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POLL 4 on a very simple argument specially designed for DBT and Koyaanisqatsi

Is the argument valid?


  • Total voters
    9
  • Poll closed .
I understand what you claim. And don't justify your claim.

I just did and you quoted it. That is exactly what all those words are above.

It's a fact there's an argument.

No, there isn't. There is an assertion that X may be Y. That is the beginning of an argument, not an argument unto itself. Here, I'll prove it: The moon may be green cheese. That's an assertion; a possibility. So the positive truth claim that an argument would be formed around in order to test would be: The moon is green cheese.

"May" is not a truth claim. It is not definitive. Cars may be cows. Trees may be the earth's hair. Water may be maple syrup.

You can literally claim anything "may be" anything else all fucking day long. None of them are conclusions.

A false premise makes an argument unsound, not invalid.

This, for example, is a valid argument:

Socrates is an octopus;
All octopi are molluscs,
Therefore,
Socrates is a mollusc.

Replace "is" with "may be" and it is still valid. "May be" is a truth claim about a probability.
 
A false premise makes an argument unsound, not invalid.

It's not an issue of a false premise. It's not even an issue of a syllogism. Let's take your syllogism for example and word it as Speakpigeon has:

Socrates may be an octopus
All octopi are molluscs,
Therefore,
Socrates may be a mollusc.​

Fist of all, there is no need for P1 or P2 to derive C. He could have simply asserted C to begin with.

As to the validity, P1 is a conditional statement. It is neither true nor false. Socrates may be an octopus or he may not be an octopus. That is inherent to the use of "may." We don't know and the premise does not affirm either condition. Thus, it is not possible to say that P1 is "true" or "false." It simply does not apply and does not need to apply, because, once again, there is no need to derive C from any of that.
 
A false premise makes an argument unsound, not invalid.

It's not an issue of a false premise. It's not even an issue of a syllogism. Let's take your syllogism for example and word it as Speakpigeon has:
Socrates may be an octopus
All octopi are molluscs,
Therefore,
Socrates may be a mollusc.

Fist of all, there is no need for P1 or P2 to derive C. He could have simply asserted C to begin with.

I think the point is that you can take a possibility and a fact and discover another possibility. If A may be B, and B is known to be C, then it might be useful to argue that A may be C.

For example:

Integrated circuits may be used to make small computers;
Small computers may be useful;
Therefore,
Integrated circuits may be useful.

As to the validity, P1 is a conditional statement. It is neither true nor false. Socrates may be an octopus or he may not be an octopus. That is inherent to the use of "may." We don't know and the premise does not affirm either condition. Thus, it is not possible to say that P1 is "true" or "false." It simply does not apply and does not need to apply, because, once again, there is no need to derive C from any of that.

If we know that Socrates is a man, then "Socrates may be an octopus" is false. How is it not a truth claim?
 
I think the point is that you can take a possibility and a fact and discover another possibility.

But you're not "discovering" another possibility. All you have to do is wonder whether or not A may be C. There is no syllogism required to arrive at/derive "A may be C." You can simply ponder whether or not A may be C.

For example:

Integrated circuits may be used to make small computers;
Small computers may be useful;
Therefore,
Integrated circuits may be useful.

Again, the assertion "Integrated circuits may be useful" does not need to be derived. You can simply make that assertion. Then what happens is a test of the assertion by stating: "Integrated circuits are useful."

As to the validity, P1 is a conditional statement. It is neither true nor false. Socrates may be an octopus or he may not be an octopus. That is inherent to the use of "may." We don't know and the premise does not affirm either condition. Thus, it is not possible to say that P1 is "true" or "false." It simply does not apply and does not need to apply, because, once again, there is no need to derive C from any of that.

If we know that Socrates is a man, then "Socrates may be an octopus" is false. How is it not a truth claim?

"Socrates" may simply be the name of a pet octopus.
 
But you're not "discovering" another possibility. All you have to do is wonder whether or not A may be C. There is no syllogism required to arrive at/derive "A may be C." You can simply ponder whether or not A may be C.

Again, the assertion "Integrated circuits may be useful" does not need to be derived. You can simply make that assertion. Then what happens is a test of the assertion by stating: "Integrated circuits are useful."

But how did you come upon the idea that ICs may be useful? Perhaps someone explained that they may be used to make small computers, something that you would find useful.

