal Logic 101.
It doesn't matter if we are saying "is" or "may be"
Again, yes, it does and not just in regard to what Speak is attempting to establish; to test. Again, Speak is NOT trying to come up with an example of a syllogism that he can use to illustrate the concept of validity.
because the conclusion is still valid:
All men are mortal.
Socrates may be a man.
Therefore, Socrates may be mortal.
No, it isn't, because, again implicit in the conditional is that its contra can also be true, which means it cannot be said to be true or false.
Iow, P2 is neither true nor false (or, if you prefer, both true and false at the same time). Socrates may be a man, but he may also not be a man. We don't know the condition of Socrates via P2, which necessarily means we cannot derive C.
Likewise, in C, Socrates may be mortal, but he also may not be. C tells us exactly nothing other than we have an unanswered conditional.
It tells us that we will know that Socrates is mortal once we establish that he is a man.
"Establish" being the operative word. And, again, no it does not and cannot. Try it:
Socrates may be mortal.
All men are mortal.
Therefore, Socrates is a man.
Non-sequitur.
bigfield said:
bigfield said:
Koyaanisqatsi said:
bigfield said:
As to the validity, P1 is a conditional statement. It is neither true nor false. Socrates may be an octopus or he may not be an octopus. That is inherent to the use of "may." We don't know and the premise does not affirm either condition. Thus, it is not possible to say that P1 is "true" or "false." It simply does not apply and does not need to apply, because, once again, there is no need to derive C from any of that.
If we know that Socrates is a man, then "Socrates may be an octopus" is false. How is it not a truth claim?
"Socrates" may simply be the name of a pet octopus.
But what if we knew that Socrates was a man?
Then P1 can't be true.
Then it was a truth claim.
Not if we already know that Socrates is a man. Note again the operative word "establish." If we simply know that Socrates was a man, then asserting "Socrates may be an octopus" is already false. Here, again, try it:
We know that Socrates is a man.
Socrates may be an octopus.
Therefore, what? Socrates is not an octopus?
We already know that he is a man. We have tested nothing. The syllogism serves no purpose.