I could make any assertion I want, but no-one is going to believe it unless I lead them from premises they accept as true.

As to the validity, P1 is a conditional statement. It is neither true nor false. Socrates may be an octopus or he may not be an octopus. That is inherent to the use of "may." We don't know and the premise does not affirm either condition. Thus, it is not possible to say that P1 is "true" or "false." It simply does not apply and does not need to apply, because, once again, there is no need to derive C from any of that.

If we know that Socrates is a man, then "Socrates may be an octopus" is false. How is it not a truth claim?

"Socrates" may simply be the name of a pet octopus.

But what if we knew that Socrates was a man?
 
But how did you come upon the idea that ICs may be useful?

It's a trivial assertion. It can literally be made about anything in the universe. A car may be useful. A dead slug may be useful. Any X may be useful. The question isn't what may or may not be useful; the question (that a syllogism would be used for) is whether or not X IS useful.

Again, there is no need to derive "X may be useful." It can simply be asserted in its own right. Deriving a conclusion is intended to show that the conclusion could only come from the logical progression of the premises. But "X may be useful" can be stated all on its own without needing a syllogism.

I could make any assertion I want, but no-one is going to believe it unless I lead them from premises they accept as true.

Look at your second premise. It is identical to the Conclusion. Why would anyone accept as true that a small computer may be useful? It wasn't derived. So if anyone were to accept that premise to be true, then they could just as easily accept the conclusion to be true without the need to derive it.

bigfield said:
Koyaanisqatsi said:
bigfield said:
As to the validity, P1 is a conditional statement. It is neither true nor false. Socrates may be an octopus or he may not be an octopus. That is inherent to the use of "may." We don't know and the premise does not affirm either condition. Thus, it is not possible to say that P1 is "true" or "false." It simply does not apply and does not need to apply, because, once again, there is no need to derive C from any of that.

If we know that Socrates is a man, then "Socrates may be an octopus" is false. How is it not a truth claim?

"Socrates" may simply be the name of a pet octopus.

But what if we knew that Socrates was a man?

Then P1 can't be true.
 
It's a trivial assertion. It can literally be made about anything in the universe. A car may be useful. A dead slug may be useful. Any X may be useful. The question isn't what may or may not be useful; the question (that a syllogism would be used for) is whether or not X IS useful.

Again, there is no need to derive "X may be useful." It can simply be asserted in its own right. Deriving a conclusion is intended to show that the conclusion could only come from the logical progression of the premises. But "X may be useful" can be stated all on its own without needing a syllogism.

Look at your second premise. It is identical to the Conclusion. Why would anyone accept as true that a small computer may be useful? It wasn't derived. So if anyone were to accept that premise to be true, then they could just as easily accept the conclusion to be true without the need to derive it.

OK, you didn't get my example, which means it was badly chosen.

Using the classic:

All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.


It's trivial to claim that Socrates is mortal. There's no need to derive such a claim, it can simply be asserted in its own right, without a syllogism. But that's not the point of the exercise.

It doesn't matter if we are saying "is" or "may be", because the conclusion is still valid:

All men are mortal.
Socrates may be a man.
Therefore, Socrates may be mortal.


It tells us that we will know that Socrates is mortal once we establish that he is a man. Demonstrating that kind of relationship is useful.

bigfield said:
Koyaanisqatsi said:
bigfield said:
As to the validity, P1 is a conditional statement. It is neither true nor false. Socrates may be an octopus or he may not be an octopus. That is inherent to the use of "may." We don't know and the premise does not affirm either condition. Thus, it is not possible to say that P1 is "true" or "false." It simply does not apply and does not need to apply, because, once again, there is no need to derive C from any of that.

If we know that Socrates is a man, then "Socrates may be an octopus" is false. How is it not a truth claim?

"Socrates" may simply be the name of a pet octopus.

But what if we knew that Socrates was a man?

Then P1 can't be true.

Then it was a truth claim.
 
OK, you didn't get my example, which means it was badly chosen.

No, I did. I found it merely academic, which doesn't particularly interest me.

Using the classic:

All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.


It's trivial to claim that Socrates is mortal.

Actually, it is not, as it is possible--however unlikely--that there could exist immortal beings. So, if one wished to determine (i.e., derive) that Socrates was in fact not an immortal being, then that syllogism would do the trick.

There's no need to derive such a claim

See above.

But that's not the point of the exercise.

This isn't a logic and language course and Speakpigeon isn't trying to come up with a syllogism he can use to teach Modal Logic 101.

It doesn't matter if we are saying "is" or "may be"

Again, yes, it does and not just in regard to what Speak is attempting to establish; to test. Again, Speak is NOT trying to come up with an example of a syllogism that he can use to illustrate the concept of validity.

because the conclusion is still valid:

All men are mortal.
Socrates may be a man.
Therefore, Socrates may be mortal.

No, it isn't, because, again implicit in the conditional is that its contra can also be true, which means it cannot be said to be true or false.

Iow, P2 is neither true nor false (or, if you prefer, both true and false at the same time). Socrates may be a man, but he may also not be a man. We don't know the condition of Socrates via P2, which necessarily means we cannot derive C.

Likewise, in C, Socrates may be mortal, but he also may not be. C tells us exactly nothing other than we have an unanswered conditional.

It tells us that we will know that Socrates is mortal once we establish that he is a man.

"Establish" being the operative word. And, again, no it does not and cannot. Try it:

Socrates may be mortal.
All men are mortal.
Therefore, Socrates is a man.


Non-sequitur.

bigfield said:
bigfield said:
Koyaanisqatsi said:
bigfield said:
As to the validity, P1 is a conditional statement. It is neither true nor false. Socrates may be an octopus or he may not be an octopus. That is inherent to the use of "may." We don't know and the premise does not affirm either condition. Thus, it is not possible to say that P1 is "true" or "false." It simply does not apply and does not need to apply, because, once again, there is no need to derive C from any of that.

If we know that Socrates is a man, then "Socrates may be an octopus" is false. How is it not a truth claim?

"Socrates" may simply be the name of a pet octopus.

But what if we knew that Socrates was a man?

Then P1 can't be true.

Then it was a truth claim.

Not if we already know that Socrates is a man. Note again the operative word "establish." If we simply know that Socrates was a man, then asserting "Socrates may be an octopus" is already false. Here, again, try it:

We know that Socrates is a man.
Socrates may be an octopus.
Therefore
, what? Socrates is not an octopus?

We already know that he is a man. We have tested nothing. The syllogism serves no purpose.
 
x may be some part of B;
y is some part of B;
Therefore, x may be y.
The lost boy may be a member of the Boy Scouts.
Bobby is a member of the Boy Scouts;
Therefore, the lost boy may be Bobby.

Yep, that's basically it, if people could just listen to the sweet music of words... And let their brain make up its mind!
EB
 
It's a fact there's an argument.
No, there isn't. There is an assertion that X may be Y.

Easy to falsify your idiotic assertion here. Here it is:
x may be some part of B;
y is some part of B;
Therefore, x may be y.

Premise 1 and premise 2, therefore conclusion.

The conclusion follows obviously from the two premises.

"May" is not a truth claim. Cars may be cows. Trees may be the earth's hair. Water may be maple syrup. Or not.

No. The sentence "may be p" means it is possible that p, which means we don't know that not p.

As such, it is clearly a truth claim: It is true that we don't know that not p.

We know that cars are not cows and that water isn't maple syrup. We also know that the Earth isn't a living body so it doesn't have hairs so the expression is false.

No possibility and no "may" in these cases and we all know that.

We can say, however, that it may rain tomorrow because we don't know it's not going to rain tomorrow. Simple. Truth claim.

You can literally claim anything "may be" anything else all fucking day long. None of them are conclusions.

Yes, they are. It's just that you're too biased to understand English. You don't think. You're merely given voice to the ideology that has become intuitive from years of rehearsing. Good job.
EB
 
x may be some part of B;
y is some part of B;
Therefore, x may be y.
The lost boy may be a member of the Boy Scouts.
Bobby is a member of the Boy Scouts;
Therefore, the lost boy may be Bobby.

Yep, that's basically it, if people could just listen to the sweet music of words.

It's the same problem. P1 cannot be said to be true or false, because it contains its own contra. X may be some part of B, but it also may not. The proper way to handle it would be to write two syllogisms:

The lost boy is a member of the Boy Scouts.
Bobby is a member of the Boy Scouts;
Therefore, the lost boy is Bobby.


Non-sequitur.

The lost boy is not a member of the Boy Scouts.
Bobby is a member of the Boy Scouts;
Therefore, the lost boy is not Bobby.


Sequitur.
 
The only thing that matters in regard to testing is whether or not you're claiming that X is Y.

OK, so it doesn't matter if I say that you may be a Nazi sympathiser?
EB
 
The only thing that matters in regard to testing is whether or not you're claiming that X is Y.

OK, so it doesn't matter if I say that you may be a Nazi sympathiser?

In regard to invoking a syllogism as a means to test it? No, we do not need a formal syllogism to answer the question of whether I may or may not be a Nazi sympathiser.
 
Here, let's try a different tack. Since P1 is a conditional, let's spell out those conditions in full:

X may or may not be some part of B;
Y is some part of B;
Therefore, X may or may not be Y.


What was concluded/tested? Nothing. That "X may or may not be Y" tells us literally nothing about X or Y and we have advanced nowhere due to that conclusion. Iow, the fact that "X may or may not be Y" was a condition before we formed the syllogism just as it is after we formed it. We have learned nothing.

For even starker relief, let's format it for the only relevant question we are trying to test:

X may or may not be some part of B;
Y is some part of B;
Therefore, X is Y.


Very clearly non-sequitur, yet that conclusion is clearly the answer that is being sought by invoking a syllogism in the first place. We want to know whether or not X is Y, correct? We already know--as a basic, existential condition--that any X "may or may not be" any Y. But what we want to find out--derive, conclude--is whether or not a specific X is a specific Y.

Iow, we want to test thus:

X is some part of B;
Y is some part of B;
Therefore, X is Y.


And what is the result of the test? Non-sequitur. It is not necessarily the case that if X is some part of B and if Y is some part of B, that X is therefore Y.

We have used the tool of logic for it's proper purpose, not to see whether or not we can come up with any idiotic word games that can allow us to slip past structural rules on a technicality.
 
A false premise makes an argument unsound, not invalid.

It's not an issue of a false premise. It's not even an issue of a syllogism. Let's take your syllogism for example and word it as Speakpigeon has:

Socrates may be an octopus
All octopi are molluscs,
Therefore,
Socrates may be a mollusc.​

Fist of all, there is no need for P1 or P2 to derive C. He could have simply asserted C to begin with.

That's true of all arguments. We could always just assert the conclusion.

As to the validity, P1 is a conditional statement.

No, it's not. It's a modal statement, obviously.

It is neither true nor false.

It is either true or false, obviously.

Either we don't know that Socrates is not an Octopus, in which case it is true that Socrates may be an Octopus;

Or, we do know that Socrates is not an Octopus, in which case it is not true that Socrates may be an Octopus.

So, it is either true or false that Socrates may be an Octopus.

Socrates may be an octopus or he may not be an octopus.

Only if we don't know that Socrates is not an Octopus. If we know he isn't, then we say it's not true that he may be an octopus.

That is inherent to the use of "may." We don't know and the premise does not affirm either condition. Thus, it is not possible to say that P1 is "true" or "false."

???

So, when we say that it may rain tomorrow, it is neither true nor false that it may rain tomorrow?! Sorry, but if we don't know that it's not going to rain tomorrow then we claim it's true that it may rain tomorrow. And if we could know it's not going to rain tomorrow, then we would say that it is not true that it may rain tomorrow.

No brainer.
EB
 
Yep, that's basically it, if people could just listen to the sweet music of words.

It's the same problem. P1 cannot be said to be true or false, because it contains its own contra.

???

Contra?! What's that?!

Do you mean negation?! Well, in logic, what else? Aw, that's terrible. "May be p" and "may be not p" are not the negation of each other.

So, apparently, you just don't understand what the modal "may" means.
EB
 
It's valid imo, but I'm no expert on this.

Aw, gosh, where have you been? I did take you a long time!

OK, congratulations and thanks for overcoming your genetic reluctance to support, however indirectly, what I say. :)
EB
 
Yep, that's basically it, if people could just listen to the sweet music of words.

It's the same problem. P1 cannot be said to be true or false, because it contains its own contra.

???

Contra?! What's that?!

Do you mean negation?! Well, in logic, what else? Aw, that's terrible. "May be p" and "may be not p" are not the negation of each other.

So, apparently, you just don't understand what the modal "may" means.
EB
He does have a different conception of “may.”

I would not say that your house may be on fire merely because it’s possibly the case your house might be, but he would.
 
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